Faith in Search of Certainty:
Karl Barth's Method in Dogmatics and Apologetics.
A Study in Historical Theology and Cultural History.

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Presented in Fulfilment of Requirements
for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the
University of Edinburgh
1977

We whose origin is in liberal theology could not have become or remained theologians if we had not encountered in liberal theology a serious and radical honesty; we felt the work of orthodox theology at the Universities, of whatever complexion, to be an attempt at compromise, within which we could only have sustained an existence which was inwardly fragmented.... Here - so we felt - was the atmosphere of truthfulness in which we could all breathe.

Rudolf Bultmann.
1924.

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Structure of the Thesis.

Declaration.

I hereby declare that the thesis is entirely the product of my own research, and that all ideas and written materials used are, to the best of my knowledge, appropriately acknowledged.

15th March 1977

Acknowledgements.

We should like to acknowledge our indebtedness for help in this task from more than a few sources. Firstly, our indebtedness to Professor John McIntyre of the University of Edinburgh for reading both preliminary sketches, and the whole of the first draft, for examining our assumptions, and for helpful criticisms throughout our task. Secondly, our indebtedness to Dean D.W.D. Shaw of the University of Edinburgh for frank and helpful reactions to our drafts.

We might also acknowledge an indebtedness of another kind: to Professor T.F. Torrance, a scholar of Barth, whose presence in the University has been a stimulus to continual questioning of Barth's method. In such a study as this, one is also indebted to one's companions, both 'peers' and 'elders' whose 'fellowship'

over lifted fork and mug has often lifted the burden of one's work off one's mind, replacing it with subjects of delight and worth; also, and not in an insignificant way, to Britain's Radio Three, for both "companionship" and refreshment of spirit during necessary academic isolation. Nearly last, yet far from least, one is "indebted", both literally and figuratively, to a parent for the loan of funds without which this study would not have been possible. One would finally acknowledge a debt to the task itself, for its help, inwardly, in the midst of changing circumstances.

15th March 1977.
Edinburgh.
Scotland.

Abstract of the Thesis.

The thesis seeks to examine Karl Barth's theological method against the backdrop of the historical context in which it developed, that is, the political-social-economic context, and the philosophical-theological context.

After outlining this context, and tracing Barth's theological development up to 1930 in Part I, the thesis turns its attention to Barth's study of Anselm's theological method, the Fides Quaerens Intellectum of 1931. Here, prior to the commencement of his Church Dogmatics, both Barth himself, and his major interpreters (after 1960), concur that Barth "found himself" methodologically. Thus Part II of the thesis seeks to examine both (1) the accuracy of Barth's interpretation of Anselm and (2) the nature of the theological method Barth attributes to Anselm. The thesis maintains that Barth "found himself" methodologically only by seriously misinterpreting Anselm at a quite basic level.

Part III of the thesis seeks to examine several basal aspects of the actual method of Barth's theology. As 'the Credo', or the credal tradition and dogmas of the Early Church, was of central importance to the method Barth attributed to Anselm (in contrast to Scripture), Part III asks questions as to the place, importance and type of relation to Tradition, specific-

ally the credal Tradition of the Early Church, in Barth's theology. This aspect of Barth's method has been all but ignored by the major interpreters of Barth. Among our findings are that (1) credal beliefs form a significant portion of the basis upon which this theology is built; (2) the type of relation to credal Tradition is characterized by unquestioning submission to, and dogmatic assertion of these credal beliefs. In addition, there is significant evidence that Barth operates on the assumption that credal Tradition is an infallible articulation of revelation, and an infallible form of "the Word of God."

Part III goes on to examine issues of method concerning the relationships between man, theology and revelation. Here the thesis finds that unquestioning submission to Tradition is accompanied by unquestioning submission to what is alleged to be revelation, that is, to what is experienced as "the Word of God" in an "Event" in which human words (allegedly) become "the Word of God" by the action of the deity (the human words of Scripture, etc.).

Evidence is also found that Barth operates upon the assumption that Dogmatics itself, like Scripture, preaching (and creeds) is, at least at points, a human form of "the Word of God." It is from this vantage point that Barth's conception of Apologetics is viewed. It is a conception in which the deity allegedly 'validates' the theologians own

words as "the Word of God" for "unbelievers".

After laying out and examining these several basal aspects of Barth's method, the thesis seeks to put this method into historical perspective, viewing it firstly with reference to the development of another influential figure, the composer, Igor Stravinsky; and secondly, by seeking possible reasons for the development of Barth's method by turning to consider the extremely troubled economic, social and political context in which this method developed.

The thesis concludes by summarizing the results of research, and by listing eight reasons for holding that Barth's theological programme should not be taken seriously as a real option for theology. In a concluding critique Barth's theology is found to have only minimal relevance for preaching, that is specifically for Barth's own preaching. Thus Barth theology apparently has only minimal relevance for its most central aim: to serve the preaching of 'the Church'.

Abbreviations.

A.F.Q.I.	Fides Quaerens Intellectum.**
and	
Anselm	Ibid.
C.D.	Church Dogmatics.
K.D.	Kirchliche Dogmatik.
R.T.M.	Revolutionary Theology in the Making: Barth - Thurneysen Correspondence, 1914-1925.

Works Referred to by Author:

von Balthasar	The Theology of Karl Barth.
Berkouwer	The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth.
Bowden	Karl Barth.
Charlesworth	St. Anselm's Proslogion, text and commentary .
Clark	Karl Barth's Theological Method.
Hamer	Karl Barth.
Hartwell	The Theology of Karl Barth: An Introduction.
Hick and McGill	The Many Faced Argument: Recent Studies on the Ontological Argument for the Existence of God.
Parker	Karl Barth.
Torrance	Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931.
Zahrnt	The Question of God: Protestant Theology in the Twentieth Century.

Full annotation for these works is given in the Bibliography.

** We have referred to this work by its title in the English edition, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, in order to avoid confusion with Anselm's Proslogion which is also known as his Fides Quaerens Intellectum.

INTRODUCTION.

Our quest in our thesis is for historical perspective upon the nature and development of a theological method which has had considerable impact on twentieth century religious thought, both positively and negatively. Here in the next few pages we shall try to describe, in brief form, the task which we are undertaking.

Our quest is for a deeper understanding of a method. Thus the content of the writer's thought will concern us only insofar as it can help us understand the method. This does not mean we shall ignore the content, or pass over it lightly. For this thinker was of the opinion that "content" should determine "method". Even if we shall not always find this to be the case, nonetheless, we shall have to deal with content, at many points, in dealing with method.

It is concerning the issue of method that we have found weaknesses in the major studies of Barth's Theology. For, at this point in the history of the

interpretation of Barth (1970-75), there is a general consensus among interpreters that Barth's study of Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, is of crucial importance for understanding Barth's actual method.[1] Yet this work has lain in neglect (with only a few exceptions) until about 1958-1960. Thus we find that, almost without exception, each of the major studies of Barth's Theology has almost completely ignored this important study (being written in this period c1945-1960 when the work on Anselm was neglected). It is this work, Barth's study of Anselm, which has suggested many of the methodological issues we have investigated in our thesis.

A second weakness we have found in the major studies of Barth is the sparcity of attention paid to certain aspects of Barth's working method. That is, while these works may accurately report on Barth's methodology (that is on what Barth says about theological method), we have usually found these studies inadequate in their attempts to describe Barth's actual method in operation. Thus, for example, we have found these studies of little or no help in investigating the major theme of our thesis; the place of Tradition in Barth's actual operational procedure. One finds reports of Barth's views on Tradition, but one does not find the interpreter's view of the importance of Tradition in Barth's actual procedure.[2]

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1. See below, pp.257ff.

2. See below, pp.279ff.

It has been, in fact, Barth's methodological study of Anselm, the work ignored by these major interpreters, which has suggested the central importance of Tradition for Barth's operational procedure. To our knowledge, no major study of Barth has taken up this theme and investigated it. In our study we shall be arguing that Tradition, specifically the credal Tradition of the Early Church, has a significant and important place in Barth's operational procedure, a place and importance close or equal to that of Scripture.

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As we have already stated, we see our task as both historical and critical. In our procedure we shall not separate these two aspects of our task, for example by placing the critical task at the end of our thesis. Rather we shall offer critical comment directly following our exposition of aspects of Barth's work. Thus we shall distinguish but not separate exposition and critique.[1] Additionally, at the conclusion of our thesis we shall offer a limited critique of Barth's theological programme as a whole.

As our quest is both historical and critical, one might object, and say: "It is too early to evaluate such an influential figure. We must leave this to later generations." We would reply both "yes"

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1. We are following Hamer's precedent in this respect, one that we find useful. Cf. Hamer, p.vi.

and "no". In one respect this might be quite true. That is, it is most likely much too early to try and evaluate Barth's place in the development of Twentieth Century religious/theological thought, that is, to evaluate both his stature, and his influence upon contemporary and subsequent thought.

Yet there is another respect in which, in our view, historical and critical perspective is both possible and much needed. If one leaves aside the questions of Barth's stature and influence, that is, his importance for Twentieth Century religious thought, we would argue that it is both possible and necessary to gain historical perspective on, and deeper understanding of the nature of this theology, and in particular the actual method it uses as it proceeds. For if man is determined by his past, he is also determined by the recent past. That is, unless unexamined assumptions and presuppositions made in the recent past can be uncovered and critically examined, there is the risk that they will simply be carried over into the present in their unexamined state, affecting activity in the present for good or for ill. One would argue, therefore, that there is a real need for historical perspective and critical examination concerning the thought of the recent past. One would also argue that this task is pressing and cannot wait for the end of time. While one might be in a better position to do such work several decades from now, as more documents

emerge, yet there would seem to be both a plethora of documents, and enough distance in time to enable us to gain some perspective upon this body of thought and upon its method.

The Procedure of the Thesis.

In Part I we shall look briefly at the context in which Barth's theology developed. We shall look at both the ideational context and the political-economic-social context. We shall also sketch Barth's development up to 1930, the date of his methodological study of Anselm, our study of which makes up Part II. In this sketch we shall also attempt to relate the development of Barth's theology to the theology of the previous century.

In Part II we shall turn to a small book which Barth wrote in 1931. It concerns St. Anselm of Canterbury, his theological method, and his Proslogion, where his theological method, in Barth's view, was put into practice. We have turned our attention to this work in particular, for both Barth (in 1958), and his major interpreters (after 1960) concur that in this study, Barth found much of what was to inform his actual theological method in the Church Dogmatics, which commenced just after this book on Anselm was written. Our questions in this part of our thesis will be: (1) Is this interpretation accurate? and (2), Since Barth finds much of methodological value here, what is the nature of this method, which Barth attributes to Anselm?

In Part III we shall turn to Barth's mature theologizing, specifically to the period 1930-1942, (that is approximately the first half of Barth's

mature productivity). With the method of Barth's Anselm in mind we shall inquire into several aspects of the actual procedure of this theology. That is we shall inquire as to what his actual method is, in several of its basic aspects. We shall not concentrate on Barth's views of his method, as given in the "Prolegomena" to his Church Dogmatics (C.D.I/1, I/2), for we find these views a poor guide to the understanding of his actual method. We shall however sketch his views of his method, and also note what, in our opinion, is missing, or inadequately dealt with.

We shall not attempt to give a complete account of Barth's actual working method, as in our view this is beyond the scope of a single thesis. Rather we shall take up and examine several basic aspects of this method, which in our view underpin Barth's whole dogmatic enterprise. We shall only mention other basic aspects, and describe them in brief.

We shall examine the manner in which the theologian relates to Tradition, and the manner in which he uses Tradition, specifically Early Church Tradition, in this theology. The other aspects of method we shall consider all centre around the manner in which the theologian relates to what is alleged to be "the Word of God" in this theology. Here we shall treat (1) Barth's avoidance of contemporary anthropology and philosophy, (2) his own view of Apologetics, and (3) the nature of Dogmatics as a form of the "Word of

God".

We shall bring together our views of these aspects of Barth's method at the conclusion and offer a critique which will argue against taking this theological program seriously as a real option for theology. As this theology claims to serve "Church Proclamation", the chief form of which is preaching, we shall also ask whether and to what extent this theology was relevant for preaching, and specifically for Barth's own preaching.

Part One.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OF KARL BARTH'S THEOLOGY, 1886 - 1930.

PART ONE.

The Historical Context and Development of Karl Barth's Theology, 1886 - 1930.

Introduction to Part One.

In Part One we shall first sketch the political social and economic setting in which Barth's Theology developed. We shall begin here for we are of the opinion that certain aspects of Barth's method can be more fully understood when seen in reference to this context. We shall then describe "the philosophical landscape" of Germany in the years 1890-1930. Here we shall find philosophical options which Barth shall finally reject after 1930 in spite of the fact that one of these options, the I - Thou personalism of Martin Buber bears a strong resemblance to Barth's own views as they develop after 1930. Following our survey of the philosophical setting we shall trace Barth's theological development from his University years up until 1930, the time of his composition of his study on Anselm's theological method. We shall then turn to this study in Part Two.

Chapter I.

THE POLITICAL-SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF BARTH'S DEVELOPMENT.

In the following pages we shall sketch three events in the political-social-economic context of Barth's theological development. In attempting to understand the development of Barth's actual working method, we shall at the end of our thesis, hold that this method can be more fully understood by understanding the context in which it developed. As Barth's working method or "operational procedure" received a rather definite formulation as early as 1931, and became for all intents and purposes "operational" as early as 1932 (with the publication of Barth's Church Dogmatics, Volume I/1) we shall look at the political-social-economic context leading up to these years. The period which will concern us is roughly from 1900 - 1932. This means that we shall leave aside consideration of the "triumph" of Nazism. For both the popular surge toward Nazism and its "triumph" occurred after Barth's operational procedure received formulation, and became more or less operational. We shall therefore look at events leading up to 1932 in attempting to understand this method more fully. Near the end of our thesis, after we have explored several basic aspects of this theological method, we shall attempt to correlate these two, the method and the context in which

it developed. Here in Part One we shall sketch these events in brief form. Following this we shall explore one of these events, the Inflation of 1919-1923, in some detail, inquiring into its impact upon people generally, and upon Barth in particular. We have chosen to investigate this event in particular for (1) it was the first of the three events which Barth experienced directly and (2) we have access to Barth's reaction to this event, in the form of letters written in this period.

The question may arise as to the relevance of events in the political-social-economic sphere in the task of understanding developments in the ideational or "intellectual" sphere of activity. We shall seek to answer this question, at several points, as we proceed.

The Great War.

One need hardly argue in our own time that the Great War had a deep impact upon Europe, and upon Germanic Europe in particular. Besides the obvious physical destruction of this war, the magnitude of the loss of life, the impact of this war was felt in perhaps less obvious ways. For example, severe food shortages within the heart of Germany during 1916-1918 caused an estimated 750,000 deaths alone.[1]

One may ask in this connection: was Barth relatively unaffected by the Great War? One might

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1. Holborn, a respected historian quotes this as a reliable statistic. Cf. Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, 1840-1945, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1969, p.460.

note that even if his physical existence was not threatened, (he resided in Switzerland during this period) there is no evidence that this war was not significant, even in his theological development. In the 1950's Barth looks back upon the outbreak of the war, and upon his reaction to finding the signatures of his most important theological teachers on a document supporting the German Kaiser's declaration of war.

> One day in early August 1914 stands out in my personal memory as a black day. Ninety three German intellectuals impressed public opinion by their proclamation in support of the war policy of Wilhelm II and his counsellors. Among these intellectuals I discovered to my horror almost all of my theological teachers whom I had greatly venerated.[1] In despair over what this indicated about the signs of the time, I suddenly realized that I could not any longer follow either their ethics and dogmatics or their understanding of the Bible and of history. For me at least, Nineteenth Century theology no longer held any future.[2]

One might point out that (according to his own account) Barth has reacted, and reacted sharply to the political decisions of these figures, that is to their decision about something, technically speaking, in the political sphere, that is, their decision in reference to a declaration of war. Yet this political decision had, for Barth, rather deep theolog-

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1. The signatories included Adolf Harnack, Reinhold Seeberg, and Wilhelm Herrmann among other theologians.

2. The Humanity of God, p.14. Collins, London, 1961.

ical significance. What one wishes to point out here is the extent to which a political occurrence had an impact upon Barth not only personally, but theologically.

Has Barth overstated the impact of this political occurrence upon his thought in the theological realm (he reports his reaction here nearly forty years 'after the event'). In our view, he has not, for two years after the above mentioned event, in 1916, he will climb to the pulpit of the Town Church of Aarau, Switzerland and in a theological address declare that the 'god' of the Western world is finished:

> He is not even righteous. He cannot prevent his worshipers, all the distinguished European and American apostles of civilization, welfare, and progress, all zealous citizens and pious Christians, from falling upon one another with fire and sword to the amazement and derision of the poor heathen in India and Africa. This god is really an unrighteous god, and it is high time for us to declare ourselves thorough-going doubters, sceptics, scoffers and atheists in regard to him. It is high time for us to confess freely and gladly: this god, to whom we have built the tower of Babel, is not God. He is an idol. He is dead.[1]

Here Barth is most emphatic about the significance of this political event for theological realm. Apparently, then, the war had considerable impact not only upon Barth as a person, but upon his theological

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1. "The Righteousness of God" in The Word of God and the Word of Man, Harper and Row, New York, 1957, p.22. Cited by Parker, pp.9f.

thinking as well. We shall explore this further below.[1]

Barth's Sensitivity to Events Political, Social and Economic.

If we find sensitivity, even acute sensitivity, to events political, social and economic in nature, perhaps this is not too unusual. For Barth, a Continental pastor at this time (1912-1921) has not only associated himself with, but become an active figure in a movement of Religious Socialism. Barth was to remain active in Swiss Religious Socialism well into the 1920's.[2] Even if he ceased to be active in this movement after c.1923 it is doubtful that he ever lost his sensitivity to political, economic and social issues, or that events in these spheres ceased to have considerable impact upon him. We shall find evidence of continuing sensitivity to such issues as we proceed. One would note also, in this connection ~~this~~ (in Barth's reaction to the ~~example of the~~ outbreak of the Great War, and the German involvement in this) how events of a political nature have an impact upon theology via ethics. (In both passages we have just cited "rightness" and "righteousness" are central). Thus perhaps Barth's ethical sensitivity is a factor in helping us under-

1. See below, pp.45ff.

2. See below, p.51f.

stand the impact of such events upon Barth not only personally, but (in the case of the Great War) theologically. It is, in fact, to a work of Ethics (the Ethik of Wilhelm Herrmann, 1913) that Barth attributes his first deep interest in theology.[1]

Two Economic Catastrophes: The Inflation of 1919-1923, and the Depression of 1929-1933.

Following upon the War, Germany experienced two economic catastrophes in the period 1918-1933. In 1919 an inflationary spiral began which was to spin out of control until the end of 1923, when the German economy was to find a new monetary basis. (We shall study this occurrence in some detail following our sketch of the period 1900-1933).

Following a period of economic recovery and relative prosperity from approximately 1924-1928, trouble again occurred in the German economy. Even prior to the Wall Street crash, that is, early in 1929 unemployment had risen to crisis proportions; both agriculture and industry in Germany were in deep trouble again. When the Wall Street crash came, and New York financial support, upon which German industry to a large extent depended, was withdrawn, Germany was plunged into a Depression of its own, one which was to bring its economy near to total

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1. See Theology and Church, p.238.

paralysis for over four years. It was in this context that the "triumph" of Nazism occurred, with the Nazi Party taking power in 1933.

Now that we have sketched in brief form three events in the period 1912-1933 which shook Germanic Europe, and shook it deeply, we shall take up one of these events, the Inflation of 1919-1923 and study it in greater detail together with Barth's reaction to it. We choose this event in particular for (1) it was the first of these events which Barth experienced at first hand: he had become a Professor of Theology in Göttingen, Germany in this period; and (2) we have access to Barth's reaction to this occurrence, in the form of his letters to his friend and comrade, Eduard Thurneysen, and thus we can gain some idea of the nature of his reaction to one of these events.

The Inflation of 1919-1923

We turn now to the Inflation of 1919-1923. Here we shall go into some depth. What concerns us in the following is not simply bare figures spread out over certain timespan, but the impact of this occurrence on the great multitude of people, where it mattered. That is, what happened to their savings, their even meagre investments, but even more basically, to their ability to provide themselves with the most basic food, clothing and housing necessary to live. Tied up with all of this, the feelings aroused by a volatile and rapidly changing situation. In short it is the human aspect of this broad economic situation which is our concern.

In such a situation one tends to become acutely aware of how "tied into" the "economic fabric" of his immediate setting he is, and how dependent he is upon the viability and relative dependability of this economic fabric. For he becomes aware that such very basic human needs as food and housing, and of course the means of income, job or otherwise, to get these things, depend on this fabric. In less 'trying' times one tends simply to assume these things.[1]

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1. Perhaps one tends to be more aware of these things in our own time because of economic stress throughout the Western countries.

Our Procedure in the Study which Follows

We will first try to describe the rapidly changing situation. Then we will try to sense the consequences, for people in general, of this occurrence. Finally we shall 'listen' to Barth's reaction to these things as he writes from the midst of them to fellow thinkers in Switzerland.

The Period of Inflation 1919-1923

Inflation had begun in Germany during the war.[1] The cause is generally accepted to be the manner in which the German government financed the war. While the Mark was stable before the war at a rate of 4.2 Marks to $1 it emerged from the war with a drop in value to about 20 Marks to $ 1.

In describing what happened to the Mark between 1919 and 1923 we shall refer to its exchange rate with the Dollar. Yet in doing so we are also describing what happened to the Mark within Germany, that is its purchasing power within the Germany economy. In the case of Germany in this period, these two coincide[2] (that is, both the loss of value on the international exchange markets, and within

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1. For the following we are using: R.A.C. Parker, Europe 1919-45, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 1969; Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London 1969 [A major and respected work]; A.J. Nicholls, Weimar and the Rise of Hitler, Macmillan, London, 1958. Other works as cited. In footnotes we shall refer to the foregoing by author.
2. See R.A.C. Parker, Op.cit., pp. 63,64.

the domestic economy). Today, typically, they do not.

There was a general assumption that after the war the Mark would stabilize at this low value, and nothing need be done. How wrong this assumption was we shall shortly see.

In the year after the treaty of Versailles was signed the Mark declined steadily and rather sharply to February of 1920, when it took 100 Marks to equal £1. Thus from 1914 to 1920 the Mark had lost ground so to have only 1/25 of its value in 1914.

The political context from September 1918 to 1920, that is from when the German High Command called for an end to the war, and parliamentary government, to the establishment of the Weimar Republic in late 1919, the political arena within Germany, had been highly troubled. As we shall see in the next decade both the extreme 'right' of the political spectrum and the extreme 'left' were highly active, volatile, and, even if small in numbers at this point, forceful in an unstable situation. For example, Bavaria was proclaimed a Soviet Republic in April 1919, to remain so for a full month before being suppressed by the German Army. There were numerous political murders.

From the beginning of 1920 to the middle of 1921 the Mark had a period of relative stability, that is, after losing over 90% of its value in the previous six years. It recovered slightly, and fluctuated at between 40 and 70 Marks to £1. Yet beginning in mid 1921, the Mark began an unrequited decline. While a worker needed 60 Marks to

buy goods worth £1 in June of 1921, in August he needed 84 Marks to buy the same goods. In September he needed 100 Marks. In October 150 Marks. In November 260. Something was happening, which must have seemed inexorable. The worker could not find reasons. There were numerous strikes as workers tried to win back what they were losing.

In 1922 the decline became an increasingly rapid drop. While the same worker needed 210 Marks in February to purchase the same goods worth about £1, by June he needed 315 Marks. Then the decline increased dramatically. One needed 500 Marks in July. But then suddenly, in August he needed 1,000. In October he needed 3,000 Marks. By the end of the year he needed 7,379 Marks to buy the same £1 worth of goods.

What had happened? Explanations were offered from various quarters. The most popular explanation, supported firmly by the government, and an explanation which was basically wrong, was that the overwhelming burden of Reparation Payments demanded by the Allies following the war was wrecking havoc in Germany's economy.[1] This explanation was widely accepted, and bore with it the bitterness of the German people toward the Allies.

Finally the German government declared in default on

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1. There is a general consensus among historians (Parker, Holborn, Nichols and others) that while there was some limited truth in the governmental explanation, other factors far outweighed the causes the government chose to cite. They point out that the inflationary spiral began and became an established phenomenon well before any Reparation payments were actually made.

Reparation Payments, just at this point, in January of 1923. The response of France and Belgium, to the abhorrence of Britain and America, was to invade the industrial Ruhr Valley by force, occupy it and attempt to exact Reparation Payments from the occupied territory. They were met with passive resistance.

One wonders what the German government was doing at this point to counteract her economic situation. A group of foreign economists were summoned in late 1922, including John Maynard Keynes of Britain, and Gustav Cassel of Sweden. They urged stabilization of the Mark using Germany's Gold Reserves, limiting the notes in circulation, and balancing the governments budget. The Mark in Germany was not backed by gold, and could be stabilized by so backing it in the opinion of the assembled economists. Germany had sufficient gold to do so.

The German government ignored this advice, perhaps as too radical, and instead took one half of their very considerable gold reserves to purchase Marks on the international money market, in the hope that this would halve the headlong decline of the exchange rate. Holborn comments: "It was quixotic to expect that these interventions could result in anything but the mere loss of gold."[1]

It was at this point, the beginning of 1923 when the Mark had plummeted to 7,300 equalling £1 that the real

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1. Op.cit., p. 598.

plunge began. With Germany running short of factories capable of printing more notes, the Mark plunged toward nothingness for a full ten months. Postage stamps of 5,000 Marks were quickly overprinted with a 'value' of 2 million Marks (specimen below).[1] Notes were likewise overprinted, perhaps to save the value of the paper they were printed on!

Barth wrote to his friends that his University salary has been set at 6 million Marks in May of 1923, remarking wryly that together with his house he was now a multi-millionaire.[2] But in just four months his whole salary will be worth approximately 4 ¢ and would be just enough to purchase a cup of coffee. So while the specimen note (shown below)[3] would equal a University salary in May, it would barely buy a cup of coffee in September.

From September of 1923 to November of 1923 the Mark dropped from an astonishing 120,000,000 Marks equal to $1, to a hard to believe 4,200,000,000,000 (4.2 Million Million, or 4.2 Trillion). What one finds remarkable here is not simply the quantities involved, but more important, the rapidity and the magnitude of the change.

The effects of the Inflation

A few large fortunes were amassed, mostly among industrialists, for one could borrow large sums, and pay them back very cheaply in inflated marks. "Inflation

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1. Please see next page.
2. Letter of May 18th, 1923, R.T.M., p.140.
3. Please see next page.



Five Million Mark Note issued 1st August 1923.

Five Thousand Mark Stamp overprinted as a
Two Million Mark Stamp.

profiteering" was a game played by many German Industrialists.[1] Some large industrial conglomerates resulted.

All debtors and mortgage holders could easily pay off their debts. Conversely creditors suffered.

Yet for the vast masses of people there was hardship and suffering. The Middle classes and the Working classes were both very hard hit. In the Middle classes, all savings lost their value, together with insurance policies, bonds, and war bonds in particular which were widespread. (The German government had financed much of the war on war bonds.) Perhaps more important for day to day life, there was no longer any income from these sources on which to live.

Ironically, one of the few institutions in which funds retained their value, the German Stock Market, was so distrusted by the Middle classes in this period that few had invested in it.

If the wages and the salaries of both the Working classes and the Middle classes had kept up with the pace of inflation, perhaps the whole picture would have been far different. Both Holborn[2] and Simon[3] point out that this was not the case. There was only one exception to this, on the whole, and that was greater and lesser state officials.

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1. W.M. Simon, Germany, A Brief History, Batsford, London, 1967, p. 294.
2. Op.cit., p. 599.
3. Op.cit., p. 295.

Holborn states:

> ...The great mass of people suffered severe hardships... Most workers' families were unable to afford the purchase of adequate food and clothing. Mortality and sickness increased at an alarming rate, particularly among children of the poor.[1]

Arthur Rosenberg, present in Germany during this period confirms this view in his History of the German Republic.[2] At the height of inflation a well trained and skilled worker would have to work a whole week for wages to buy a hundredweight of potatoes, several days for a pound of butter; six weeks for an ordinary pair of boots; a suit of clothes: twenty weeks. His figures on health bear out Holborn's statement.

So we have seen material loss and suffering. But in and with this we must see many broken dreams, strangled aspirations and deep frustrations. The process has cut across the whole social structure called Germany as a knife across flesh.

Gustav Stresemann, the Chancellor who finally led Germany out of this debacle, made the following statement four years later, on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize (1927):

> The historian still to a great extent regards the catastrophe of the War for Germany as being mainly the loss of territory....He often overlooks the most serious loss in which Germany has been involved. And this, as I see it, is that the intellectual and productive middle class, which was traditionally the backbone of this country, has been paid for the utter sacrifice of itself to the State during the

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1. Holborn, op.cit., p. 599.
2. Methven, London, 1936, pp. 184, 185.

> War by being deprived of all its property and by being proletarianized. How far reasons of State could justify the demand of such a sacrifice of a whole generation - a sacrifice that consisted in the total devaluation of money issued by the State, which was not replaced - is a question upon which the minds, and perhaps also the practice of the Legislature have hitherto been vainly exercised.[1]

Stresemann's statement, however inaccurate about causality, does seem to us to highlight the seriousness of what had happened.

The historian Holborn makes perhaps the most pertinent comment and one suggestive for consideration of that other economic earthquake of this period the Depression of 1929 in Germany:

> The inflation of the German currency was a nightmarish experience to most Germans, and the panic caused by it was likely to recur whenever the economy entered critical days.[2]

Barth and the Inflation of 1919-1923

Let us turn bow to Barth's reaction, as observer and participant, in this situation.

Barth entered Germany in October of 1921 when he accepted an Honorary Professorship in Göttingen in the Northern Lowlands of Germany, leaving behind the relative peace and stability of the small Swiss village of Safenwil.

Was he insensitive to this developing situation? Could he remain aloof emotionally as well as practically? Practically, he could not. We have no evidence that he had any substantial 'means' outside the German economy now.

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1. Quoted in Rosenberg, Op.cit., pp. 183, 184.
2. Op.cit., p. 600.

A possible exception was income from his Romans, but after the initial printing of the first edition in Switzerland, in 1919, the book was taken over by Christian Kaiser of Munich in 1920, who subsequently published the completely revised Second edition in 1922. They also published most of his other writings of this period.

We can get a glimpse of his reaction at several points in his 'circular letters' to comrades in the Zwischen den Zeiten group. It is interesting how he goes about describing the landscape on a trip in the North and how the economic situation gets woven into his description. The time is October of 1922. The Mark is now losing ground with increasing rapidity.

> So to Bochum. Countless factory chimneys and fantastic machines, the air full of coal dust, the kingdom of Stinnes and Thyssen. Naumann would have composed some appropriate "devotions": 'Jesus at the Blast Oven' and others like it. That kind of thing, however, is now perhaps finally past. The [fall in the value of the Mark] in these recent days gave to everything[1] the remarkable appearance of a world in decline.

It is interesting to note Barth's own awareness of how the economic situation is affecting his outlook here.[2]

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1. Letter of October 26th 1922, in R.T.M., p.115.
2. The Mark which had been declining steadily since the previous Autumn had in these last three months taken three drastic falls. In the previous September it took 105 Marks to equal £1. This increased steadily to 289 Marks the previous May but then the amount of increase changed dramatically, to 315 Marks = £1 in June, 500 in July, then suddenly 1,000 in August, 1,400 in September and finally 3,000 in October. Yet, serious as this was the year ahead would be far worse.

If we move ahead six months, from October of 1922 to May of 1923, the situation has intensified in such a way that cannot easily be grasped by the onlooker. (Here in the quote we repeat some of what we remarked about in the foregoing, but we repeat it to grasp Barth's reaction)

> ...A hundred Marks has become a small coin which the up to date beggars (actually!) refuse as being worth nothing!...My income at present amounts to six millions and if things continue like this I can as house owner bring this up automatically to the level of a multi-millionaire....Oh what a fraud! Everything else moves ahead, the printing of banknotes, the sliding scale of wages, and in correspondence with this, life itself...at least for those who somehow manage to have a remunerative post....But it is quite impossible for anything else to happen than that countless people should silently be ground under the wheels....[1]

As Barth accurately senses here, in the extremity of the situation, he is suffering less than the vast majority of people. For as Holborn points out, wages and salaries simply did not keep pace with the inflation of prices. Those who did better in this respect were people who held higher positions in State-paid employment. As a Professor in a German University, Barth would have been one of these. Yet still the loss of <u>real</u> income compared with pre-war levels was not small. In general such 'fortunate' people might have received one-third of the real income he would have received in 1914.[2]

Barth, in this same passage, reflects the feeling of mysteriousness, of suspicion and frustration in seeking

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1. Letter to Thurneysen, May 18th 1923, <u>R.T.M.</u> pp. 140, 141.
2. Hajo Holborn, <u>Op.cit.</u>, p. 599.

explanations for what was happening.

> ...And if only one knew more exactly...where in the history France really stands in regard to the right and wrong of it....But where is really the root of the evil, where the intrigue...what needed to be different? The talk of F.W. Foerster and his people seems to me altogether too superficial and too incendiary to be convincing.

Barth concludes:

> In short one feels his way entirely in the dark.[1]

That Barth is not unaffected by all this is clear by the way he continues:

> ...In the meantime everything moves on in its course. That is the remarkable thing. One stands amazed and shocked, one feels that he is completely in the dark and yet lives on nevertheless in his corner, itself relatively transparent, and humanly speaking he draws his life out of this corner.[2]

The inflation spiral is to rage on for another seven months at an ever increasing rate of change. Four months later, Barth remarks (as we have noted before) that a cup of coffee is by now four million marks "tomorrow likely six", that is, the same as his whole university salary four months before.[3]

Three months later, things became so severe that Barth must reassure those of his comrades in Switzerland that

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1. R.T.M., p. 141.
2. Ibid. [First emphasis added, second emphasis original.]
3. Letter to Thurneysen, September 24th 1923, R.T.M., p. 149. He also confirms that the value of these Marks in gold (that is, for foreign exchange, including the dollar) is the same as for goods. Thus the Mark's loss against the dollar is an accurate indication of the Marks loss of purchasing power in Germany.

alongside these "apocalyptic events"[1] there is "certainly always much that is harmless, much 'happiness in a corner'." We are quite sure that he uses 'apocalyptic' figuratively. Yet his last word, re-echoing his reflections in his May letter eight months earlier, is wonderment about 'human survival', even his own 'survival'.

"One notices above all in oneself how indestructibly one goes on living [in the midst of all this]"[2]

This last remark, taken in its context seems highly personal. That is, it is not a general reflection, but something about himself: "One notices above all in oneself ...[how one goes on living]". This is the wonder. The context in which Barth makes this remark is also of interest. He seeks to reassure those of his friends in Switzerland that life is more liveable than "the Swiss newspaper reader thinks as he takes in all the alarming reports".[3] There are smaller things in one's daily life which compensate for these things which are "really sad and gruesome".[4]

The common presupposition between Barth and his comrades is that these events are indeed 'apocalyptic',[5]

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1. We are quite sure Barth does not use 'apocalyptic' in a theological sense, but rather, in a descriptive-poetic sense, which is quite in keeping with his practice in his letters.
2. Letter to Thurneysen, December 20th 1923, R.T.M., p.158. (emphasis is Barth's).
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Again, we are quite sure he speaks figuratively.

that is, so serious that Barth will reassure them that he can bear up under the stress ("how indestructibly one goes on living") and find compensations.

We find Barth's reaction to his situation far different from, say, one who takes the attitude internally, to himself, as well as outwardly, to others, that "this is nothing to do with me. I just get on with my work and ignore these things": We do not find Barth isolating himself from his situation. What we find is a sensitivity to the situation and an emotional involvement, perhaps deeper than would first appear. For both times he goes into this subject in some depth in his letters in 1923, that is, both in May and (eight months later) in December, there stands the same theme: "one stands amazed and shocked,...yet lives on nevertheless..." (May). And (in December) "[yet] one goes on living in the midst of all these apocalyptic events". These events, then, are not experienced as minor and insignificant, but as major events, even on an 'apocalyptic' scale.

We can only conclude then that Barth did feel the effect of these events, and felt them quite deeply.[1]

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1. One might ask then: Why didn't Barth say more in his letters in this period? He does go into some depth in at least two of his eight letters May to December 1923. He says some in a third, and there are passing references in the others. But one must note (1) these are not personal letters, communicating about 'how things are' in general. They are 'circular letters' meant to further communication on theological matters among a group of like-minded men. Thus the majority of space is devoted to these concerns. And (2) he is writing primarily to comrades in Switzerland who as Barth remarks seem more fully and accurately informed of his own political-economic situation through the respected Swiss press than he is.

Chapter II.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL LANDSCAPE OF GERMANIC EUROPE: 1890-1930

In surveying the scene of philosophical Germany in the early part of the 20th century our purpose will be two fold: (1) Firstly to sense the ideational setting of Barth's theological development; the ethos of his times; (2) Secondly, to set out the options which were open to him as a theologian, which he, and perhaps to a greater extent, other theologians would take up in the period 1915-1930 and beyond. (3) A third purpose could be listed also: To know more fully the full range of options in philosophy which Barth was to leave behind when he chose to 'opt out' of this context in 1930-31. In a section following this we will seek out figures who were influential for Barth. Here, in this section, we have another task, that is, to survey the general philosophical scene of Germanic Europe, in order to sense the whole context, and the whole range of options Barth was to reject after 1930.

In this brief sketch we can only sense the general currents and cross-currents of thought. We can only skim the surface.[1]

We might best begin with Husserl, and the setting in which he found himself in the 1890's. The Germanic setting at this point consisted mainly of two broad areas,

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1. In the following we are using: I.M. Bochenski, Contemporary European Philosophy, trs. Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner, California, Berkely, 1956; Walter Laqueur, Weimar, A Cultural History, 1918-33, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1974; Peter Gay, Weimar Culture, Secker and Warburg, London, 1968. Others as cited.

one, of Idealism, the other, of various forms of "Materialism". Both had their zenith earlier in the century, Idealism in the grand systematizations of Hegel and others, and Materialism, in various forms, in the work of Marx, Feuerbach, and at a slight distance from these, in the evolutionists following Darwin. What both of these areas of development had in common was the construction of extensive, comprehensive systems, in a manner in which the phenomena of existence would be 'reduced' (using this word loosely) either toward the realm of the Ideal on the one hand, or the material on the other. Both intended to interpret the whole of the phenomena of existence comprehensively.

As subsidiary currents, running against these one could mention Kierkegaard, and his attack upon Hegelian Idealism, which we shall consider below in more detail, and Nietzsche and others in whom instinct and vital inner forces were given prominence over against the purely rational in Hegel.

We mention Husserl first, for in his development of Phenomenology, a new approach to perception and experience, one finds the first significant signs of a break with the Nineteenth Century systems and methods. One also finds here the most germane thinker for the development of the German Existentialism which found expression in Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers.

One may note at the outset here with Walter Laqueur that "in philosophy, as in most other fields, the main issues that agitated minds during the 1920's antedated the war".[1]

1. Weimar, A Cultural History, 1918-33, Weidenfield and Nicholson, London, 1974.

Husserl's Lectures on "Die Idee der Phänomenologie" (The Concept of Phenomenology) were given in 1907 in Göttingen. His "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" was published in 1911. While Husserl conceived his discipline as a strict and exact science, it is this element that those he influenced so heavily left behind. Those who followed, in what might loosely be grouped as 'German Existentialism', Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers as the primary examples, were to repudiate quite strongly any notion of philosophy as a 'science'.

In Heidegger we find 'the human condition' the real and main concern of philosophy, that is, man in his life-world, or Lebenswelt. As Laqueur observes, here the barriers between poetry, philosophy and theology were broken down. Here there is a central concern common to all three. It is not surprising then to find 'the poetic' as a vehicle for expression in Heidegger.

Heidegger's writing, especially his Freiburg Lectures, published in 1927 as Sein und Zeit had an immediate appeal to a broad range of Germans in the years immediately following. Peter Gay in his study Weimar Culture describes this phenomenon. We shall quote him at length, for here one can sense not only the philosopher, but his unusual impact on his readers.

> "...One of Heidegger's most perceptive critics, Paul Hühnerfeld, has said: 'These books, whose meaning was barely decipherable when they appeared, were devoured. And the young German soldiers in the Second World War who died somewhere in Russia and Africa with the writings of Hölderlin and Heidegger in their knapsacks can never be counted'.

Gay continues the theme:

> The key terms of Heidegger's philosophy were, after all, anything but remote: more than one critic has noted that words like "Angst", "care", "nothingness", "existence", "decision", and (perhaps most weighty) "death" were terms that the Expressionist poets and playwright had made thoroughly familiar. What Heidegger did was to give philosophical seriousness... to (the concerns) that dominated so many Germans in this hard time. Thus Heidegger aroused in his readers obscure feelings of assent, of rightness; the technical meaning Heidegger gave his terms, and the abstract questions he was asking, disappeared before the resonances they awakened." 1

We are of the opinion that some of the same dynamics were at work when Barth was read, that is, in the words of one commentator 'carried as loaves of bread' across the border from Switzerland into Nazi Germany. Here too one finds terms and concepts with a depth of emotional import not irrelevant to the situation into which they were spoken. (Cf. below, Part III, pp 436 ff).

Heidegger's relevance to Germanic Theology is most obvious in Bultmann. His influence in theology widened after the Second World War.

Karl Jaspers stands out as another major figure in German Existentialism. A psychiatrist who became a philosopher in the late 1920's he stands out in contrast to Heidegger with his emphasis on interpersonal reality, and his consideration of theological questions.

Beyond these two major figures there are a host of others in the diversity of thought usually associated with the term 'Existentialism'[2] in Germany.

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1. Op.cit., pp. 81, 82.
2. The term was coined in 1929 well after its beginnings by one Fritz Heinemann, an outsider to the group. Cf. Laqueur, p. 205.

Barth was aware of Heidegger's work, even in his early theological period. Both Heidegger and Bultmann, the latter in close cooperation with Barth in this period, were at the University of Marburg. Thurneysen, Barth's closest friend, for example, relates to Barth in detail the reaction to his lengthy presentation of their theological 'program' at a special seminar in Marburg in 1924, in which Heidegger's response, basically positive, was noted with interest.[1]

Neo-Kantianism

In contrast to the 'Existentialists', and in another 'area' of the philosophical landscape of Germany, we find the Neo-Kantians. Springing from a revival of interest in Kant in the last 30 years of the 19th century, the movement was active well into the 1930's.

The major figures of this movement are Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp and Franz Rosenzweig. While their main emphasis was 'Critical Idealism' their contribution to this period transcended this. What was the character of this Neo-Kantianism, and that of the Marburg School in particular? It was a re-thinking of Kant in which emphasis was placed on logical analysis of knowing and willing. Knowledge of the world of objects was synthetic, that is a construction of the mind operating upon sense data. In the construction which resulted, one had no knowledge of, or access to the essence of something, only knowledge of phenomena, that is,

1. Letter of 21st February, 1924, in R.T.M., pp. 169-170.

things as they appeared to the beholder. The creative nature of knowledge was emphasized; that is, synthesis, the creating of a whole in one's mind out of several parts. Also emphasized is the inaccessibility of real concrete reality, or better, the essence or content of real things. The 'data' of sense perception, standing, as it were, in the middle ground between knower and a would-be known, were a problem for the mind, not 'givens' to be simply accepted as they were and then built upon. Thus intuition, for example, was an impossibility (i.e. direct unmediated insight.)

Thus the re-processing and re-affirming of Kant in all of this gave a strong critical cast to their thought. James Collins points out that their thought should not be seen as simply imitating Kant, but "as a distinctive plane of modern philosophical argumentation".[1]

But there was also a constructive impetus. Let us turn to the Marburg School. It was perhaps the most influential of the schools, founded by Hermann Cohen (1842-1918), and included Paul Natorp who wrote an influential work on Plato: Platons Ideenlehre (1903). Here we find 'panlogism', or 'Logical Idealism'. One commentator sees this as "an extremely radical type of idealism".[2] What he means is that in constructing a view of reality, members of the Marburg school would first construct a web or network of logical laws, thought to be immanent in pure reason. This web would then act as a filter, which would filter out

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1. James Collins, Interpreting Modern Philosophy, Princeton, Princeton, 1972, p. 171.
2. Bochenski, op.cit., p. 93.

any irrational elements in experience. These would be rejected as unreal. Only those data which could be logically integrated with other sense data would be accepted in the search for truth. In the end, reality was reduced to a set of logical relations. Thus the term 'panlogism', or Logical Idealism. What is worthy of note here is how the irrational is rejected, almost scorned.[1]

This rejection of the irrational was not typical of all Neo-Kantianism. The other main school, the Baden-Baden School had more respect for the irrational.

We would infer from this that it was the critical impetus of the Marburg School which Barth took up, not their constructive efforts.

Barth knew of both Cohen and Natorp in his University years, and even attended Cohen's lectures during his period of study in Marburg. That they both made a deep impression on him can be gathered from a comment he makes in 1925, while yet in his early years, theologically: "There has been and there will perhaps be again a philosophical fervour which is almost priestly, as was impressed on us at Marburg in Hermann's time by the figures of a Cohen and a Natorp".[2]

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1. One wonders why such Neo-Kantians, with their emphasis on reality being 'created' in the mind,cut off the intellect from the rest of the human personality, and did not study how 'reality' in practice might continually be 'created' by non-logical processes, (accurately or inaccurately). The non-logical connections actually made by people in real life are given no consideration here. It is hard to see how such a process of thought so limited in scope could become so strong and live on.

2. "The Principles of Dogmatics according to Wilhelm Hermann" (1925) in Theology and Church, p. 256.

Neo-Hegelianism

A revival of interest in Hegel culminating in a Neo-Hegelian reaction to Existentialism came to a peak about 1930 with the establishment of a World Hegel Association and International Congresses in 1931 and 1933.[1] This movement, however, did not carry as much weight within Germany as the Neo-Kantian movement.

The Vienna Circle

Against each of these developments was heard a voice from Vienna, in 1929, which in essence said: "You are all wrong. You need your language examined". In this year the 'Vienna Circle', a loosely knit group of thinkers issued their 'First Manifesto'. Its central point was that the problems of their German colleagues were a product of semantic confusion.[2] Although 'positivistic' in thrust, the many-faceted Wittgenstein emerged from this same framework. From the Circle came Rudolf Carnap, Moritz Schlick and Hans Reichenbach.

There is no evidence that Barth took any real notice of this 'school'. It had, in fact, more influence internationally than within Germanic Europe.[3]

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1. Laqueur, pp. 206, 207.
2. I.M. Bocheński, Contemporary European Philosophy, tr. from the German by Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner, California, Berkely, 1956, 52ff.
3. Ibid.

Dialogical Anthropology

The last group of thinkers considered here are usually given only passing notice in accounts of philosophy of this period, yet their names arise at significant places in the pages of theological thinkers in this period. This group could be fairly listed under 'Existential Thought' if the term is used broadly enough, but their theme is so distinctive that we have considered them separately. We will devote somewhat more space to consideration of this group, since we find an interesting parallel with an aspect of Barth's later thought here, while at the same time Barth would completely dissociate himself from their 'movement'.

When Martin Buber was finishing the rough draft of his Ich und du in 1922, after a period of 'spiritual ascesis' in which he put aside the reading of any contemporary philosophy, he found to his surprise that three other of his contemporaries were exploring and writing about the same concerns.

These concerns centred around the manner and the modes in which one can encounter and interact with that which is 'other', 'other' not in the sense of different, but as separate from oneself. Thus, and we can only state it in crude form here, one may encounter that which is other as 'it' in which case it will be to him as simply an object. Yet there is another way in which we can encounter that which is 'other', and that is as a 'you' ('Thou' is the usual translation). Here one is in a quite different kind of relation with this 'other'. It is the specific

way of being with this 'other' and the way this 'being with' is reciprocated by this other which characterize this other made of encountering. Here the 'other' which may have formerly been a mere object, an 'it' for one, becomes present to him as 'subject', that is as a 'you'. The one who encounters this 'other' as 'you' experiences things from the standpoint of this 'you' as he takes his stand in relation.

It is perhaps significant that Buber tries to express his thinking in a poetic form of expression, for poetry, like the relation Buber wants to speak about, involves the whole of one's personhood. One can then sense in Buber's poetic writing the mode of encounter about which he speaks. We have tried briefly to describe Buber's most characteristic concern: the difference between an I-It relation and an I-Thou relation.

What Buber found in 1922[1] when he emerged from a period of no reading was that three other figures had concerned themselves with this same distinction, and had published their writing: Hermann Cohen, a Neo-Kantian Jewish thinker, at this point retired in Berlin,[2] Franz Rosenzweig, a Neo-Kantian thinker and disciple of Cohen, also a Jewish thinker,[3] and Ferdinand Ebner, a Catholic Schoolteacher in Austria.[4] Buber was soon to find others

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1. For the following, cf. Buber's "History of the Dialogical Principle" in Between Man and Man, pp. 209-224.
2. Religion der Vernuft aus den Quellen des Judentums, 1919.
3. Der Stern der Erlösung, 1921.
4. Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten, 1921.

on the track of the same concern including Eberhard Grisebach.[1] Later, Gabriel Marcel and Karl Jaspers.

What we find of interest is how reference to the writings of these figures turn up among those in the movement of dialectical theology, especially in Gogarten's writings. Thus for example Gogarten expresses appreciation for Ebner's Das Wort... (1921) in 1923,[2] Grisebach's Die Grenzen... (1924)[3] and Grisebach's Probleme der wirklichen Bildung (1923) in 1928.[4] It is not surprising then to find the concern of Buber and his fellow thinkers reflected in one of the central themes of Gogarten's Theology:

> The problem of reality begins for man at the point where he faces other men as his counterparts; all decisions concerning his relationship with reality are made in the sphere of his relationship to his fellowman.[5]

This would seem to re-echo Buber's statement that all real life is meeting.

This is the context, the immediate context and the wider context, we find Barth 'opting out of' after 1930 (below, Part 2, passim). He will have nothing to do with anthropology, or philosophy which stands independently of (his concept of) 'the Word of God'. He denigrates the procedure of using "independent" anthropology: the product can only be "lemonade" (that is, weak and watered down substance).[6]

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1. Die Grenzen des Erzichers und Seine Verantworten, 1924.
2. Cf. Beginnings of Dialectical Theology, p. 342, n. 3.
3. Cf. Bethge, Bonhoeffer, p. 59, n. 63.
4. Cf. Beginnings of Dialectical Theology, p. 379, n. 15.
5. Zahrnt, p. 58 (Zahrnt's paraphrase).
6. Zahrnt, p. 58.

Yet we find it somewhat ironic that nearly twenty years later when Barth publishes his Doctrine of Creation both he, in that place, and Buber agree that the anthropology in Barth concerning relational reality, is almost identical with Buber's anthropology.[1]

1. Cf. Buber, op.cit., pp. 222-224.

Chapter III.

KARL BARTH'S BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT UP TO 1930

Karl Barth was born in Basle, in 1886, into an old established Basle family.[1] His father, Fritz Barth, a minister was appointed Lecturer in Theology in Bern three years later, and remained there until his death in 1912, becoming Professor of New Testament and Early Church History. Here the young Barth grew up, and here, in such a family "deep and lasting foundations were laid at home, in church and at school, where his faith was nourished in positive evangelical theology".[2] His father, a moderately conservative theologian, was not an inconsequential figure in his setting. One of his books, Die Hauptprobleme des Lebens Jesu was well received and went through three editions between 1899 and 1907.

Considering the younger Barth's later development, especially his relation to Church History and Tradition after 1924, we do not think his family background to be of minor significance. We would venture that his father, and the character of his thought, was quite probably a key factor in his later development, particularly when Barth

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1. For the following we are using: Peter H. Monsma, Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation, Somerset, Somerville (New Jersey), 1937 [we find Monsma's treatment of Barth's background and development unusually fulsome and sensitive to pertinent issues despite its early date. We find such a treatment sorely needed and typically missing or quickly passed over in the major works on Barth such as Balthasar, and Berkower]; Also used: T.F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931, S.C.M., London, 1962; T.H.L. Parker, Karl Barth, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1970; Godsey's Introduction in Karl Barth, How I Changed My Mind, Introduction and Epilogue by John D. Godsey, John Knox, Richmond, 1966; Others as cited.

2. Torrance, op.cit., p. 15.

turned to Dogmatics after 1923.[1]

As a youth, Barth showed literary inventiveness, for example in writing a play (performed several decades later for his students' entertainment). His interest in entering the ministry was early, well before his University years.

He began his University training in 1904 under his father in Berne. Then, while on the one hand, Barth wished very much to study under the younger Ritschlian, Wilhelm Herrmann in Marburg, his father, on the other hand, perhaps wary of Herrmann's Kantian 'liberalism', did not wish this. "Compromise": Barth went to Berlin, for one semester (hearing Harnack), then to Tübingen (one semester) and finally to Marburg where he sat under Herrmann for three semesters. Here he also attended the lectures of the Neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp (cf. below p.49). Here he also met a fellow Swiss who was to become his closest and most important friend, Eduard Thurneysen of Basle.

But it was the influence of Herrmann which was most central here. (cf. below, pp.60ff). Emerging from University in 1909, Barth saw himself as one of the younger Ritschlians.[2]

After taking a clerical job with a church publisher, Barth finally entered the ministry in Geneva. A few years later, in 1911, he went to the parish church of Safenwil, a

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1. We shall consider this possible factor below, pp.62ff.

2. Torrance, op.cit., p. 16.

small rural Swiss village in the agricultural setting of North Central Switzerland. It was here that his most significant theological development was to begin.

We shall turn now to look at how outward events were to force Barth to rethink his 'liberalism', in particular the Great War which broke out three years after his arrival in Safenwil. What did the outbreak of the war mean for Barth, and in particular the fact that his mentors, his theological teachers, lined up behind the cause of German nationalism and supported Germany's entry into the war?

Was not something brought out into sharp relief which was sensed as immanent in the religious situation previously? Namely that Christianity, and Protestant Liberalism in particular, had in the last one hundred years become too tied up with German nationalism. And was this not, for Barth, part of a larger problem, namely that Christianity had become too tied up with European civilization, and civilization in general; so tied up that, for Barth, there was the danger that Christianity would lose, or had lost, any distinctiveness over against 'culture'.

If Thurneysen's reportage is correct, Barth and himself had slowly begun to see this before the war, that is in the period 1911-1914, and had begun to move away from 'bourgeois' Protestantism quite firmly in this brief pre-war period.[1]

Did not the war, and in particular the fulsome support the established theologians gave to the cause of German

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1. Cited in Monsma, op.cit., p. 49.

nationalism bring this problem out into the open with perhaps devastating impact? His well known account of his own reaction to these things would support this.[1] Barth proclaims from the pulpit of the Town Church of Aarau in 1916, (that is, before his study on Romans was to begin) with eloquence and fiery determination that the god of the Western world is finished:

> "He is not even righteous. He cannot prevent his worshippers, all distinguished European and American apostles of civilization, welfare and progress, all zealous citizens and pious Christians, from falling upon one another with fire and sword to the amazement and derision of the poor heathen in India and Africa. This god is really an unrighteous god, and it is high time for us to become thorough going doubters, sceptics, scoffers, and yes, even atheists in regard to him. It is high time for us to confess openly and gladly that this god... is not God. He is an idol. He is dead."[2]

Not only has Christianity become too tied up with Germanic nationalism but the deity has become too tied up with Germanic 'civilization'.

Perhaps it is not just by chance that a Swiss 'student' of this situation is able to see this and articulate this so clearly. As a Swiss he has lived on the fringe of Germanic civilization, and experienced its nationalistic thrust. As a Swiss he has no inhibitions to overcome in criticizing what would be, for Germans, the Fatherland.

Yet this phenomenon he views, large and significant as it is, that is, Christianity tied to German nationalism

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1. "...For me...[as of that day] nineteenth century theology no longer held any future". In The Humanity of God, cited by Parker, op.cit., p. 16.
2. In The Word of God and the Word of Man, p. 22, pointed out in Parker, Karl Barth, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1970, pp. 9,10.

and German 'civilization', is part of an even larger problem, that is, the problem of how Protestant Christianity has become so intertwined with Western culture in general. While naturally, one need not agree with the radical nature of Barth's solution, nor the radical means he employed in pursuing his goal, and even if at times he overstates the problem, in categories that are perhaps too black and white, yet one senses a genuine insight here, one that was to impel a formerly middle class youth into becoming a revolutionary on the theological scene. That this issue runs deep in Barth's impetus and outlook can be gauged by the manner, and the radicality with which the same issue arises a decade and a half later, even if the frame of reference has shifted somewhat, that is from a more or less political-cultural situation, to an ideational-cultural situation. It is right in the heart of Barth's methodological concerns, which we shall be pursuing in the thesis, that he offers these words (1932):

> ...to the best of my ability I have cut out... everything that...might give the slightest appearance of giving theology a basis, support, or even a mere justification in the way of existential philosophy....Because in the former undertaking I can only see a readoption of the line Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Herrmann, and because in any thinkable continuation of this line I can only see the plain destruction of Protestant theology and the Protestant Church.[1]

Beneath this we see the same issue, the same concern in slightly changed terms. In place of German nationalism and Germanic culture, here is substituted Western culture, and more specifically philosophy. (That it is not

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1. C.D. I/1, pp. ix, x. (emphasis added).

existentialism in particular that Barth fears here, can be seen by his reference to Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Herrmann, in whom existentialism is not present). What one senses here also is the radical nature of the threat Barth sees: "the plain destruction of...the Protestant Church". And here, as well as in the period we are studying, Barth seeks to take a radical solution: dia/stasis, a clear cut breaking off of relations with that which 'endangers'. We have said that Barth seeks a radical solution in the war period to the state of affairs where Christianity and its God have become tied up with and intertwined with 'civilization', with Germanic culture, philosophical as well as political. What will the means of this revolutionary be?

He will seek out others who have questioned and 'cut at' this situation.

We venture that Kierkegaard was for Barth in this period somewhat of a sword which slashed into the web of interconnections between the two parties. That is a sword which, inserted into the situation cut them apart creating not only distance between them but dia/stasis and a vacuum. Between which two? Between Christianity and 'civilization', but also, and primarily, between God and 'the world'. Kierkegaard's imagery will not only fuel the fire, but sharpen the bite of the flames which will sear this alliance. So we hear proclaimed an "infinite qualitative difference" between Time and Eternity.

This and other imagery will be wielded as swords in

cutting apart what had become knotted together during the previous century.

There were certainly others Barth called upon (1) to help him sharpen the vision in his own mind, (2) to help him wage an attack upon the mainstream of Protestant Thought during the previous hundred years.

Kant, Cohen and Natorp

There were many, and we cannot, in such limited space, adequately try to describe what part they played. Kant was there, the 'critical' Kant, in the work of Herrmann, Cohen and Paul Natorp (whom we have looked at above in surveying the Philosophical Landscape). Here again we see the creation of a vacuum, created this time in the area of knowledge. For the insistence of the Neo-Kantians that one cannot know real being, that one cannot know the essence or contents of objects, only appearance, means in the hands of a theologian that there is a noetic vacuum between man and the deity, a gulf, which man cannot cross using reason. Thus Kant's affirmation of the limits of 'reason alone' becomes in the theologian's hands an affirmation of the hiddenness and inaccessibility of the deity. Thus a vacuum is created between man and God, a vacuum which will, in Barth's view, be filled not from man's side, but from God's, in his speaking his Word.

Overbeck, Feuerbach, Dostoevsky

Other figures important to Barth in this period included the secular Historian, Franz Overbeck, the secular philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, the novelist Feydor Dostoevsky, and in the background, the liberal theologian Wilhelm Herrmann, and Barth's father Professor Fritz Barth.

Feuerbach's views on religion presented Barth with a problem similar to the one presented by Kant. That is, the problem of knowledge. For Feuerbach religion and religion's God were man's creation. Man took the "highest" in himself, that is, those attributes he considered most worthy, then after isolating these out, man absolutized them, making them into perfections (for example, 'love' became 'perfect love') and assembled these attributes into a conception: the deity. Thus the deity was a projection of the highest of man's attributes. As in Kant, it is man's creativity which is foremost here, a creative synthesizing.

Yet, for Barth, Feuerbach has stated the problem to be overcome. For Barth, man and his religion are here enclosed within man's subjectivity. Between this circle of subjectivity and God himself there remains a gulf which in Barth's view has not been bridged. For Barth nineteenth century 'liberalism' is a living example of the process Feuerbach describes. And Barth uses Feuerbach to 'hit out' at and dismiss 'liberalism'.

In the secular Historian, Franz Overbeck, Barth finds several things, perhaps chief among them is this non-church

thinker's warning to German Protestantism that it is in danger of being no more than a mere duplication of German 'Culture'. Here Barth finds also a concept, 'Urgeschichte', roughly 'primal history', events allegedly concrete and real, yet by definition outwith the grasp of the historian as historian. Barth will find this concept useful in describing 'events' which are revealed, and are part of revelation, yet stand beyond the historian's grasp.

In the writer Dostoevsky, Barth and his comrade Eduard Thurneysen find themes and emphases which are suggestive for their own work: the deity as a being who is distinct from man and the world, Dostoevsky's conception of divine forgiveness, his conception of the resurrection of the dead, and his criticism of socialism, religion and the church for being 'a law unto themselves' apart from the deity.[1]

The influence of Fritz Barth and Wilhelm Herrmann were more marked for the period in which Barth turns to dogma (below).

Ragaz, Kutter and the Blumhardts: Barth's Involvement in Religious Socialism

At the same time Barth was dissociating himself from the prevailing theology of his time, Protestant Liberalism, he was also dissociating himself from the prevailing political movements, thus creating a distance from both sides of the

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1. Cf. Monsma, op.cit., p. 205, n. 25.

'alliance' he was attacking. Thus his active involvement in the movement of Religious Socialism was both politically and theologically relevant for him. For in the Swiss leaders of this movement, Hermann Kutter and Leonhard Ragaz, he found a cutting criticism of both established political forces and established ecclesiastical forces. These two figures, together with the younger Blumhardt, not only emphasized the need for political reform, but saw this need in terms of the kingdom of God. This Kingdom, in contrast to the 'Kingdom' of Protestant 'liberalism' was not of man's creating. This was God's doing. Here there was a sharp distinction between man's creating (machen) and God's doing (tun).

Barth was an active figure in this movement, not just a passive member. For example, during his Safenwil pastorate, he actively aided the women workers of the nearby knitting mill in their struggle to assert themselves.

One may note also that these figures, Ragaz and Kutter were Swiss. Barth found companionship here with these socialists when other socialist groups were disappointing to Barth in the way that they, like other political forces, followed their several nationalistic leanings in the war. Ragaz, Kutter and their followers had avoided this.

The Commentary on Romans

As Barth pursued his pastoral duties in the small Swiss village of Safenwil, he became involved in a study of Paul's Letter to the Romans which was to become a book to shake the theological firmament of Germanic Europe and

change the course of Germanic Theology in the coming decades. Over the three years 1916 to 1918 Barth 'plowed and replowed the furrows' of this text many times (his own imagery), remarking at one point how to his surprise, he found Paul so much richer than either Luther or Calvin. Yet as he plowed and replowed, all the influences we have described above came alive in and with the text of Paul.

The basic and central theme of Barth's Römerbrief is that God is Totally Other, ie., totally other than man or the world. He is not the highest aspiration of civilization, nor in partnership with it. It is his 'infinite qualitative difference' (Kierkegaard) from man and his world which is stressed. Man cannot reach him either through his reason or his religion (as such) (Kant and Feuerbach). Across this gulf, a gulf separating Time and Eternity, from the other side God speaks his Word. It is essentially, in the Romans, a word of judgement, upon man's efforts, his civilization and his religion.

Thus it would seem that using these influences together with Paul, or Barth's interpretation of him, Barth succeeded with varying degrees of success in driving a wedge between Christianity and 'civilization', God and man in his world, at least for significant numbers of his contemporaries in Germany and Switzerland. Barth had attacked 'established' theological positions, and by the end of the next 4-5 years had won considerable ground.

The 'dialectical' character of the theology of the Romans

In the Romans one finds a recurring characteristic, one which must have struck his contemporaries as perhaps strange and new. We refer to its dialectical character. That is, one statement is made, or rather proclaimed. And then another statement is made, or proclaimed, but is in apparent contradiction to the first. This is somewhat similar to Hegel's dialectic of thesis and antithesis, except that here in Barth, there is simply no synthesis. The two statements find no resolution. Rather they remain standing, and clash with one another. But where is truth to be found, one asks? It is to be found in the clash.

Perhaps one could find a parallel with this in music. If two chords are struck, between which there is, not harmony, but dissonance, and if each chord is left sounding, without 'resolution', then we have a parallel with the two differing statements of Barth. But continuing with the parallel, neither of the two chords is the really important thing. Rather, the dissonance produced between them which results when both chords are struck together, is the important thing. So in Barth's mind, when both statements of his writing are thought together at the same time, the resulting clash or dissonance was where the truth was to be found, or better, was to best express the truth. One must note, however, that in such a scheme, the truth is left unstated, that is, it remains, for lack of a better term, 'implicit' in the clash between the two statements, which while they might be 'equally true', are also 'equally contradictory'.

In such a scheme one ends up with many paradoxes. It is not surprising then that paradox is perhaps the most prominent feature of this theology. Here he is very close to Kierkegaard.

The relatively minor role of dogma and tradition in this period (1917-1922)

Of special interest to our thesis, is to note how little attention is given in this period to dogma, creeds or Tradition in general, that is, the theology of the Christian tradition from the second century onwards. In the sixth and final edition (revision) of Romans, one finds almost no reference to the figures of Church History. The minor exceptions are Luther and Calvin, as one might expect. Apart from these two there are only a very few figures that even come up for consideration, even in their exegesis of Paul. Apart from one mention of Augustine, and one of the relatively minor figure of Tersteegen, one is hard put to find others. By contrast, the philosophers Plato (twice), Socrates (twice), Nietzsche (7 times), Kant (4 times) Feuerbach (twice) cross his pages with far greater frequency.

Even those he found especially important in general in this period far outweigh Luther and Calvin. For example Dostoevsky comes up for consideration 19 times, Calvin 5 times; Kierkegaard 12 times and Overbeck 8 times, while Luther comes up only 9 times, even though one might have thought Luther's Romans might have been especially relevant. The same, essentially, holds true in Barth's

other writings of this period (1917-1922). The articles of this period reflect Barth's main preoccupation with exegesis of scripture and ethics. We can find no major study of a theme of dogmatics proper, nor past dogmaticians.[1]

We point this out, for after 1923, the situation will change dramatically in this respect.

The Founding of "Zwischen den Zeiten", and Gogarten, Tillich, Bultmann and Brunner.

Barth was not alone in his attack upon liberal Protestantism. Soon after the publication of the first edition of his Römerbrief in 1918, Barth found that there were otherstheological thinkers ready to join the attack upon Nineteenth Century Liberalism. Thus one finds Emil Brunner, Friedrich Gogarten and Rudolf Bultmann reacting with qualified praise for Barth's Römerbrief in this early period (1919-1922).[2]

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1. T.H.L. Parker; a biographer quite favorable to Barth, confirms our view here, stating that in his initial years of University teaching,1921-1923, Barth was only slowly re-discovering older expositions of Church dogma. The Reformation Era came first. Yet "...even at this stage (1922) his reading outside the Reformation was chiefly for understanding the Reformation....Nothing from the Early Church. Anselm does not yet appear." (Parker,p.52) Parker is even of the view that "Barth was learning theology" in this period (1921-1923), following his production of "The Letter to the Romans" (1917-21). (See Parker,p.55). In Parker's view, Barth is undergoing a transformation (in this period,1921-24), from a leader of a movement of religious thought to a theologian. Cf. T.H.L. Parker, Karl Barth, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1970, pp.49ff.

2. Cf. The Beginnings of Dialectic Theology, ed. J.M. Robinson, John Knox Press, Richmond, 1968, pp.63ff, pp.82ff; and pp.100ff.

One finds a fifth thinker, Paul Tillich joining the internal debates between these three and Barth, as early as 1923. Not all was peaceful between these figures, even in this early period of their association, yet there was sufficient common ground for the founding of a periodical: "Zwischen den Zeiten" in 1922. Yet from this point onwards, the differences between these figures grew ever more significant. Tillich and Bultmann left the group first (1924-1926); Gogarten left in 1929. Finally Barth and Brunner parted company after a fiery exchange of articles in 1933.[1] We shall consider this fragmentation, with the methodological divergences implicit in it, near the end of Part II of our thesis.[2]

The Turn to Dogmatics: 1923-1930.

Barth's work in his initial period of productivity had been mainly concerned with theological exegesis, that is exegesis of scripture with pointed theological invective. Theological exegesis had in the main a critical and destructive function in this initial period: the attempt to smash the liberal Protestantism of the late Nineteenth Century. Yet after 1923 we see major changes in the direction of

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1. See Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, Natural Theology, comprising "Nature and Grace" by Emil Brunner and a reply, "No" By Karl Barth, Centenary Press, London 1946.

2. See below, pp.210ff.

Barth's work. Essentially we shall see a turn from the critical-destructive task of theological exegesis to the essentially constructive task of a new dogmatics.

Perhaps the most significant sign of this change is another change which occurred at about the same time: A revival of interest in pre-Eighteenth Century dogmatics. While Barth had studied the older forms of "orthodoxy" as a student, that is, as a student with liberal leanings, and had most probably studied in depth, yet, as we have already noted, pre-Nineteenth Century theology: Protestant orthodoxy, scholasticism, the Fathers, Creeds etc., undergo an almost total eclipse in the period 1914-1922. Thus in the Römerbrief's sixth edition (essentially the 2nd edition with minor revisions), we find only one reference to Augustine, one reference to Tersteegen and one to Zinzendorf. Thus apart from the Reformers (Calvin: 5 references, Luther: 9 references, Zwingli: 1 reference) one finds only three references to the whole history and development of Christian dogma. One finds the situation roughly the same in Barth's shorter writings 1918-1922. It is only after 1922 that one finds significant attention paid to the History of Christian Thought.

Let us look now at how the situation changes. In 1924 Barth gives his first lectures in Dogmatics. If we turn to the letters of this period, we find comments which suggest both intensive and wide ranging

reading of older dogmatics. We also find comments which suggest a rediscovery of these older works, and perhaps more significantly, a rediscovery of their 'worthiness'.

So we find Barth writing to his close associate Eduard Thurneysen about his in-depth reading of ancient formulations of the Trinity. (He writes in May of 1924, several months after beginning his first Lectures in Dogmatics):

> ...I am just now in the midst of the mysteries of the Trinity. I had to think over it long and sadly, brooding ever and again over the runic characters which the ancients have left us: essentia, persona, notiones personales ... not to forget filioque.

Barth then apparently exhorts his associates:

> .1.Don't think, however, that this is old rubbish; all, all of it, seen in the light, seems to have its own good sense.

Barth concludes by saying:

> It was already high time for us finally to give our attention to these things and so to begin at least the attempt to establish contact with the ancient church.[1]

Barth's final comment is perhaps the most significant: It is high time to begin to try to establish contact with the ancient church. We find this together with the exhortation not to think that these "ancient dogmas" are simply 'old rubbish'. There are

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1. H.T.M. Letter of 28th May 1924, pp.184-185. (emphasis added).

other passages in these Letters of Barth which indicate renewed reading of the ancients, reading of considerable intensity and breadth. Barth often reports his discoveries, or rediscoveries, concerning ancient dogma to his comrades.

Thus together with evidence already cited (and the lack of explicit attention paid to 'ancient thinkers' previous to 1924), Barth's comments here point to a revival of interest in, and renewed concentration upon, ancient church dogma. This appears as a new development c.1924. Thus the turn to dogmatics is accompanied by a turning to old dogma. We may note that the nature of this turn, to Tradition, shall be a central concern in Part III of our thesis.

Wilhelm Herrmann and Fritz Barth.

In considering figures influential in Barth's theological development, we have left two figures for consideration in this period, his turn to the task of Dogmatics. We shall now try to give brief assessments of the influence of Wilhelm Herrmann and Fritz Barth, the father of Karl Barth.

Karl Barth had studied under Wilhelm Herrmann in Marburg in his University years. When he turned to write an article on Herrmann in 1925, that is, just after his first Lectures in Dogmatics, Barth states:

> Herrmann was the theological teacher of my student years. The day, twenty years ago ...when I first read his Ethik, I remember as if it were today. If I had the temperament of Klaus Harms, ...I could say as Stilling did of Herder, 'From this book I received the push into perpetual motion.' With more restraint, but with no less gratitude, I can say that on that day I believe my own interest in theology began.

Who was Wilhelm Herrmann, and how was he important, in Barth's mind, now, at this distance, in 1925? Herrmann's theology was both neo-Kantian and moderately liberal. Herrmann 'began' with human religious experience and proceeded toward the affirmation of revelation. That is, he began within the purely human context and proceeded toward the divine. How is it then that he had importance for a thinker such as Barth, who had turned upon liberalism, sometimes with a vengence, and who insisted on beginning with the assertion of revelation and then proceeding to comment upon man (in his Römerbrief)? One can perhaps find only partial answers to such questions. Yet one factor of perhaps first order significance in this context, (Barth's turn to the task of Dogmatics) was Herrmann's seriousness and earnestness concerning the task of Dogmatics. This discipline, in the view of Barth and others, had fallen into relative neglect of the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. Herrmann was one figure who attempted to elevate the task of Dogmatics "to its rightful place." Here Barth had found a figure of considerable influence

who had asserted the importance of the question of truth concerning older dogmas, as a question of even greater importance than the (for Herrmann, methodologically prior) question of man's own religious experiences. Perhaps this factor, together with Herrmann's emphasis upon the importance of Ethics, helps us to understand why he was so important for Barth.

The other figure which we have left for consideration until now is Professor Fritz Barth. This should not imply that he had little or no influence on Barth's development up until this point (1923-1930), but rather that his influence was probably greatest in the present period (1923-1930). Among the interpreters of Barth, only Peter Monsma, an early interpreter, devotes any real attention to this figure.[1]

Professor Fritz Barth, the father of Karl Barth, while not a major figure in Continental Theology at the end of the Nineteenth Century, was non-theless a productive and original thinker. His book, Die Hauptprobleme des Lebens Jesu, went through three editions (republications) between 1899 and 1907. A collection of his shorter writings was published just after his death in 1912.[2]

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1. Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation, Somerset Press, Somerville, N.J., 1937. (Despite its early date, a scholarly and often acutely sensitive work).

2. Christus/unsere Hoffnung, Bern, 1913.

Fritz Barth, a pastor in Basle, first became a lecturer in a Theological College in Basle. He was then called to the University of Berne, where he was appointed a Professor of New Testament and Early Church History in 1889. He remained at this post until the end of his life, in 1912.

Although we cannot, in a brief introduction to a thesis go into much depth concerning the amount of influence Fritz Barth had upon Karl Barth's development, we may note several things, and then cite Peter Monsma's summary of the signs of this influence.

The first thing we may note is that Fritz Barth was a conservative theologian of a moderate cast. As a moderate conservative, he argued, for example, upon historical grounds, that the Synoptic Gospels did not support the 'liberal' view of Jesus. Yet in opposing liberalism he was not so conservative in some respects as his son Karl was to become. For example, Fritz Barth could not accept the Virgin Birth, and publically rejected it.[1]

Thus the younger Barth was brought up in a home setting in which there was high respect for moderate-conservative views of Scripture, and where Early Church creeds and dogma were held to be of high importance. He not only emerged from such a

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1. Monsma, p.9. Compare this with Barth's treatment of the Virgin Birth, below, pp.313ff.

home setting, but went on to Berne University to study under his father. Only then did he go on to Berlin and finally to Marburg, to study under Herrmann. Yet in Monsma's view, "from this father Karl Barth, while at Berne learned more than from any other professor of theology."[1] Perhaps Monsma overstates his case, yet the evidence Monsma cites in support of his statement is significant. Monsma summarizes his evidence thus:

> ...Certain characteristics of his father's teaching later reappear in his own. Among these are, on the one hand, his father's acceptance of the Bible as the Word of God, his belief in the peculiar sonship and in the resurrection of Jesus, ...his limiting of the sphere of philosophy, his tendency to oppose revelation to it, ...his idea of God speaking on the basis of his revelation in the Bible through our lives unto us... and on the other hand, his denial of the equality of the Bible's dignity with God himself, his acknowledgement, though qualified, of the right and need of Biblical criticism, and his rejection of all current theories of inspiration.[2]

It is clear that Barth did not totally reject his father's influence even in his post University years when his affinities lay essentially with the liberal Protestantism of Wilhelm Herrmann and others. When Karl Barth became pastor at Safenwil in 1912, it was his father who preached the sermon at his installation. (Barth thought well enough of the

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1. Monsma, op.cit., p.10.

2. Ibid. See also Monsma's exploration of the thought of Fritz Barth, pp.3-10.

sermon to send his comrade, Eduard Thurneysen, a copy of it). When Barth comes to write the preface to the first edition of his Römerbrief in 1918 he says this:

> The understanding of history is an uninterrupted conversation between the wisdom of yesterday and the wisdom of tomorrow. And it is a conversation always conducted honestly and with discernment. In this connection I cannot fail to think with gratitude and respect of my father, Professor Fritz Barth. For such discernment he signally displayed throughout his whole active life.[1]

It is just this respect for history which we see coming alive in Barth five years later when he begins his in-depth reading of the History of Christian Dogma. And it is the influence of his father which perhaps shows up most clearly in Barth's rather heavy handed emphasis upon Early Church creeds and dogma, the latter being an aspect of Barth's theology we shall study in some depth in Part III of our thesis.[2]

While we have given brief accounts here of two more figures influential in Barth's theological development, we have only added to an already large list. Thus the influence of, and/or intellectual kinship with figures such as Kierkegaard, Overbeck, Dostoevsky,

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1. (Preface to the First Edition), The Epistle to the Romans (E.T. of the sixth edition), Oxford, London, 1933, p.1.

2. See below, pp.279-382.

the Blumhardts, the Neo-Kantians, Cohen and Natorp continue in this period (1923-1930). In 1932 this situation will change: Barth will try to delete from his theology (1) any significant 'non-Church' influence, and (2) any significant participation in philosophy. The document which signifies this change, Barth's study of Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, will be the subject of part II of our thesis. Now however it remains for us to complete our sketch of Barth's development up to the point when this work on Anselm was written, that is up until approximately 1930.

The First Attempt at "Prolegomena" to Dogmatics: Die Christliche Dogmatik of 1927.

Barth's first attempt at writing "Prolegomena" to Dogmatics, (that is a methodological account of the nature and purpose of Dogmatics together with its key concepts) appeared in 1927.[1] What shall concern us at this point is the question as to why Barth chose to set this book aside and later begin again upon the same task. This second attempt appeared five years after the first, in 1932; that is just after his study of Anselm had been completed (1931). We shall ask this question (as to why Barth set aside his first attempt), for methodological issues were

1. Full Title: Dogmatik I. Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes. Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik, Chr. Kaiser Verlag, München, 1927.

central to this decision. Thus if we can isolate and lay out the major differences between these two attempts, we shall be in a better position to understand the importance of Barth's methodological study of Anselm, undertaken between the publication of these two attempts.

In 1932, with the publication of his second attempt, Barth states in "Author's Forward":

> ...to the best of my ability I have cut out in this second issue of the book everything that in the first might give the slightest appearance of giving theology a basis, support or even mere justification in the way of existential philosophy.... Because in the former undertaking I can only see a readoption of the line Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Herrmann, and because in any thinkable continuation of this line I can only see the plain destruction of Protestant theology and the Protestant Church...I can only so No here.[1]

In his first attempt at Prolegomena in 1927, Barth had described one of his key concepts "The Word of God" with the use of existential terminology. More significantly Barth had sought to consider "the Word of God" from man's standpoint, i.e. from the standpoint of man's own concrete setting. Thus Barth had attempted, not to describe "the Word of God" in abstraction from man's hearing of it, but rather, he had attempted to describe his conception of "the Word of God" as heard by man. Thus it was from man's

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1. C.D.I/1, p.ix, x.

standpoint (man's perceptual standpoint) that he wished to describe his conception of the Word of God in this first attempt. Thus man and man's perceiving were included here. Consequently, as man and man's perceiving were involved, this meant that anthropological considerations had to come into play. This is roughly how things stood in Barth's first attempt at Prolegomena in 1927.

The importance of these anthropological considerations was pointed out to Barth in a review of his first Prolegomena written by Friedrich Gogarten, formerly a close associate of Barth's.[1] Gogarten's central criticism was that Barth had not followed through with his existential insights and developed an adequate anthropology.

Now one sees at least two possibilities open to a thinker in Barth's position at this point: (1) either he shall develop an adequate anthropology, or (2) he shall find a way of proceeding which (allegedly) does not involve an anthropology. (Of course there may be other possibilities; at this point only these need concern us).

It is fairly obvious from the passage we have quoted from Barth's second attempt at Prolegomena that he chose this second option. That is, rather than attempt to describe "the Word of God" from man's

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1. See Friedrich Gogarten, "Karl Barths Dogmatik", Theologische Rundschau, N.F.1, 1929.

standpoint, from the standpoint of man's concrete situation, he shall attempt to describe "the Word of God" from outside any standpoint man can take up. He will try to describe "the Word of God" from an (allegedly) "objective" standpoint, that is without taking into consideration man's perception and/or misperception of "the Word of God". Only then, only after this initial step shall he take up man's standpoint and consider this same Word of God from man's own standpoint.[1]

This change of methodological procedure is reflected throughout Barth's second attempt, (Church Dogmatics Volume I/1, and I/2). It is reflected in Barth's deletion of existential/-ist terminology, his deletion of references and allusions to existentialist philosophers, in particular, Kierkegaard, and even in the change of chapter headings, treating roughly the same subject.

As the vehemence with which Barth expresses himself concerning this change suggests, this is not a minor methodological issue but a methodological issue of the highest importance ("...in the continuation of this line I can only see the plain destruction of Protestant theology and the Protestant Church... I can only say 'No' here.")[2]

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1. Whether or not it is actually possible to do this need not concern us at this point. We shall however study Barth's "No" to Anthropology, in Part III, below, in greater detail.

2. C.D.I/1, p.x.

Barth shall not only try to excise his Dogmatics of existential anthropology, and any other type of anthropology, but he shall attempt to eliminate from his Dogmatics any elements of thought borrowed from philosophy, in fact any elements of thought having a non-ecclesiastical origin (an origin outside of church dogma and scripture). Non-ecclesiastical (e.g. philosophical) concepts will be used only in an incidental way, only in illustrating or elucidating what has already been worked out independently of their use.[1] In place of philosophical presuppositions, assumptions, etc., Barth shall attempt to draw upon "the Word of God" itself. Thus, even methodological presuppositions are to have their source in revelation, not in secular or religious philosophy.

We have now arrived at the point where it is important to turn to Barth's study of Anselm. For in Anselm, Barth thought that he had finally discovered a theologian who, like himself, wished to build his thought solely upon the Church's articulation of revelation, that is upon the Church's 'Credo'. Conversely none of his thought shall be built upon any source other than this.

Barth turned to the study of Anselm's theological method in 1930, that is, three years after the

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1. This was Barth's aim. We have left aside the question as to whether he succeeded. Such a question is beyond the scope of our thesis.

publication of his first attempt at Dogmatic Prolegomena and, perhaps significantly, only one year after Gogarten's review of his Prolegomena, in which the methodological issues we have been describing were thrown into sharp relief.

It is our own contention that Barth has misinterpreted Anselm, and misinterpreted him at a very basic, methodological level. Thus our task, in Part II which follows will be (1) to examine the nature of the theological method which Barth finds in Anselm's thought, and (2) to examine the accuracy of Barth's interpretation of Anselm. From this point we shall go on, in Part III of our thesis, to examine several basic aspects of Barth's theological method, that is, his actual operational procedure as he carries on his theological enterprise. It is Barth's study of Anselm, and in particular, his rather unusual interpretation of Anselm, which has been highly suggestive for the study of Barth's actual operational procedure.

Part Two.

KARL BARTH'S STUDY OF ANSELM'S THEOLOGICAL METHOD.

Part Two.

KARL BARTH'S STUDY OF ANSELM'S THEOLOGICAL METHOD.

Introduction.

Section A.

WHY THE STUDY OF BARTH'S BOOK ON ANSELM?

Before entering upon our study of Barth's book on Anselm we should raise the question as to why we are turning to this book in particular, and devoting a sizeable portion of our thesis to its study. As we shall note in the brief survey of the interpretation of this book which follows, the answer to such a question would not have been at all apparent to interpreters of Barth, even major interpreters of Barth, before the year 1960. Until about this year, Barth's Anselm was almost entirely neglected by interpreters of Barth. After this year, as we shall see in the following, the picture changes dramatically.

Our question remains: Why do we consider this book in particular in interpreting Barth? We shall be exploring its relevance, of course, throughout both Part II and Part III of our thesis, and therefore this question would be answered most adequately near the conclusion of our study. Yet here at the outset we can give a preliminary answer: namely that (1) in our view, Barth "found himself" methodologically, in his study of Anselm; and that (2) he found "himself" in his study.

Perhaps we could take the first statement firstly: He "found himself" in regard to method. Barth's own account, almost thirty years after its publication, would support this supposition. In 1958, he writes, in the preface to the second edition of his Anselm[1]

> Only a comparatively few commentators...[have] realized how much [my study of St. Anselm] has influenced me or been absorbed into my line of thinking. Most of them have completely failed to see that in this book on Anselm I am working with a vital key, if not the key, to an understanding of that whole process of thought that has impressed me more and more in my Church Dogmatics as the only one proper to theology.[2]

One may note that Barth speaks of "a key" to " a process of thought". What is central here then, is theological procedure, that is, method, in contrast to "content" considered by itself.

That Barth experienced a "methodological vacuum" after his first and abortive attempt at Dogmatics in 1927, Die Christliche Dogmatik, primarily because he could no longer accept or tolerate in his theology an anthropological element, that is, an element of philosophical anthropology which stood in independence from scripture and 'revelation', and, as a consequence, was to search for a process of thought which would obviate such anthropological presuppositions (or so he hoped), lies behind his reflection

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1. Although the original title of his work is Fides Quaerens Intellectum, it has been given the title: Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum in translation, and we shall refer to it as "his Anselm" to avoid confusion with the Proslogion of Anselm which is also known by the title Fides Quaerens Intellectum.

2. A.F.Q.I., p.11.

in 1939 when he speaks of

> "...[having had] to rid myself of the last remnants of a philosophical, i.e., anthropological... foundation and exposition of Christian Doctrine. The real document of this farewell is, in truth, not the much read brochure 'Nein!', directed against [Emil] Brunner in 1934, but rather the book about the evidence for God of Anselm of Canterbury which appeared in 1931. Among all my books I regard this as the one written with the greatest satisfaction.[1]

In short, taking these two passages together, Barth has, in his own thinking, found in his study of Anselm the key to a "process of thought" which will enable him to bid farewell to philosophy and philosophical anthropology along with their presuppositions in his doing of theology. (In our sketch of how the book on Anselm has fared with Barth's interpreters which follows, we shall see to what extent interpreters, especially after 1960, find themselves in agreement with this estimate.)

Our second supposition was that in his study of Anselm, Barth found "himself". That is, he found a process of thought that was uniquely his own, and can only be ascribed to Anselm by misinterpreting him at several crucial junctures. Of course, this is our own view, and our task, in part, in what follows will be to examine several of these crucial junctures, in order to explicate and support our view. Further, the way in which (in our view) Barth misinterprets Anselm, or pushes the evidence farther than the text warrents, should be highly suggestive for understanding "that whole process of thought" embodied in Barth's Church

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1. Autobiographical sketch "How My Mind Has Changed" (1939) reprinted in Karl Barth: How I Changed My Mind, ed. John D. Godsey, John Knox, Richmond (Virginia), 1966, pp.42,43.

Dogmatics. Of course those points where we find no real reason to question Barth's interpretation of Anselm may also be suggestive.

A Brief Sketch of the History of the Interpretation of Barth's book on Anselm

Now we might look briefly at the use made of this book in interpretation of Barth over the past several decades, and in particular how its importance has been assessed by major interpreters of Barth. We shall be limiting our sketch here, essentially, to major interpreters of Barth, leaving aside those whose main task was to interpret Anselm. What we find, surprisingly, is that the book has been almost completely ignored until about 1960. Then, as we have remarked, the picture changes, first slowly, then dramatically. There are only a few exceptions to this general overview.

In Hans Urs von Balthasar's major work on Barth, completed in 1951,[1] Barth's Anselm is given only three brief mentions. Here it is seen only as the place where Barth's emancipation from philosophy "found expression". Balthasar uses the book only to draw out what Barth means by analogy. The question of the book's importance for interpretation of Barth in general is not even raised. So it would appear that the book is not considered any more

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1. Karl Barth: Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie, English Trans. The Theology of Karl Barth, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1971.

important than Barth's essays of the same period.

If we go to the second major work on Barth, in this same period, G.C. Berkouwer's The Triumph of Grace in the Theology of Karl Barth,[1] we find even less consideration given. There is only one reference, in a footnote. Even though Berkouwer states that "Barth regards his book on Anselm as the decisive turning point in his development",[2] we find no consideration of the sense in which this could be so.

In Gustav Wingren's Methodenfragen, (Translated as Theology in Conflict...)[3] an influential study also written in the 1950's, we can find no mention at all of the book on Anselm.

So also in Jerome Hamer's suggestive study published in 1949; only in the preface to the English Edition, published in 1962 is the book mentioned.[4]

Before 1960, we find only three significant exceptions to the general picture of the book remaining in obscurity. The first is Peter Monsma's sensitive and suggestive study of the early Barth, Karl Barth's Idea of Revelation, published in 1937. In this little known work, Monsma devotes a full page and a half to study of the book and regards it important in understanding Barth's way of relating philosophy and theology (or rather, dissociating these two fields).[5]

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1. E.T. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1956.
2. Op.cit., p.42, n.50.
3. E.T.: Theology in Conflict: Nygren-Barth-Bultmann, Muhlenberg, Philadelphia, 1958.
4. Karl Barth, L'Occaisonalisme...theologique de Karl Barth, Paris, 1949 (E.T., Karl Barth, Sands, London, 1962).
5. Somerset Press, Somerville (New Jersey), 1937.

The second exception, following chronologically, occurs in a work concerning interpretation of Anselm, yet in assessing Barth's interpretation of Anselm at some length, the author also pauses to assess the importance of Barth's book on Anselm for the understanding of Barth. In St. Anselm and His Critics, published in 1954, John McIntyre states that

> ...[Barth's] Fides Quaerens Intellectum...an analysis of and a commentary upon St. Anselm's proof of God's existence...is a work of paramount importance for any examination of Karl Barth's own works and of his own methodology.[1]

The third exception, and the only major study of Barth's work before 1960, to take Barth's book on Anselm seriously, is Henri Bouillard's Connaissance de Dieu[2] a compilation of material selected from a larger two volume work on Barth published in 1957.

After 1960

After about 1960 we find that the picture changes, slowly at first, then dramatically. This may be due to the fact that the book was reprinted in 1958, and finally translated into English in 1960. So we find the book figuring prominently, for example, in the study of T.F. Torrance in 1962,[3] in the theological biographies of Parker[4] and

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1. Op.cit., p.25.
2. E.T.: The Knowledge of God, Herder and Herder, New York, 1968.
3. Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931, SCM, London, 1962.
4. Karl Barth, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1970.

Bowden[1] of the same period, and in James Smart's work, The Divided Mind of Modern Theology (1967), where a sub-section is devoted to "The Contribution of Anselm of Canterbury"[2] which highlights the importance of the book for understanding Barth.

Finally even the popularizers of Systematic Theology reflect what has become a more or less generally accepted view:

> Barth's Anselm is an indispensible key to the understanding of his mature position [on issues of method] ...and as such is one of the most important documents of modern theology.[3]

We find then that Barth's own view of the importance of this work for his theological development finally underlined and confirmed by studies after 1960.

We may note that as a consequence of the relative lateness of the 'discovery' of this book, that there is no major study devoted to the full breadth of Barth's mature work which has taken into account this important study on Anselm.[4]

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1. Karl Barth, S.C.M., London, 1971.
2. p.194ff.
3. William Nicholls, Pelikan Guide to Modern Theology, Vol. I, Pelikan, 1969, p.103.
4. Possible exception to this: Bouillard's study (1957).

Section B.

THE NATURE OF THE HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP OF BARTH'S ANSELM

In the preface to the first edition of his book on Anselm, Barth argues a point of historical method. This can be summarized briefly, i.e., that the Proslogion, the text with which Barth concerns himself, is to be seen in the context of the Anselmian corpus and not in isolation from the rest of his works. One may grant that much historical or polemical inquiry into the Proslogion up to this point (the 1930's) had steadfastly ignored the context of the Proslogion, or how the Proslogion fits into the remainder of Anselm's works. This isolationism has been a tradition in some philosophical circles, with its advantages and, we think, major disadvantages. It has of course been a tradition in some theological circles, where doing history is sometimes to too great an extent confused with doing theology. History done with no polemical interest, or no personal involvement would be dull, but where it is done only to serve polemical interest or with unacknowledged bias, it is no longer worthy history. So much for our polemic.

We return to Barth's point about seeing the Proslogion in the context of the Anselmian corpus. Barth asks: if others cannot agree with the result, of the study, can they not at least agree with the (general outline) of the path taken in pursuing it?[1]

1. A.F.Q.I., Preface to the first edition, E.T., pp. 8,9.

To this we would agree. It is obvious that if one seeks to understand the Proslogion, one must become acquainted with the writer. His other writings should be a major help.

Yet there is one "but" that crops up immediately. What about the context in which Anselm did his work. If Barth insists on seeing the wider context into which the Proslogion fits, and this context, for some reason he calls it a "theological scheme", is his major interest, one notes some interesting things about his study.

We could perhaps best draw out what we have to say by asking the following question: If the reader did not know the period, that is, the date, as well as something of the nature of the times in which the Proslogion was written, what would he find out or know from reading Barth's book?

We would note the following, and divide our notes into the following sections, that is:

(1) what was said of (1a) Anselm's immediate intellectual context, i.e., his contemporaries and (1b) his intellectual milieu, e.g. the growing openness to non-ecclesiastical antiquity: Stoic and Neo-platonic thought;

(2) what was said of Anselm's wider cultural context of an ideational nature, (2a) contemporary vernacular and Latin verse ("secular" as well as ecclesiastical); (2b) Popular religious notions which may have entered the assumptions and thought processes of great writers; (2c) the cultural context beyond the

mainly ideational, i.e., fine arts and architecture;
(3) the political and ecclesiastical course of events;
(4) Last but not least, Anselm's predecessors in the history of Christian thought.

It will be relatively simple to deal with these questions. We take (4) first since it is perhaps most relevant. There is no more than passing reference to Anselm's predecessors. The most conspicuous example is Augustine. There is passing reference, but by that we mean one sentence, not a developed paragraph or series of paragraphs. (In contrast, other commentators have often devoted space to studying Augustine; for example, Charlesworth gives at least two paragraphs of careful analysis.) This is probably the most fruitful figure to study among Anselm's predecessors if only for the fact that he found value in the same philosophical tradition as Anselm.[1]

As for other figures, no comparisons or contrasts are made. They simply do not exist.[2]

We take next (1a), Anselm's immediate intellectual context, that is, his contemporaries or near contemporaries. Here again it is a rather simple question to answer. There are simply no references. (One could have referred for example, to the Abelard-Clairvaux ferment later in the same period, or to the realist-nominalist controversy, etc.)

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1. Neo-platonism. Augustine also had an argument for the existence of God that was in some respects similar to Anselm's.

2. On re-reading Barth's Anselm for this aspect we need to qualify this, but only slightly. There are several references to Augustine, yet still only passing references. As for other predecessors, or contemporaries, we find almost no references. References are made to take interpreters of Anselm's argument however, St. Thomas, etc.

Of his intellectual milieu, by which we mean the ideas in the air, ((1b)), whether or not propounded by contemporaries, there is one philosophical stream mentioned, Neo-platonism. But it is only mentioned, and again, only in passing, mainly in a way to indicate that Barth thinks it of little or no significance in understanding the text. He mentions only "the Neo-platonic technique of the exposition" in the case of the Monologion, and avoids asking the question whether Anselm made use of anything more than Neo-platonic technique, that is, for example, whether any basic Neo-platonic assumptions were involved.[1] Again we find no real investigation or even minor genuine historical questioning.

As to point (2) above, that is, what was said about Anselm's wider contemporary context of an ideational nature, yet not strictly theological or philosophical thought, we would not expect much of a historian of Barth's period. The possible fruitfulness of such questioning was not well seen in his time and within his sphere of activity.[2]

As to (2a), no troubador or trouvere crosses Barth's pages; none of the thinking or artful nobility who ventured to enrich the meaning of the words of Latin as well as the vernacular tongues with their feelings and their art. Had

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1. A.F.Q.I., p. 58.

2. An exception of course is New Testament study where ((2b)) popular religious notions have been investigated, however unpleasant the questions these searches raise. It seems somewhat ironic that New Testament scholarship has in some ways been more adventurous in its historical questioning than, for example, the History of Philosophy or for that matter, the History of Christian Thought!

Dante read Barth's book a century and a half after the time of Anselm he would have felt ill at home indeed. By reading the text it is doubtful whether he could have discovered either the period, or the place where Anselm had written (unless he had discovered one footnote midway through Barth's book). And most of all there was no mention of the poets of the twelfth century whom Dante loved and admired, and tried to emulate. But perhaps more importantly, Dante, or such a man would not have been able to sense the world, or the context in which the Proslogion and its accompanying works were written.[1]

We find this neglect of search for possibly fruitful insights from Anselm's context surprising, for in Barth's other attempts at doing intellectual history he ranges quite widely and arouses interest in doing so. We see this in his Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century. He does not stay within the highly intellectual realm (cross references backwards and forwards to other thinkers), but seeks images and analogies for concepts beyond the intellectual sphere). He also has small but delightful references to the humanity of a writer. (Kant's daily walk at precisely the same time every day and in the same place.) How it enlivens one's understanding of an otherwise perhaps dry writer.[2] In his introductory section in

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1. On (2c) and (3) Barth does make use of the image of the 'cathedra', the architecture, where it suits his argument most; and there is a footnote, but only a footnote, in which the crusades are mentioned, in the context with the writing of the Proslogion. Again, it would seem, to support Barth's "militancy" or militant posture, which he finds in Anselm's text.

2. Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl (American Edition) 1969, p. 152.

the same book, on the Enlightenment, the attempt to contextualize is very present and greatly appreciated.

We will try to speculate briefly later, in the conclusion of Part II, as to why Barth's Anselm is so "narrow" in this regard, because we think it has something to do with the nature and function of the book in Barth's theological development. He was, we venture, at work on something more and basically other than purely historical inquiry.

Perhaps now we could look at the text of Barth's Anselm from another aspect, and explore a proposition: There is a similarity between the way in which Barth approaches and deals with scriptures, and the way Barth approaches and deals with the text of the Proslogion.

After laying out what Barth calls Anselm's "theological scheme", a reconstruction of what Barth sees as the frame of reference in which Anselm does his theology, he finally turns to the Proslogion itself. This forms the second half of his book on Anselm.

In noting the character of his work on the Proslogion itself there is an overall impression that Barth is dealing with a scripture: a text which has, in his mind, a primordial significance. What contributes to this impression?

The most visible element of this is his way of dealing with the Proslogion in a series of comments on two or three sentences of the text, that is, in a "verse by verse" treatment. This continues up to the last page of

the book. There is no drawing together of all that has come before. The last page is devoted to an exposition of a further "verse" from the Proslogion and the book ends with a short concluding paragraph.[1]

Barthian exegesis of scripture is notable for ignoring the life-setting in which the scripture is written; for its unwillingness to consider the life-setting from the perception or point of view of the author of a scripture, (e.g. the several editions of the Römerbrief); also, its unwillingness to consider the words of the author in terms of his setting (intellectual, religious or otherwise) as perceived by the author. Barth was either ambivalent about this issue or a bit coy in his Römerbrief period when he declared: "the critical historian needs to be more critical".[2] As others have noted, this declaration runs right against the grain of his whole approach in the Römerbrief.

But as we have noted above, Barth gives no consideration to Anselm's intellectual setting or intellectual resources, for example, Augustine, Greek and Roman philosophy etc., nor to his wider religious, ideational or cultural setting (the only exceptions being a few scattered references, one to cathedrals, another to crusades). We find therefore a similarity here between Barth's approach to scriptures and to Anselm, but a

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1. We may note that Barth's commentary on the last 'verse' of Anselm's text does form a conclusion of sorts for the whole book. Cf. below: "Anselm's Prayer of Gratitude and Barth's Interpretation", pp.150ff.

2. Preface to the second edition, E.T., p. 8.

definite contrast with his studies of the figures included in his Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl.[1]

One notes a "word by word" study of key words and phrases throughout the study especially in Part 2 dealing with the Proslogion. Again this is very close to Barth's approach to scripture study. The words are studied in some detail, although we leave open at this point the question as to whether Barth has selected evidence which only supports his theories and ignored evidence which runs across the grain.

But one must note first that, as with many Germanic scholars, there is an overwhelming dependence on a "root theory" about the meaning of words: the assumption that one almost infallibly gets the author's meaning by tracing the rootage of the word back to one basic meaning. Although at times there is a bit of consideration given to how the word is used and the phrase or context in which it is used, this is minimal. This issue is of crucial importance, for example, in considering Anselm's phrase about proving "sola ratione" or "by necessary reasons alone". Barth gives very little space to considering other interpretations than his own, that is, to considering the options in interpretation and then justifying his own view or option. He runs through this problem as if "there is no real problem here".[2] In fact he begins his exposition of the phrase "sola ratione" by naming it as a "much disputed methodological formula".[3]

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1. Op.cit.
2. A.F.Q.I., pp. 43ff.
3. A.F.Q.I., E.T., p. 43.

But in the ten or more pages which follow there is not a single reference to another interpretation, nor even another interpreter, nor even as to what the dispute is about. Only eleven pages later does one get a hint that there is a deep difference between Barth and the main stream of all interpretation of the Proslogion coming before him, over the interpretation of this phrase.[1] Even here one finds no exposition, or serious consideration given to other interpretations.

The second thing one notes is a lack of historical sensitivity in his word studies. What is meant here is that there is an implicit assumption that a word or a phrase (e.g. sola ratione) meant the same thing to Anselm over a period of thirty to forty years. In Luther studies, for example, it has become evident in the last few decades that such assumptions can lead to unfruitful and misleading results.

What is implied in this assumption, among other things is that Anselm did not develop or mature over this period of time, or ever change his mind. If Barth holds the opinion that the Monologion is not a mature work, (and it is convenient to his general theory about Anselm's method to do so, as signs of Neo-platonic influence are quite strong there), must he not at least raise the question of maturation and change throughout the Anselmian corpus? One may note that Barth is not alone in not raising the question of change and maturation. This question becomes

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1. Ibid., p. 54. Although one finally gets the gist of what the "dispute" is about, Barth gives no serious consideration, or extended exposition of those who he disagrees with.

more important when trying to reconstruct Anselm's working method over the period of his productive lifetime.

The literary style of Barth's study of the Proslogion (i.e., the second half of his book) suggests that the Proslogion, or parts of the Proslogion became, in Barth's frame of reference, "Word". That is, that parts of the Proslogion 'came alive' for Barth to such an extent and in such a way that at points the words underwent that transformation which in Barth's frame of reference would mean: became revelatory.

Of the three forms of 'the Word' that Barth was to set out in the first volume of the Church Dogmatics it would seem to be 'the Word preached' here.

We will have to pursue what is suggested here in another part of Part II (below), but we may note that if this is so, if the Proslogion or parts of it were in Barth's mind 'Word' one would want to put alongside this the rather sharp distinction that Barth frequently makes the same period between preaching, or 'the Word preached' on the one hand, and theological reflection on the other hand.

Was Barth's Anselm a work of history or a work of theology?

The question could also be raised as to whether it was primarily Barth the historian or Barth the dogmatician at work here. This question is suggested by Jaroslav Pelikan's comments in the Forward to Barth's work on Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, where Pelikan sees a definite difference between the two, a clue being that when Barth the historian is at work the issue

pp.123ff.

of "good guys and bad guys" in theology does not arise.[1] One clue in answering the above question is that Anselm comes out, as interpreted by Barth as such an undeniably and unambiguously "good guy" in theology in Barth's eyes where if, for example, Barth had accepted the general lines of interpretation of others before him, it seems fairly certain that, given his extreme position against natural theology, Anselm would have had to be in Barth's mind an undeniably and unambiguously "bad guy".[2]

In pursuing this question of whether it was primarily Barth the dogmatician, or Barth the historian at work here, one question which could be raised is: are there marked differences in character and approach between his study on Anselm, and the essays a few years later which make up Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl.[3] We have pointed to one such difference above: the lack of attention to Anselm's ideational religious-cultural context; and another, above: there is no ambiguity in the value judgements Barth passes on Anselm's work. One senses, in contrast, a healthy ambiguity, for example, in Barth's judgements about Schleiermacher in Protestant Thought... Barth points out 'favourable' elements wherever it comes most readily. For example, Schleiermacher never neglected the importance and centrality of preaching, either in his

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1. Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl (American Edition) Harper, New York, 1969, p. 8.
2. That is, in his Proslogion.
3. Op.cit.

personal activities or in his theology. In contrast Barth the dogmatician, e.g., in the Church Dogmatics, has very little favorable to say of Schleiermacher.

Perhaps we could summarize here by saying that even though Barth's work on Anselm is quite valuative in nature, he rarely or never reaches a negative valuation about any aspect of (1) Anselm's method in general, his "theological scheme" or (2) the Proslogion in particular. In his preface to his work he finds the Proslogion and the "theological scheme" in which he sees it residing, as "a model piece of good, penetrating and neat theology, which at every step I have found instructive and edifying".[1] This statement, because of its unqualified nature, suggests to us a lack of critical detachment from Anselm's text, and, more generally, Anselm's theological method. Together with the evidence already cited, there would seem to us to be fairly sound evidence that it was basically 'Barth, the dogmatician' at work here, not 'Barth, the historian', and more than that, that 'Barth the dogmatician' had quite a bit at stake personally in his work on Anselm. We shall be exploring this point more extensively below.

We have tried in these pages to look at the nature of the historical scholarship in Barth's Anselm from several vantage points. We have done so with the hope that what we have found may prove suggestive in various ways for the remainder of the study which follows.

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1. A.F.Q.I., p. 9.

Chapter I.

THE MAJOR FEATURES OF BARTH'S INTERPRETATION OF ANSELM.

Section A.

BARTH'S MAIN THESIS ABOUT ANSELM AND ITS COROLLARY.

Before embarking on a detailed study of Barth's interpretation, we wish, in this chapter, to set out what we find to be Barth's main thesis along with what we see as its corollary.

Barth's main thesis about Anselm's actual working method we might state as follows: In pursuing his theological program, all the 'building blocks', that is all the presuppositions, and basic elements of thought were drawn from 'the Credo', that is from 'the texts of revelation'. This term 'the Credo' needs some clarification. It is to be distinguished from Scripture.[1] What then forms the content of 'the Credo'? Barth names "Articles of Faith",[2] and specifically, the creeds of the Early Church;[3] 'The Credo' apparently consists of the creeds and dogmas of the Early Church as developed and given official sanction by the Medieval Church of the West.

Subthesis to Barth's Main Thesis.

There is a subthesis to this main thesis: namely that Anselm began, and finished his work, in faith, that is, in the fullness of faith, faith with no significant admixture of doubt. And further, that

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.40.
2. See for example, A.F.Q.I., p.55.
3. A.F.Q.I., p.24. Here, very early in Barth's study he also includes Scripture in 'the Credo'. Yet not after this point.

'existential,' or personal doubt was not in any way a motivating factor for Anselm's work.

In addition, the process of thought Anselm was engaged in was not designed to strengthen or reinforce faith. It could have no effect on faith.

The relevance of this subthesis to the main thesis can be seen in what is perhaps the best way of paraphrasing Barth's view of Anselm's approach to theology: "Anselm believed and the Credo was assumed". The elements of this statement remain in their unqualified nature. That is, Anselm's 'believing' is never qualified by any remarks about doubt. And his 'assuming', or assent to the Credo likewise remains unqualified; it remains as unproblematic assent, without qualms. The only "questions" which remained concerned the 'content' of 'the Credo'.

Further faith in its fullness, and unproblematic belief in the whole of 'the Credo' are the methodological point of departure for Anselm's theology, not the goal toward which he shall aim. They are the terminus a quo not the terminus ad quem of his theological work.

The Main Thesis and the Subthesis Seen Together

Thus, taking the main thesis and the subthesis together we see that in Barth's view Anselm took over a host of assumptions from this 'Credo', and in effect took them over uncriticially. Neither initially nor in the process of his work does Anselm in any way question or test the viability and validity of any of these elements he takes from the Credo. No problem of their viability ever arises.

It would appear then that in Barth's view of Anselm's theological work Anselm has a host of unexamined assumptions. They remain in this primal, unexamined state.

Corollary to Barth's Main Thesis

There is a major corollary to Barth's main thesis: namely that in taking over all his basic 'building blocks', presuppositions and elements of thought, from 'the Credo', he avoided taking over any significant presuppositions and basic elements from any stream of philosophical thought. In fact Anselm, in Barth's view avoided any significant participation in philosophical streams of thought. If there appear to be borrowings, or participation in philosophical streams of thought, these are in practice of little or no significance. For example, what appears to be substantial Neo-Platonism is really only 'technique of exposition' and nothing more.

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Barth does not in any one place gather together his main theses about Anselm in the course of his study. This is one of the factors which make study of his work difficult. But they are there none-the-less, appearing at various points throughout the study.

Thus we find the main thesis and its corollary in a description of Anselm's process of thought. In the following, rationes necessariae, or necessary reasons are roughly equivalent to: the 'building blocks', or elements of thought Anselm uses in pursuing his goal. They are the "A B C D's" used in establishing his "X". Thus Barth writes:

> Throughout all Anselm's investigations the origin of the rationes necessariae is to be found somewhere other than where it ought to be found in a philosopher... namely...within the Credo itself. Within [the Credo], now this Article and now that Article figure as the unknown X which is solved...by means of the Articles of faith a, b, c, d...which are assumed to be known.[1]

Thus the elements, the 'building blocks, of Anselm's thought are seen as coming, not from a philosophical source, where one might expect to find 'necessary reasons', but "[from] within the Credo itself". The elements of Anselm's thought, the "A B C D's" used to establish his X are all described as coming from 'the Credo'.

So also in Barth's discussion of the Proslogion, all the presuppositions and elements which go to 'prove' Anselm's 'X' are described as coming from 'the Credo'.[2]

Not once is Anselm ever described as using any borrowings from Philosophy. Further at those points where the subject of Anselm's borrowings from Philosophy cannot be avoided, any signs of this are so played down as to reduce them to insignificance. So, in discussing Anselm's Monologion, where Neo-Platonic elements are perhaps strongest, Barth will dismiss the significance of this factor by referring to it as (mere) "Neo-Platonic technique in the exposition".[3]

Barth's view that there are essentially no borrowings from philosophy comes to the fore when the question of Anselm's discussion with an unbeliever arises. There is no

1. A.F.Q.I., p.55.
2. A.F.Q.I., p.78.
3. A.F.Q.I., p.58.

common ground between these two on which discussion could take place. It is "quite clear that the parties in the discussion are operating on two very different planes".[1]

Thus the main thesis, that all the elements of Anselm's thought come from 'the Credo', and its corollary, that there are essentially no borrowings from philosophy, nor participation in philosophical streams of thought, would seem to be quite clear.

As to the subthesis to the main thesis, that Anselm did his work out of the fullness of faith, faith untroubled by doubt, this is to be found at several places. For example in his discussion of the relation between faith (fides) and the result of Anselm's theological process, understanding (intellectum), it is faith that has already reached "the goal" toward which "understanding" can only approach as upon a path. There is thus "a gap" between the extent to which faith and theological understanding can approach their common object.[2] That faith has reached the goal which understanding can only approach would mean that Barth sees the fullness of faith operating here.

Our summary, "Anselm believed and the Credo was assumed", is also reflected in several places. So Barth speaks of "that acceptance of the Credo of the Church, which faith itself has already implied".[3]

That 'the Credo' as the Faith of the Church is simply and unproblematically assumed, and remains unquestioned is

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1. Ibid., p.63.
2. A.F.Q.I., p.25.
3. Ibid., pp.26,27.

evident when Barth states: "A science of faith, which denied or even questioned the Faith (the Credo of the Church) would ipso facto cease to be either 'faithful' or 'scientific'."[1] How is it that the whole of 'the Credo' and all of its elements are simply and unproblematically assumed. Barth has a simple answer: "through faith in the impartial good sense of the decisions of ecclesiastical authority".[2]

We find no statements that would portray Anselm's faith as anything less than the fullness of faith, or his belief in 'the Credo' as anything but unproblematic belief.

We might turn now to Barth's view of the nature of Anselm's theological process. Here we will only give a brief summary.

The aim of Anselm's theology is to explore and exhibit the "inner consistency"[3] of 'the Credo' that is, the rational interconnections existing between elements or parts of 'the Credo'. Anselm will carry out this program, as was remarked in the foregoing, by selecting one element of 'the Credo', a doctrine or belief, place it 'in brackets', that is, set it aside, and then, choosing other elements out of 'the Credo' show the logical or 'rational' interconnections between the selected elements of the Credo and this one set aside, or placed 'in brackets'. Barth speaks of this process using mathematical symbols, that is, the bracketed belief is the 'X', and the other elements taken

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1. A.F.Q.I., pp.26-27 (emphasis added).
2. A.F.Q.I., p.26.
3. A.F.Q.I., p.70.

from 'the Credo', in terms of which this 'X' will be examined are the 'A B C D'S'. If the theologian has 'discovered' and exhibited '*ratio*' or rational interconnections which exists between A B C D's and the X, that is 'found' how the X interlocks with the A B C D's and thus how they 'cohere' then he has 'established' the X. The 'proof' has taken place. He has reached his goal.[1]

This goal then is 'understanding' which Anselm seeks in faith. When Anselm speaks of "faith seeking understanding", *fides quarens intellectum*, this is the process he speaks of.

It is a process which involves no presuppositions borrowed from philosophy or current world-views, and involves no significant participation in philosophical streams of thought, nor are there any significant borrowings from non-ecclesiastical thought in general.

Thus there is no common ground between Anselm and one who does not believe. There is no basis on which Anselm could 'argue his case' before one who did not believe. Consequently there is no apologetic, in the usual senses of this word, in Anselm.

We shall now go on to examine the text of Anselm's *Proslogion*, the text which Barth studies in his work, and then compare what we find, at various points, with Barth's interpretation.

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1. *A.F.Q.I.*, p.55.

Section B.

"ONTOLOGICAL RATIO" AND "NOETIC RATIO".

There is another preliminary consideration which we might take up before going to the text of Anselm's Proslogion and studying Barth's interpretation of it. In Barth's exposition of Anselm's theological programme, Barth makes use of two unusual terms: "ontological ratio" and "noetic ratio".[1] Since we can find no evidence that these are Anselm's terms, nor any evidence that Anselm ever used such terms, we shall treat them as specifically Barth's terms. We shall do so for an additional reason: Barth uses these terms approvingly, apparently with high esteem for them, and later in his study makes use of them in a normative way when he leaves Anselm's text behind and makes theological formulations apparently meant to be relevant to Twentieth Century theology.[2]

In this chapter, we shall first question the usage of such terms. Is there semantic confusion here?(or at least a semantic muddle)? Then we shall go on to ask what these terms meant for Barth. Lastly we shall examine what we see as certain "dissonances" between what we see as Anselm's method of thinking and Barth's method of thinking over this issue, specifically

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1. See A.F.Q.I., pp.48ff.

2. See below, pp.103ff.

at the point where this issue touches on methods of analogy.

The Problem of the Use of Language.

At one point in describing Anselm's theological process of thought, Barth begins talking of "noetic ratio". What he refers to is that which is in the human mind, the mind of the theologian. It is used in contrast to "ontological ratio." What this latter term refers to is much more difficult to pin down. Yet this first term, "noetic ratio", may strike the reader as somewhat odd. What other kind of ratio can there be, if not "noetic" ratio? After all, does not ratio have to do with what goes on in the mind, with 'having reasons' for thinking such and such, with 'reasoning toward a solution', with 'using ones reason', perhaps using it to construct a body of logically interrelated thought, or a body of 'rationality'?

These things would all seem to have to do in one way or another with the mind and what goes on within it, with the realm of 'nous' or thinking. Thus the term 'noetic': roughly, having to do with thought. But why then talk of "noetic ratio"? This seems repetitive. We shall return to this question as we proceed. Let us turn to the other term now. Barth goes on to talk of another kind of ratio. He will call it "ontological ratio". This is something

to be distinguished sharply from "noetic" ratio. This term may also strike the reader as somewhat strange. For "ontological" is a term that usually has to do with "being". Yet both "noetic" and "ratio" are terms which usually have to do with "thought". And since the time of Hume, and even more so, Kant, the distinction between these two groupings of words has become sharpened in to the categories of "thought" on the one hand, and "being" on the other.

Now let us suppose for a moment that Barth intends to use this rather strange term "ontological ratio", to describe something outwith the circle of human subjectivity, that is, a 'ratio' existing independently of any human mind.

Let us suppose further that what he wants to describe has to do with the deity, for example, with what is 'in the mind of God', and, if we go one step further, with what God 'speaks' in his addressing man 'in his Word'.

Now it would seem to us that if one is talking of a personal God, which we assume to be the case here, one is talking of a personal Subject. Now if one wishes to use the word 'ratio' about what is 'in the mind' of this personal Subject, one is hard pressed to know why this should not be considered "noetic" ratio, that is, why one wishes to make this switch from "noetic ratio" to some sort of "ontological ratio". Yet Barth does want to make this switch.

But we must note (1) that he has had to invent a term here at this point;[1] and (2) he has created a hybrid term, one part of which having to do with thought, the other part having to do with being; (3) In doing so he has mixed the categories of "thought" and "being" in an area where philosophers and theologians have been particularly sensitive about distinctions, about 'which falls to each'. We shall note below that he makes this move not just to interpret Anselm, but also in a normative sense, for twentieth century theology.

Nevertheless he does go ahead and make this move. Thus we find two kinds of ratio, "ontological" and "noetic". If the one usage, "noetic" ratio, would seem to us repetitive and 'redundant', saying one thing twice, this other usage "ontological ratio" would seem to us an even more unusual usage of words.

We would venture then that the term "ontological ratio" must be considered as somewhat of an anomoly. That is, if we compare this term to a term from a more mundane realm, the terminology of golf, perhaps we might find a rough parallel. When a golfer speaks of a "wooden iron", he speaks loosely, and for the sake of convenience simply uses the term without stopping to examine it. Yet if one wishes to speak with precision about the substances involved

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1. See A.F.Q.I. pp.48ff.

here, the noun could be misleading. Iron it isn't. Wood it is. "A wooden iron?" an unknowing philosopher might ask in surprise. "What kind of entity is that!!?" However, golfers can speak loosely and the language seems to serve the purpose. If, however, a philosopher or theologian speaks loosely, without care, at important points in his process of thought, his enterprise may very well suffer. Or possibly the reverse might occur: his thought process may do very well, to all appearances, based on a technical mis-use of language. He "gets somewhere (illegitimately) with words".

We think it probable that the term "ontological ratio" is much like this golfer's term "wooden iron". While Barth may well wish to describe something that is ontological, ratio it isn't; or: we do not follow how it could be "ratio" if it is ontological. For, if, for example he wishes to mean by ratio: "logical relationships existing between ontological entities", he will have to work quite hard to convince many people that logical relationships are "out there" rather than being, for example the way objects are perceived (here already it is in the 'noetic' realm, for 'in the way that they are perceived' means in effect, 'in the perception' and already we are within 'the eye of the beholder'.) This would not necessarily mean, as it can in modern thought, that this 'subjective' realization has no 'objective' basis, but rather, that 'logical' and 'rational' are things to do with human perception

and judgement.

If Barth means by ontological ratio, something which is "out there" as far as humans are concerned, yet "out there, in a mind", that is "in the mind of God", then we cannot see how "ontological" applies, for if it is thought of as existing in a mind, then "noetic" would seem a more fitting term than "ontological".

One of the problems of understanding Barth at this point is that the term is used so loosely that one cannot know specifically which of these he means. In our view, the term remains an anomoly, like the term "wooden iron". We can only go on now to see how he views the relation between "ontological ratio" and "noetic ratio".

How Does Barth Use these Terms?

We have referred to these categories of "noetic ratio" and "ontological ratio" in the foregoing as Barth's categories, even though they appear in his book on Anselm. We have done so, as we have said at the outset of this chapter, because we cannot find any evidence that Anselm used such categories. We have not found, (and Barth does not give citations of) Anselm using these terms. We have referred to these categories as Barth's categories for the additional reason that at points he uses the terms independently of his interpretation of Anselm's text, and in a way

that is, in our view, meant to be normative for twentieth century thought. So, for example, when Barth ventures suppositions about how such an argument as Anselm's could have real force (in his interpretation) for an unbeliever, he ventures that it is this "ontological ratio" which "enlightens man from above", which makes the argument effective. Here he uses the term "objective ratio", yet in other places he uses "objective ratio" and "ontological ratio" interchangeably. Thus the argument could be effective for the unbeliever because of "the objective ratio of the object of faith that enlightens...(and is) able to teach truths that are beyond the power of one human being to teach another."[1] Barth then lays beside this conception of "objective ratio" which he attributes to Anselm, his own view of how this conception of "objective ratio" actually applies in the situation of preaching. That is, "...where the first and last presupposition of the preacher must be trust in the objective ratio that... enlightens from above ... and where we must move on... to our task with a sense of humour..."[2] So we can only conclude that this is a normative view of Barth.

Now we may ask, what does Barth, the interpreter mean when he uses these terms of his. It would appear that there are two realms of ratio. There is the

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.71.

2. Ibid. (emphasis added).

"noetic ratio" of the theologian. But there is also the "ontological ratio" of "the beyond", of the deity, existing in complete independence from the human mind. This latter is not only the proper object of the theologian's study, but is that on which the "noetic ratio" is completely dependent, not only for its content, but for its existence. The "noetic ratio" is "enlightened from above" by this "ontological ratio". Without this relationship, one of almost pure dependence of the "noetic ratio" upon the "ontological ratio", theology would be impossible. The job of the "noetic ratio" is to reproduce the "ontological ratio" with accuracy and "faithfulness".

We will see now how Barth's idea of analogy derives from his view of these two realms of ratio. In this idea of analogy the primary 'partner' of the analogy is in the realm of the "ontological ratio". Earthly reality is then to be interpreted as being analogous with the reality of this other realm. For example: one does not gain a notion of what the Heavenly Father is like from earthly fathers, or human parents, but rather, just the reverse. One gets to know what a human father should (properly) be by first knowing specifically what the Heavenly Father is like.[1] Thus in this form of analogy one gets his notion or idea from the realm of "the beyond".

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1. C.D.II/1, pp.229ff.

Barth abhors types of analogy which travel in the opposite direction, specifically the Catholic analogia entis, which in Barth's view has the reverse procedure. That is, one travels roughly from earthly reality to the realm of "the beyond".

It is somewhat interesting then to compare this idea of analogy with the manner in which one gets an idea of the meaning of the 'key phrase' according to Anselm. In Anselm's response to Gaunilo he addresses this issue: How does one get an idea or notion of "that than which nothing-greater-can-be-thought"? Gaunilo insists he cannot "form an idea of it from other things similar to it."[1] Anselm responds: Obviously this is not so", and proceeds to show how he thinks a notion can be formed; "mounting from the less good to the more good...it is evident to every rational mind that...we can...conjecture a great deal about that-than-which-a greater-cannot-be-thought."[2] That he has earthly reality in mind as his starting point, "mounting from the less good to the more good" is underlined when he remarks that should any "orthodox Christian" deny this, let his remember that 'the invisible things of God from the Creation of the world are clearly seen through the things that have been

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1. Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo, Charlesworth, p.187, line 5.

2. Ibid., lines 6-11.

made, even his eternal power and God head [Romans I, 20]'." [1]

With his citation of Romans, then, Anselm would appear to be underlining and supporting the 'rightness' of his "mounting from the less good to the more good", that is his use of 'the things that have been made'. In short, we find Anselm forming notions from earthly reality. And this is quite in contrast to Barth's method of forming notions from other wordly reality which will be applied to earthly reality.

We would see considerable "dissonance" then between what we find to be Anselm's method here, and both Barth's interpretation of Anselm's method, and Barth's own method of analogy which comes into operation in the Church Dogmatics.

We shall deal with these concepts at various points as we go on now to consider the text of Anselm's Proslogion and Barth's interpretation of it.

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1. Ibid., lines 30-35.

Chapter II.

CONSIDERATION OF THE TEXT OF THE PROSLOGION AND BARTH'S INTERPRETATION OF IT.

Section A.

CONSIDERATION OF THE TEXT OF THE PROSLOGION AND BARTH'S INTERPRETATION OF IT: THE PROCEDURE WE SHALL FOLLOW.

We shall now turn to consider in some detail the text of the Proslogion, and Barth's interpretation of it. In the chapters which follow we shall take up one element or aspect in each section, examine the text, examine Barth's interpretation and offer a critique in the same place.

Following this part of our study we will consider more general issues concerning Barth's interpretation. At the conclusion of Part II of our thesis we shall draw together and summarize our findings.

We shall begin with a brief summary of Anselm's argument in the Proslogion, Chapter II (our own account).

A Summary of Anselm's Argument in the Proslogion, Chapter II.

Anselm first sets out a definition of the deity. If we define him as: that-than-which-no-greater-can-be-conceived, then we can reason as follows:

If one[1] can hear and understand this phrase one can then have it in his mind, as a conception. But which is greater: this idea as it exists in the mind alone, or also in reality? But surely if it exists in

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1. The Insipiens or Fool who does not believe is brought in here, as one who can hear and understand this phrase, and follow as the argument proceeds. There is no evidence that he is 'left behind' at any point as the argument proceeds.

reality it is greater. But then it must be the case that it exists in reality, because if it existed in the mind alone, one could think of a greater than that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought. But such a state of affairs would be absurd. Therefore that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought must exist in reality.

Section B.

THE MOOD OF THE OPENING OF ANSELM'S PROSLOGION: THE OPENING PRAYER AND BARTH'S 'CONCLUSIONS'

Barth makes much of the fact that Anselm begins his Proslogion in prayer. Barth in fact derives much support for his interpretation of Anselm from this fact. We will first consider this prayer, then take up Barth's interpretation of it.

Let us turn to the opening of Anselm's Proslogion prayer and let us try to sense the underlying mood, the character of Anselm's prayer. It is a complex piece, one fraught with difficulties for the interpreter; there are nuances and allusions which perhaps only a contemporary, or Anselm himself could sense. Yet its main concerns are clear enough.

In the prayer, which has the title "A Rousing of the Mind to the Contemplation of God", Anselm does not show forth sure and certain faith, with which perhaps to bring the same to the fore in his reader. In contrast, there is a depth out of which Anselm asks for help, a depth of 'lostness' and a depth of longing to know "the countenance", "the face" (of the deity). There is an underlying sense of emptiness and unfulfilment.

"The countenance" that he wants to know, is a recurring concern in his prayer. Is the countenance benign, friendly or one of concern, or is it, rather, one of anger. Is it, (perhaps, worse), one of indifference?

He wants to know, and he does not. "How long, Lord,

will you be unmindful of us? 'How long will you turn your countenance from us'?[1] When will you look upon us and hear us?[2] When will you enlighten our eyes and show 'Your countenance' to us?[3] When will you give yourself again to us?..."[4] Anselm continues in a way that suggests a deep identification with the psalmist who vocalizes his concern. He now uses his own words "...I beseech you, Lord, let me not go sighing hopelessly, but make me breathe hopefully again. My heart is made bitter by its desolation...I set out hungry to look for you...Do not let me depart from you fasting...Do not let me return scorned and emptyhanded."[5]

Thus there is a real question here as to whether this contenance will be benign, that is, will this countenance be one that is benign, and 'giving', or will it be one which returns this one, searching for Him, scorned and emptyhanded.[6]

The one who searches for this countenance and wants to know it, speaks as one who is 'out of relation' with that which he seeks. That is, he speaks <u>into the void</u>. He speaks into the darkness. Thus there is another question implicit in his speaking: Is there a face? Is there a countenance? In short, Does the one exist, whom he is addressing.

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1. Ps. xii, I.
2. Ps. xii, 4.
3. Ps. lxxix, 4.
4. Charlesworth, p.113, (last three lines), p.115, lines 1-3.
5. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.115, lines 8-16.
6. <u>Ibid.</u>, p.115, line 15.

We in no way see that simply because Anselm addresses a Thou, that it necessarily follows that the one who addresses has faith that there is a Thou, and more than that, has sure and certain faith that there is a Thou. Additionally, it would seem that the one who speaks here is out of relation with the One he would address.

While on the one hand we are not saying this implies total doubt, yet on the other hand, any faith that is sure and certain, of itself or its Object would seem to be absent. At best, we can only find faith that is troubled, faith that is uncertain, perhaps deeply troubled and deeply uncertain.

Thus the mood is one of darkness, one of apartness, one of longing, and of a felt helplessness that would seem to border on hopelessness.

That the one who would address this Thou is 'out of relation' with whom he wishes to address is underlined by the manner in which the Fall is spoken of, that is, in a way in which one senses that this Fall is experienced, and experienced as somewhat overwhelming.

> How wretched man's lot is when he has lost that for which he was made! Oh how hard and cruel was that Fall!...He [Adam] groaned with fullness; we sigh with hunger. He was prosperous; we go begging.... Why, since it was easy for him, did he not keep for us that which we lack to much? Why did he deprive us of light and surround us with darkness? Why did he take life away from us and inflict death upon us? Poor wretches that we are, whence have we been expelled and whither are we driven? Whence have we been cast down and whither buried? From our homeland into exile....[1]

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1. Ibid., p.113, lines 1-22.

Anselm is deeply expressive here. That 'loss of relation' is central here, and loss of 'the countenance' which he seeks in the opening of the prayer seem clear by the way he continues:

> [Whence have we been expelled, and whither are we driven?]....From the vision of God into our present blindness; from the joy of immortality into the bitterness and horror of death....What a grievous loss, a grievous sorrow, utterly grievous![1]

In what follows Anselm refers again to this loss of relation. "Alas, unfortunate that I am, one of the miserable children of Eve separated from God...."[2]

Now one may object to this interpretation, saying that Anselm has taken up the pose of one who doubts, in order perhaps to vocalize and articulate the doubts of his reader, that is, as a competent actor in drama might convincingly do, acting the part of one who doubts. Yet even <u>if</u> this were so, we would note (1) that Anselm speaks so convincingly and with such expressiveness that he must well have known and experienced that which he talked of; (2) that even if this were so, the argument <u>begins</u> against the same backdrop, that is, of what has actually been articulated in the prayer. Anselm has still begun his <u>Proslogion</u> with the articulation of this dark mood of doubt, or, at best, troubled faith mixed with doubt.

Even though faith is seen to be important for what follows in his <u>Proslogion</u>, near the end of the prayer,[3] it

1. <u>Ibid.</u>, lines 19-26.
2. <u>Ibid.</u>, lines 27-28.
3. "For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand [sed credo ut intelligam]... (Ibid., p.115). In this context one should be careful not to interpret "believe" automatically

(Contd.

would seem quite unnatural for there to be a transition suddenly from the mood we have described, to sure and certain faith, for the beginning of his arguments. As we can find no evidence of such a dramatic transition, we can only conclude that this mood of doubt, or troubled and uncertain faith is meant to form not only the backdrop but the point of departure for the arguments which follow. Thus when at the beginning of the chapter which follows we find the words "...now we believe that you are something than which nothing greater can be thought", and in the line before, "...grant me that I may understand...that you exist as we believe you to exist...", the meaning, and thus the force of "believe" here must be seen as modified by the whole of the prayer which has just finished. Thus we must see, at most, a tentativeness here, congruent with the mood of the prayer. Simply because the word is credo does not mean that it is the credo which thunders forth with the affirmation of certainty from the Mass or the creed "Credo in unum deum...". We have seen no thundering forth in this manner in the opening prayer. Such a sudden transition of mood, again, would seem quite unnatural, and we can find no evidence even to suggest it.

The mood of this opening prayer stands out in sharp relief when compared with the manner in which Anselm closes his Proslogion[1]. In Chapter 26, one no longer hears sighs

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Contd.) as "believe with certitude", or as believing untroubled by doubts. That it occurs within this context suggests, in our view, quite strongly, that for Anselm faith and doubt were not like oil and water, i.e.,'unmixable'.

1. Pointed out by J. McIntyre in St. Anselm and His Critics, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, p. 1954, p.9ff.

of hopelessness, agony over Adam's Fall, nor petition for help in distress. Rather, one hears an almost unbounded expression of exuberance. Anselm speaks of a joy which touches the roots of his being.

Since it was the Fall of Adam which was so acutely experienced in the opening and, here at the conclusion, the experience of this Fall is no longer present in a relevant way, and since the Fall of Adam had to do, even in Anselm's words, with 'separation', 'exile', 'loss of relation' it would seem then that the change of mood has to do, to some extent at least with a change vis a vis Anselm's faith and restored relationship.

If it were only the case here, as Barth insists, that a theologian has only better understood the inter-relations between previously accepted articles of faith, and that his work, by definition, could be of no aid to his faith, we would find not only the extended reference to the experience of the Fall of Adam, at the beginning of the Proslogion, and the consequent expression of exuberant happiness, here at the conclusion, in terms alluding to entering "into the joy of the Lord"[1] which so touches the whole of his being that "when the heart is filled with that joy, the mind is filled with it, the soul is filled with it, [and] the whole man is filled with it...",[2] we would find such a change of mood somewhat puzzling, if only an intellectual process, even a very satisfying intellectual process, such as Barth describes, had taken place.[3]

1. Charlesworth, p.153, lines 11,12.
2. Ibid., lines 5-7.
3. We would add to this the view of J. McIntyre, whose remarks suggested this idea, that "This change of mood from

(Contd.

Barth's Interpretation of the Opening Prayer

How then does Barth interpret the Opening Prayer. He simply does not interpret it. He begins his 'verse by verse' treatment of the text of the Proslogion with Chapter 2, that is, that which immediately follows the prayer. We can find no consideration of the text, or the content of the prayer anywhere in Barth's study.[1] If our interpretation of the prayer is somewhat near the mark, it is not in Barth's interests to consider it. For, in Barth's interpretation, Anselm begins his 'argument' with untroubled faith. That is, the methodological point of departure of Anselm's argument is sure and certain faith, faith with essentially no admixture of doubt; and with unproblematic belief in the totality of 'the Credo'.

By interpreting Anselm as beginning in this manner, it would be our opinion that here, right at the beginning, Barth has "gotten off on the wrong foot", or at least a misleading one, and that this has shaped his whole interpretation of the Proslogion. Unfortunately, we find that he has completely ignored the prayer, its nature and character, which immediately precedes the arguments, wrongly concluding from the fact that Anselm prays, that the argument takes sure and certain faith, and an actualized relationship to God as its methodological point of departure.

Contd.) c.1 to c.26 is so marked that it appears permissible to conclude that the address to God which occupies cc.2-25 is the process in and through which St. Anselm has been taken from uncertainty concerning God to joy in his presence". Op.cit., p.9; Cf. p.10.

1. Even where Barth goes on about the prayer at some length, it is solely about the significance of the fact that Anselm prays (or Barth's interpretation of this significance). Cf. A.F.Q.I., pp.101,102.

Section C.

THE CHANGE OF CHARACTER IN ANSELM'S 'KEY PHRASE': BARTH'S INTERPRETATION[1]

At the beginning of the Proslogion's arguments, Anselm uses a phrase to describe the deity. God is "something than which nothing greater can be thought".[2] This phrase, with only minor variations, forms a thread through the whole of Chapters 2 and 3, the arguments for the existence of God, and indeed throughout the remaining chapters of the Proslogion. This phrase is so central in Anselm's arguments that it has commonly been called "the key phrase". In the following we shall call it by this name.

The main interest in the following pages is to show how this phrase is regarded, and how it changes in character and meaning halfway through the argument in Barth's interpretation; and further, how the whole character of Anselm's thought is affected as a result.

In Barth's interpretation of Proslogion 2, there is a basic shift in the meaning of the key phrase.[3] Briefly, the phrase, "that than which no greater can be conceived" has one word which shifts meaning, thus radically altering

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1. Ideas germane to the following were first suggested by McGill, in Hick and McGill, p.100ff.
2. Proslogion, Chapter 2, Charlesworth, p.117.
3. McGill is also of this opinion, op.cit., p.100.

the character of the argument midstream. The word is "can" (posse).

As the "argument" begins, "can" has behind it the basic meaning "is able". Man is not able to conceive a greater, or "this is that than which man is not able to conceive a greater".[1] As far as we can tell this word retains a meaning within the range of "is able" throughout the argument. And for this reason Anselm's argument remains an argument.

Yet in Barth's interpretation, there is a basic alteration of meaning of this model auxiliary "can". It occurs midstream in the argument in Proslogion 2. Suddenly the insipiens (we cannot call him a "fool" if he can follow such an intricate argument as this!) is left behind.[3] The sense of the key phrase will have to become a forbidding 'no' to certain modes of thought. The sense of "cannot" is altered from "is not able" to a quite different "is not permitted". And the "key phrase", changes character in Barth's interpretation from having "a purely noetic" content to embodying in Barth's words a "prohibition" for thought.[2]

Perhaps now one could briefly examine the text of Chapter II of the Proslogion in light of this aspect of

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1. Our own paraphrase of Anselm's phrase.

2. Barth speaks quite explicitly of the phrase as: "this prohibition: he can conceive of nothing greater". A.F.Q.I., p.77. Cf. p.73ff. for Barth's characterization of this phrase. Is there not much of the early Barth here, for example, the loud snapping "neins" to man's 'initiative'? Does not again a human voice get confused with a deity's voice (or so it does in our view), and does not Barth here do the confusing, that is confusing what he wishes to slap or snap at with a supposition as to how the deity would react? Here we find much of the early Barth.

3. Anselm has been explaining how this insipiens, that is, the fool who says in his heart there is no God (Psalm 13:1) can follow his argument.

Barth's interpretation. We shall explicate Barth's interpretation further in the process.

Firstly, is there literary evidence for a basic shift in the nature of the argument, specifically where (in Barth's interpretation) the insipiens is supposedly left behind, and is no longer kept in mind? That is, is there evidence that Anselm has left him behind? This supposed change occurs at a specific point in Anselm's text.[1] One could ask two questions: (1) Is there literary evidence for a radical change, and (2) Is there in fact literary evidence which weighs against the existence of any such change.

The last sentence before this change is: "Even the Fool, then, is forced to agree that something than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the mind since he understands this when he hears it and whatever is understood is in the mind". The text at the point of the supposed change continues, and in the Latin we find these words: "Et certe...," i.e. "And surely that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot (nequit) exist in the mind alone". "Si enim vel..." "For if it exists solely in the mind...".[2] Not only can one see no evidence of a change here, but: (1) Et certe suggests a continuation of the same train of thought;[3] and (2) this impression is strengthened by the beginning of the next sentence "Si enim vel...", "For if...".

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1. In the Latin text, line 15 in Charlesworth, p.116; In translation, line 22, p.117, ibid. Barth pinpoints this sentence as the point of change. In exegeting the passage following this, he begins: "We have now entered upon the Proof proper..." A.F.Q.I.,p.123. In the context of Barth's discussion this indicates the point of change. Cf. Ibid., p.123f.
2. Charlesworth, p.117, lines 19-24 for this whole passage.
3. Suggested by McGill, in Hick and McGill, pp.100,101.

Both of these literary connectives in the Latin text suggest an even flow of thought, with no real shift, either of intention or intended audience.

Secondly, is there evidence for a basic shift in the meaning of the "key phrase" and specifically of that modal auxiliary, "can" (posse)?

We may note at the outset that posse in Latin usage is ambivalent, and can have at least two basic fields of meanings. The one, of course, is "is able". The other centers around "is permitted"; and one would suppose that the context in which it would be most relevant is a legal one, or one having to do with actions, for example, in the social-political sphere, or with mores, customs, traditions.[1]

Again we could go first to the text with the question. As the key phrase moves throughout the short chapter, are there signs that this modal auxiliary within it undergoes a basic change of meaning? It is quite clear that in the beginning of the argument its meaning is within the field of "is able".

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1. In A Latin Dictionary, ed. C.T. Lewis and Charles Short, Oxford, London, 1940, we find: "possum"
   I. In gen., to be able, have power; I (thou, he, etc.) can...; it may be, is possible...as much as (or) as far as possible;
   II. In partic., to be able, to have influence or efficacy, to avail; ... Posse as subst. (poet.) the power of speech...;
   In apodosis of conditional sentences, analogous to the auxiliaries of the Eng. potential mood.

(1) We note that Anselm uses the term *posse* throughout the argument. There is no change of word which might indicate a shift of meaning.

There is one exception to this. In the sentence which follows the *supposed* change in the nature of the argument, the word Anselm uses in place of *posse* in the key phrase is *nequit*.[1] This is of definite interest, for *nequire* does not share the same ambivalence of meaning as *posse*. Its basic meaning is "to be unable".[2]

So in the study of the literary aspect of the text we can find no evidence of a change. We can in fact find evidence to the contrary.

Thus, in the midst of the section of the argument where Barth sees the key phrase suddenly taking on the character of a prohibition, and thus in a place where one would thus expect the modal auxiliary in the key phrase to shift from "is not able" (that than which one *is not able* to think of a greater) to "is not permitted" (that than which one is not permitted to think of a greater) one finds *nequit* (*nequire*) substituted for the more common *posse*. Further: *nequire does not have this secondary "prohibitive" sense which posse can*.[3] We can only conclude that *Anselm had no intention of*

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1. Line 16 of the Latin text, *Ibid.*
2. We shall establish this in what follows.
3. In Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary* (op.cit.) we find: "*nequeo*: to be unable, not to be able, I cannot." All of these, we may note have to do with "is able". We find only one other listing: "impers: it is impossible." This last, "it is impossible" is used in an *impersonal* sense. Thus it *carries no sense of "being prohibited"*. The example given by Lewis and Short would bear this out.

implying a prohibition with his key phrase.

One could argue that thinkers in the medieval period were basically insensitive to the question of meaning, and thus basic shifts of meaning. That is, that Western man grew only much later to sense the complexity of these issues, and that if there was such a shift of meaning, that Anselm simply could not be aware of the "mistake", and thus be excused.

But there is evidence to the contrary, not only that medieval thinkers were sensitive to this problem but also that there was an awareness that some thinkers could and would use fluidity of meaning to their advantage in a way which one could only call subterfuge.

To the first point firstly: as to whether Anselm in particular was sensitive to the complexity of meaning, and in particular the meaning of modal auxiliaries.

That Anselm was sensitive to complexities of meaning, and meanings of modal auxiliaries is evident in his de Grammatica. We may note that the probable date of composition of the latter is relatively close to the probable date of the Proslogion (1080-85 and 1078 respectively). Here we find that posse can carry the sense of having power, having competence in doing something; and also whether something is within the range of possibility.[1] What we find then is a consideration of the complexity of the meanings of modals and posse in particular.

To the second point as to whether there was sensitivity

1. D.P. Henry, The Logic of St. Anselm, London, 1967, p.140ff.

to the misuse of words, of "getting places (illegitimately) with words", one of Anselm's pupils was sensitive and to the extent that he commented on Anselm himself in this respect:

> (Anselm taught) not as others do, but in a vastly different way, explaining each point by referring to common and well-known examples, and basing it on solid arguments, without any ornaments or tricks of speech.[1]

The proximity of the two phrases, "solid arguments" and, in contrast, "tricks of speech" suggest a sensitivity to language, particularly in the field of argumentation and suggests an awareness that words can "play tricks on you", and perhaps also that the one who argues can use language in a deceptive manner.

Another Approach to the Problem

We can look at this supposed change from another angle. Barth sees the phrase as having a "purely noetic content" at the outset.[2] But (as we have pointed out) there comes a point in the text when the *insipiens* is left behind, and after this point the phrase is seen as a prohibition. Just what Barth means by "purely noetic content" is not made clear. But what would seem clear is that the phrase is, in a Barthian framework of thinking, inert, inactive, without the character of being "Word" or at least considered as such. In contrast, suddenly after

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1. Eadmer, *Vita Anselmi*, ed. R.W. Southern, London, 1962, p. 56. Cited in Charlesworth, p.11.
2. *A.F.Q.I.*, p.83; also pp.100ff.

line 15 of Chapter Two[1] the phrase is a prohibition,[2] a 'revealed rule for thought'; in short it is suddenly Word. Barth remarks that interpreters have ignored "the revelatory-theological character of [the key phrase]".[3]

Perhaps now we could turn to another central aspect of Barth's interpretation of Proslogion, Chapter II, and this key phrase in particular. It is as if a deus ex machina must enter halfway through the argument, interrupt the reader and say: "Look here: you can't think like that. I won't have it, this thinking of a greater.[4] This is the consequence we see when this phrase is interpreted as (1) having the nature of a prohibition, and (2) having a "theological-revelatory character", that is, being a Word of prohibition.

The success of Anselm's argument, in Barth's interpretation, is dependent on this change midstream in the

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1. Charlesworth, p.116.
2. A.F.Q.I., p.77.
3. A.F.Q.I., p.78, n.2.
4. If this is Barth's deity, one could think of a greater, namely one who would refrain from interrupting or erupting this way in the midst of man's reflective process. It would be "big" of the deity to allow man to have peace, detachment and a mind of his own, as in reality seems the case, even if man may be somewhat wrongheaded at times. If this freedom is there, then one could only conclude that the deity has been "big" enough to take this risk. There are too many all too human thinkers who would want to take away this freedom and thus remove all such risks.

Proslogion, Chapter 2. As far as one can see, this change means a considerable change of meaning of the "key phrase" and concurrently a considerable change in the whole ethos and tone of the argument. A quiet meditative reflection suddenly bodies forth some command which has struck down into man's reflective process from above. And this has happened with no change of literary style, no obvious change of tone of the argument, no change of words in the key phrase. In short, we can see no solid hint of this in the argument.

We can only conclude then, if Barth is correct, that:

(1) Anselm is careless, or quite uncritical in his use of words, shifting meanings at critical junctures with no notice given, or doing this clandestinely, by using a word (posse) which can embody at least two widely disparate meanings.

(2) Not only is Anselm uncritical or careless in the use of words but he is unaware of a basic shift of the nature of his argument. Either he is not aware, or, worse, not willing to be open and explicit with his reader about what is occurring in his argument, and about that on which his argument depends for its validity.

In short he is either a quite uncritical thinker, or quite an opportunistic thinker. Opportunistic, one would have to add, in the name of a higher good, i.e. in order to be convincing in a good cause.

It is interesting that points (1) and (2) above could easily fill out the meaning of the term which Barth uses

here and later in the C.D:"implicit apologetics". What Barth sees Anselm doing, and on another level wants to see happening in Anselm's argument, what one could call a deus ex machina intervening in midstream, these very things can help us understand what Barth meant by implicit apologetics.

Are we right then in understanding Barth about this, namely that certain portions of the Proslogion are to be understood and "heard" as "Word", and that apart from this happening, the whole thing falls through? By "this", we mean of course the deus ex machina which we have just referred to which intervenes in the midst of the argument.

We may note the rather important implications of this, if we are correct. For Barth there are three forms of "the Word": "The Word Revealed" (Incarnation...), The Word Written (Scripture), and the Word Preached (Preaching). Theology or Dogmatics is to be distinguished carefully from each of these, as reflection upon "the Word", and not "Word" itself. It is to be distinguished from preaching in particular.[1]

But here in the Proslogion we have what Barth explicitly considers "a model piece of good, penetrating and neat theology, which at every step [he has] found instructive and edifying".[2] And we find that here a human word, Anselm's word, is to be a considered "Word". And at that, not in any

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1. C.D. I/1, pp.98-140.
2. A.F.Q.I., p.9.

inert way, but in an active, "inbreaking" way, so characteristic of earlier Barthian thought. In short it is 'Event'.

In the closing paragraph of Barth's book on Anselm he states:

> God gave himself as the object of his [Anselm's] knowledge and God illumined him [Anselm] that he might know him as object. Apart from this event there is no proof of the existence, that is of the reality of God....In the power of this event..."[1]

Obviously, then, for Barth theology is not only reflection upon "Word", but "Word" itself.

The consequence of this is that it would be impossible for Barth to maintain any clear distinction at this point between theology and preaching. Both intend to address hearers, and both intend to address hearers, at points, as "Word".

This should be instructive in understanding the overall nature of the Church Dogmatics which Barth commenced with at the same time as he wrote the above words, quite favorably, about Anselm's theology.

An Argument from Authority

As we have already described, in Barth's interpretation there is, in the thinking and reflecting moment, a sudden disruption, an intrusion into this important moment in man's personal life. We refer to the "theological-revelatory character" of the key phrase as it takes the form

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.171, underlining added.

of a Word of prohibition. One says disruptive and intrusive, for what Barth intends or wants to see is a disruption by an authority; a command, and a negative command at that.

This is not a side issue or a minor element in Barth's interpretation of Anselm's Proslogion for without this supposed intrusion, the argument, for Barth, would end in futility.[1] It would seem that Anselm's words carry weight and have validity only with this supposed intrusion. It becomes, as McGill suggests, just what Anselm intends it to avoid becoming, (and Barth explicitly acknowledges with ostensible approval, this intention): an argument from authority.[2]

One would note also that in Barth's interpretation of Anselm's Proslogion, theology takes on and has to take on, the character of preaching, for it to succeed in the manner that Barth wishes it to. It is this supposed intrusion into the moment of reflection which would give it this character.

One could note also that the supposed intrusion that Barth/has in mind here perhaps is not supportive of free inquiry. It takes the form of a prohibition. One could say that this supposed intrusion is one that would be hostile to thought. It takes the form of "Thou shall not think such and such...".

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.171.
2. McGill would also understand Barth's interpretation in this manner. Op.cit., p.101f.

Barth points out that an essential element in Anselm's methodology is a manner of argumentation which avoids argument "from authority". This is in connection with the intention to prove "sola ratione", or by means of "necessary reasons". Whatever the latter phrase means, it indicates the intention to avoid "argument from authority".

But then, in Barth's interpretation, Anselm's argument in the Proslogion Chapters 2 and 3 involves what appears as a deus ex machina, an intervention of a deity who "speaks" a word of "prohibition". As we have seen, the success of Anselm's argument in Barth's interpretation is dependent on the intervention of this authority, and dependent, on no less than an authoritarian intervention: Not all authorities intervene, and not all intervene in a manner which is prohibitive, here, prohibitive of thought.

Barth then has failed to point out a basic and essential contradiction between what he sees as Anselm's methodology, on the one hand, (i.e. what Anselm has said he is doing), and his method on the other hand (i.e. the actual path he has supposedly taken in his argument). Thus, in Barth's interpretation Anselm has failed in an essential way to live up to his explicit intention. And Barth the interpretive critic has failed to note the contradiction in his interpretation of Anselm.[1]

Since Barth, so far as we know, is the only interpreter

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1. This problem was cited first by McGill, in Hick and McGill, p.101f.

to interpret Anselm in this manner, and since there are so many obvious difficulties with this interpretation, we may ask: Why does Barth so interpret Anselm? That is, why does he go so far out of his way to bring this authoritarian element into the midst of Anselm's reflective moment?

Is this not a Barthian krisis which supposedly erupts? Not a crisis in the most common sense of the English word, but a supposed in-breaking of judgement? This is our view, since because we can find no justification for Barth's interpreting Anselm in the manner he does, we can only conclude that Barth has inadvertently mis-interpreted Anselm in such a manner which would support his own views in theological matters.

The krisis which supposedly erupts the inbreaking of judgement which takes the form of a strict and harsh prohibition, namely, not to think such and such, does in fact re-echo a common and central theme of Barth's own theologizing in the decade and a half immediately preceding the composition of this book on Anselm.[1] We would then see this basic element of Barth's interpretation of Anselm as an element carried over from this earlier period of his thought.

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1. Cf. Zahrnt, p.23ff., especially p.25ff. In the Commentary on Romans, second edition of 1920, the expression krisis occurs on nearly every other page. It is a central and key theme of Barth's early theology.

Section D.

THE QUESTION OF THE SOURCE OF THE 'KEY PHRASE'.

Barth states quite categorically (1) that the 'key phrase', "that than which nothing greater can be conceived", is "taken from the Credo";[1] (2) it thus has the status of an article of faith,[2] and (3) that Anselm "declares quite explicitly the source from which he considers it to have come to him".[3] He also states (4) that the key phrase is in fact a 'Name of God' and (5) that "it is in fact as far as Anselm is concerned a revealed Name of God."[4]

As (1), (2) and (3) form a group, let us consider these first. As to (1), the central and most important statement here, we can find absolutely no substantiation in Barth's text for this statement. That is, no source, and no concrete text is ever cited where this phrase or anything near it occurs, whether scripture, Creeds, or 'the Fathers'. The objection that McGill raises to this assertion of Barth is only partially to the point. McGill remarks that it is simply not the type of phrase that one finds in a Creed. It has no resemblance to a Credal declaration.[5] Yet while Barth means to cover a wider territory than just creeds with his term 'the Credo', that is, more or less the whole of the 'authoritative documents' of the Church, excluding Scripture,[6] i.e., Creeds and 'Official Doctrine', we may

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.78.
2. Implicit in the same passage, Ibid., p.78.
3. Ibid., p.77
4. Ibid., emphasis added .
5. Cf. Hick and McGill, p.93ff.
6. See above, p.91.

note that, given even this wider ground we still find no substantiation of Barth's claim, no citation from any source in Barth's work. If Anselm does in fact "declare quite explicitly the source [from which it came]" we find this lack of citation somewhat odd.

There is only one 'substantiating footnote' to this passage in Barth's study concerning Anselm's 'explicit declaration' of the source. Here we find what we take to be an attempt at substantiating this claim indirectly from something that Anselm has said. The footnote consists simply of a short passage from the Proslogion, and a more or less superfluous comment:

> Si enim aliqua mens posset cogitare aliquid melius te, ascenderet creatura super Creatorem et judicaret de Creatore: quod valde est absurdum [...For if some intelligence could think of something better than you, the creature would be above its creator - and that is completely absurd]. (Prosl. 3:I,103,4ff)[1]

Barth adds only a comment on the fittingness of Anselm's use of melius rather than maius in the passage.

How this passage from Anselm has anything to do with indicating the source of the phrase is not indicated. The passage would seem to concern 'conceiving' (cogitare), and the absurdity of conceiving of something better than the deity.

As we have already remarked, in (4) and (5), Barth states categorically that this phrase, "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" is "a Name of God". He

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.77, footnote 4. We have added Charlesworth's translation of the passage, and left it standing since there seem to be no real textual difficulties here. Charlesworth, p.119.

also states that this is not his interpretation, but that this is Anselm's view of the phrase.

Neither in the footnote to this statement, nor in what follows this passage, do we find any reference to anything which Anselm has said which might substantiate this.

But then if it is Barth's view, that this phrase is "a Name of God": (1) What does he mean, and (2) How does he substantiate his quite categorical statement that it is "a Name of God"?

From the footnote to this passage[1] it would seem that Barth means something similar to a usage of nomen in Medieval Scholasticism. There occurs among the scholastics the term "nomen Dei". Yet, as Barth has to admit, all three writers whom he cites, Bonaventura, Thomas and Agidius of Rome, use this term in the sense of the nomen essentiale Dei, that is, "the Nature of God". Barth contrasts this meaning to his own meaning of nomen. For Barth, the 'key phrase' is a "nomen personae". What he means by this, in contrast to the Medieval usages he cites is not clear. What is clear is that he means something quite different from any source, Medieval or otherwise, that he can draw on. Thus we find no substantiation from a text of Anselm supporting Barth's contention. And we find that when Barth has considered other usages of the term nomen in such a context as this, he cannot find a precedent for his specific use of the term, and thus no precedent for his specific way of regarding the phrase.

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.77, n.5.

A Supposition as to the Source

Our task, namely of examining the viability of Barth's interpretation of Anselm, and specifically the question of the source of the 'key phrase' could well end here. We have found Barth's view of the source of the key phrase to be unsupportable and even lacking in any textual evidence.

Yet we could go on and raise the question: Where *might* Anselm have found such a phrase, or a phrase close enough to it to have been suggestive?

To the Library of Bec

If we go to the small library of the monastery of Bec in the early 1100's, that is, about twenty-five years after Anselm was to piece together his argument in a nearby room, and we *can* go there, at least in our imagination, thanks to a 'catalogue' of the books in the library drawn up at this time,[1] we would find the books of no less than three authors, whose work might have proved suggestive for Anselm in the production of his *Proslogion*, and which used phrases which may have proved suggestive for Anselm's 'key phrase'.

Thus in both the works of Boethius and Augustine, two authors Anselm 'knew' well, he might have found definitions of the deity which were highly suggestive. In fact, in Augustine's *De Libero Arbitrio*, Anselm would have found an argument for the existence of God which has marked similarities with, as well as equally significant differences

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1. Charlesworth cites sources, op.cit., p.15. See also footnote 2 in the same place.

from, his own argument.[1] Augustine's argument would seem to function in independence from 'authority', Scriptures or dogma, perhaps even in a 'purely rational' way.[2]

Yet to find those definitions of the deity which might well have proved suggestive for Anselm we could go to Augustine's Confessions and also to his De Moribus Manichaeorum.[3]

Firstly Anselm's phrase:

Aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest.[4]

Something than which nothing greater can be thought.

Now we might go to the Confessions, VII, where we find:

> Neque enim ulla anima umquam potuit poterit ~~de~~ Qur cogitare aliquid, quod sit te melius, qui summum et optimum bonum est.[5]

We may note that elements of Anselm's formula appear, yet not the 'connective tissue'. The elements are not related in the same way.

We might go also to Augustine's De Moribus Manichaeorum where God is defined as a being

Quo esse aut cogitari melius nihil possit[6]

Here again we find surprising similarities. We may note that both of these instances exist separately from

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1. Cf. Charlesworth, p.55f. See also footnote 1, p. 55, where a comparison and contrast between Anselm's and Augustine's works are drawn.
2. Cf. ibid.
3. Cf. ibid., p.56, n.4.
4. There are minor variations of the phrase: "id quo maius cogitari nequit"; "aliquid quo maius cogitare non valet"; etc.
5. Cited in Charlesworth, p.56, n.4.
6. Ibid.

Augustine's argument for the existence of God in De Libero Arbitrio.

If we continue down the shelf in the library of Bec, in the early 1100's, we find among quite a few other books from ancient 'pagan' Rome, two copies of Naturales quaestiones written by the Stoic, Seneca. Here in the preface to this work we find a definition of God which is word for word almost identical with Anselm's phrase. Firstly, Anselm's phrase again:

"Aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari potest".

Seneca's definition:

"...Qua nihil maius cogitari potest".[1]

The context of this passage can be seen if we quote the whole:

> What is God? The mind of the universe; everything that you see and everything that you do not see. His greatness, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is only attributed to him if he alone is everything, if he holds his work from the inside and from the outside.[2]

Here then in Seneca's Naturales quaestiones we find a phrase which word for word and in all essentials is virtually identical with Anselm's phrase. We might also note that it forms part of a definition of God. Could it be that Anselm found his phrase here, in the work of a 'pagan' Roman Philosopher?[3] This is where with others we would venture a supposition, but one we think quite likely for two reasons.

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1. Cited in Charlesworth, p.56, n.4.
2. Translation given in Jonathan Barnes, The Ontological Argument, Macmillan, London, 1972, p.7. We have made only one minor change, translating cogitari as 'conceived', as is usually done, rather than 'imagined' which is Barnes' translation. Emphasis is ours.
3. Barnes, op.cit., p.7., among others is of this opinion.

Firstly, we know for sure that two copies of this work of Seneca were in the library of Bec in the early 1100's,[1] that is, about twenty-five years after Anselm composed his Proslogion. It would then seem quite possible, even quite likely, that at least one of these copies was present in 1076-77 when Anselm wrote his Proslogion.

Yet, one might ask, even if a copy were present, what were the chances that Anselm would have known of it? May it not have been 'in a dark corner' lost in a host of manuscripts, or neglected since it was a 'pagan', not a Christian, work?

To the first question, might it have been 'lost in a host of manuscripts', and therefore easily passed by, / we would say that this would seem highly unlikely. For in the eleventh and twelfth centuries libraries existed only on a small scale. The library of Bec in the early twelfth century contained only one hundred and sixty-four volumes. Books in this period then were scarce, and, perhaps as a consequence, highly valued. They normally had a high circulation within a monastery.

We may note also that Anselm would only have had to read the preface to have run across this definition.

One might note also that there is evidence that 'pagan' Roman writers were regarded with respect not only at Bec, but across Medieval Europe in this period of the beginning

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1. Ibid.

of 'the Twelfth Century Renaissance'.[1] Alongside the study of theology at Bec, one would have found the Roman poets, Ovid, Virgil, Horace, the historical and philosophical writings of Cicero, Pliny the Elder, Caesar, as well as Seneca.[2]

Even if neither of the two copies of Seneca's work were present in Anselm's time, it is possible that it might have been among the works that circulated among the monasteries of France. There was a primitive system of 'library loans' in existence.[3]

The second reason we think this supposition highly likely is the closeness of the two phrases. There is no major dissimilarity. Could it have been that Anselm's phrase flowed off of his pen with naturalness after having found the exact formulation of Seneca suggestive for his own highly original line of reasoning? (We are not saying of course that the phrase had the same meaning for both authors).

If it might actually have been the case that Anselm's phrase was suggested by his reading of Seneca, this would shed a very different kind of light on Anselm's work, and in particular the key phrase, from that in which the phrase appears in Barth's interpretation. Rather than being

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1. Evidence in Charlesworth, p.14. Cf. also Friedrich Heer, The Medieval World: Europe from 1100 to 1350, Cardinal, London, 1974.
2. Charlesworth, p.14.
3. Cf. Jasper Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, Minnesota, Minneapolis, 1972, p.30f.

taken from 'the Credo' and assumed in faith, one would, if the supposition here be correct, see Anselm finding his highly prized phrase in the apparently pantheistic setting of a work by a 'pagan' Roman philosopher.

One might note that even if Anselm might have used a phrase almost word for word from another author, without giving the source, this is hardly unusual for the Medieval period. Nor does it significantly decrease the originality of Anselm's handiwork. After all, who among us 'lesser mortals' could have taken such an 'innocent looking' phrase and forged an argument that was to set some of the greatest minds in philosophy deep in thought and reflection until they could reach some viewpoint concerning it. And so it does yet in our own age.

What we would conclude from all of the foregoing, is that Barth's assumption that the phrase is simply picked out of 'the Credo' is not viable. In contrast there would seem to be a high probability that the source of the 'key phrase' is to be found in non-ecclesiastical philosophy. We may note that if Augustine's works are the source of the phrase, even here there is no evidence to suggest that the phrase would have come from 'the Credo'.

Here then we have an example of a basic element of Anselm's thought, whose probable source is to be found, not in 'the Credo', but in philosophy, whether it be in 'the philosophical Augustine' or Seneca, the Stoic.

The Consequences of our Findings

We should point out that it is essential that this phrase come from 'the Credo' if Barth's account of Anselm's theological scheme is to be successful. For in his account, this phrase is the chief and supreme element allegedly taken from 'the Credo' and used to 'prove' or establish the existence of the deity. That is, it is chief among the A B C D's taken from "the Credo" which go to 'prove' Anselm's X. Compared with this one, the other 'presuppositions' taken allegedly from "the Credo" are of such little consequence as to merit attention only in a footnote in Barth's study.[1] So here, in the 'key phrase', we have a crucial element for Barth's whole interpretation. If this element does not come from 'the Credo', Barth's whole interpretation would seem to fall.

The key element of this alleged procedure was the lifting out of one element from the Credo (as an X), not doubted, but to be 'established' or 'proved' by means of other elements (as A B C D's) each of which came from 'the Credo'. This is the heart of the procedure Barth describes. These A B C D's in Barth's own words are "found somewhere other than [they] ought to be found in a philosopher who deduces the Credo a priori - namely on the same level on which the question to be answered is raised, [that is,] within the Credo itself. Within it, now this Article and now that Article figure as the unknown X 'which is solved in the investigation by means of the Articles of faith a, b, c, d... which are assumed to be known.[2]

1. See A.F.Q.I., p.78, especially footnote 3.
2. A.F.Q.I., p.55.

Here, then, in our study, we have seen that there is absolutely no evidence, that is substantiation, either by citation of a text, or otherwise, (indirectly), that this 'key phrase', this chief and decisive element among the A B C D's going to 'establish' Anselm's X comes from 'the Credo'.[1]

In contrast to Barth's thesis, it seems quite likely that the real source of this phrase is philosophical, and the most probable concrete textual source would seem to be the 'pagan' stoic philosopher Seneca.

Of the several places that Barth's interpretation would seem to us to fail, this is a central one.

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1. McGill, among other interpreters, sees this as the chief failing, among other failings of Barth's interpretation. Cf. Hick and McGill, p.93ff.

Section E.

ANSELM'S "GREATER THAN" PRESUPPOSITION

Charlesworth, among other interpreters, points out an assumption in Anselm's argument which we will try to isolate out below. Our purpose in isolating this element out is to ask about its nature, its importance in Anselm's argument and about its most likely source. Unless we are wrong, it forms a presupposition of a methodological sort which contributes in a central and basic way to Anselm's arriving at his conclusions.

The presupposition could be stated in a general form, namely that one thing or being is "greater than" another if it possesses certain attributes. "Greater than" has the sense of "better" or "more perfect".[1] Thus, as Charlesworth suggests, Anselm argues that a man is "greater than" a horse, by reason of his attributes. Likewise a horse is greater than a tree by reason of the nature of its attributes.[2] "Greater" is not used in a quantitative sense, or various other possible comparative or relative senses, but in an absolute sense. For example, where we can compare <u>in particular respects</u>, a man and a horse, and say that a horse is greater, or more perfect in muscular ability, one such as Anselm is saying that man is greater than or more perfect than a horse <u>in an absolute sense.</u>[3]

What lies behind this assumption is even more interesting: using this idea of 'greater than', one finds

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1. Charlesworth, p. 60.
2. <u>Ibid</u>.
3. <u>Ibid</u>.

that the whole universe has been categorized into levels of being, from inanimate matter at the lowest rung up to man and beyond.

Involved with this mode of conception is the idea that a being or object on a higher rung "has more being" than the being or object on the rung just beneath. This raises an interesting question, for on the surface, the question is one of truth, that is, <u>is</u> a man "greater than" a horse, or a horse "greater than" a tree, in an absolute sense?

One senses beneath this question of being a question of value, for one decides this question only after taking into account certain "attributes" these particulars possess. And there would seem to be a weighting according to the attributes considered. For example a tree lacks in muscular ability compared with a horse. What one senses is the involvement of values and value judgements in what at first sight seems to be questions of truth, in truth judgements.

For example, for the poet, in contrast to the metaphysician, the superiority of a horse over a tree may not at all be evident. A poet may in fact place a higher value on the attributes of trees than on the attributes of horses, and might, if he cared to, argue for their superiority!

Where the question may become more interesting is where man is involved, over against a horse. It would seem that man is considered "greater" or better or "more perfect" usually for the reason of his ability for ratiocination.

While not taking issue with this, one would venture that a large value judgement is involved here also,

specifically, the value of ratiocination. Why has ratiocination been selected? One would note that the person who usually makes this value judgement, the philosopher, perhaps above all others, is one who uses his process of ratiocination in his daily work.

Why could not man be considered superior e.g. in the reason of his capacity for relationship, for companionship, that is, something which involves his whole personality? Of course horses too, perhaps, are capable, in a limited sense, of relationship, but not on the same level as man.

One raises the question to become better acquainted with the values of the metaphysician, in this case, the metaphysician of medieval times. Anselm is probably not far off from Aristotle and Plato in their value scheme in this respect. It would be understandable for a metaphysician to consider ratiocination of higher value than the capability e.g. for relationship. To poets and others these values are not so obvious.

To return to our main theme, when one takes into account this sense of 'greater than', allied with these levels of being, i.e., that a being or object on a higher rung "has more being" or existence than one on a lower rung, one can sense better what Anselm means when in addressing the deity he says that compared with the deity man hardly exists at all.

As Charlesworth points out, this idea of levels of being and this sense of "greater than" strikes 20th century readers as somewhat strange. We are not used to thinking in these categories or with this sense of "greater than". This raises the interesting question of its source or rootage.

Firstly though, we shall consider what place this idea has in Anselm's argument. Is it peripheral, of little importance, or is it much more than that?

At several key points in Anselm's argument he has to ask whether A is "greater than" B. And if the answer is positive, certain important consequences follow. This is not only true in Chapters 2 and 3, the arguments for the existence of God, but throughout the remaining 23 chapters. In almost each case, it is a question of A being 'greater than' B by possessing such and such as attribute. The presupposition runs as a thread through the whole of the Proslogion. The all important consequence which typically follows, is that if A is greater than B, it is A which exists; or a state of affairs exists involving the presence of A rather than the absence of A.

Certainly the most prominent example of Anselm's employment of this idea is in Chapter Two where he poses the question: which is "greater", the idea or description of the deity which he proposes, as it exists in the mind alone, or as it exists, in addition, in reality. He reasons as follows: "...Surely that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought cannot exist in the mind alone. For if it exists solely in the mind even, it can be thought to exist in reality also, which is greater."[1,2]

The fact, for Anselm, that to exist in reality is "greater" is of much significance. That the nature of the significance may vary to some extent according to whose interpretation of the Proslogion one follows is of little

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1. Proslogion, Chapter 2. tr. Charlesworth, p. 117.
2. We leave aside the issue, often debated, of whether "existence is an attribute". This is a separate issue.

consequence here. In general, regardless of which interpretation is followed, this move forms a step, a building block to get somewhere.

This question of "greater than" and the step it involves, runs as a thread, not only through the well known argument(s) in Chapters 2 and 3, but as we have mentioned above, throughout the remaining 23 chapters as well. It is one of Anselm's operational presuppositions which are used to get to his conclusion. That is, we have here an operational presupposition, and one of central importance.

Thus one cannot dismiss the significance of this move and the presupposition involved as e.g. mere "technique of exposition", or a peripheral matter of small consequence.

Our purpose in examining this element of Anselm's work is not to ask of its viability, the philosophical question, but to ask of its source and rootage: the historical questions. More particularly, since it would seem to be, not a peripheral assumption, but an important operational presupposition, we wish to ask: Does it come, or could it have come from "the Credo", in Barth's usage of this term, or did it most likely come, by whatever route, from 'pagan', non-Christian philosophy, that is, from a source outside the confines of ecclesiastical culture. The question is raised because Barth is holding the position that there is no important or significant dependence on philosophical thought, and non-ecclesiastical thought in general, in Anselm. In place of such dependence, Anselm puts his dependence in "the Credo".

It would seem very hard to see how Barth could hold that this presupposition came from "the Credo". Its content hardly concerns an issue in dogma. It would seem to be more a manner of viewing the world, or in Barth's categories, a constituent part of World-View whose source is neither in scripture nor dogma (tradition). That Anselm may or may not have become acquainted with this mode of thinking in Augustine or Boethius first does not modify what we have said.[1]

The most likely source for this idea, or rather nexus of ideas is Neo-Platonism, however modified it may have become in transmission and reinterpretation down through the centuries, since the time of Plotinus, down through Porphyry and Augustine.[2]

Charlesworth comments that "for Anselm this whole neo-Platonic notion of metaphysical 'perfections' [attributes] was so familiar and so seemingly self evident that it needed no justification".[3]

It would seem that Barth would want to hold not only that Anselm wished to be essentially "clear" of and separate from his philosophical world, but also that he in fact was.[4]

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1. Barth, while considering over and over again the sense of "greater than" never raises the question of its rootage or source.
2. Most commentators find the source in Neo-Platonism. Cf. e.g. Charlesworth, p. 60.
3. Charlesworth, p. 60.
4. Where Barth can hardly avoid the issue of actual participation in philosophical streams of thought he plays it down or sidesteps the issue so as to deny it. Cf. especially A.F.Q.I., pp. 58, 59.

With this example, and others that we will examine, we find this is simply not so. This operational-methodological presupposition is of central importance to Anselm's process of thought. It is essential to his argument. And it is Neo-Platonic in source and character.

Post conclusion

We cannot find evidence that Anselm had any hesitation, unlike Barth, about participating in the philosophical currents of his own times for the reason that they were per se philosophical currents and had their rootage and source in non-Christian 'pagan' philosophy. While Anselm may have objected to particular philosophical tenets, for example, the universals controversy, one cannot sense any attempt to "remain pure from the world", from philosophy in general, nor from philosophical presuppositions in particular.

One may note that Barth is unable to cite any explicit evidence to this effect. It remains as an unexamined assumption in Barth's interpretation that Anselm does in fact 'keep clear' of non-ecclesiastical philosophical presuppositions. For example the Neo-Platonic element of Anselm's Monologion is explained away as merely "Neo-Platonic technique of exposition".[1] We see this as indicative of Barth's position, for generally interpreters

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1. This element is called a "procedural technique", A.F.Q.I., p. 59. With reference to the Monologion it is called "Neo-Platonic technique of exposition" A.F.Q.I., p. 58. Nowhere is the former's philosophical rootage acknowledged, nor that it is more than a mere 'technique'.

have pointed out Neo-Platonic elements in the Monologion which are far more far reaching in importance than mere "technique of exposition". I.e. they are on the level of basic assumptions. One cannot term what we have been concerned with, above, "mere technique of exposition".

Section F.

ANSELM'S PRAYER OF GRATITUDE AND BARTH'S INTERPRETATION

We will now turn to consider another element of Anselm's Proslogion, and Barth's interpretation of it: the prayer of gratitude at the end of Chapter IV. Here we find much that is faulty in Barth's interpretation of Anselm.

When Anselm offers a prayer at the conclusion of his arguments concerning the existence of the deity, we would venture that one must take into account in interpreting this passage the nature of the passage, that is,its mode of expression. While, as we shall consider below, Barth makes much of this passage, he might have considered the nature of the passage before embarking on his interpretation of it.

What we find is a prayer, expressing a burst of gratitude. We find this in sharp contrast with what comes before it, that is, a rather technical discussion of the question as to how it can be that the insipiens does not believe. The passage before the prayer concludes:

> ....Whoever really understands this understands clearly that this same being so exists that not even in thought can it not exist. Thus whoever understands that God exists in such a way cannot think of him as not existing.
>
> Thanks be to Thee, good Lord, thanks be to Thee, since what I believed before through Thy free gift I now so understand through Thy illumination, that if I did not want to believe that Thou existed, I should nevertheless be unable not to understand it.[1]

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1. Proslogion, Chapter IV lines 8-17, in Charlesworth, p. 121, except that we have retained a more archaic form of English (Thee) which seems more appropriate to the almost liturgical opening of the prayer.

One is transported in an instant from a highly logical intricate argument of fairly academic theology - ...res cum vox eam significans cogitatur....licet haec verba dicat in corde... etc. - into prayer expressing feelings of gratitude, which opens in an almost liturgical way: Gratias tibi, bone domine, gratias tibi, quia quod prius.... That one has been transported from one mode of expression to another could be highlighted by the poetic, almost musical character of this opening, when one senses the accents and groupings of words:

Grátias tíbi, bone dómine,
Gratias tibi,
Quía Quod prius
Crédidi te dónate....

What one wishes to point out is that there is a sharp break in the mode of expression with the onset of the prayer. The significance of this change cannot be ignored if one wants to interpret this passage accurately.

One is <u>not</u> saying however that the presence of a liturgical element and a poetic element means the absence of noetic content or 'intellectual substance'. Anselm's characteristic ways of speaking of his method recur here. We shall however lay aside consideration of the latter in order to address the point Barth wishes to make about this passage.

Because it is a prayer, and, what we would venture is an expression of Anselm's own religious life, we would expect to find the language of prayer, that is, a mode of expression quite in contrast to the academic precision of

scholastic theology.

While there may be many contrasts between the two, perhaps the most relevant one here is that prayer and liturgical usage in general is not noted for its "qualifications". That is, when one prays the Anglican liturgy and says "there is no health in us", one would not expect the phrase to continue "although we would qualify this by saying...". An Anglican theologian, we venture, would most likely very much want to qualify such a phrase.

We mention this contrast in particular, for in Barth's interpretation the prayer appears as an unqualified "acknowledgement" that all credit for his work must, technically, be ascribed to the deity.

What one wonders is whether one would expect Anselm to qualify his acknowledgement of divine help or aid in his prayer? We shall consider this again below after considering Barth's interpretation. But if one does not normally expect "qualification" in prayer, this would seem to hold true even more so here. For example, even in expressing gratitude to a friend for his help, e.g. in some joint task, it would by custom be ill fitting and rather out of place to mention one's own efforts in the same breath. How much more so when Anselm chooses to express his gratitude to the deity.

Thus the absence of any mention of Anselm's contribution to this effort would seem entirely congruent with, and not in conflict with Anselm being of the opinion that however much "aid" he received, the work was still uniquely his own, in which his own creativity and logical acumen played a significant

and substantial part.

Barth, as we shall see, draws conclusions from this passage quite hostile to this view.

Now let us turn to Barth's interpretation of the prayer. Even though Barth gives consideration to the material surrounding the arguments in Chapters 2 and 3 of the Proslogion and considers this important for trying to support his view of the nature of Anselm's theologizing, he shows little awareness of the mode of expression of these passages. That is, while he makes much of the fact that Anselm addresses a Thou at points in his work, he does not, as interpreter of Anselm, take into account the mode of expression in this surrounding material, nor the possibility that here Anselm wishes to express something to the deity much more than communicate something, unambiguously and with precision to mere mortals. This holds true for Barth's consideration of this passage of Anselm as well.[1]

That is, in our opinion it would be a mistake to conclude that Anselm's own view of his work as a whole can simply be "read off" from this passage of gratitude. Barth concludes too simply that the passage is a comprehensive and reliable indication of how Anselm regards his work.

He goes much further than this, to conclude that this passage indicates "not satisfaction over a work that he has completed...but gratitude for a work that has been done and of which he is in no sense the master".[2]

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1. A.F.Q.I., pp. 170, 171.
2. Ibid., emphasis added.

We would say that no such thing can be concluded. We would note however that Barth's formulation reflects both the denial of human "initiative" and "enterprise" in theology and the passivity and determinism which were to become the hallmarks of Barthian views of theology.

We may note that there is none of this "all or nothing" view even in Anselm's hymn of praise, i.e., there is no negating of his own contribution (as can happen in liturgical expression) in his expressing gratitude for the deity's contribution. There is no simple either/or even implicit in Anselm's praise.

It is perhaps significant that Barth's book on Anselm ends with a commentary on this very passage from Anselm's Proslogion. There is no other conclusion added (other than another short paragraph which continues the same theme). So it would appear that this is Barth's "summing up" about the character of Anselm's theology. But it is also intended to be a 'critical' commentary on this same passage from Anselm's Proslogion, just as the preceding pages are 'critical' commentary on the passages of Anselm which precede this. It is to serve both purposes, a 'critical' commentary, and a "summing up" of his conclusions about Anselm's work as a whole.

These are not minor points then, which Barth wishes to make. Unfortunately, we find:

1. he has not taken account of the nature of this passage: its mode of expression, its main purpose;
2. he has drawn out of it what we cannot find: that Anselm denies any substantial or important

contribution that he, as man, brings to theology in his expression of gratitude to the deity for His contribution. We refer to our consideration, above, where we would find any consideration of Anselm's role in the theological process rather out of place in a prayer of gratitude, and thus not to be expected;

3. he has, in place of accurately interpreting the passage, taken it to imply (a) the noetic determinism (b) the noetic passivity (c) the depreciation of man in his contribution to theology, which were to become the peculiar hallmarks of the Barthian view of theology.[1]

Conclusion of the Study of the Text of the Proslogion and Barth's Interpretation of It.

We have now come to the end of our study of the text of the Proslogion in connection with Barth's major theses concerning the method involved here. We shall not at this point draw together our findings, but rather do this at the conclusion of Part II, where we shall explore our findings in the context of other considerations concerning Anselm's theology, which we shall take up in the chapters which now follow.

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1. "Not satisfaction over a work that he has completed... but gratitude for a work that has been done and of which he is in no sense the master" A.F.Q.I., pp.170, 171.

   We find (a) (above) in "for a work that has been done and of which he is in no sense the master"; (b) in "for a work that has been done"; and (c) In the first segment taken together with the second segment.

Chapter III.

THE QUESTION OF APOLOGETIC INTENT IN ANSELM'S WRITINGS.

THE QUESTION OF APOLOGETIC INTENT IN ANSELM'S WRITINGS:

A. Introduction.

In raising the question as to whether Anselm had 'apologetic intent' in writing, we shall in the first of the two sections which follow, raise the question as to whether there actually were people in Anselm's own setting to whom it could have been relevant to present an argument. That is, were there actually people ~~like the~~ similar to the insipiens or "fool" who "says in his heart there is no God?" If so, were any of these people contemporary with Anselm? Were they in his proximity? If there were not such people, contemporaneous with Anselm, and also within his proximity, then, in our view, apologetic intent on Anselm's part becomes somewhat dubious. After dealing with this question, we shall go on in the section which follows the first, to lay out several types of evidence for apologetic intent in Anselm's writing.[1]

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1. The type of apologetic intent we are concerned with is to be differentiated from what we shall describe below in describing Barth's view of "implicit apologetics". Here, in this section of Part II, we are concerned with apologetics of an explicit sort: (1) an apologetic which intends to present an argument which is meant to have some degree of validity when presented to the thinking processes and critical faculties of the "unbeliever", and (2) in addition does not presuppose the 'authority

We raise the question of apologetic intent in Anselm's writings, for if we can give to this question a positive answer, this will count quite heavily against Barth's view of Anselm's 'theological programme', and thus against his view of Anselm's theological method. How this is so should be apparent as we proceed.

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of scripture' nor the authority of ecclesiastical thought. In contrast, when dealing with Barth's views of "implicit apologetics", we shall be dealing with an apologetic in a very specialized sense of the word, which is quite different from the "explicit apologetics" we inquire about in this section of Part II.

Section B.

IN SEARCH OF THE INSIPIENS

Anselm talks of an *insipiens* in his *Proslogion*, one who denies there is a deity. In trying to understand the nature of his argument one could ask: Did he have any kind of person in mind, or any concrete persons in his own time who were in some sense a kind of *insipiens*? That is, is it possible that he wrote, even if secondarily, with such a kind of person in mind. And if Gaunilo writes a reply "on behalf of the *insipiens*" could this Gaunilo have been articulating the questions and/or objections of such a kind of person? Such a question is not an easy one to answer. One could try several paths. We will try one. But first we must ask: How could this question be of importance in dealing with the issues of this part of the thesis, in dealing with the nature of Anselm's process of thought in the *Proslogion* and Barth's interpretation of it?

One reason we raise this question is that if there were no external stimuli for apologia, or for an apologetic element in Anselm's writing, that is, if there were no one to argue with, or present an argument to, about certain articles of belief, then the supposition of any apologetic motivation on Anselm's part becomes doubtful. And if one ignored evidence in the text to the contrary, Barth's thesis of no real discussion with unbelievers would seem more likely. It is this discussional or dialogical element which is of central concern here. In Barth's theory about Anselm, Anselm does not carry on a discussion with the insipiens or

unbeliever. He merely confronts the hypothetical unbeliever with the consequences of his belief. That is, with belief systematizing itself. There can be no discussion about the validity of these things, is the basic attitude Barth sees. One notes that it is an attitude that is also a hallmark of Barthianism. However, in all this, it would seem relevant to ask the question: were there any with whom Anselm could have discussed, who clearly could not fully participate in what we see as the theological or religious mainstreams of the High Middle Ages, i.e. who were somewhat or perhaps totally estranged from the 'cathedra', from high theological culture and more generally from the ecclesiastical culture, the general religious mood of those most tightly within 'the ecclesia' in Western Europe.

If there were not, if there were no diversity of outlook, and no problems of belief in the declared doctrines of 'the ecclesia', and no real dissonances within a thousand miles of where Anselm did his work then (1) either any apologetic intent in Anselm is a result of our own misreading, and Barth's main thesis gains weight, or (2) if there was apologetic intent the stimulus must have come solely from (a) within the believing soul in order to meet its own needs and the needs of others of like mind, or (b) the felt need to defend certain things in the face of Eastern Orthodoxy or the Moslem world.

In the following we will in no way discount (2)(a) and (b), for evidence for both has been cited, but rather try a slightly different tack. The (1) above can be shown

as doubtful from internal evidence in the text of e.g. the Proslogion (c.f. above).

Perhaps our reason for raising the question can better be put in its positive form: If there were those in Anselm's setting who doubted some or most of the major tenets of ecclesiastical decree, and/or could not fully participate in the contemporary theological-religious setting for reasons of doubt or antagonism, i.e. if there were basic differences in attitude to contemporary religious authority, then Anselm and others would have had a concrete and proximate stimulus for certain kinds of apologia in defense of certain tenets.

Coming at this question from another angle, one could ask: Was the concern in the Proslogion's Chapter II and III, that is the question of the existence of the deity purely academic? Were there in fact no persons having even the slightest resemblance to the 'insipiens', who comes to the fore in Chapter II? The question is not easily answerable and perhaps not answerable at all, but we feel it to be worthy of a try. André Hayen for example argues for Anselm's solidarity with the 'insipiens', yet Anselm's ~~all~~ full participation in the theological community.[1] Yet he and most others working on the Proslogion have not raised the question as to whether there were such as the insipiens whom Anselm could have had concretely in mind. If, as we question below, Medieval Europe was of one mind in its attitude toward creeds and the dogma of the past then Hayen

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1. In Hick and McGill, p. 162ff.

would have to search outside Western Europe for the likes of the insipiens, whom Anselm has in mind, perhaps as far as North Africa or Arabia. One notes however that the existence of the deity was hardly in question even in the mainstreams of Islamic and Eastern Orthodox thought.

There is one issue which needs consideration before we embark on any search. If Medieval Europe was socially, culturally and more important, religiously homogeneous and monolithic, and, perhaps most centrally, if it were homogeneous in its attitude to creeds and the doctrines expressed by past thinkers, the raising of this question becomes trivial and without point. It is a priori eliminated as a real consideration.

There has been strong debate about this assumption, that is, of a "homogeneous" and "monolithic" Medieval setting, historiography with roots in 19th century history maintaining the assumption, and more recent writers vigorously questioning it. Christopher Brookes points to the central difficulty with this older historical work, "..Geistesgeschichte, a form of study to which we owe much genuine understanding, but which has the tendency to urge us to believe that the outlook of our forefathers was far more uniform and monolithic than the evidence suggests".[1] The assumption of a religiously and culturally homogeneous and monolithic Medieval Europe no longer stands. It is regarded now as

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1. The Twelfth Century Renaissance, London, 1969, p. 175.

untenable.[1]

Again we may restate the problem, slightly differently: if all in this period, or perhaps now more narrowly, all capable of intellectual exercise, really were of one mind about a certain body of dogmas, or ecclesiastical decrees of a theological nature, and of one attitude toward them, then our search would be of little use.

One may note in passing that even the larger figures of this era were certainly not of one mind on what we call philosophical issues. E.g. the debate about universals became quite bitter and deep - and runs its course through the Middle Ages from the tenth or eleventh centuries to the sixteenth. And as to differences, theologically there were an Abelard, a Bernard of Clarvaux, a John of Salisbury. But our question goes even beyond these confines. It concerns differences at an even more basic level. And differences of attitude toward the enterprise of theology and philosophy itself.

Charlesworth recognizes the relevance of the question, the search for the insipiens which Anselm had in mind, but finds the supposition of C.C.J. Webb, of a medieval philosophical debating society which would meet periodically to discuss certain questions a bit too romantic an exercise of his imagination.[2] Surprisingly Charlesworth is one of the few to even raise the question. Could it not shed light, in however limited a way on our understanding

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1. Cf. Ibid. Also, Friedrich Heer, Professor of the History of Ideas, Vienna has written extensively to the contrary. Cf. his work Die Mittelalter, E.T., The Medieval World: Europe from 1100 to 1350, Cardinal, London, 1974 (passim).

2. Charlesworth, p. 44, n. 5.

of Anselm in his work, to have some ideas of his possible intended audience, even if he would have written for such an audience secondarily, and as most commentators insist, primarily for himself and his fellow Benedictines?

In all this we will have a try at one way, among possibly others, of answering this question. One does not seek a firm conclusion since knowledge of different social or religious groups in such period of history is limited, and gaps necessarily exist.

We would first propose certain criteria about the persons or social group we are looking for and then later look back at the extent to which these have been fulfilled. We propose the following criteria:

1. People who were literate, could read and follow a discussion of a problem in thought.
2. People who knew Latin (2a) and were probably acquainted, even if only somewhat, with the conceptualities of theological Latin.
3. People contemporary with Anselm whom he could have come in contact with, could have known and sensed their point of view.
4. People who could not fully participate in the mainstream of religious thought, and attitudes of the period toward "received doctrine" (tradition), that is who were partially or quite fulsomely estranged from the mainstreams of religious thought in the West.

The Trouvere of Northern France

We could turn first to the Trouvere, poets of northern France in the High Middle Ages.[1] They flourished in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, yet probably had their start in the eleventh. They were of noble birth usually and had enough wealth to have their poetry and music copied in collections, and performed by "professional" singers (Grout). More than four thousand of their poems are preserved, which is somewhat surprising considering the content of some of the poetry. Their poetry of love was a bit more earthly and earthy than that of the troubadors, their counterparts in the south of France whose love was more platonic in nature.

What is especially interesting here is that the trouvere debated fine points in their songs, on political and ethical topics. Many of the songs are dialogical in character, exploring two or more points of view. Admittedly many of the topics may seem quite trivial to 20th century ears, e.g., the finer points of courtly love, yet there was a means of vocalizing and expressing dissent, and more importantly, in a form (dialogical) which engaged thought as well as feeling.

Alas, however, we have fulfilled only 2, perhaps 3 of our criteria. While they were literate, and could discuss a problem in dialectical give and take, i.e., had

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1. For the trouvere our sources are Gustave Reese, Music in the Middle Ages, p. 200ff., and Donald Jay Grout, A History of Western Music, Norton, New York, 1960, p. 59ff., and Karl Vossler, Medieval Culture, An Introduction to Dante and His Times, 2 vols., Ungar, New York, 1929, ET of Die Gottliche Komödie; vol. I, pp. 32-67.

some intellectual capabilities, and while they were probably not only contemporary with Anselm but were productive in the north of France, their language was the langue d'oïl, the dialect of medieval French which became modern French. There is no evidence they were fluent in Latin. They did however provide 'color' in this medieval setting, as their outlook on life was quite spontaneous, evidently without piety, yet rich with humanity. Their most obvious connection with ecclesiastical culture was in the music to which their verse was sung - almost identical in form with plainsong chant.

But because there is no evidence of Latin, there is also no evidence of ecclesiastical education nor the ability to cope with the complexity of the conceptualities of medieval Latin religious thought.

The "Followers of Golias": Goliardic Verse

Fortunately this does not exhaust the possibilities among those who put their thoughts and feelings 'in print'. There is another group we might consider, loosely scattered like the trouvere yet maintaining an identity through similar concerns and perhaps an underlying common outlook and perhaps most of all, symbolically united as followers of a perhaps mythical Golias. The group was not limited to one locale in Western Europe but ranged through Europe and Britain. They rose in the tenth century, reached their height in the eleventh century, and died out in the early thirteenth.[1] One commentator sees their ancestry in

1. Gustave Reese, Music in the Middle Ages, p. 200ff.

the Latin poetry of the Carolinian court.[1]

They are generally considered to be youth, perhaps engaged in study, or perhaps students who left 'academia'. What interests us is the ethos of their circle, their outlook, and their attitude to ecclesiastical culture.

Perhaps we could take one short poem and briefly explore it. It is anonymous and concerns an abbot. It is among their preserved texts.

Ego sum abbas Cucaniensis
et consilium meum est cum bibulis,
et in secta Decii voluntas mea est,
et qui mane me quesierit in taberna,
post vesperam nudus egredietur,
et sic denudatus veste clamabit:

Wafna, wafna,
quid fecisti sors turpissima
Nostra vita gaudia
ab stulisti omnia.

I am the Abbot of Cucany,
and I meet with my fellow drinkers
and belong to the sect of Decius.
Whosoever meets me in the tavern over dice
looses his garments by the end of the day,
and thus denuded, he cries:

Wafna, wafna!
What hast thou done, o infamous fate?
Thou hast taken away
all the pleasures of this life.[2]

Without having much competence in interpreting Medieval verse, one can still try to catch the flavor and mood of the piece. Goliardic verse is most often satirical

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1. Ibid.
2. Cited in anthology of Golardic verse used by Carl Orff for his choral composition "Carmina Burana". Complete collection of Goliardic verse in process: Carmina Burana eds. A. Itilke and O. Schumann, Heidelberg, Vol. I (1930), Vol. II (1941).

so we can almost assume that these words are "put to the mouth" of an Abbot, i.e. attributed satirically. That is, it is quite surely not a poem by the 'subject'. What is of interest first is reference to "the sect of Decius" to which this abbot "belongs". An allusion most probably to a pre-Christian, Roman legend of the gens or clan of Decius, the most notable member of which, P. Decius Mus was "supposed to have 'devoted himself to death' in battle in the Latin war (340 B.C.) and his son P. Decius Mus, supposed to have done the same at Sentinum (295 B.C.)" from which the Romans derived an adjective, "decianic" (Decianus-a-um.).[1] In the context of the poem it would seem to be an allusion to how the abbot in question pursued his game, or perhaps his opponent!

One could venture out on a limb and venture the supposition that Cucany is an allusion to Cluny perhaps the most notable monastery in eleventh century France. If so, could the general import of the piece be that the abbot of Cluny, the monastery of reform, was the most devoted of throwers of dice at his 'local', in fact 'devoted unto death' in the defeat of his opponent (the tone of determination in lines 4,5 together with the allusion to the clan of Decius)?

If so, one senses a maybe not so gentle mocking of one in authority and perhaps also a bit of admiration for his effectiveness with dice.

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1. Cassell's New Latin Dictionary, p. 169, col. 1.

The words of his 'opponent' are touching and expressed with feeling: Wafna! wafna! what hast thou done, O infamous fate?

If what we have found is somewhere close to the sense of the text, it is not far off from what most historians find in Goliardic verse: anti-clerical satire, parody, poking fun "at their religion and themselves".[1] Their verse was "distinguished by its clever manipulation of rimes (sic).....amusing parodies of even sacred phrases, and its infectious spirit of fun".[2] Neither of the commentators, nor Reese (cited above) see them as totally outside Medieval society, but as perhaps partially estranged, and, of course, critical.

There is one other important aspect: their ability to shape Latin phrases in sometimes deeply expressive ways. One can sense this better in other pieces for which there is no room here.

But where did they gain their rootage in Latin and what fostered their facility? The most likely answer would be the cathedral schools. Universities were not yet founded and those who entered monasteries were likely to remain tightly within the ecclesia. In any case, it is likely they learned their Latin in an ecclesiastical setting, probably along with instruction in religious thought (cf. below).

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1. Hoyt, op.cit., p. 413f.
2. David Herlihy, Medieval Culture and Society, Walker, New York, 1968, p. 208.

One could suppose, as one commentator suggests, that students of the Cathedral schools became 'fed up' or over-fed with the constant feeding of the trivium and quadrivium and could find no vent for their feelings in academic Latin nor for their not so pious feelings in the liturgical Latin. In fact if the usage of Latin had one deficiency, it was so limited in its range of emotional color, in what a person could express about his world and how he encountered it. Although this view may follow a caricature of Latin, could it not be far from the truth? It had been the language of law, of history and the language of intricate intellectual technicalities, but as a language of feeling - had it not a stunted development in this area? The exception being in liturgical usage and the expression of pious and none-too-earthly feeling.

But the followers of this mythical Golias did not desert the common ground of Latin when they tried to put their feelings into words. The language which must have burst upon them in its fullness as something strange and new when they entered a course of study - certainly not the language of their childhood or upbringing, did not die under the weight of repetitive instruction, nor was it rejected in toto or repudiated in favor of the available forms of e.g. medieval French which proved quite rich in expression for the Trouvere, contemporary poets of northern France.

But what did they do, then, with their Latin? Turn it upon their masters? Anarchy? Repudiation? Bitter disgust? Perhaps to some extent, but as one commentator points out, any group which can mock itself also in its

poetry cannot be totally alienated from that which it primarily mocks.[1] Irreverence perhaps, then, but not total repudiation. If he and other commentators are right, then, this suggests a degree of openness toward the 'ecclesia' as well as a common language and a common heritage of discourse.

What one notes also is the possibility of a common affinity for Roman antiquity. Both the Goliards and a few of the creative intellects of the 11th and 12th century enriched their language and thought from Roman and directly or more probably indirectly, Greek sources (e.g. Abelard's affinity for Stoicism, Anselm's reappropriation of parts of Neo-platonism and Roman law). Although on a different level and perhaps for different reasons the followers of Golias draw on Roman imagery directly to express their feelings. A poem of spring:

Veris leta facies mundo propinatur, hiemalis acies victa iam fugatur, in vestitu vario. Flora principatur, nemorum dulcisono que canto celebratur Flora fusus gremio Phebus novo more risum dat, hoc vario iam stipatur flore. Zephyrus nectareo spirans in odoro Certatim pro bravio curramus in amore.	The bright face of spring shows itself to the world, driving away the cold of winter. Flora reigns in her colorful robes, praised in the canticle of sweet-sounding words. Phoebus laughs in Flora's lap again. Surrounded by flowers, Zephyrus breathes The fragrance of their nectar. Let us compete for the prize of love.[2]

1. Robert S. Hoyt, Europe in the Middle Ages, New York, 1957, p. 413ff.

2. Carmina Burana, Section 3, Primo Vere, in the short anthology Carl Orff chose for setting to music in a composition of the same name. E.T. from same source.

Even without having much competence in interpreting Medieval poetry, one can sense that the ethos of these lines is quite different from poetry for the 'ecclesia' of the same era. Here Phoebus, Flora and Zephyrus join together to help the poet express spring. Yet they remain vehicles for expression, poetic personifications. I.e. One senses an affinity for Roman culture perhaps, rather than Roman religions. The lines flow in playfulness and breathe with the renewing life of nature. The writer, in spite of his perhaps patchy knowledge of Roman sources seems comfortable with what he knows.

Though the realm of Roman antiquity drawn on here is different from the realms drawn on by e.g. Abelard and to some extent Anselm and others, yet there is an affinity for the same culture, and so in some sense they have something in common: i.e. classical Roman sources.

Perhaps now we could return to Bec and Anselm and his concern for the insipiens in the Proslogion. In another place he gives us an account of one of his motivations in writing. It was "to answer for our faith against those who, not wishing to believe what they do not understand, mock the believers."[1] It is curious that in the very phrase in which Anselm gives what has usually been taken to be his apologetic intention he mentions "those who, not wishing to believe what they do not understand, mock the believers". This last

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1. Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi, ed. Schmitt, Bonn, 1971, p. 16.

phrase, at least to some extent, is suggestive of the situation we have been describing in describing the Goliards. Of course we cannot be absolutely sure who is mocking the "believers". But we do know now who were among those who did in fact poke fun, and "mock". As David Herlihy has pointed out, the Goliards' productions were distinguished by "(their) clever manipulation of rimes (sic)...[and]...amusing parodies of even sacred phrases...."[1]

Here perhaps the words of Anselm's biographer, Eadmer, would suggest more about this wish itself in Anselm's statement, as it could have been embodied in teaching either in 'classroom' or in a piece of writing: "not as others do, but in a vastly different way, explaining each point by referring to common and well-known examples, and basing it on solid arguments...."[2]

What is suggested is an appeal to the thinking part of man rather than e.g. indoctrination; but more centrally, a genuine concern to communicate, to reach out, and to reach out to learners, to beginners or would-be beginners in theological exercises.

If we presuppose an inner consistency in Anselm's views ~~life~~ about education, ~~i.e.~~ over his productive lifetime, we could take these two passages together, granted that Eademer's estimate is authentic, and conclude that given

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1. Op.cit., p. 208.
2. Cited in Charlesworth, p. 11.

people who would mock, Anselm's response would be "to answer for our faith", "explaining each point by reference to common...examples". I.e. not by verbal tricks, nor in a condescending or indoctrinating manner.

Cathedral Schools and the School at Chartres

To round out our venture into Medieval culture we will turn briefly to the Cathedral schools of the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries, and to one in particular, as both illustrative, and possibly supportive of our other evidences. The Cathedral schools of this era formed a counterpart to monastic education. They flourished in the era of Anselm and even more so in the era of Abelard and Bernard of Clairvaux, and culminated in the establishment of the Medieval universities. Yet while the quality of scholarship varied, some, perhaps much, was on a high, or at least quite sound level. The intellectual figures emerging from their confines are impressive. E.g. John of Salisbury emerged from the Cathedral school at Chartres, the school we will examine a bit more closely.

Our question is twofold. The one concerns, roughly, the level of scholarship, on the part of students and teachers. The other concerns the possibility or probability, or great likelihood that those such as the Goliards were present and active in the vicinity of Bec, i.e. in northern and central France.

In answering these questions we shall study briefly the school at Chartres. Charlesworth thinks it possible

that Anselm studied here before coming to Bec.[1] We may note also that Chartres was only about fifty miles due south of Bec and Rouen. Founded c.990 A.D. the school flourished throughout the period of Anselm's lifetime. James Bowen states in volume 2 of his book A History of Western Education:

> From the late tenth century beginnings under Fulbert, Chartres had maintained the quality of its school which was sustained by a succession of scholars committed to the ideas of Plato....[2]

What was the nature of their education? Fulbert, according to Bowen, taught grammar, arithmetic, astronomy and some medicine along with a fulsome emphasis on theology, examined with the use of a Boethian type of dialectic. So there were liberal arts and theology. Plato was present in his Timaeus, and Aristotle was used for the first four subjects we have listed. Neoplatonism was seen in light of Plato's Timaeus.[3]

John of Salisbury, who emerged as a student from Chartres, gives a glimpse of daily 'goings on' in his Metalogion. He studied under Bernard of Chartres, then the head figure at Chartres, and no mean thinker himself. The period of Bernard's leadership is very close to Anselm's lifespan, c.1114-1130. Bowen selects some of John's comments on his experience at Chartres:

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1. Op.cit., p. 9.
2. Op.cit., Methuen, London, 1975, p. 55.
3. Bowen, op.cit., p. 46.

> ...Studies centered on grammar and the reading of classical authors (Bowen)...'each student was required on the following day to elaborate on some of the matters he heard the day before'.
> [John of Salisbury, Metalogion][1]

John's other remark is even more germane to our concerns here: "The boys composed daily written exercises in prose and poetry and checked each other by comparing their work".[2] We would conclude from this remark by a contemporary that not only was the response of the student important, but was one that exercised the student's ability in poetry as well as prose.

We conclude from this:

1. that there was study, perhaps extensive, of classical authors;
2. there was intensive training in Latin grammar, with daily exercises on the part of students, not only in oral form but written;
3. These exercises were both in prose and in poetry. So the poetic element was not at all excluded or frowned upon. (In contrast, in our day, the gap between, and possible condescension from, philosophy to poetry is, at times at least, far greater! Who is to say that the work of the poet is any less significant than that of the philosopher?)

It would appear then that there was a tradition of education at Chartres that could be compared on not too unfavorable terms with monastic education which e.g. one

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1. Bowen, op.cit., pp. 55, 56.
2. Cited in Ibid., p. 56 (emphasis added).

might find at Bec. That is, it would be hard to establish that the intellectual equipment of such students was that much inferior to comparable monastic education. The figures these cathedral schools produced would seem to confirm this statement.

We examine this question as it has a bearing on criteria (1) and (2),(2a), above,/p163 i.e. whether these were those who had the facility to follow a theological or philosophical argument.

As to the second question, were there among these, e.g. in the cathedral schools, who were either Goliards or of their like, there is evidence to support this.

In speaking of the 'awakening' of the 1100's, Friedrich Heer remarks of those schools which were open to previously unknown literature:

> "where a youthful and enquiring intelligentsia was arming itself mentally and emotionally for the encounter with the hallowed philosophical and poetic giants of the past. Young men of this calibre were to be found in the cathedral schools, particularly those of France (Chartres, Rheims, Laon, Orleans and Paris)....There were also "wandering scholars"...in which there was so much literary and intellectual movement. These...who were unbeneficed clerks [sic], were acute observers of their times, specialists in satire and irony, and, a few of them, highly gifted poets.[1]

Heer sees a pattern recurring: born a poet, died a bishop. Basically, many of these youthful "dissidents" went on to contribute their lifework to the Church. As an example he points to one: Hildebert of Lavardin, who was roughly contemporary with Anselm: 1056-1133. A schoolmaster,

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1. Friedrich Heer, Professor of the History of Ideas, Vienna, The Medieval World: Europe from 1100 to 1350, Cardinal, London, 1974, p. 97.

he died Archbishop of Tours, but "was perhaps the purest exponent of classical Latin poetry of his time....He was the author of satires, very worldly in tone....His verses were on everyone's lips."[1] So here we have, not an inept young poet, but an articulate schoolmaster, a contemporary with Anselm who lived and wrote in France and later, perhaps after youthful revolt, became Archbishop of Tours, a cathedral only about ninety miles from Bec. Heer cites him as one among many, not as an isolated phenomenon.

Could it not be that when Gaunilo spoke, he spoke "on behalf of" persons such as this in his Reply "On Behalf of the Fool". Youthful these poets were, yet capable. Later, after a period of youthful revolt which was tolerated, many of them came to serve that church which they satirized and perhaps angered with their pointed verse. Does the poetic element in a person obliterate intellectual capabilities? Can the two not exist side by side? We would argue that they can. We would also argue for the probability that Hildebert was among the kind of person that Anselm had in mind, in writing such a piece as the Proslogion, that is, writing for "those who mock the believers," for the reason that while they could understand, they did not; no-one had approached them as thinking beings capable of reaching their own conclusions on hearing an argument, that is, an argument that invited them to reach their own conclusion, rather than merely assent to or "swallow" what is "given".

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1. Ibid., p. 119.

And could it be that Anselm found the passage about the "insipiens" from the Psalms fitting or useful because while insipiens implies fool, or what some of what we in English mean by fool, but in and with these meanings fool can mean "jester" as in Court jester. But further: one who makes jest, pokes fun, has wit. I.e. one such as the goliards. One such as this may pose as "thick" i.e. stupid, but there is often a cleverness to jest, a cleverness to the "pose" of fool. Does this cleverness necessarily exclude intellectual cleverness, i.e. ability? We feel this does not follow. Hildebert, after all rose to a fairly high post, and while it does not necessarily imply creative or lofty intellectual capability, yet it does imply a measure of intellectual capability. And this must have been present in potentiality or actu in his earlier years.

Conclusion

From our study we reach the following limited conclusions: (1) That there were in fact articulate, partially estranged youth with Latin learning, (1b) who had the ability to follow the dialectic of theological argument, yet (1c) with a perhaps mocking and doubtful attitude toward ecclesiastical authority, theological and otherwise.
(2) That these youth were present in the time of Anselm and also in northern and central France, (2a) It would be hard for Anselm not to have known of them, even if he had no contact with them. So they fulfil our four criteria above. /p.163
(3) That Anselm's words about writing, for those who "not

wishing to believe what they do not understand mock the believers", dovetails with one of the characteristic marks of the likes of the Goliards. His interest in teaching in a way which could not be called indoctrination is of relevance too. For it suggests a non-indoctrinating, i.e. apologetic approach to unbelief.

These evidences we feel strengthen a supposition that Anselm had, among others, the 'followers of Golias', dissenting, anticlerical students, in mind when writing, and that there is a high probability that one can in fact find Anselm's insipiens in such a group. If so, Anselm would have had proximate and concrete stimulus for apologetic intent.

As a postscript to this we will state that even if we might not have fully succeeded in finding the like of the insipiens, even if such as these we have cited could not have given Anselm apologetic impulse, even though we are maintaining the contrary, we can still maintain the presence of apologetic intent from internal evidence, in Anselm's own writing, both reflecting about his work, e.g. the passages cited above, and the work itself. These both give indication of the presence of apologetic intent within theological-philosophical substance.

Section C.

EVIDENCES OF APOLOGETIC INTENT IN ANSELM.

Certainly the question of apologetic intent has been raised in several quarters concerning Anselm's work. In contrast to our approach in which we turned our attention to the side of unbelief, to look for the existence of the like of the *insipiens*, commentators have usually turned their attention to the more accessible side: that of belief, that is, to Anselm, and his contemporaries. One might point out at the outset that the question of the existence of apologetic intent in Anselm is different from the question as to whether Anselm was a "thorough-going rationalist." Not all apologists are "thorough-going rationalists."

We shall seek to lay out some of these evidences in brief form. Since we cannot be comprehensive, and since this is not a central question for our work we shall note in a footnote here some of the places this question receives consideration.[1]

If one asked the question: were there others engaged in apologetics, in an unambiguous manner, who were (1) contemporary with Anselm and (2) in the proximity of Anselm, one might turn to Charlesworth's

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1. See Charlesworth's "Introduction", p.3-46; especially p.30ff. See also John McIntyre, *St. Anselm and His Critics*, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1954, p.1-55; Arthur C. McGill, "Recent Discussion of St. Anselm's Argument", in Hick and McGill, p.33-110. McGill gives references to other sources.

citation of two significant examples. They are Gilbert Crispin and Rodulfus, both pupils of Anselm, that is, two writers who studied under Anselm and over whom Anselm had considerable influence. In his Disputatio Christiani cum Gentile de Fide Christi, Gilbert Crispin describes a debate which takes place in a London inn, among members of what to us would resemble a philosophical debating society. Here a Christian engages in a discussion with an unbeliever over the credibility and rationality of the Christian faith and they both agree to leave aside all appeal to the authority of Scriptures.[1] That Gilbert Crispin's concern is with a "rational apologetic" for the Christian faith, is confirmed, in Charlesworth's view, by the course of the dialogue. (One may note that Charlesworth leaves aside the question of whether the dialogue is meant to represent an actual occurrence, or typical occurrence, and centres on Crispin's intent).[2]

The other disciple of Anselm whom Charlesworth considers is Rodulfus. The latter declares at one point that "those who live according to reason rightly advance upon the right road, and if they make their way always with reason, they will finally come into the company of the saints."[3] Charlesworth goes on to point

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1. Charlesworth, p.44f.

2. See Charlesworth, p.44f.

3. Quoted in Charlesworth, p.45.

out that "in his dialogue between 'Sciens' and 'Nesciens', Rodulfus elaborates a causal proof of the existence of First Cause of life. The proof is constructed independently of faith in order to persuade 'Nesciens' who doubts whether God exists..."[1]

One may note, firstly, the dialogical form made use of by both writers, in which believer talks directly with unbeliever. Here they follow a pattern of their master, but take it one step farther. We have in mind Anselm's dialogue in the Cur Deus Homo in which Boso, a believer articulates the doubts and objections of unbelief (and perhaps belief as well) to the Incarnation. Here, in the dialogical writings of Anselm's pupils, the unbeliever is brought into the argument itself, where he may "speak" directly.

One may note, secondly, that given the (literary) presence of the unbeliever, the writers proceed in a strongly 'rationalistic' manner, that is, in a manner which sets aside faith, and 'authority'.[2] Thus the apologetic intent is quite unambiguous in two writers, not only contemporary with Anselm, and in his proximity, but more significantly, in two writers who received their training under Anselm himself.

Evidence from Anselm's writings.

As we have noted, one of the passages in which

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1. ibid.

2. In using the term 'rationalistic', a term which may have a variety of meanings, we are using it in just this sense: a process of thought which sets aside faith and authority (scripture and ecclesiastical decree).

Anselm speaks of his motivation in writing, dovetails neatly with the type of insipiens we have found: namely medieval scholars, that is, students and post-students who stood somewhat outside the 'ecclesia', and satirized both 'ecclesia' and its thought in their poetry.[1] Thus it may be much more than coincidence that Anselm states that he writes "... to answer for our faith against those who, not wishing to believe what they do not understand, mock the believers."[2] We have found articulate youth trained in ecclesiastical centres of learning who do in fact "mock the believers."

Yet Anselm goes on to say, in the same place, that his intention is to proceed "through necessary reasons and without making appeal to the authority of scripture to prove those truths we hold through faith concerning the divine nature and its persons."[3] Here in the Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi written about fifteen years after the Proslogion, at le Bec, probably just before becoming Archbishop of Canterbury, one finds a rather strong emphasis on apologetic of roughly 'rationalistic' nature. One says this because of the second passage: " to prove through necessary reasons and without making appeal to the authority of Scripture."

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1. See above. pp.165ff

2. Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi, ed. Schmitt, Bonn, 1931; cited in Henri Bouillard, The Knowledge of God, Herder and Herder, London, 1968, p.82.

3. ibid., cited in Bouillard, p.76.

The phrase "through necessary reasons" and its allied phrase "by reason alone", sola ratione, have proved to be 'problematic' phrases in the interpretation of Anselm's method. Yet we have found Barth's understanding of this phrase to be untenable. For Barth would have us believe that with this phrase ("through necessary reasons"), Anselm intended to indicate articles of belief, taken from "the Credo", and this alone.[1] Yet we have found that Anselm has no hesitation in drawing on other sources, outside "the Credo", for the presuppositions and elements of thought he uses in his theological process. Even if he uses some elements from "the Credo" at points, it does not follow that he uses the Credo exclusively, or even predominantly. As to the phrase "rationes necessariae", there is no solid evidences for thinking that Anselm had "the Credo" or articles of belief in mind. At minimum, then, this leaves the question open as to whether Anselm meant to indicate by this phrase: a manner of proceeding which would have validity for believer and unbeliever alike. The phrase is typically interpreted in this manner. Anselm speaks at several points of proceeding "by reason alone", sola ratione. Arthur McGill summarizes these in his study "Recent Discussion of Anselm's Argument." [2]

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1. In A.F.Q.I., p.55 he states quite explicitly "the origin of the rationes necessariae is to be found... within the Credo itself."

2. See Hick and McGill, p.51ff.

Textual Evidence of Apologetic Intent.

As to the textual evidence from the Proslogion itself, one might ask the question: How does Anselm reply to Gaunilo's criticisms? That is, does he reply in a manner which suggests that he intends his argument to have some force with the unbeliever, that is, with the insipiens whom he names as the argument opens. Or does he reply to Gaunilo solely as one believer talking with another believer upon the basis of their faith, as Barth argues.?

That argument may have additional force for a believer over and above the force it may have for an unbeliever is a separate question. Thus, if Anselm talks with Gaunilo at points as one believer with another, appealing to the latter's belief as an additional reason for the strength of his argument, this need not concern us.

What is of concern is whether there is evidence that Anselm intends his argument to have validity in the eyes of the unbeliever as unbeliever.

One of Gaunilo's central objections is that one cannot really have a notion of "that than which nothing greater can be thought." As a consequence, he cannot have it in the understanding, or in his mind.[1] If this is so, then the argument cannot proceed to pose the question: which is greater, this as it exists in the mind alone, or in reality also. And thus to its

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1. Anselm's Reply to Gaunilo, Charlesworth, p.169.

conclusion that "that than which nothing greater can be thought" exists in reality.

Anselm's reply to Gaunilo is twofold. Although he does appeal to Gaunilo's faith, arguing that Gaunilo can have a notion of this, since he is a Christian,[1] he also goes on to argue at length that the unbeliever, the insipiens, can understand this phrase, "that than which nothing greater can be thought." Anselm is seeking to defend himself against the objection that the unbeliever cannot form an idea of "that than which nothing greater can be thought" on the grounds that he "neither knows the thing itself, nor can... form an idea of it from other things similar to it." [2] Anselm replies that "it is evident to every rational mind that, mounting from the less good to the more good we can from those things than which something greater can be thought, conjecture a great deal about that than which a greater cannot be thought".[3] He then gives several examples, and concludes by saying:

> In this way, therefore, the Fool who does not accept the sacred authority of Revelation can easily be refuted if he denies that he can form an idea from other things of that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought. [4]

The manner in which Anselm continues is significant.

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1. ibid.
2. Charlesworth, p.187, lines 4-6.
3. ibid. lines 8-11.
4. ibid. lines 27-30.

> But if any orthodox Christian should deny this, let him remember that 'the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen through the things that have been made, even his eternal power and Godhead. [Rom.i.20] .[1]

Scripture is invoked here,not to confirm a 'datum of revelation', but to confirm a process of thought by which an unbeliever may look at the natural world and gain an idea of "that than which nothing greater can be thought." That is he can gain an idea of the latter, not only in its general outlines, but of the specific content Anselm will ascribe to the deity throughout the 23 chapters which follow his arguments for the existence of the deity in Chapters 2 and 3. For, as Anselm points out in this passage concerning the unbeliever, the latter can understand, for example, the eternality and changelessness of the deity from the natural world.[2]

What is perhaps more significant in this context is that Anselm refers Gaunilo to a passage of scripture, which perhaps more than any other passage, has been used to support "natural theology." And he does so in order to point out to another Christian the validity of the process by which the _insipiens_ can form an idea of the deity.

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1. _ibid_. lines 30-34.
2. Charlesworth, p.187 lines 11-27.

What is of central importance here is the manner in which Anselm meets Gaunilo's objection. Anselm replies in such manner as to take up the objection from the standpoint of the *insipiens* or unbeliever and attempt to overcome it from the unbelievers standpoint.

In our view this *type* of move on Anselm's part, that is, overcoming the objections of the unbeliever *from the standpoint of the unbeliever* counts against Barth's view of Anselm, in which Anselm never for a moment "leaves the ecclesia", or the standpoint of the Church and its 'Credo'.

In this connection we might note Charlesworth's argument that Anselm saw his piece of reasoning as a 'rational argument' for the existence of the deity having force for both believer and unbeliever (and thus having apologetic intent).[1] Charlesworth reasons roughly as follows: Gaunilo replies to Anselm *as if* Anselm has presented a rational argument. Yet Barth objects, saying that Gaunilo's criticisms rest on a "sheer misunderstanding" of the point and purpose of Anselm's work.[2] Gaunilo's objections in Barth's view are not simply invalid or inconclusive, but completely irrelevant and pointless. Charlesworth concludes that:

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1. We are using the term 'rational argument' to indicate: an argument having *some* force apart from faith, and apart from Scripture and Tradition.

2. See *A.F.Q.I.* p.131, where Barth claims that Gaunilo has completely failed to see the *basic nature* of Anselm's thought as Barth sees it.

> ... if Barth sees Gaunilo's attack as being a complete misunderstanding of St. Anselm's position, this is certainly not the way in which St. Anselm himself sees it. In his reply to Gaunilo he does not, in fact, anywhere complain that Gaunilo's criticisms are irrelevant or beside the point, but he confronts Gaunilo's objections... and attempts to show that they are invalid. In short, what is obvious in St. Anselm's counter-reply is that he agrees completely with Gaunilo's reading of the Proslogion argument as a rational proof of the existence of God. [1]

This we see as both a strong argument against Barth's interpretation and an argument which favours 'apologetic intent' in Anselm's Proslogion. There are other writings of Anselm in which one can be quite sure apologetic intent is present. We have not gone into these since they lie outside the scope of a thesis which is concerned only indirectly with Anselm. We have gone into some detail vis-a-vis Anselm's Proslogion, for it was this piece of writing that was specifically at issue in Barth's book on Anselm. If one wished to look further among Anselm's writings for apologetic intent, certainly chief among them would be the Cur Deus Homo, in which Boso articulates doubts, and objections to the Incarnation, which Anselm then seeks to answer. One may note that here some of the doubts and objections of unbelievers are articulated and replied to. Here, as in the Proslogion, the elements of thought Anselm "borrows" from outside

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1. Charlesworth, p.42,43. Cf. Charlesworth's other objections, pp.41ff.

"the Church", or "the Credo" play an important part.[1]

We would conclude that there is a considerable amount of evidence favouring the view that Anselm wrote with apologetic intent in mind.[2]

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1. See, for example, John McIntyre, St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1954. See especially pp38ff.

2. We should point out that what we have described in this chapter as apologetic intent should not be confused with the rather specialized meaning "implicit apologetics" has when used to describe a specific type of apologetic intent which Barth alleges Anselm to have, and which we will describe below, pp.191ff.

Chapter IV.

CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS.

Section A.

BARTH'S VIEW OF "IMPLICIT APOLOGETICS" AS IT EMERGES IN HIS ANSELM.

So far we have said little or nothing of Barth's views of apologetics in his study of Anselm. Actually, in describing the dogmatic method Barth "finds" in Anselm, we have also been describing his apologetic approach, that is, the way he sees, with approval, Anselm's dogmatic enterprise as having apologetic relevance. The apologetic relevance lies within the dogmatic substance. Our job in the following is to try to describe the manner in which this is so.[1]

We have said that the apologetic relevance lies within the dogmatic substance. That is, the apologetic relevance is implicit in the dogmatic substance. It is implicit in two senses:

One: There is no apologetic that lies outside the dogmatic substance, even partially outside (for example, in a way that the apologetic enterprise and the dogmatic enterprise overlap at points). Further, and as an extension of this view: there is no apologetic enterprise separate from dogmatics having an independence of its own. In addition, the apologetic that is implicit in the dogmatic enterprise (1) has no independence from that dogmatic enterprise; it cannot stand

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1. For what follows, see in the main, A.F.Q.I., pp.62-72.

independently, even at points; and (2) it has no independent basis, that is, no other basis than the dogmatics Barth describes, i.e. no basis outside 'revelation', for example, in philosophy.

This last point places this view of apologetics in perhaps sharpest contrast from most views of apologetics in Christian Thought.[1] For most apologetic enterprises have sought some kind of common ground between 'belief' and 'unbelief' upon which to meet and discuss with the latter. But in the case of the apologetic venture Barth describes, no common ground is sought, not even in the form of certain elements of thought, or presuppositions, acceptable to 'belief' and 'unbelief'. In fact any such common ground is "impossible", that is, methodologically inadmissible. The one who believes and the one who does not are separated by a gulf, across which only certain words can be spoken. But the gulf remains, and each party remains, as it were, on different ground.

Two: The apologetic intent is implicit in the dogmatic substance in the sense that this intent is not made explicit. The appeal is not made in an explicit manner. As a consequence, the 'unbeliever' is never confronted with an argument, or a line of thought which intends to engage his own critical faculties. As a

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1. As Apologetics is a complex phenomenon, which cannot be done justice in a brief sketch, we are aware of the over-simplification we must make at this point.

result, he is not invited to be present as a thinking being, as one who uses his critical faculties in forming judgements about what is presented to him. No appeal will be made in an explicit manner, to which he could apply his thought.

"Implicit Apologetics" seen from two vantage points.

What then is the activity, which is properly the activity of dogmatics, yet also carries the apologetic relevance. Here we shall divide our consideration roughly into two aspects. The first concerns, in the main, the activity of the dogmatician. The second concerns primarily the (alleged) activity of the deity.

We shall take the first consideration firstly. It is when Barth asks what relevance Anselm's argument in the Proslogion can have for the insipiens (the "fool" who does not believe that there is a deity) that he explains what we have described in the foregoing, namely that it cannot be the case that there is any appeal to be made on the basis of any common ground. The believer and the unbeliever are separated by a gulf. Using another metaphor, they are operating on different levels altogether.[1] In summary, the theologian as theologian can be of no help even if this unbeliever should wish to cross this gulf from the side of unbelief to belief. This re-echoes Barth's

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.67, 71.

supposition that Anselm's process of thought can have no effect, positive or negative on Anselm's (i.e. the theologian's) faith.

Yet there is something he, as theologian, can do. And here his work as dogmatician coincides with his work as apologist. He can show how his beliefs, that is, the A B C D's and the X which are taken from the Credo, are not in contradiction. Yet he can go farther. Not only is there an absence of contradiction, but there is something else, which he as dogmatician-apologist will "show" or produce: he will show the inner consistency of Christian statements.[1] What does this mean? Let us go back to where Barth describes the activity of the theologian, in reference to the beliefs he takes from the Credo, which he then uses to "solve" his unknown X.[2] The theologian takes one belief from the Credo, and temporarily regards it as an "unknown" (the X). He then takes other beliefs from the Credo, and 'proves' the X, that is 'establishes' it in the sense of showing its necessity vis a vis the beliefs selected, and already assumed as true.

The dogmatician shows, then, not only "inner consistency" in the sense of an absence of contradiction, but more than that, "inner consistency" in the sense of the way that "Christian statements" are shown to interlock in such a manner as even to be nec-

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.69, 70.

2. See especially A.F.Q.I., p.55.

essary to each other.

After the dogmatician-apologist has done his work, the question could be raised: what value is this to one that does not believe? Barth's answer is that it has only the limited value of removing an unnecessary stumbling block for the unbeliever.[1] Yet, as we shall see in our second consideration, which follows, this "noetic ratio" produced by the theologian will have another importance as well.

Thus this is one side of the apologetic activity: exhibiting beliefs in an understandable manner, and more than this, showing that they are an interrelated and interdependent complex of beliefs, consistent with each other, that is a body of "noetic ratio".

Yet there is another aspect to Barth's view of "implicit apologetics". This is the role supposedly played by the deity. As we have seen, in Barth's interpretation of Anselm, the 'key phrase' of Anselm's Proslogion must be heard as "Word" for the argument to be effective. That is, it must be heard as an authoritative "Word" of prohibition, not to think of a greater.[2] As we have remarked, Barth speaks of the phrase as having a "revelatory" character.[3] He refers to it explicitly as "the Word of God".[4] We should note again

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1. A.F.Q.I. p.66f.

2. "this prohibition: he can conceive of nothing greater" A.F.Q.I., p.77.

3. ibid., p.78, n.2.

4. ibid., p.131.

that Barth is unable to support this rather peculiar view, either directly, from a text, or indirectly.[1]

Thus we see that this phrase, the major presupposition of the argument, in Barth's interpretation, not only is one of the A B C D's which came from the Credo, (in going to 'prove' or establish the X, the existence of the deity), but also, that this phrase, the chief of the A B C D's must be considered as, and heard as "Word" for the 'argument' to be effective.

Yet who allegedly "speaks" this "Word"? It is the deity. In this second aspect of apologetics we are concerned with the role of the deity.

This alleged revelational activity of the deity then stands behind Barth's statement about the active role of "the objective ratio of the object of faith" vis a vis the unbeliever in apologetics.[2] It is the alleged revelational activity which is central here, that is, vis a vis the 'unbeliever'. Barth refers to this "objective ratio" as

> ... the objective ratio of the object of faith that enlightens ... and teaches truths that are beyond the power of one human being to teach another. [3]

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1. see above, pp.123ff.

2. Here Barth is apparently using the terms "subjective ratio" and "objective ratio" in place of "noetic ratio" (of the theologian or thinker) and "ontological ratio" (of the deity) respectively. See footnote No.1. on p.197.

3. A.F.Q.I., p.71.

One can be fairly sure Barth means by "objective ratio" what he means elsewhere by "Revelation", that is, the Word in its primary form as "the Word revealed".[1] How close we are to Barth's concept of preaching, that is, the preaching and the hearing of "the Word" is shown by the manner in which Barth continues:

> Perhaps for Anselm theology had as much a part in proclaiming Christ as preaching, where the first and last presupposition of the preacher must be trust in the objective ratio that ... enlightens [2]

Thus the 'unbeliever' is to be treated as if he stood "within the precincts of theology, ... and within the precincts of the Church", [3] not by reason of any "power of his own subjective ratio existing from creation and not obliterated by the Fall", but for the reason of this "objective ratio of the object of faith that enlightens .., and teaches".[4]

Thus it is that in Barth's view, the apologetic is effected by the alleged intervention of the deity in the midst of theology, speaking his "Word" of revelation and in so doing, enlightening the hearer in and

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1. cf C.D.I/1, p.124ff. T.F. Torrance holds that the "objective ratio" here is roughly equivalent to 'the Word revealed'. cf his study of Barth's Anselm in his Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931, S.C.M., London, 1962, p.182ff. See especially, p.187.

2. A.F.Q.I., p.71.

3. ibid., p.70.

4. A.F.Q.I., p.70, 71.

through the "noetic ratio" of the theologian in a manner roughly similar to (the Barthian concept of) preaching, in which the deity intervenes, speaking his Word of revelation (the "objective ratio"), and in so doing, enlightens the hearer in and through the words of the preacher.

One sees a close similarity, then, between Barth's theory of preaching and his theory of "implicit-apologetics". It is a similarity that also applies to Barth's theory of dogmatics.

We may note again that in the case of the Proslogion, the primary element (but not necessarily the only element) which must be seen as revelation, and heard as "Word", is the key phrase: the deity is "that than which nothing greater can be thought"; and one may note again that this "Word" takes the form of an imperative, and a negative imperative, or prohibition, at that: it is prohibited to think of a greater.[1] A major weakness in Barth's attributing this view of apologetics to Anselm is that he is not able to substantiate his claim (1) That Anselm thought of the 'key phrase' in this manner, or (2) that this phrase has its source in 'revelation'.

The Nature of this View of Apologetics.

It should be fairly obvious that what we have described here as Barth's view of "implicit apologetics"

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1. Cf above, pp.123ff.

has little or nothing in common with the apologetic intent we have found as most likely present in Anselm's thought. That is, very little or nothing when one stands back and looks at 'the whole'.

We may note that in this view of apologetics (i.e. "implicit apologetics") the thinking process of the unbeliever is not engaged. It is not an apologetic that involves any thoughtful consideration on his part. It is not an apologetic that approaches him as a thinking being capable of reaching conclusions. The only thinking involved is a "thinking along with" the theologian, as the theologian draws his connections, making "the Credo" into a body of "ratio" consistent with itself. It is only when Authority intervenes, (if we return to Barth's understanding of the Proslogion's argument), that the apologetic can be effected. Here then we have an apologetic of 'krisis', an inbreaking of judgement from above, in the form of a "Word" of prohibition: "he shall not conceive of a greater."

Thus, such an apologetic would seem not only to avoid engagement of man's critical faculties, but it would also seem to disrupt such critical faculties with the alleged intervention of a deity's "Word" to the effect "Thou shalt not think such and such." In such an arrangement all man's critical faculties, and processes of thought are simply by-passed, and so also, we would argue, the intellectual integrety of man, who experiences, and reflects with the critical

use of his thinking, upon what he experiences. If so, it is an apologetic which does not respect man in his wholeness, and in particular, this aspect of his wholeness, which reflects upon, or "chews over" what he experiences before "swallowing".

As this same problem is involved in Barth's theory of dogmatics, and his dogmatic method we will return to this theme in Part III of our thesis.

Section B.

DIVERGENCE IN INTERPRETATION OF ANSELM: WHY?

In this study of the interpretation of Anselm, and Barth's interpretation in particular, we might stand back for a moment and reflect on the general scene of historical work on the Proslogion. The most striking phenomenon one encounters is the wide divergence of interpretation, so wide as to become discontinuities of interpretation.

We may take as example, at one end of the spectrum, Jonathan Barnes' recent study, The Ontological Argument,[1] and at the other end, Barth's study. While Barnes considers the arguments of Descartes and others, his study of Anselm's is extensive and intensive. Yet he dismisses Barth's rather sizeable work in one paragraph with no more regard than to mention it as an absurdity. Barnes concludes his paragraph:

> "Whether or not he succeeded, Anselm certainly intended to present an argument for the existence of God which presupposed no articles of faith; he had no wish to indulge in the curiously futile exercise Barth puts upon him".[2]

Here we have an interpretation where faith, and articles of belief play no part at all.

If we go briefly to the other extreme we find nearly a mirror image, that is, the same pattern, but in reverse. Barth's attitude to interpreters such as Barnes, who see Anselm's Proslogion in the same genre with the arguments of Descartes and Leibnitz, that is, as basically philosophical

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1. Jonathan Barnes, The Ontological Argument, Macmillan, London, 1972.
2. Ibid., p. 6.

in character, is similarly dismissive without serious consideration. The final paragraph of Barth's book:

> "That Anselm's Proof of the Existence of God has repeatedly been called the "Ontological" Proof of God, that commentators have refused to see that it is in a different [class] altogether from the well known teaching of Descartes and Leibnitz... all that is so much nonsense on which no more words ought to be wasted".[1]

One may note that Barth has "wasted" very few words in explicitly considering the views of such commentators. He too has more or less ignored the other end of the spectrum, not to mention those who stand between these extremes.[2]

To draw out the contrast further, Barth's interpretation requires that Anselm begin his argument with faith, and at that, faith certain of itself and (the existence of) its object. More than that, faith must have certainty about a body of beliefs, or a "Credo", which were presupposed at the outset of the argument.

Here we are faced with a historical phenomenon in itself. Two interpreters who have devoted time and effort to an in-depth study of the same text feel confident that they can not only ignore the other end of the spectrum but dismiss it as absurdity or "nonsense". We are faced with a discontinuity of interpretation. And one which occurs in basically the same period of historical study (1930-1970).

What factors help explain such a discontinuity, and how might they help us understand both Anselm and Barth?

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1. A.F.Q.I., p. 171.
2. There are a few scattered footnotes, but not much more than that.

One may note first that the divergence of viewpoint occurs at a most basic level. It is over the character of Anselm's theologizing-philosophizing. It concerns the method of his thinking. It is about how he got from his A B C D's, to his X; that is, how he got from his premises to his conclusion as well as the nature of the constituent parts.

The divergence would seem most acute, then, over the issues of both Anselm's method and aim in his work.

One may note in passing that there are certainly other, perhaps more moderate interpretations of Anselm falling between these two extremes. Of the more comprehensive and extended interpretations, that of M.J. Charlesworth, stands out for its historical and textual sensitivity.[1] But Charlesworth is certainly not alone in this middle ground.[2]

For the novice approaching Anselm's text with the guidance of these interpreters, the experience can be one of confusion. For, and here we give only our own experience, if one turns to either Barnes or a similar interpreter, one who for the sake of simplicity, let us say, sees Anselm as Philosopher, one comes away from it with the impression: "that makes sense, there's a coherence in (Barnes's) view of Anselm".

Yet after one turns to Barth, and reads, in depth and at length, one <u>also</u> comes away from this interpretation with the same impression: "<u>this</u> view of Anselm coheres, there's

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1. Charlesworth, pp. 3-101.
2. Cf. the Bibliography in Hick and McGill; as well as the contents, especially the first half.

a coherence here too". The experience is one of intellectual "double vision".

Yet what can explain two widely divergent interpretations, both of which have a semblance of coherence and accuracy? Perhaps we can find several factors which allows this kind of thing to happen in the case of Anselm's text.

1. Since there is a divergence in the understanding of Anselm, perhaps Anselm's language and language in his day might be considered. The Viennese Historian of Ideas, Friedrich Heer, points out that in the realm of thought, the meanings of words had a certain fluidity in Anselm's time which they did not have a century and a half later at the height of scholastic theology. In the later period, a word had been defined into a clear, clean, neat meaning, suited to the perhaps dry precision of thought of the major thinkers of this later era.

Heer speaks of the twelfth century, but what he has to say would seem to apply equally well to the late eleventh century, Anselm's period. We will quote at length for he takes some time to unravel what he has to say.

> The twelfth century used Latin both as the instrument of thought and speculation and as the medium of creative imagination. Latin was the speech of the intellectual world throughout Europe, a world at first inhabited exclusively by clerks [sic]; and when laymen came to join them they went through the same preliminary education. The Latin of the uncommitted twelfth century was far from being the precise scholars' tongue it was to become when Thomas Aquinas and the thirteenth century schoolmen were wielding it as the chosen instrument of logical, "purely scientific" and juridical thought, when each word was restricted to a single meaning and ever more rigorously and narrowly defined, until it was reduced to a single dimension.

> The Latin of the twelfth century, and especially the Latin of theologians and philosophers, was a living, flexible language. Each word easily accommodated several layers of meaning, often of great ambivalence. An individual found in this "open" language room to express the religious experience of his childhood, of his people, and of a thousand years of history.
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> Words were still ciphers, symbols, sacraments, a bundling together of different meanings, signposts directing attention to something beyond. The schoolmen of the thirteenth century....had no use for this sort of language: they tore it to pieces and condemned it as "imprecise", "illogical", "unscientific". Yet it was just this kind of language that was eminently suitable for speculative writing and for expressing in all its nuances that spirituality, so instinct with intimations of God and the natural world, which distinguishes some of the most interesting thinkers of the twelfth century.[1]

Heer includes consideration of Anselm among others in what follows this passage.

While we cannot say that this applies *in toto* to Anselm, it would seem to apply at least to a large extent, and more generally, to Anselm's whole intellectual context. Anselm himself was probably well aware of this situation, for he devoted much effort to the study of words (for example, in his *de Grammatico*), and to the range of meanings, for example, of modal auxiliarica, and other key words of importance in his time.[2]

The problems which may arise from this linguistic situation may become clearer when we consider the other points below.

2. The divergence of interpretation which we have laid out above centers, in our view, around the *character* of

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1. Friedrich Heer, *The Medieval World: Europe 1100-1350*, Tr. from the German by J. Sondheimer, Cardinal, London, 1974, pp. 97, 98; (emphasis added).
2. Cf. D.P. Henry's study, *The Logic of Saint Anslem*, Oxford, London, 1967.

Anselm's process of thought. Central to this issue is the issue of method.

As we have pointed out at other points in Part 2 methodological concerns had an intense importance for Barth in the period in which he turned to Anselm and wrote his book.

As well as the heightened consciousness of method in the sciences and the humanities in the first half of the 20th century, one may note also that Barth was at the crossroads in his own theological method, searching for a new path after his first and abortive attempt at Dogmatics in 1927, Die christliche Dogmatik.

But while methodological consciousness may have been at a very high level in 1930, one could not and would not expect to find the same level of concern or consciousness at the beginning of Medieval scholasticism, in the 11th century.

We would venture that Anselm was far more interested in getting from A to X than in reflecting upon how he got there. Of course we are not saying that there is no reflection on method in Anselm, which there is. But rather, that it was not nearly as acute a concern nor as sophisticated a concern as it was for thinkers in Barth's period.

As a consequence of this, one could not and would not expect Anselm to expend a lot of effort in cleaning up ambiguities in what he had to say about his method, ambiguities which may have occurred quite naturally given a fluidity of meaning for terms.

If this is so, if ambiguity exists in Anselm's reflections on statements about his own method, especially his phrase fides quaerens intellectum, then this leaves an open door to arbitrary interpretation.[1]

The same holds true for certain key words and phrases in the heart of Anselm's thought itself. Such words as fides, credo, intellectus, ratio, probare, and necessitas are in our view vulnerable to arbitrary interpretation, and are key words for any constructive study of the Proslogion.

Here, in our work we are seeking only to examine, critically, Barth's scholarship concerning Anselm.

The problem involved here is complicated in Barth's case by Barth's "word by word" approach to Anselmic texts. Barth's word studies are notable for their overdependence on the "root" for finding the intended meaning, and their lack of attention to the context in which the word is used. Thus when a key word is found in a second context, after its meaning is initially established in the first context, it is too easily assumed that Anselm means the same in the second context.

An example of this problem with words is entailed in our third point.

3. In the marked differences between the interpretations of Barnes and Barth, the part that faith plays, or does not play, is, in our view, of central importance. Perhaps a difficulty in understanding Anselm at this point is a factor in the

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1. For a review of interpretations of this phrase, and its companion phrase credo ut intelligam, cf. John McIntyre, Anselm and His Critics, A Re-interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1954, pp. 7-55, especially pp. 15-50.

divergence of interpretation.

While Barnes discounts the importance of faith in considering the argument, citing several 'authorities' in doing so, Barth goes to the other extreme, and sees it not only as a factor to be considered, but, more than that, that a certain kind of faith, more specifically, faith that is certain of itself, faith with no admixture of doubt is Anselm's point of departure, and, at that, Anselm's indispensable point of departure.

Unfortunately, Barth does not, in our view, really inquire into the nature of Anselm's faith, and assumes too easily that it is the faith of certainty rather than faith which searches, uncertain of itself or its object. For example, Barth nowhere considers the content of Anselm's opening prayer, where Anselm's faith, in our view, is far from untroubled.

Barth does not allow for the flexibility or range of meanings in this word fides, as it occurs in different contexts in Anselm. Barth, thus, in our view, has gotten off on the wrong foot (and a very different 'foot' from Barnes') in interpreting the Proslogion.

Both writers, in fact, in considering Anselm's text, have ignored Anselm's humanity, his involvement in his own work, especially insofar as this could help in understanding the character of his theologizing-philosophizing.

We are not saying that the three factors we have laid out above are completely adequate to explain this wonder, this discontinuity of interpretation. There certainly may be others. Among them, perhaps, the "vested interests" of

the interpreter in "having (Anselm) his own way", either to support his own philosophical or religious quest, or as a precedent for his theological quest. (One notes that Barnes is a philosopher, Barth a dogmatician. It would be still a far greater wonder if Barnes had taken the view that Barth exposited, and Barth that of Barnes).

We have for purposes of discussion ignored a whole range of interpreters falling between these two extremes, interpreters perhaps far more helpful in discovering the complexity of what Anselm was about. But by considering these two in their extremes, the hope has been to come to a better understanding of the factors which contribute to divergences of interpretation and misinterpretation.

Section C.

BARTH'S GROWING ISOLATION AND A POSSIBLE MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY ON ANSELM

While up to now we have considered the nature of Barth's historical scholarship in his study on Anselm, the intellectual, economic and political context in which this study was written, and considered at more length separate issues concerning his theses about Anselm's work, we have not as yet seriously raised the question as to Barth's motivation for the study on Anselm. In the following pages we shall stand back from the foregoing issues, and pursue a possible motivating force behind Barth's impetus. We have spoken about the significance the study had for Barth, i.e., that it was much more than a disinterested historical treatise. Now we will consider one possible major motivation for this study, of such importance for its writer. As motivation is often a complex issue, we are not of course excluding other approaches to this question. It is possible for several motivating factors to stand out. Here we try to sense the context, or more specifically the way Barth fitted into, or perhaps refused to fit into, the intellectual context in which he found himself. From this we will draw out a tentative conclusion. Our theme is basically the need for methodological precedent, and the factors which exacerbated this need. We shall consider these factors firstly.

Barth broke off relations with more or less the whole of his ideational setting, in this period 1929-1931, while, in contrast, Brunner, Bultmann, Gogarten and Tillich in

several senses maintained contact. Among his former compatriots, there was no severance in intention or actuality from their companions in philosophy and the humanities. Brunner in his idea of eristics would still relate to his contemporaries, would argue with them.[1] For Barth, even to argue meant, and here perhaps he was most perceptive, meant standing on common ground. But why was he acutely aware of this latter? For some reason, or reasons, it mattered and mattered deeply that he should share essentially no common ground with non-ecclesiastical thought. We shall go into this matter further later in our thesis. This implies a severance at a fairly basic level.

In one area this severance cannot be carried to completion, and Barth is resigned to this. The theologian must express himself. And to do this he has to use language technically adequate to express distinctions, etc. which cannot be expressed in everyday language. Here the theologian has to admit he has no recourse but to use the available idioms. Barth would probably see this as technique of exposition and nothing more. That is, the possibility that use of non-ecclesiastical philosophical categories might 'contaminate' 'Church' thought is a risk that has to be run.

In what ways did this happen, this severance from his contemporary context, indeed the modern context, from 1790 onwards?

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1. Barth opposed even this 'eristics' along with explicit apologetics. C.D. I/1, p. 28.

Philosophical and Anthropological

When Barth refused any longer to consider the "I" who considers this "Thou," when he sought to stamp out any 'positive' anthropological mode of thinking and consideration of man's involvement in theology after his 1927 attempt at Dogmatics, he left behind not only the chance of contact and intercommunication with his philosophical colleagues (Scheler, Buber, Heidegger) but also isolated himself from the concerns of Bultmann, Brunner, Gogarten and Tillich. There ceased to be a common concern in this significant area, and thus the possibility of dialogue here. In place of a possible common concern, there was a continual source for friction and invective.

One could compare what we find in Barth at this point with Gogarten's concern in this same period (Zahrnt's wording):

> "The problem of reality begins for man at the point where he faces other men as his counterparts; all decisions concerning his relationship with reality are made in the sphere of his relationship to his fellow men. Man discovers himself as an I only when he is challenged by a Thou and becomes aware of reality as a sphere in which he takes decision and exercises responsibility. Only in this way does he obtain an understanding of himself and of his existence in history.[1]

Gogarten is concerned with the concrete human situation in which man hears this "Word". Barth will have none of this, or rather none of any contemporary anthropological insight into this. This element is not entirely new, suddenly in 1928-32. It was earlier, in 1924 that the young Bonhoeffer

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1. Zahrnt, p. 58.

reacted sharply to Barth's first lectures in Dogmatics, and specifically about this concern, fearing that Barth's approach "threatened and volatilized the due emphasis on man's concrete, earthly plight".[1] What may have only been a fear in 1924 became an actuality after 1930.

Historical and Critical

By 1930 Barth has ceased to have common concerns with the others in the Zwischen den Zeiten group in historical-critical work also. While he affirmed the importance of historical-critical work in theory in the prefaces to the Römerbrief, one sees little evidence of this sort of activity even there. In Zahrnt's view, by 1932 Barth has not only set aside theological criticism of scriptures, but historical criticism too.[2] In moving in this direction he in effect isolated himself from what were, and were to become problems and questions of central importance for his colleagues, and for Christianity in the 20th century as a whole.

Leaving Behind His Former "Comrades in Thought"

In growing more isolated from the general ideational context in which he found himself, he also left behind most of his 'companions' of his Römerbrief period, and his first Dogmatics period (1924-1927): Kierkegaard, Overbeck,

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1. Bethge's summary, in E. Bethge, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, 1967 (E.T. 1970), p. 53, (E.T.).
2. Zahrnt, p. 91.

Dostoevski, etc.[1] Perhaps less importantly, he had left behind his comrades in Christian Socialism, Ragaz, Kutter and others, whose names cross the pages of his letters with great frequency and enthusiasm in the Römerbrief period. He had left behind any active participation in the political realm, the movements of his day (although his interest remained).

The Benefits of this Isolation

In detaching himself from the broad ideational context especially the philosophical context, as well as the narrower theological context, including the area of historical-critical work, Barth also did in fact evade a host of problems and questions being raised in each of these spheres. Unweighted by such problems he could pursue his own path relatively unhindered. Perhaps this explains in part the 'unproblematic' nature of the Dogmatics, and also why it was perhaps easy to produce so much, literarily, as he did.

In pointing to a growing isolation one is not denying that there were similarities and similar concerns between Barth and his former comrades, but:

1. in several important areas, there ceased to be commonly shared concerns: historical-critical, anthropological;

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1. One is not saying that he in fact left Kierkegaard behind, i.e. his presuppositions, style of thinking, characteristic concerns, as this is another question. But rather, he ceased to have any sense of comradeship with Kierkegaard. He did not conceive of himself as of the same cloth any longer.

2. the methodological difference overshadowed the similarities which existed, and

3. although there were similar concerns, the framework in which these concerns were raised was so considerably different.

4. With this, one is not saying that Barth was unaffected by the broad ideational setting nor the philosophical and theological setting from 1800 onwards. This is another important question we will consider elsewhere. One is saying rather that he ceased to have 'comradeship' and 'companionship' as a compensation for his isolation, in this setting.[1]

As a footnote to this growing isolation one could mention at least one possible exception. Barth was involved in conversation with certain teachers of philosophy and science about issues of methodological interest. However involved these conversations were, though, a passage in C.D. (I) which takes up a list of scientific methodological tenets and considers each,[2] finally boils down to the fact that Barth can accept only one of these and only in "a very limited interpretation": the "principle of non-contradiction". He makes clear, that it will not act as a restraint upon him. For the remaining five 'postulates', they "can only remind the theologian that he should know what he is doing when he transgresses them, and that as a theologian he cannot escape

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1. One possible major exception to this, i.e. Bonhoeffer, can for the most part be set aside. Although they met as student or just 'past student' and Professor a few times over coffee in this period, Bonhoeffer remained a minor figure in Germanic Religious Thought until the publication of his The Cost of Discipleship (1937) and Life Together (1938).

2. C.D. I/1, p. 7ff.

the necessity of transgressing them. Not an iota can be yielded here without betraying theology...".[1]

Since the list was worded by H. Scholz, one of this group, it would seem that Barth found really little solidarity here either.

One might ask: What did Barth have to say about this growing isolation? Did he recognize it? As to the fracturing of the Zwischen den Zeiten group, he did comment in 1938 in a sketch, autobiographical in nature, on the "centrifugal effect" he had in his work, in talking of

> "a painful change which has come about in the last ten years [up to 1938] [which] has involved the loss of a host of theological neighbors, co-workers, and friends whom I still possessed in 1928. ... We quite definitely got on different roads. We are still travelling those different roads today, and at best can only greet one another from afar."[2]

He then speaks, as we have hinted, of "a certain explosive, or in any case centrifugal, effect [which] seems to inhere in [his work]".[3] One notes in passing that Barth presupposes in this that he was the center, the central figure in 1938, and that the others have only "spun off" him. We will not argue the point here, as it is not our major concern, but we see this assumption as debatable. In any case the substance of what he has to say would seem to support our thesis of a significant and substantial isolation which had occurred by 1929-1931, the period in which he turned to Anselm.

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1. C.D. I/1, p. 8.
2. K. Barth, How I Changed My Mind, Knox, Richmond (Virginia), 1966, p. 41.
3. Ibid.

But of what significance was this isolation for Barth the man, a human being engaged in a highly demanding intellectual task. We may gain some insight into this if we turn to a very late work, which at points, in our view, has the marks of autobiographical comment. In 1962-1963 Barth writes "An Introduction" to "Evangelical Theology". In this sizeable book, he devotes, not a paragraph, nor a series of paragraphs, but a whole chapter to "Solitude", the solitude of the Theologian. In it we find echoes in deeply etched tones of what we have been talking about all along here.

He opens his discussion of the subject of solitude with the words: "Whoever takes up the subject of theology discovers himself immediately, recurrently, and inevitably banished into a strange and notoriously oppressive solitude". He continues in an autobiographical tone:

> In our old church hymnal we used to sing with emotion a song by Novalis containing the line, "Be content to let others wander in their broad resplendent, teeming streets". These words might sound very appropriate as a slogan for theology; however they would not be altogether honest, for who at bottom would not really like to be an individual in a <u>greater</u> crowd? Who, as long as he is not the oddest of odd fellows would not like to have his work supported by the direct or at least indirect acknowledgement and participation of...all men or at least as many as possible?[1]

He goes on to speak of this isolation <u>not only</u> in terms of isolation from 'the world', "but also <u>in the Church</u>".[2]

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1. Evangelical Theology, p. 110.

2. <u>Ibid</u>.

We must note the autobiographical cast of this passage, for although the book is not as a whole autobiographical in intent, it often shows marks of personal comment. We say autobiographical cast, for not only is there an autobiographical element, i.e. the hymn of Novalis "we used to sing with emotion", but when one stands back from the passage, one must ask: Is this so? Does theology, or better, has theology "inevitably" incurred a "notoriously oppressive solitude"? We must simply say, no. Barth speaks here of a deep solitude or isolation, almost monastic, yet even more, individualistic alienation from one's fellows. Even a monk is in the companionship of his fellow monks. Has this always or even <u>generally</u> been so? That is, such a deep isolation for theologians. Again, we must say no. Exceptions there must be, and Barth may be one of them.

We might qualify this, <u>but only somewhat</u>, by noting a rather commonplace observation that large creative figures in any field who "cut out a different path" must put up with <u>some</u> isolation (e.g. Freud <u>vis a vis</u> Jung may be an extreme example), yet it is more rare for this relative isolation to become so nearly complete as, in our view, it has become for Barth. For this reason also, we must consider Barth's comments autobiographical, implicitly at least, even if not directly. They simply do not apply generally, to other figures. In what follows, we will see evidence of this.

What follows this passage is also of interest for our purposes, for in it Barth outlines some of the causes for this isolation. They are specifically <u>Barthian</u> in

character. It is in commenting on Tillich's lack of isolation that we get the best glimpse of this. For as we have noted, it is not only isolation from others within the Church, but also isolation from those in the companion field of philosophy. In discussing Tillich's Philosophical Theology, Barth exclaims:

> If only the philosopher, as such, wanted to be also a theologian! If only, above all, the theologian, as such, wished to be a philosopher! According to Tillich, he should and can desire to be this. What solutions! What prospects! "Would that we were there".
>
> This and similar attempts to do away with the solitude of theology cannot possibly, however, be carried to completion...[1]

Barth goes on to give his own reasons for why this is "impossible" and the reasons hew close to earlier Barthian lines.

By pointing to "this and similar attempts" Barth has pointed out the fact that he and nearly he alone stands in this isolation from philosophy, for nearly all the others in the "Zwischen den Zeiten" group had some relation to a sector of the current philosophical world. We include Brunner here too for, he at least would try to speak directly to philosophical issues. Barth is alone in his isolation. He cannot even share the experience of isolation with his former comrades. This factor heightens the personal and autobiographical cast of these passages and leads us to believe also, because of the deeply etched picture Barth

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1. Evangelical Theology, pp. 112, 113.

paints with his words e.g.: Whoever...immediately recurrently, and inevitably (is) banished into a strange and notoriously oppressive solitude", to believe also that this solitude was no small thing for this author. It "must be endured and borne, and it cannot always be easily borne with dignity and cheerfulness."[1]

This is the solitude we see Barth entering into with the fragmentation of the Zwischen den Zeiten group and his production of his book on Anselm. Here, in the above, we see him implicitly reflecting upon this isolation at the distance of just over 3 decades. As Barth has pointed out for us by reference to Tillich, et al., this isolation was not the only available option for practicing theologians. It was only one option among many.

We must also note that while Barth isolated himself from the adjacent areas of study, philosophy and the humanities in general, in and with this same process he was isolating himself from others in the Church. His movement away from philosophy which became crystalized in 1929-1931 in his study of Anselm was also a movement away from Tillich, Gogarten, Bultmann, and Brunner. The separation from Brunner, for example, which was implicit by 1931 became explosively explicit only a few years later with Barth's angry 'Nein', a reply to Brunner.[2] So in and with this isolation from philosophy and allied humanities there occurred at the same time an isolation from others in the Church, and so, as a consequence an isolation from the concrete living Church.

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1. Evangelical Theology, p. 111.
2. "Nein! Antwort an Emil Brunner", 1934, cf. Zahrnt, p.66ff.

We shall now go on to try to characterize this situation with the aid of an image taken from a more mundane realm. If one pictures the broad ideational situation c.1930 as a ball park, a playing field, with major and minor figures holding certain positions, having a place of their own, it would seem clear that while e.g. Brunner stayed to fight (his 'eristics') and Bultmann e.g. stayed to participate (in conjunction with Heidegger), and while both, together with Gogarten and especially Tillich remained to address the problems and objections which others on the field raised,[1] i.e. to participate, even yet keeping an element of independence and detachment, in contrast, Barth had decided to leave the field. Continuing with the image, he was over the fence and out to perhaps a distant meadow, from which he intended to shout back to those on the field. He had left not only the broad ideational context of his time, but that narrower area of it where theology was being carried on.

In that more or less distant meadow, i.e., in this isolation, methodological and otherwise, one could perhaps understand how such a thinker without 'companionship', without solidarity particularly in the area of methodology, how this thinker, even much more than others could wish to find 'companionship', and even more than this, could wish to find a precedent for this very isolation from his non-ecclesiastical context, a precedent at the most basic, i.e. methodological, level.

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1. E.g. what was later to become Tillich's Theology of Correlation.

Certainly Luther, where he most differed from any contemporary and accepted thought patterns turned to Augustine and Paul (i.e. in his thinking on gratia) which had he not done so, would have left him, in the eyes of his contemporaries, and himself also, without precedent and support.

So Barth also, at this critical juncture, where he differed so with his compatriots and with theology since Schleiermacher, turns at this critical point to a large figure in the past, and in his study of Anselm finds so much of what later will sustain him in the method he actually follows. We venture that this increasing isolation was a major factor in leading him to find exalted significance in his interpretation of Anselm.

That Barth sensed this isolation is clear from what we have cited. There is a feeling of desertion in his autobiographical article of 1938.[1] The others of the "Zwischen den Zeiten" group have really deserted the cause. He is the only one left. He is alone.

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1. How I Changed my Mind, p. 41ff., especially p. 42.

CONCLUSION TO PART II.

CONCLUSION.

Here in the conclusion of Part II we shall draw together and review our research into Barth's study of Anselm. We shall then draw what conclusions seem appropriate.

Barth's Main Thesis and its Corollary.

Let us begin with Barth's main thesis about Anselm's theology and its corollary: All elements of thought, presuppositions etc. used in this theology come from 'the Credo', 'the Faith of the Church'; conversely none come from outside 'the Credo'. That is, this theology has no significant basis, even partial basis in any kind of philosophy. All of its presuppositions come from 'the Church's Faith', that is, even its methodological rules and/or assumptions. Thus it is a theology built entirely upon 'what the Church has received' in revelation. Yet it does not argue "from authority". Thus Scripture, as the text of authority, is set aside, and as such plays no positive or constructive role in this method. So, for example, there are no "proof texts", no statements to the effect "...it is written". As we have pointed out, this means that 'the Credo' from which Anselm (allegedly) draws all his basic assumptions consists of the beliefs of the creeds and dogmas of the Early Church, (and their development); 'the Credo' does not

include Scripture. Thus, the content of this 'Credo', as Barth uses it, is Tradition. As, in Part III of our thesis, we shall explore the place of Tradition in Barth's theology, it is important to point out that here in Part II we are dealing with Barth's view of the place of "the Credo" = Tradition in Anselm's theology.

Now we have stated what we see as Barth's main thesis and its corollary. Anselm draws upon 'the Credo' for essentially all elements of thought, presuppositions etc. used in his theological construction. Essentially none of these elements come from outside 'the Credo'. Thus, in Barth's view, Anselm has 'kept clean' of any significant participation in any philosophy.

Let us look at one of the passages in which Barth articulates this view of his. In the following passage Barth uses Anselm's term "rationes necessariae" to refer to the A B C D's or basic elements of thought, presuppositions etc., upon which Anselm allegedly builds.

> ...Throughout all Anselm's theology the origin of the rationes necessariae is to be found somewhere other than where it ought to be found in a philosopher ... - namely, on the same level as that on which the question to be answered is raised, within the Credo itself. Within it, now this Article and now that Article figure as the unknown X which is solved by means of the Articles of faith a, b, c, d ... which are assumed to be known....[1]

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.55. (emphasis added).

Let us now look at our findings concerning several of these A B C D's in the text of central concern in Barth's Anselm, the Proslogion. Have we found that all of the A B C D's here come from 'the Credo', as Barth asserts? If not, is there evidence that some of them have a source outside this 'Credo'? We are asking the question: How does Barth's theory concerning Anselm 'prove out'?

When we turn to look at the Proslogion and Barth's interpretation of it, there is one of these basic elements of thought, or A B C D's which stands out among all others as of primordial significance. It is the 'key phrase': ["God is] that than which nothing greater can be thought." Barth specifically names this as "the 'a' taken from the Credo by means of which the Existence of God now represented as X is to be transformed into a known quantity from one that is unknown (not disbelieved, but as yet not realized)."[1]

So important is this 'a' that Barth almost completely ignores any 'b' 'c' 'd' 's which may accompany it. Thus Barth devotes over fifteen pages to consideration of this phrase,[2] while relegating consideration of any other A B C D's to a mere footnote.[3] This key phrase or as Barth chooses to call

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.78.

2. A.F.Q.I., pp.73-89.

3. A.F.Q.I., p.78. n.3.

it, "name of God" is thus of primordial importance in Barth's interpretation of Anselm's Proslogion. Thus, if this phrase, this alleged "name of God", of such central importance in Barth's interpretation, does not come from 'the Credo', it would appear that Barth's interpretation is in serious trouble.

Yet just here, at this crucial point, we find that Barth is totally unable to support his contention that this 'key phrase' or name of God comes from 'the Credo'. As we have pointed out in our study, above,[1] he is unable to cite any evidence to support this assertion; he can cite no text of 'the Credo' where Anselm found, or from which he derived this phrase. Additionally he can cite no indirect evidence. Perhaps of equal significance, he cannot cite any evidence that Anselm was of the opinion that this phrase came from 'the Credo' or the 'Faith of the Church'.

It is of crucial importance to Barth's interpretation that this phrase, or 'name of God' be seen as having its source in 'the Credo', the 'Faith of the Church', that is, in what 'the Church' has been given in revelation. For Barth shall go on to hold the view that at a crucial juncture in Anselm's argument, this phrase must be considered revelatory: it must be heard as "the Word of God"; it must be heard

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1. See above, "The Question of the Source of the Key Phrase", pp.131ff.

as a "Word" of prohibition, "this prohibition: he can conceive of nothing greater."[1]

As we have seen in our study, Anselm's whole argument, in Barth's hands, depends on this revelational element. That is, it is dependent for its effectiveness as an argument on the alleged intervention of the deity in an Event of revelation, in which the human words of this phrase, "[God is] that than which a greater cannot be thought" become the Word of God,[2] and in so doing become a prohibition (to paraphrase): "You, man, are permitted to think of nothing greater." Thus this phrase becomes, in this (alleged) revelatory transformation, a 'revealed rule for thought'. This is crucial to the argument as Barth interprets it. For apart from this Event in which the 'key phrase' becomes revelatory, Anselm's argument has no force. At the close of his study Barth speaks of this Event of revelation.

> God gave himself as the object of his knowledge, and God illumined him that he might know him as object. Apart from this event there is no proof of the existence, that is of the reality of God. But in the power of this event there is a proof which is worthy of gratitude.
> [..."Ohne dieses Ereigniss keinen Beweis der Existenz, d.h. der Gegenstandlichkeit Gottes! Aber in Kraft dieses Ereignisses ein Beweis der des Dank wert ist."][3]

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.77.

2. Barth states this explicitly, A.F.Q.I., p.131. See also p.77f and p.82.

3. A.F.Q.I., p.171; German edition, p.198.

Thus since this 'key phrase' allegedly becomes revelatory and must be heard as "the Word of God", it is crucial that the source of this phrase be, if not Scripture, then 'the Credo', that is 'the Faith of the Church', given to the Church in revelation.

Yet we have found that Barth is unable to cite any evidence (1) supporting his assertion that this phrase has its source in 'the Credo', or (2) that this phrase has a revelatory character. Additionally, Barth is unable to cite evidence that (1) Anselm was of the opinion that this phrase came from 'the Credo', or (2) that Anselm viewed this phrase as revelatory, as embodying a divine "Word" of prohibition.

Now for Barth to hold that this phrase is a prohibition, one word of this phrase, "posse" must have the meaning "is permitted", so that in the negative it means "is not permitted", i.e., "is prohibited."[1] Yet while the word "posse" can mean both "to be possible" (e.g. within the range of possibility) and "to be permitted", we have found (1) that in the Proslogion Chapter II and III there is no evidence to suggest that "posse" has the meaning of "to be permitted." In fact we have found evidence which apparently makes it impossible to interpret "posse" in this manner. For at the very point in the text where Barth sees

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1. Here we shall summarize the results of our investigation of the nature of the 'key phrase' in Barth's interpretation. See above, pp.117ff.

this phrase as articulating a divine "prohibition", Anselm substitutes "nequire" for "non posse": "Et certe id quo maius cogitari nequit..."[1] As "nequire" does not share the ambivalence of meaning of "non posse", that is, as it can only mean "is not possible" (not "is not permitted"), this would apparently confirm that there is no sense of "is prohibited" in Anselm's use of "non posse" (or "posse" with a negative). Thus on the basis of textual evidence it is impossible to hold that this phrase embodies a "prohibition".

Thus concerning this phrase or "name of God" (as Barth terms it) we have found that it cannot have the meaning Barth attributes to it. It cannot be seen as a prohibition. And thus it cannot be regarded, as it must be regarded in Barth's interpretation, as a divine "Word" of prohibition: man is not to conceive of a greater.[2] Thus it cannot be regarded as a 'revealed rule for thought'.

If Barth's contention as to the nature of this phrase is untenable, what of his contention as to the source of this phrase. As we have already pointed out, Barth is apparently completely unable to support his contention that this phrase comes from 'the Credo' or the 'Faith of the Church'. He is also unable to cite any evidence that Anselm thought of this phrase

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1. Proslogion, Chapter II, Charlesworth, p.116, lines 15-16.

2. A.F.Q.I., p.77.

as coming from 'the Credo'. On the evidence available we have argued[1] that the most probable source of this phrase is the 'pagan' Stoic philosopher, Seneca, specifically his Naturales Quaestiones. Two copies of this book were at Bec in the early 1100's, about 25 years after Anselm's work on the Proslogion. It is thus highly likely that at least one copy was present while Anselm worked on his Proslogion. The second most likely source, we have argued, is 'the philosophical Augustine'. One finds a phrase very similar to Anselm's key phrase in writings of Augustine writings basically philosophical in nature.

In summary, concerning the source of this phrase, the most significant of Anselm's presuppositions in his Proslogion argument, we have found Barth's assertion that it comes from 'the Credo' completely unsupported. No text, and no indirect evidence is cited. Barth's assertion that Anselm regarded this phrase as "a revealed name of God" is also completely unsupported.[2] No text or indirect evidence is cited here either. Barth cannot even support his contention that the phrase must be considered a "name of God" or nomen dei.[3]

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1. See above, pp.134ff.

2. A.F.Q.I., p.77.

3. A.F.Q.I., p.77. See note #5 where, on close inspection one finds that Barth cannot cite a precedent for his use of these words, "nomen dei".

In contrast we have found that the most likely source of this phrase is to be found in Seneca's Naturales Quaestiones, that is, in the work of a 'pagan' philosopher. Following this, the second most likely source is the philosophical Augustine.[1]

As to the nature of the phrase, as a prohibition, embodying a divine "Word" of prohibition, and thus having the nature of a 'revealed rule for thought', we have found (1) no evidence to suggest this reading of the phrase, and (2) we have found textual evidence which makes such a reading impossible. Anselm means "is possible" by "posse", not "is permitted". One may note that this is the only presupposition of the argument to which Barth devotes significant attention.

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Are there then other "presuppositions" which Anselm uses, and yet which cannot be claimed to come from 'the Credo'. We have found one, which is both technically central and necessary to Anselm's procedure. For this reason we have called it a 'procedural presupposition'. It is Anselm's "greater than" presupposition.[2] That is, one 'entity' is "greater than" another by reason of possessing certain attributes. It is not simply greater than the first entity in particular respects, but rather, greater

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1. See above, pp.134ff.

2. Here we are reviewing the findings in our section entitled "Anselm's 'Greater Than' Presupposition", above, pp.142ff.

than the first in an absolute sense. A horse is greater than a tree, for example, for it possesses the attribute of locomotion. Thus a horse is on a higher level of being vis-a-vis a tree.

In Anselm's argument, we have found this "greater than" presupposition to be of central importance for his argument (regardless of which interpretation one is following). For it is upon the basis of this assumption that Anselm proceeds step by step towards his conclusion. In our research, we have (1) found this presupposition to be of crucial importance to Anselm's argument, and (2) we have identified its source as Neo-platonic philosophy. Here then we have a second major presupposition which does not come from 'the Credo'. It comes, as most probably does the first mentioned, the 'key phrase', from philosophy.

As we have identified two presuppositions, one of which quite definitely comes from philosophy, i.e., Anselm's "greater than" presupposition, and one which most likely comes from philosophy, the 'key phrase', we have thus outnumbered the presuppositions remaining, which Barth has explicitly named and claimed as coming from 'the Credo'. (He names only one, besides the 'key phrase', yet does not do more than name it in a footnote).[1] Thus both Barth's main thesis

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1. Cf. A.F.Q.I., p.78, footnote #3.

and its corollary are apparently untenable. Not all of Anselm's presuppositions come from 'the Credo'. Some of central significance come from philosophical sources.

Three Central Sub-theses in Barth's Study of Anselm.

Let us now look at what we see as three central sub-theses of Barth's Study of Anselm. In Barth's account, (1) Anselm begins in faith, that is in the fullness of faith, faith essentially untroubled by doubt. (2) In faith, Anselm simply assumes the truth of 'the Credo', as a whole, and in each of its elements. There is no questioning as to the truth of its beliefs prior to assent, nor subsequently. The process of thought which allegedly takes place subsequent to assent is a process of thought which essentially only examines the "inner-consistency of Christian statements." That is, one element of 'the Credo' is set aside as an "unknown" X (temporarily unknown, yet believed as true). This X is then "established" with the help of other elements from 'the Credo', i.e. A B C D's also assumed as true. The chief consequence of this exercise is a "deeper understanding" of the "content" of 'the Credo', that is a deeper understanding of the interrelatedness of its beliefs, and their consistency with each other. (3) As a consequence, this process of thought cannot aid faith; it cannot increase faith. Points (1) and (2) concern Anselm's alleged methodological "point of departure" in theologizing. Let us consider point (1)

firstly. Anselm "begins" in faith, that is begins in the fullness of faith, faith essentially untroubled by doubt. This is the first major point Barth lays out concerning Anselm's mode of theologizing. Barth states that " it is because we possess the certainty of faith [that] we must hunger after the fidei ratio", i.e. the rationality, or inner-consistency of 'the faith'.[1]

Yet we have asked in our study of the Proslogion: is this so? Is Anselm's "point of departure" in the Proslogion characterized by "the certainty of faith"? Here we shall summarize the findings of our study of the Opening Prayer of the Proslogion.[2] Barth makes much of the fact that Anselm begins his Proslogion in prayer, addressing the One Who's existence he wants to inquire about. Barth takes this as rather definite indication of sure and certain faith. Yet, as we have noted (1) Barth not once mentions or examines the content of this prayer, nor its character and mood. While he devotes space to a line by line study of Anselm's arguments which follow this prayer, he devotes not one sentence to the ~~line~~ text of the prayer itself; (2) In our examination of Anselm's 'Opening Prayer' we found evidence of much less than sure and certain faith. Rather, here was a man asking, out of darkness,

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.~~25~~21.

2. See above, pp.110ff.

for help. It is the fall of Adam which Anselm speaks of in this prayer: "Oh how hard and cruel was that Fall....Why did he [Adam] deprive us of light and surround us with darkness."[1] Anselm then implores, "Show Yourself to us. Give Yourself to us....I set out hungry to look for You. Do not let me return scorned and empty handed."[2] Is this the fullness of faith? We have argued, above, that the faith of this prayer is troubled faith, the faith of one who is "out of relation" with the One he seeks.[3]

Thus even if Anselm, when he wrote this, may have possessed "the fullness of faith," he has chosen to articulate a faith that is neither certain of itself nor its Object; and he has chosen to begin his theologizing in this manner. (One can see no evidence of a 'violent' transition of mood as Anselm proceeds to begin his argument which immediately follows). We cannot find the fullness of faith which Barth speaks of at this point. If we do find it, at the conclusion of the Proslogion, perhaps Anselm's theologizing has helped him out of the "depths" he has articulated in this prayer.[4] (If so, and we have cited evidence to this effect this argues against

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1. Charlesworth, p.115.
2. Ibid., p.117.
3. See above, pp.110ff.
4. See above, pp.114ff.

point (4): i.e. that this theology cannot be of aid to faith). Given this evidence, we do not find Barth's view accurate concerning point (1). Anselm does not "begin" his theologizing in sure and certain faith. Such faith is not his "point of departure".

Let us turn to point (2), i.e. the second sub-thesis we find in Barth concerning Anselm's method: In faith Anselm simply assumes the truth of 'the Credo', as a whole and in each of its particulars. He then builds his thought upon "presuppositions" taken from 'the Credo'. Thus there is no questioning of the truth of particular beliefs of 'the Credo' either prior to assent nor subsequently, i.e. in the theological process of thought.[1]

How is it that we make this last statement about Barth's account of this method? In the process of thought which Barth attributes to Anselm, Anselm takes one belief and examines this belief vis-á-vis other beliefs, also taken from 'the Credo' and assumed to be true. He then seeks to "establish" the first belief with the help of these other beliefs. Yet what is the consequence of this process of thought? The consequence is apparently to establish an inner-consistency between "Christian statements".[2] Thus

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1. It would not be unusual for a medieval thinker to assent to 'the Faith of the Church' without prior questioning. What concerns us here is whether there is subsequent questioning of the truth of these beliefs.

2. A.F.Q.I., pp.69-70.

when the first belief is "established" or "proven" using these other beliefs, this means that a logical consistency has (allegedly) been exhibited as existing between the first belief and these other beliefs. Thus in this process of thought the theologian has (allegedly) only understood the 'content" of 'the Credo' more fully. In short the theologian here has only asked the question as to whether one belief of 'the Credo' is consistent with other beliefs in 'the Credo'.

Yet this means that essentially the only question dealt with is whether, and how, and to what extent this one belief is consistent with other beliefs, in 'the Credo', all of which are assumed without question to be true. As a consequence, the question of truth regarding the beliefs of 'the Credo' has not been raised prior to assent, nor subsequently, in the theological process of thought. The question of truth concerning beliefs has no place in this theological programme. Only the question as to the "content" and the "inner-consistency" of 'the Credo' have a place here.

Thus it should be fairly obvious that such a process as Barth describes can be of little help to the insipiens, the "fool" in the Proslogion who believes there is no God.

Now, as we have found this account of Anselm's methodology essentially inaccurate in its "main thesis"

and "corollary", in that we have found that not all of Anselm's A B C D's used in reference to his X come from 'the Credo'; and that some definitely come from philosophy, we may go on to a second consideration: Is there evidence that Anselm did seek to question the truth of certain beliefs, that is to raise and answer the question of truth concerning certain beliefs of 'the Credo'?

We might answer this question best by considering another question: Is there evidence that Anselm intended his argument as having validity, even limited validity for an "unbeliever", such as the insipiens or "fool" in the Proslogion? That is, did he intend his argument to have some amount of validity apart from faith and "authority" (Scripture). That is, did he seek to raise the question of truth concerning certain beliefs and answer it in a manner which had some degree of validity apart from faith and authority, i.e. Scripture and 'the Credo'?

In answering this question we may note three things. We have found (1) that there is a significant philosophical basis for Anselm's theology in the Proslogion. That is, if both Anselm's 'key phrase' and his "greater than" presupposition have their source in philosophy, not in 'the Credo', then here is a partial basis for his theologizing which is independent of faith, 'the Credo' or Scripture.

We have also found (2) that there were those

present in Anselm's time and in his proximity who had literacy, latin learning, and capacity for theological conceptuality, yet who stood outside the confines of the Church, in doubt or disbelief.[1] Therefore there were those to whom Anselm could have presented an argument for certain Christian beliefs. Here, one may note, such a philosophical basis could have been of relevance in such a task, for the people we have described would have had at least some exposure to philosophical reasoning, i.e. in the Cathedral Schools.

Given a partial basis in his thought, philosophical in nature, and thus in ~~independence~~ independence from faith, 'the Credo' and Scripture (i.e. 'faith and authority'), and given the presence of unbelievers to whom theological argumentation could be of relevance, we might now point out (3) that we have found a fair amount of evidence of "apologetic intent" in Anselm's writing. Here we shall review what we laid out above,[2] as "evidence for 'apologetic intent' in Anselm". Not only were two notable pupils of Anselm, Gilbert Crispin and Rodulfus, to offer proofs for Christian beliefs, which were intended to function independently of faith and 'authority', and thus show "apologetic intent" quite unambiguously, we have also found evidence in

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1. See above, pp.165ff and p.178f.

2. See above, pp.180ff.

Anselm's writings. Thus we have found Anselm giving an account of his motivation for writing as follows: "to answer for our faith against those who, not wishing to believe what they do not understand, mock the believers."[1] He goes on to say, in the same place, that his intention is to proceed "through necessary reasons, and without making appeal to the authority of Scripture, to prove those truths, we hold through faith concerning the divine nature and its persons."[2] This last passage, seen in the context of the first would apparently indicate fairly strong 'apologetic intent'.

We have also found evidence that Anselm is concerned that his argument in the Proslogion shall have validity for the insipiens who does not believe there is a God. For when Gaunilo objects that the key phrase, "[God is] that than which nothing greater can be thought," is incomprehensible for the unbeliever (thus rendering the argument useless and invalid for the unbeliever), Anselm goes to considerable lengths to refute Gaunilo's claim, showing how the unbeliever can turn to nature (not revelation, or 'the Credo') and form an idea of "that than which nothing greater can be thought." Thus it is apparently quite important to Anselm that his argument, at this critical

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1. See above, p.183f.

2. Ibid.

point, have validity for the unbeliever. (In backing up his claim that the unbeliever can turn to nature, and proceed, by analogy, to understand this phrase, Anselm cites a passage of Scripture, one which has often been cited in defending 'natural theology' ((Rom.I.20))[1]).

The final piece of evidence we cited, and perhaps the best, was one pointed out by M.J.Charlesworth. In Gaunilo's criticism of Anselm's argument, Gaunilo assumes that Anselm has presented an argument intended as having validity for an unbeliever. Barth is rather caustically critical of Gaunilo's (allegedly) faulty understanding of Anselm's argument: Gaunilo has completely failed to see the basic nature of Anselm's argument.[2] Yet Charlesworth observes (correctly in our view) that

> If Barth sees Gaunilo's attack as being a complete misunderstanding of St. Anselm's position, this is certainly not the way St. Anselm sees it. In Anselm's reply to Gaunilo he does not, in fact, anywhere complain that Gaunilo's criticisms are irrelevant or beside the point, but he confronts Gaunilo's objections...and attempts to show that they are invalid. In short, what is obvious in St. Anselm's counter-reply is that he agrees completely with Gaunilo's reading of the Proslogion argument as a rational proof of the existence of God.[3]

There is considerable evidence then that Anselm intended

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1. See above, pp.185ff, and especially p.187f.

2. See A.F.Q.I., p.131.

3. Charlesworth, pp.42-43.

his arguments to have at least some degree of validity for unbelievers. Yet this means that he wished to raise, and answer questions of truth concerning certain beliefs, and do this in some degree of detachment, from authority, that is, Scripture and 'the Credo', and from faith. Yet this means also that his arguments were intended to aid and support faith, that is, to help the unbeliever toward faith, and to help his own faith toward fuller faith. We have found evidence that Anselm's Proslogion has fulfilled this function for its author, i.e. evidence which suggests that it has brought him to greater faith.[1]

Yet this is the very thing that cannot happen according to Barth. For point (4) in our summary of Barth's sub-theses about Anselm's theological process of thought, was that (according to Barth) this process of thought cannot aid faith; it cannot help in bringing man to fuller faith. "...The aim of theology cannot be to lead men to faith, nor confirm them in faith, nor even deliver their faith from doubt. Neither does the man who asks theological questions ask them for the sake of his faith...."[2]

The evidence which we have just cited in arguing that Anselm wishes to raise and answer the question of truth concerning beliefs, and do so in a way that both

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1. See above, p. 114ff.
2. A.F.Q.I., p. 17.

helps the unbeliever toward faith and helps the believer toward greater faith, would apparently indicate that Barth has misunderstood Anselm's theological method, and misunderstood it at a quite basic level. For Anselm, unlike Barth, or Barth's picture of Anselm, apparently wants to honestly face the question of truth regarding these beliefs. In contrast, the process of thought described by Barth, with full-hearted approval, avoids this very question. It asks essentially only one question: How are the beliefs of 'the Credo' to be interrelated; how are they to be understood in their interrelatedness?

In summary we find both Barth's main thesis[1] and its corollary[2] concerning Anselm's method essentially untenable and misleading. We also find the sub-theses of Barth, laid out above,[3] as essentially untenable and misleading. Thus in each of its major aspects we find Barth's study of Anselm to be seriously faulty and basically misleading.

There are several features of the theological method which Barth has outlined here in his study of Anselm which call for additional comment.

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1. See above, p.223f.
2. See above, p.223f.
3. See above, p.233.

All through this work Barth has referred to an entity called 'the Credo'. It is from this 'Credo' that Anselm allegedly draws all the basal elements of his thought. Yet what is this 'Credo'? Of what does it consist? It does not include Scripture. Scripture and Credo are sharply distinguished. (This is necessary, for Barth is aware that Anselm refuses to argue "from authority", and by "authority" was meant Scripture in particular).

By 'the Credo' or 'the Faith of the Church' Barth has in actuality been referring to the creeds and dogmas of the Church, specifically, to the creeds and dogmas of the Early Church, as developed in the Western Church. In short, what Barth has been referring to by this term is Tradition, that is, Tradition over against Scripture. Now why is this of importance? Here we find (1) a theological method in which Scripture has no constructive role (only a limiting role).[1] Yet more significantly we find (2) a theological method in which there is unquestioning assent to Tradition, i.e. there is no questioning of the truth of 'the Credo' beliefs prior to assent, nor subsequently in this theological process of thought.

As we have already noted, essentially the only question concerns the "content" of Tradition: how are these beliefs to be understood and interrelated? As a result, 'the Credo' = Tradition is regarded, ipso

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1. See below, pp.261ff

facto, as an authoritative articulation of revelation. The method Barth describes proceeds on this assumption (for the reason that it does not question these beliefs; it only examines and articulates their content and their interrelatedness, while yet asserting their truth, and their accuracy in articulating revelation). Yet in displaying these beliefs in this manner, this process of thought implicitly assumes them to be an authoritative articulation of revelation.

Is there further evidence for this view that we are presenting? Let us briefly review our examination of one of Anselm's A B C D's which allegedly came from 'the Credo' = Tradition. The key phrase "[God is] that than which nothing greater than can be thought" allegedly comes from this 'Credo'. Is this phrase, then, considered by Barth to be an authoritative articulation of revelation? We have found this to be the case. The 'key phrase' must be considered, and heard as "the Word of God." The argument can only be effective, in Barth's view, if the phrase is so regarded. But one should note: here the human form of "the Word of God" are the human words of (what is allegedly) Tradition (i.e. not Scripture). Thus (1) Tradition has a place of primordial importance in the method Barth describes; (2) It is implicitly regarded as an authoritative articulation of revelation; (3) There is some evidence that Barth is of the view that the human words of tradition are a

human form of "the Word of God", (The key phrase being an example of this); (4) The theologian's relation to 'the Credo' = Tradition is one of unquestioning assent: there is no question of truth raised prior to assent or subsequently in this theology.

That what we have just outlined here has little to do with Anselm's own actual procedure should be apparent, if, as we have argued, Barth has misunderstood Anselm's method at a quite basic level.

There is one further point we should make before concluding our study of Barth's Anselm. As Barth readily admits, Anselm's argument comes to nothing, in his interpretation, unless God intervenes, and speaks his "Word" in and through Anselm's human words.[1] We have identified the central place where this must happen. That is, Anselm's 'key phrase' must be heard as "the Word of God." Barth states that "apart from this Event [in which God speaks his Word] there is no proof of the existence, that is, of the reality of God."[2] Yet what this means, and here we agree fully with Arthur C. McGill,[3] is that Anselm's argument becomes, in effect, "an argument from authority." For it is only when Authority (i.e. God) intervenes, and speaks his "Word" through Anselm's human words

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.171.
2. A.F.Q.I., p.171.
3. See above, pp.128ff.

that this argument, so interpreted, has any effectiveness. Thus the argument is totally dependent on Authority for its effectiveness.

That this has little to do with Anselm's own theological programme should again be apparent, if we are correct in maintaining that Barth has misunderstood Anselm's theology at this point (The key phrase comes, if we are right, from Seneca, a 'pagan' philosopher, not from 'the Credo') (and there is no evidence that Anselm viewed this phrase as a prohibition, even a divine prohibition). If, as we are maintaining, Barth has misunderstood the nature of Anselm's method as carried out in his Proslogion, and misunderstood it at a quite basic level, this should not mean that it has not served Barth well in his own quest for a methodology. While it does mean, if we are essentially correct, that Barth has no precedent in Anselm e.g. for cutting himself off from all non-ecclesiastical sources of thought (philosophy etc.), and for attempting to base his theology solely on (what is alleged to be) "the Word of God" as articulated in the 'Faith of the Church', yet, perhaps Barth could never have reached the 'methodological crystalization' he did except by misinterpreting this respected figure of the past. He sees this study as his most satisfying production, as "a vital key, if not the key, to an understanding of that whole process of thought that has impressed me more and more in my Church Dogmatics

as the only one proper to theology."[1] With this thought in mind we shall now go on in Part Three of our thesis to look upon Barth's own theological procedure. In doing so, we shall not simply presuppose that what we have found here in the method Barth ascribes, with favor, to Anselm, he simply puts into practice. Rather we shall let this study of Anselm suggest questions concerning Barth's own procedure. We shall find some remarkable similarities, yet combined with significant differences.

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1. A.F.Q.I., Preface to the second edition, 1958, p.11.

Part III.

KARL BARTH'S THEOLOGICAL METHOD IN OPERATION.

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Introduction to Part III.

Our purpose in the next few pages is to describe both what we shall be trying to do in Part III of our thesis, and also what we shall not be trying to do. In general terms, we shall, in Part III, be trying to lay out evidence for the presence of certain basal characteristics which we find in the actual working procedure of Barth's theology. That is, characteristics in the manner in which Barth carries out his theological programme. Thus our concern is with what we find to be Barth's actual working method. His own account of this working method will concern us only at points, and only indirectly, for we find his own account deficient in several ways, which we shall indicate. We might also point out that what we are concerned with are aspects of method, rather than, for example, the specific "content" of his doctrines. The content of his doctrines will concern us only insofar as they can help us understand the method.

Our goal is to exhibit evidence, and argue upon this evidence, for the presence of certain "characteristics of method." In doing so our aim (most often) is not proof, that is definite certainty, but rather, exploration leading up to a statement of, for example, the great likelihood that such and such is the case. If one aims only for proof and certainty, this in our opinion limits one in his explorations. That is, what one can prove, or make a completely watertight case for, in any given body of thought is probably in most cases quite limited in extent. In contrast, that which one can give significant evidence for, and argue for, that is, arguing for its probability and great likelihood (over against an opposing viewpoint concerning the writer in question) is, in our view, just as important as what one might be able to prove with certainty. So much for our aims in general. We might now state what we shall not be trying to do in Part III, that is, how we are limiting our study.

We shall not be trying to investigate the complete extent of Barth's working method. To carry out such a task adequately is, in our view, beyond the scope of a single thesis. Rather we shall focus upon several central and basic aspects of this method, which in our view underpin the whole theological enterprise.

We shall limit our study additionally by considering Barth's dogmatics of the period 1930 - 1942, that is, approximately the first half of the period of his

mature productivity, c.1930 - 1965. This period includes the Church Dogmatics, Volumes I/1, I/2, II/1 and II/2, Credo (1935) and Dogmatics in Outline (1947). Although the latter lies just beyond the period we have named, yet it is of methodological importance for our period. Barth's study of Anselm, which has proved so suggestive for our study of Barth's method, also falls within these years, being composed in 1931.

Firstly, we shall investigate the relation to Tradition which exists in this theology, a subject that has received relatively little attention in studies of Barth. The importance of this subject has been suggested by Barth's rather unusual interpretation of Anselm, in which tradition, in the form of 'the Credo' functions in a central and highly significant manner.[1] We shall be arguing that Tradition, and specifically the credal tradition of the Early Church, and the dogmas associated with it, are of central importance for Barth's own method, and that this method, as a method, cannot be understood without careful attention to this basic factor. This is not to deny the importance of exegesis of scripture, specifically Barthian exegesis. Yet this is another issue, and has received treatment from many quarters.[2] The methodological

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1. The Relevance of A.F.Q.I. See also below.

2. See for example Klaas Runia, Karl Barth's Doctrine of Holy Scripture, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1962.

importance of Tradition, in contrast to Scripture, has received a surprisingly small amount of attention, among the major interpreters of Barth. In fact, as a methodological issue it has almost been ignored. As a consequence, the manner in which this theologian relates to Tradition in his theology has received relatively little attention. We shall refer to this issue in shorthand form by calling it "the type of relation to Tradition." Questions about the type of relation to Tradition occupy the central place in our considerations in Part III of our thesis.

Near the end of our explorations of the relation to Tradition we shall be arguing several things. Chief among them is (1) that "the relation to Tradition" (specifically the Credal Tradition of the Early Church) is one of unthinking submission; and (2) that because of this "type of relation to tradition", one may say that Barth's theologizing is in actual fact characterized by a type of fundamentalism not obvious to the eye at first: a fundamentalism based upon creeds.

We shall go on from our investigation of the relation to Tradition to consider several other aspects of Barth's method, which can be seen in fresher perspective, once the relation to Tradition has been laid out. Of importance in this section of Part III is Barth's "No" to Anthropology and philosophy in general. If Barth shall find significant basis for his theology in tradition, and in scripture as articulated and

interpreted by tradition, he is determined to cut himself off from modern anthropology and philosophy, especially as these disciplines might have given him some foundations upon which to treat theological themes, and consider theological statements. Here we find a methodological motif which we found first in Barth's highly unusual methodological interpretation of Anselm: all the basal elements for theology must come from "the Credo" of the Church. None shall come from outside these confines. This is what we saw as Barth's main thesis about Anselm, and its corollary.[1]

We shall go on from this point to take up another general theme concerning Barth's method: the relation to "Word" which inheres in his theologizing. If we found an unthinking submission to Tradition in Barth's actual procedure, we shall find that this is accompanied by an unthinking submission to what is alleged to be "Word", that is, to what is experienced as "Word" in a revelatory Event in the here and now, in which the human words of scripture become "the Word of God" within the subjectivity of the hearer.

We shall then go on to consider Barth's rather peculiar view of Apologetics in which Dogmatics becomes the apologetic by virtue of the alleged action of the deity.

Following this we shall consider a factor in

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1. See above, pp.91f; p.93.

Barth's manner of theologizing which involves appeal to the reader on a subliminal level, that is, in a manner which bypasses the reader's thought processes and considered judgement. We shall call this factor "undertow", for like a subtle current in the depths of the sea surf it tends to "pull" a person in a certain direction almost without his conscious awareness.

In our concluding section we shall look back upon the development of Barth's method in historical perspective, viewing it first in connection with the political-social-economic context in which it developed, and second, looking at its development by finding a parallel in the revolutionary development of one of the arts in this same period (1910-1930): Western Classical Music. Here we shall find parallels with Barth's development, as well as significant contrasts.

We shall also examine Barth's theology vis-a-vis preaching, namely Barth's own preaching. For this dogmatics was meant to serve "Church Proclamation", the chief form of which is preaching. The question we shall be asking is: what relevance was Barth's peculiar type of theologizing to his own preaching. We shall find results other than what one might expect. This short section will leave us with the question: What was the purpose of this theology, since it does not appear to us to have significant relevance for preaching, in particular Barth's own preaching.

Lastly we shall give a retrospective summary

of our major points and offer arguments against taking this theology seriously as a viable, healthy and worthy option in the twentieth century. We shall be arguing that the manner in which Barth relates to tradition in his actual dogmatic process is in fact most probably a danger to tradition. This is somewhat ironic for, tradition, specifically Early Church "orthodoxy" is something he sought to preserve and maintain.

While the thrust of what follows in Part III is mainly critical towards Barth's manner of theology, yet at the end of our study we shall find positive things about Barth's productivity, yet not in his dogmatics but rather in his preaching. We find definite contrasts between the two.

Throughout almost the whole of Part III, concerning basic aspects of Barth's method, our study of Barth's Anselm has been a suggestive guide at many points, prompting us to ask ourselves questions concerning Barth's actual working method that we would probably not otherwise have asked. If he himself found great methodological significance for his theology in his peculiar interpretation of Anselm,[1] so also have we, even if perhaps somewhat different ways. That this book on Anselm has been ignored for a long period of time, up until almost 1960, may to some extent explain why we are now able to explore aspects

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1. See above, pp.73ff; and also below, pp.257ff.

of Barth's actual method which have remained essentially unexplored up until the present time.

Chapter I.

PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.

Section A.

THE RELEVANCE OF BARTH'S *ANSELM* FOR UNDERSTANDING BARTH'S DOGMATIC METHOD; AND A COMMENT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT THE METHOD IN BARTH'S *ANSELM* DOES NOT INVOLVE.

After studying Barth's book on Anselm extensively in Part II we should again raise the question as to its relevance for understanding Barth's method. Unless one raises this question, one runs the risk of simply assuming that the method Barth describes in his study of Anselm is simply put into practice in his *Church Dogmatics*. One does not wish merely to make this assumption. So here in this chapter we wish (1) to examine the evidence which suggests the relevance of Barth's interpretation of Anselm for understanding central aspects of Barth's actual method; (2) we also wish to ask about the nature of the method in Barth's Anselm, most notably what this method does not involve.

The basic matter at hand here is method. How are we to say that the rather curious method Barth finds in Anselm (mistakenly in our view) is a help in understanding method in Barth's major work, his *Church Dogmatics*. We could refer back to the opening of Part II of our thesis where we studied, briefly, Barth's own reaction to this question, along with the estimate of the book's importance by major interpreters of Barth, after the book's reissue in 1958.[1] One can now look at these statements in a slightly different light, after the completion Part II in which we have

1. See above, p.72ff.

investigated Barth's interpretation.

With reference to Barth's statement in the preface to the second edition of his Anselm, could it be that with the benefit of hindsight, that is, the hindsight of 30 years, he can see and understand basic aspects of his own actual path, (that is, his working method as opposed to his theoretical methodology), with heightened clarity, if not also with the freshness of new insights? If so, this would not be an uncommon experience of writers in general.

Barth is quite emphatic in his forward to the second edition of his Anselm about the relevance of his book for understanding his method. He states, almost with impatience at this point, that is in 1958, that

> Most of the commentators have completely failed to see that in this book on Anselm I am working with a vital key, if not the key, to an understanding of that process of thought that has impressed me more and more in my Church Dogmatics as the only one proper to theology. [1]

One wishes to point out how emphatic Barth is at this point, almost 30 years late, to emphasize the relevance of his work on Anselm for "an understanding of that process of thought" carried on in his Church Dogmatics. One says "emphatic", for one senses in the manner in which Barth writes an impatience with his interpreters over this issue, "Most of them have completely failed

1. A.F.Q.I., p.11. (We quote this passage again in order to draw out something in addition to what we said previously).

to see... the relevance ". Barth could have continued: "when it has been so evident to me". This, then, would seem to be implicit in Barth's statement: that it is quite evident to him, that is, the relevance of his study on Anselm, for an understanding of his actual method in his Church Dogmatics.

As we have seen, in our introduction to Part II, interpreters of Barth after 1958-1960 are nearly unanimous in the opinion that Barth's book on Anselm is crucial for an understanding of his theological method. Let us look at some of these evaluations in detail, which we have referred to only in general in the introduction to Part II, for then we can see something that may be somewhat surprising.

James Smart in his book The Divided Mind of Modern Theology[1] quotes Barth's statement about finding "a vital key, if not the key, to...that whole process of thought..." and devotes space to a detailed study of Barth's Anselm, entitling the section, "The Contribution of Anselm of Canterbury." [2] He states that "Barth's work on Anselm brought the final resolution of the problem of where theology was to find its basis." [3] We wish to comment on this last statement after considering the reaction of other commentators.

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1. Subtitle: Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann, 1908-1933, Westminster, Philadelphia, 1968.

2. ibid., p.194ff.

3. ibid., p.198.

T.F. Torrance, another significant commentator on Barth writing after 1958-1960 states: "It was in the writing of this brilliant and extremely important little work that Barth's understanding of the fundamental nature of theological method clarified and crystallized." [1] Torrance then devotes eleven pages to a detailed study of Barth's Anselm. He sees it as "the decisive turning point in his thinking," as regards method.[2]

Zahrnt states, perhaps somewhat daringly, that "Barth's own view [of his shift in method] is that in his Church Dogmatics he was merely following through the theological program laid down by Anselm of Canterbury." [3]

We need not go on. Most other commentators re-echo these views. Barth has, in his study of Anselm, discovered or clarified (depending on the interpreter) "the fundamental nature of his theological method" (Torrance). Here, he brought to resolution "the methodological problem of where theology was to find its basis" (Smart). In his Church Dogmatics "he was merely following through the theological program laid down by Anselm of Canterbury" (Zahrnt).

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1. In Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology, 1910-1931, S.C.M., London, 1962, p.183.

2. ibid., p.182.

3. Zahrnt, p.90.

It would seem clear, then, that for Barth as well as for the majority of later commentators, the book on Anselm was central and crucial in his own development as regards method is of crucial importance. Thus it is of central importance for understanding Barth's theological method. We have then established, if only in a preliminary way, the relevance of Barth's Anselm for understanding Barth's method.

The Absence of Scripture and Christology in the Method in Barth's Anselm.

The reaction of Barth, and the interpreters raises an interesting and perhaps significant question. For while they are unqualified in their view, both Barth and the commentators, that the method in the book on Anselm is basic to understanding Barth's method, and each seems to have considered this method in the work on Anselm in detail, they have not noted what is missing in this method, and what one might have expected to find given even only cursory knowledge of Barth's Dogmatics.

Specifically, they have not noted that Christology (or Christological doctrine) and Scripture both play no part and have no place in the method and procedure described so approvingly in the book on Anselm. If one has but passing acquaintance with the Church Dogmatics, one recognizes immediately the significant and highly visible place both of these have there. Both Christology and Scriptures are typically seen as having an exalted place, in both matters of method and

content. (One is not disputing this view in what follows).

Yet in the method outlined in Barth's Anselm, both Christology and Scriptures have no significant place. In fact they are hardly mentioned. Of Christology, we can find only one reference, in passing, in the first half of Barth's study, devoted to Anselm's "Theological Scheme".[1]

Scripture in mentioned, but it plays no significant, or perhaps more accurately, no constructive part in this method. Scripture is seen as a 'referee at the sidelines'. It acts as a limit in the sense that it is used to determine "whether a theologoumenon is admissible or not".[2] "If..it is a strictly theological proposition, that is to say a proposition formed independently of the actual wording of Scripture, [in contrast to a statement that merely duplicates the words of Scripture, and thus in (Barth's-Anselm's) view "is not strictly a theological proposition,"] then the fact that it does not contradict the biblical text determines its validity. ... If it did contradict the Bible, however attractive it might be on other grounds, it would be rendered invalid."[3]

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1. "Behind the Doctrine of the Divine Word there is naturally the Christology of the Roman Catholic Church, which we cannot discuss here." A.F.Q.I.p.58

2. A.F.Q.I., p.33.

3. ibid. One would note that this leaves quite a wide door open. There are many things, for example which the writers of scripture did not know of and thus, did not "contradict."

This is the only real role Scripture plays. For in the process of 'understanding' or 'proving', that is, in the process of thought outlined in the book on Anselm, there can be no "proof texts" in pursuing the goal.[1] In addition there is "the methodological principle ... that when it is a question of *intelligere* and *probare* [that is, of proceeding according to the method outlined] nothing can be achieved by an appeal to the authority of Holy Scripture."[2]

In the place just cited "Scripture" and "the Credo" are clearly distinguished. If we go on ten pages, we find that the source for the elements, the A.B.C.D.'s which are used to 'establish' or 'prove' the X *all* come from "the Credo". Here, at this point, Scripture has no place. It is not mentioned.

It would then appear that Scripture has in fact no significant constructive place in the method outlined in Barth's *Anselm.* It remains, as it were, on the periphery, as a limit. Even here, on the periphery, it would seem to have a minor role. For the theologian must only avoid contradicting scripture. This leaves him a rather broad field in which to pursue his discipline unhindered.

What we would conclude from this, that is, the absence of Christology, and the peripheral significance

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.42, 43.

2. *ibid.*

of Scripture, is that the theological method outlined and expounded in Barth's study of Anselm can be seen, and studied, independently of these two forementioned factors. In fact Barth sees this method in operation in Anselm's Proslogion and sees this "with approval". That this method does stand independently of Christology, and that Christology is used only in conjunction with this method is implicitly acknowledged by Torrance, a commentator quite favourable to Barth. When Torrance begins the section following his own detailed consideration of the method in Barth's Anselm, he points out the fact that Barth has combined this method with Christology:

> It was with this fundamental conception of theological activity which he learned from Anselm that Barth turned to write his Church Dogmatics, but it was characteristic of Barth that he combined it in the most intensive way with Christology." [1]

One finds a faulty assumption in several sources, namely that Barth's work on Anselm has involved Christology, or "signifies the Christological concentration taking place in his work." [2]

More importantly, we find in Barth's Anselm a method taken up in his Church Dogmatics which was subsequently combined with a Christology, and where subsequently Scripture was to have an important place.

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1. op.cit., p.193.

2. We find this in Berkouwer, p.42,n.50.

This would mean that this method could be studied in its several aspects, as a separate consideration in the study of Barth's theology.

Further Conclusions from the Foregoing.

One could also conclude from the foregoing that if Barth has in his own words found "a vital key" and perhaps, more than that, "the key" to "that whole process of thought" in his Church Dogmatics, it is one which does not involve Christology. That Christology was "combined" with it later does not alter this fact. It does not of necessity involve Christology.

Additionally, it does involve Scripture. That is, not in any constructive sense. Scripture acts only as a boundary or limit: something not to be in contradiction with.

We may now raise the question as to what does this method involve? We see two major elements which stand out above the rest, in the context of this discussion. It involves Tradition, in a central and basic manner. As we have described in Part II,[1] in this method, the theologian or dogmatician selects a tenet from "the Credo", and sets it aside as an 'X' to be 'established' or 'proved'. He then takes other tenets from 'the Credo', and uses them as presuppositions, as A.B.C.D.'s to 'prove' or 'establish' his X. All of

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1. see above, pp.93ff.

the elements used come from the Credo, this synthesis of Belief handed down over the centuries. In short, all the elements come from Tradition.[1]

Secondly, the method in Barth's Anselm involves "revelation". That is, it involves revelation (in specifically Barthian terms) in the sense of an "Event" which takes place in the 'here and now' in which one hears human words and concepts as "Word". That Barth means an 'Event' of revelation in the 'here and now', seems clear from the conclusion of his Anselm where he summarizes his view of the process:

> God gave himself as the object of his knowledge and God illumined him that he might know him as object. Apart from this event [Ohne dieses Ereignis] ther is no proof of the existence, that is of the reality of God. But in the power of this event [Aber in Kraft dieses Ereignisses] there is a proof which is worthy of gratitude. Truth has spoken, not faith-needy man. [Die Wahrheit hat gesprochen, nicht der glauben wollende Mensch.][2]

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1. Although Barth at one point (early in his study) includes Scripture within "the Credo", it becomes clear, as his study proceeds that they are to be distinguished from each other. So, for example, on p.40 of A.F.Q.I. they are referred to in a disjunctive manner, as "Scripture and Credo". When he finally turns to describing the A.B.C.D.'s 'taken from the Credo', one finds two things to support this disjunction: (1) None of the A.B.C.D.'s he names are taken from scripture; (2) The contents of the Credo are described as "Articles of Faith", A.F.Q.I., p.53,55,78.

2. A.F.Q.I., p.171, German ed., p.198. The last sentence we have rendered differently from Robertson in the English edition in order to preserve perhaps more closely the sense of the German.

So we have: "God gave himself as object ... and illumined him [the theologian, or, Anselm] .... Apart from this event ... no proof.... In the power of this event ... proof.... Truth has spoken...." Spoken of here then is an 'Event' in the here and now, an 'Event' in which God has given himself as object, and illumined the theologian. The Event is indispensable to the process of thought: apart from it there is no 'proof', while with it there is 'proof'. It is an Event which involves Word, as the last sentence suggests: "Truth has spoken."[1] So we have: An Event of revelation, which involves "Word" in a specifically Barthian sense.

Thus we have a situation which could, at first glance, seem quite odd. For while this process involves revelation, and Event, that is an Event of revelation in the here and now, in which human words must be heard as "Word", this process does not involve scripture.

We could go one step further and point out that what has been, and must be heard as word is not scripture, but tradition. The phrase in Anselm's argument: "that than which nothing greater can be thought" is the central element which is "revelatory",[2] It must be

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1. See Part II, where in studying the nature of the key phrase, we found that this phrase must be heard as "Word" for the argument to be effective. above, pp.123ff.

2. A.F.Q.I., p.78, note 2.

heard as a Word of prohibition.[1] Yet most importantly, the (alleged) source of this phrase is "the Credo".[2] It is one of a series of beliefs of tradition which form the presuppositions in this process of thought. Thus we have a process of thought which involves revelation, but revelation mediated through tradition, not scripture.

Certainly there are other aspects of this method which we could mention, which stand in connection with the two we have talked of. Yet it is unnecessary to go into them at this point.[3] The most significant aspects in this context are the prominence of tradition and the prominence of revelation. Of central significance is the fact that revelation is mediated through tradition rather than scripture.

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Our most central theme in Part III will be the way tradition is regarded, the manner in which it is appropriated, the place it has functionally in Barth's theology, and the manner in which it is used polemically, against those who would disagree with Barth.

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1. ibid., p.77.
2. ibid., p.78.
3. See Part II, pp.223-248.

Section B.

THE RELEVANCE OF BARTH'S CREDO AND DOGMATICS IN OUTLINE FOR OUR STUDY; AND A COMMENT ON THE CREEDALISTIC FRAMEWORK OF HIS THEOLOGICAL WRITINGS, 1930 - 1945.

If we turn to Barth's works which stand alongside the Church Dogmatics in the period 1930 - 1945, that is roughly the period of his productivity which concerns us in our thesis, we find an unusual occurrence: almost all of the works of book length have a creedalistic framework.

If one turns to those works concerned with theology, or dogmatics proper, in fact, one finds that almost without exception, Barth chooses a creed as the frame of his work.

So in 1935 we find Credo, using the "Apostles' Creed". In 1938 we find his Gifford Lectures, traditionally given upon a theme of theology apart from 'revealed theology', in which he takes up the Scots Confession of 1560 as a framework. In 1943, The Faith of the Church: A Commentary on the Apostles' Creed according to Calvin's Catechism. And in 1945 we find his Dogmatics in Outline, again using the "Apostles' Creed" as a framework.[1, 2] Thus with the exception

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1. Published in 1947, yet first given as Lectures in 1945.

2. In fact, using the bibliography compiled by Charlotte von Kirshbaum we can find no other works of book length, concerning dogmatics proper, which do not use a creedalistic framework. We are, of course excluding his Anselm of 1931.

of his Gifford Lectures, Barth has chosen one creed in particular, the "Apostles' Creed", as his framework for each of his extended works on theology in this period. Although there are many periodical articles, some of which are significant and important, and many published sermons and 'open letters', the above mentioned works are the only works of book length concerning dogmatics.

Since we wish to draw on some of these works in Part III of our thesis, we should raise an important question firstly: Are these works simply commentaries on creeds, or the "Apostles' Creed" in particular? That is, is what is involved only exposition of the Articles, and perhaps the doctrines associated with them, as they developed in the Early Church and down through Western Christendom. Or are some of these works Dogmatics proper, that is, Dogmatic Theology as Barth conceived it, and attempted to carry it out in his Church Dogmatics, yet here, in these works, on a smaller scale? Do they involve his Dogmatic process of thought, and thus his method?

In the case of at least two of these works we can be quite sure that it is a case of the latter, that is, they are examples of Dogmatic Theology proper, and are examples of Barth's theological method in action. The two works are Credo of 1935, and Dogmatics in Outline of 1945.

What evidence supports this, namely that they are to be seen as Dogmatic Theology proper, in which

Barth's theological method is at work? Each of these works, Credo and Dogmatics in Outline begins with a chapter setting out "the task". Here is described what, in Barth's view, Dogmatic Theology should be. Thus, we find in Chapter I of Credo a passage which is reminiscent of much of what Barth said concerning (his interpretation of) Anselm's method in his Anselm.

> Dogmatics endeavours to take what is first said to it in the revelation of God's reality and to say it over again in human speech. To that end Dogmatics unfolds and displays those truths in which the truth of God concretely meets us.

The manner in which Barth continues is also reminiscent of his study on Anselm.

> Dogmatics articulates again the articles of faith; it attempts to see them... in their interconnections and context; where necessary it inquires after new articles of faith, i.e. articles that have not up to now been known or acknowledged.... Dogmatics is the act of the Credo determined by the scientific method appropriate to it - credo, ut intelligam.[1]

The chapter takes the form of prolegomena to the Dogmatic Theology that follows.

The first chapter of the other work, Dogmatics in Outline fulfils basically the same purpose, setting out again what in Barth's view Dogmatics should be, again, before setting out upon the task.

These chapters should not be dismissed as simply 'poor substitutes' for the exposition in Church Dogmatics,

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1. Credo, E.T. : tr J.S. McNab, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1936, p.3.

Volume One, for when a writer is forced to restate his thinking several years after he has initially done so, and restate it in briefer form, not only is it possible to get a more concise statement, but also, there is the possibility that in the intervening years, what is most important to him has become clearer, and his conscious priorities will stand out in greater clarity.

In the course of studying Barth's method, and in particular the relation to tradition we shall turn to these two works, as well as the Church Dogmatics. They are not brief works, even if they have that appearance when compared with the Church Dogmatics. Credo is 200 pages in length, and Dogmatics in Outline, 150 pages.

To recapitulate what we have said above, we can be quite sure these works are meant to embody Barth's dogmatic "programme" even if in an abbreviated form.

Section C.

A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE THEOLOGICAL METHOD PRESENTED BY BARTH IN THE PROLEGOMENA TO HIS CHURCH DOGMATICS.

In the following it is our purpose to give a brief summary of the main elements of Barth's methodology as he presentsedit in the Prolegomena, Volume I, of his Church Dogmatics. While here we present our summary of Barth's methodology, that is how he himself sees or presents his method, our task in Part III is not to ask as to how Barth presents his actual method (i.e. the question: what is his methodology?), but rather our question in Part III is: what is the method which Barth actually uses as he proceeds. These two do not, in our view, co-incide. Let us go on now to describe Barth's view of his method.

Dogmatics, in Barth's view, is the critical science by which "the Church" examines her proclamation, that is, her preaching and her theology (dogmatics, exegesis, and practical theology), asking this question: to what extent is it faithful to 'the Word' witnessed to by Scripture, and heard in Scripture.

Thus dogmatics is to be a critical science, examining 'what the church says' in light of one criterion and one alone: "The Word of God". To what extent is it faithful to this "Word"? We shall outline the diversity of what Barth means by "the Word of God" as

we proceed.[1] Yet we may note at this point that in this critical examination of Church Proclamation all other possible criteria are eliminated. No philosophical or anthropological criteria can be allowed to come into play. Even the operational criteria used in "other sciences" have relevance only provisionally and only to some extent. For example 'the principle of non-contradiction' cannot be binding upon dogmatics. Thus when Heinrich Scholz, one of Barth's colleagues, drew up a list of six operational presuppositions proposed as an articulation of those operational presuppositions necessarily adhered to in all the sciences, Barth ponders each point and finds he can accept only one.[2] Even this one, the principle of non-contradiction he can accept

> "only upon the very limited interpretation, by the scientific theorist upon the scarcely tolerable one, that theology will not assert an irremovability in the principle of "contradictions" which it is bound to make good.... The remaining sections of Scholz's law can only remind the theologian that he should know what he is doing when he transgresses them, and that as a theologian he cannot escape the necessity of transgressing them. Not one iota can be yielded here without betraying theology, for any concession here involves surrendering the theme of theology.[3]

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1. In our exposition, we are using the terms "Word", "the Word" and "Word of God" interchangeably. We have varied our wording only to avoid repetition, not to indicate differentiations.

2. For the list, and Barth's response, see C.D.I/1, p.7,ff.

3. C.D.I/1, p.8.

The passage gives indication of what we have been talking of: Barth's determination that dogmatics shall not be limited by, nor supported by, criteria other than this one criterion: "The Word of God"; and this alone shall be the criterion by which Church Proclamation is examined, and by which dogmatics proceeds. As to Barth's rejection of criteria from philosophy and anthropology, we shall examine this rejection in greater detail in a following chapter.[1] What is this "Word of God" which shall be the sole criterion in the critical task of dogmatics? It is to be found in three forms, in Barth's schematization. Firstly, it is the revelation to which Scripture points. It is a Word which "comes to meet man" in "the revealing Acts of God", as these are attested in Scripture. Thus "the Word of God", as revelation, exists prior to, and in this sense, independently of, Scripture. Scripture points man to this "Word".

Secondly, Scripture is "the Word of God". That is, Scripture <u>becomes</u> "the Word of God" <u>when</u> it points to "the Word" in its primary form just mentioned. What this means is that Scripture <u>becomes</u> revelatory for man when, in an Event in the here and now, it points man to the primary form of "the Word". The key concept here is "Event" ("Ereignis": event, occurrence, incident). In this Event, human words <u>become</u>

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1. See below, pp.385-404.

the Word of God, not by virtue of their worth as human words, but because it pleases God to use these human words as a medium of his own self-revealing activity. This Event in man's own present may or may not occur; that is, when the human words of Scripture become "the Word of God" this happens by virtue of God's own action in the here and now. As "the Word" approaches man through Scripture from without, in this Event, the Holy Spirit acts within man, confirming this "Word" which man hears in the form of human words.

The third form of "the Word" is preaching. Here the preacher proclaims "the Word" which is attested in Scripture, and which he hears in Scripture. That is, "the Word" in its primary form, as it is attested in Scripture, is spoken again together with the preachers commentary and application to the present situation. Here, in the preaching situation, it is again in an Event that the preacher's own words become "the Word of God" for those assembled in "the Church of God". That is, human words of the preacher, as they proclaim "the Word" witnessed to by Scripture become "Word" in the Event in which it pleases God to confirm these human words, coming within man the hearer, in the form of the Holy Spirit, confirming the Word of revelation spoken to him in his present context by the preacher.

These then are the three forms of "the Word" in Barth's schematization: the Word Revealed, the Word Written, and the Word Preached. As we have seen

a key concept here is that of Event: the Event in which the human words of Scripture and the human words of the preacher become the Word of God. Because of this view of Barth's, his theology has been termed variously "occasionalistic",[1] and "actualistic".[2] If "the Word of God" is to be criterion in theology's critical task it is to be source in theology's constructive work. In fact it is to be the sole source from which theology draws the elements upon which it reflects and with which it builds its thought patterns. No other source is to be allowed in this theology, e.g. religious experience, revelation (or what alleges itself to be revelation) other than "the Word", etc.

It would appear then that theology's constructive task consists in exegesis of Scripture, that is Scripture in that it points to "the Word" and in so far as it becomes "the Word". Further, the theologian must avoid contradicting the text of Scripture as he follows out the implications of his exposition of "the Word". Scripture thus has a 'limiting' role, as well as a mediating role.

We have said that it would appear that theology's constructive task consists in exegesis of Scripture, that is, theological exegesis. This is the view of Barth which one most commonly encounters both among

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1. See Jerome Hamer, Karl Barth, Sands, London, 1962, p.vi.
2. Hartwell, p.33f.

his interpreters and his readers: a theologian who exegetes Scripture in a specifically theological (and a specifically Barthian) manner.

In the remainder of Part III we shall find this view faulty, by reason of being sorely incomplete. No mention has been made here of the significance and importance of tradition and specifically the credal tradition of the Early Church in this method. In fact almost no mention of the subject of tradition: creeds and dogmas occur throughout the whole of Barth's lengthy Prolegomena, that is up until page 600 of the second(and last) volume of this Prolegomena. We shall investigate this situation below[1]; yet at this point we would only say that in our opinion both the view of Barth as "theological exegete" and also Barth's own Prolegomena are misleading as regards Barth's actual theological procedure: they show only one partof the picture in so far as they almost completely ignore the place tradition actually has in this theological programme. One of the central tasks of Part III of our thesis is to examine the place of tradition, and to examine both the use of tradition and the manner in which Barth relates to tradition in his actual theological procedure.

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1. See below, pp.283ff.

Chapter II.

THE PLACE, IMPORTANCE AND TYPE OF RELATION TO TRADITION IN BARTH'S THEOLOGY.

Section A.

THE METHODOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF "TRADITION" ACCORDING TO THE MAJOR INTERPRETERS OF BARTH.

The first task in a lengthy section of a thesis such as this might typically be to summarize the views previously put forth concerning this subject, namely the methodological significance and use of tradition in Barth's theology. Yet even here we are faced with a problem, that is, we are faced with what would seem to be a gap in the interpretation of Barth. For if one turns to the major interpreters of Barth, by which we mean interpreters who have produced a book length work on Barth's theology, we typically find little or no treatment of this subject. That is while we find brief treatments of Barth's view of tradition, we do not find the interpreter's view of (1) the importance of creeds and dogmas for Barth's methodological procedure (2) the manner in which Barth relates to creeds and dogmas, that is, tradition. Thus we typically find no assessment of the methodological significance of tradition for this theology.

If we look for the methodological significance of tradition in Hartwell for example, we find only one brief reference to tradition in his whole work, and this merely summarizes what one takes to be Barth's view of tradition.[1] When we turn to Berkouwer and

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1. Hartwell, p.71.

von Balthasar, again we find brief summaries of what one takes to be Barth's view of tradition, yet one finds no assessment by the interpreters of the place and importance of tradition for this theological method.

The situation is almost the same in the work of Torrance concerning Barth's development up to 1931. Even though Torrance intends to treat the issue of Barth's methodological development up through 1931, that is, up to the beginning of the Church Dogmatics, one finds only one reference to the role of tradition in Barth's theology, namely that theology is to approach scripture through the history of the church's interpretation of scripture, i.e. with the guidance of tradition.[1] Yet in a work so concerned with matters of method in theology, this subject is never again taken up and explored for its significance vis-a-vis Barth. In fact during the whole of Torrance's lengthy and detailed treatment of Barth's Anselm, not once does the subject of tradition arise.[2] That is, even though Torrance must describe the A B C D's vis-a-vis the X in Barth's Anselm, not once does he ask where these come from, nor what constitutes this 'Credo' from which all these A B C D's are drawn. Even where Torrance makes reference to Barth's term 'the Credo' he avoids any investigation of this key concept in

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1. Torrance, p.122.

2. Cf. Torrance, pp.182ff.

Barth's interpretation of Anselm.[1] As we have seen, the A B C D's are in Barth's interpretation articles of belief, which have their source in the creeds and dogmas of the Early Church, that is, tradition. To summarize: Torrance avoids the question as to the source of these A B C D's, and thus avoids the issue of Tradition. In doing so he has avoided discussion of one of the most significant and also one of the most obvious features of Barth's interpretation of Anselm: 'the Credo' as the (alleged) source of all the elements of Anselm's thought.

Hamer in fact is the only major interpreter of Barth we have been able to find who even gives the issue of tradition in Barth extended treatment.[2] Unfortunately Hamer does not follow up his investigations and ask the question of the real methodological significance of what he finds Barth saying.[3]

Since the issue of the methodological importance of tradition has in most instances been ignored, or given minimal treatment among the major interpreters of Barth, one of our tasks in Part III is to argue for its importance and significance in Barth's actual

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1. Torrance, p.191.

2. See Hamer, pp.191-199.

3. He quotes a passage from Credo which we find important and treat below, ("The Command to Obey Tradition in Credo and Dogmatics in Outline"), yet he does not follow up his investigation.

procedure in theology. If we are somewhat near the mark in our assessment of the importance of tradition in this theological programme, we can only find the lack of attention to this issue in the major interpreters somewhat surprising.

Section B.

"TRADITION" IN BARTH'S ACCOUNT OF HIS METHODOLOGY IN THE CHURCH DOGMATICS : A PUZZLE.

When Barth comes to 'sum up' his methodology in the Prolegomena to his Church Dogmatics, at the end of Volume I of this work, he describes the task of dogmatics as: "the unfolding and presentation of the content of the Word of God,"[1] that is, the content of "revelation" mediated through Scripture. When he goes on to expand this formula in this final 'summing up' chapter of his Prolegomena, he speaks of "tenets"[2] (tenets of faith, or beliefs) in connection with this "unfolding and presentation" process. Thus he speaks of

> ... tenets, in the understanding and elucidation of which the dogmatic unfolding and presentation of the content of the Word of God must be carried out.[3]

Thus, in Barth's view, it is in the understanding and elucidation of tenets of belief that this unfolding

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1. C.D.I/2, p.853; also, p.869.
2. "Grundsätze" may be translated as "axioms", yet as the translator rightly senses, the context indicates that Barth wishes to avoid any systematization based upon presuppositions or elements of thought (i.e. philosophical axioms) having their source outside 'the Word of God'. So 'tenets', as in 'tenets of belief' probably comes closest to the intended meaning.
3. C.D.I/2. p.876.

and presentation of the content of "the Word" must take place. Yet where do these tenets come from? Where are they to be found? What is their source? Are they to be found in Scripture? That is, are the majority of them to be found in Scripture? Barth would be the first to admit that this is not the case, at least with the majority of the tenets of the faith. For example, he readily admits that "the eternality of the Son" is not a belief to be found in Scripture, but is rather a dogma of the Early Church.[1] (This is not an insignificant tenet in Barth's theology, for he goes on at length, for 37 pages, about "The Eternal Son").[2]

Yet if on the one hand on the whole or in the majority of cases the tenets of which Barth speaks are not to be found in Scripture, and on the other hand his methodology makes use, in a basal and significant way, of "tenets, in the understanding and elucidation of which the dogmatic unfolding and presentation of the content of the Word of God must be carried out", we are faced with a puzzle. That is we are faced with a gap. The source for these tenets is not named.

Now one might expect dogma or creeds to be named as the source, or the more general and inclusive

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1. C.D.I/1, p.475.

2. C.D.I/1, p.474ff.

term "tradition". Yet nowhere in this "summing up" does one find even the mention of these three, dogma, creeds or tradition. One only finds the repetition of "word of God...Word of God as revealed in Scripture... etc. etc."

This leads us on to another, larger puzzle. Throughout almost the whole of the 1,500 pages of Volumes I/1 and I/2 which make up Barth's Prolegomena it is only in exceptional cases that these subjects, dogma, creeds and tradition ever turn up.[1] For example, of the actual use of the word "Tradition" ("Tradition" in German) we are able to find, even with the help of the index, only two brief references, and these are in passing. Of "Dogma" in the sense of Early Church or Reformation Dogma one still finds only a handful of references. Only when it comes to creeds ("Bekenntnis" and "Konfession") does one find an exception to this.

Thus Tradition as Creeds and Dogma have an extremely low profile throughout the whole of Barth's lengthy 1500 page Prolegomena. That is, such a low profile that one could study this Prolegomena, and study it in some depth without becoming aware of even the possibility that dogma, creeds and tradition have a deep and pervasive significance for this theological programme.

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1. There is one significant exception, which we shall mention as we proceed.

One could understand then, why in many quarters Barth's theology has been seen predominantly in terms of "Revelation", "Word of God" and "Scripture", that is, primarily as a theology of an exegetical sort.

Yet we are still faced with a puzzle. If these tenets, the understanding and elucidation of which, form a basic and significant part of Barth's actual method, (as he acknowledges in Credo,[1] and in the passage we have cited from the Prolegomena), are not, on the whole, actually to be found in Scripture,[2] and in contrast, actually have their source in tradition, Barth has not told us so. That is, throughout the whole of his Prolegomena, describing the method of dogmatics, there is hardly any mention of this factor, i.e. tradition, and its importance for Barth's Dogmatics. We find only one significant exception to this. Near the conclusion of Barth's Prolegomena, within a section entitled "Authority in the Church", there is a subsection entitled "Authority under the Word." Within this subsection one finds a brief section devoted to "Confessions", that is, Creeds.[3]

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1. See Chapter I of Credo.

2. Even if many of these beliefs have, in the eyes of many interpreters, roots in Scripture.

3. C.D.I/2, p.620ff.

Alongside it one finds an even briefer section devoted to "Church Fathers."[1] We have said "brief".

To get an idea of the proportion of the Prolegomena devoted to these two subjects, let us imagine for a moment that the whole of the Prolegomena could be reprinted in minute type, so that the whole 1500 pages could be reduced by using miniature type, to take up 150 pages (that is, reduced by a factor of 10). Thus the 60 pages Barth devotes to an extended treatment of "Church Fathers" and "Confessions" would reduce proportionately to 6 pages. Thus if the Prolegomena were reproduced in miniature type to take up 150 pages, only 6 pages would be devoted to these two subjects (The actual pages involved are 1500 and 60 respectively). In addition, one finds this brief section near the end of the Prolegomena. Thus the views concerning creeds, dogma and tradition have not been methodologically integrated with the other elements in method, nor seen in relation to the Dogmatic enterprise all through the Prolegomena up to this late point. (pp.620ff., in Volume I/2). That is, the subject (tradition) has been put off to such a late point in the Prolegomena that one is not given a view of how Barth sees tradition functioning in his method as he unfolds his view of his method up to this quite late point. The other concepts of importance to his method

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1. C.D.I/2, pp.603ff.

are all present almost from the beginning: Word of God, Revelation, Scripture, Church and Preaching. This one is absent - until this very late point. In fact for the person who wishes to examine this element in Barth's Prolegomena, it is a subject of such 'low profile' that it is difficult to locate. As we have already mentioned, if one turns to the term "tradition" he finds only two references. If he turns to "dogma" he finds a handful of references and a brief passage concerning dogmas of the past. This passage is prefaced by the remark that "we shall have to deal at a later part of our Prolegomena with dogmas, i.e. ... with their relative authority and importance even for dogmatics." [1] Yet Barth does not return to speak of "dogmas". When he returns to the subject of tradition it is under the rubric of "Confession". Even at this point it takes some "digging" to find the actual place he deals with tradition, for it is nowhere indicated by chapter heading or subsection title. Thus even in a literary sense, tradition is given a very low profile in the Prolegomena.

We have in all this so far perhaps only stated the puzzle in starker form: Why does "Tradition" have such a "low profile" in this lengthy Prolegomena? Why does Barth even avoid the use of the term? (The

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1. C.D.I/1, p.365.

German, "Tradition", is used as far as we can tell, only twice, in passing, in the whole of the Prolegomena)[1]. And why does he leave the subject until the end (C.D.I/2, pp.620ff) and thus absent from the main body of the lengthy exposition of his methodology?

We can see two possible "solutions" to this puzzle (1) Barth was not aware at this point of the importance of Tradition to his actual theological method; or (2) Barth, as a Protestant theologian, and as a thinker typically seen in his own day as a Reformer, or in the line of the Reformers did not wish to emphasize or make obvious the significant and important place Tradition had in his thought, but would rather be seen as a dogmatician whose primary and essential task was the dogmatic exegesis and interpretation of scripture. (This in fact is the picture that predominates in many theological circles up to our own day).

The (1) above is rather doubtful in our view, since as we have pointed out Barth has found the method he outlined in his book on Anselm of such a help in his methodological thinking. He acknowledges this as early as 1931 with the publication of the book. As we have pointed out, this method, as outlined there, operates almost exclusively on the basis of tradition, that is the creedal tenets and dogmas wrought in con-

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1. K.D., I/1, p.35, 107; (C.D.I/1, p.38, 117).

junction with them. Scripture has only a peripheral place, and Christology, as such, is absent.[1] Thus, in Barth's study on Anselm, Tradition has a predominating place. Additionally, in his Credo of 1935, the tenets of tradition already have a quite significant place, and this is acknowledged in that work.[2] For these two reasons, and for the important additional reason that tenets also have a significant place in his Church Dogmatics, one could hardly say that by 1939 with the publication of the second half of his Prolegomena, he would have been unaware of the significance of Tradition, creeds and dogmas, for his theology.

This would point us toward the second possible reason we have suggested, namely that as a Protestant theologian who was seen in the line of the Reformers he did not wish, in light of their "sola scriptura", to draw attention to, or emphasize this aspect of his method.

In so down playing the importance of tradition in his account of his methodology Barth has most likely misled a host of interpreters concerning the real method, or a central and basic aspect of the real method, involved in his theologizing.

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1. See above. pp.261ff; pp.265ff.

2. See below. pp.334ff.

In order to find his own account of the importance of tradition for his theology we will have to turn to his other works, especially Credo of 1935, Dogmatics in Outline (1945) and of course his Anselm of 1931.

Summary.

Our purpose in this brief chapter has been to look at the place given to Tradition; and in particular the creeds and dogmas of the Early Church in Barth's Prolegomena to his Church Dogmatics. In summary, what we have found is that Tradition, Creeds and Dogmas have a very "low profile" in Barth's account of his methodology here. That is, one might read through these 1500 pages and hardly notice the (relatively) very brief treatment of this subject. In addition, this subject is almost totally ignored until almost the very last point in his account of his methodology. One has to read through almost 1,200 pages before finally arriving at this relatively short segment of the Prolegomena devoted to Teachings of the Church Fathers[1] and "Confessions".[2]

As a result of this the whole issue of Tradition has the appearance of an after-thought in Barth's Prolegomena. It's as if Barth has said: "Oh, we

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1. C.D.I/2, p.603.
2. C.D.I/2, p.620.

should consider this too, while we are on the subject of methodology. I had almost forgotten."

The consequence of ignoring this issue for the first 1200 pages of the Prolegomena and leaving it until the end is that it has not been integrated into Barth's consideration of other methodological concerns throughout the major portion of his Prolegomena. It has not been seen in relation to his dogmatic enterprise as a whole.[1] Thus, as we have already mentioned, we shall have to turn to other works, Credo, Dogmatics in Outline, and Anselm in order to find evidence of Barth's own views regarding the importance and place of tradition for his dogmatic enterprise.

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1. We shall explore relevant portions of the section of the Prolegomena concerned with dogma and "Confessions" at several points in Part III.

Section C.
THE COMMAND TO OBEY TRADITION
IN CREDO AND DOGMATICS IN OUTLINE.

In the following we shall look at the importance of tradition and, more importantly, the kind of relation to tradition inherent in Barth's theology, by turning to a place in which Barth replies to a series of questions concerning "the place of tradition" in theology. He has just given a series of lectures, published under the title Credo.[1] It is in essence an abbreviated form of his dogmatic process, in which he has used the "Apostles' Creed" as his framework for his dogmatic enterprise. One may note that these lectures were not simply expositions of dogma, but, as is made clear in the first lecture, they in fact are meant to embody Barth's dogmatic process of thought. The time is 1935, just three years after the publication of the first part-volume of his Church Dogmatics, and just four years after his completion of his study on Anselm. The place is Holland.

In what follows, we have a "considered reaction" to questions concerning the place of tradition in theology. That is, while on the one hand, we do not have a lengthy formal exposition, which one might expect in a work of dogmatics, we do not, on the other

1. E.T., Credo, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1936, [German Edition, 1935].

hand, have simply an "off the cuff" series of remarks. The reply Barth gives is a reply to written questions. So one can assume that he has had some time to consider his reply. In addition, supporting the contention that it is a "considered reaction", the reply is a composit/ reply: the composite answer is meant as a reply to all of the questions concerning tradition. So some amount of "considered thinking" must have gone into this reply.

One finds, in this reply, two strands of thought. The first states that tradition stands on a lower level than scripture. It must be seen as having only "relative authority". It is not to have the same authority as scripture, while yet it has authority in its own right.[1] This part of Barth's reply would seem to re-echo many Protestant statements about the primacy of scripture in the face of "tradition".

Yet there is another part to Barth's reply. Here the emotional tone changes. Here something would seem deeply at stake for Barth. How are we to consider our relation to tradition? Barth picks up one of the Ten Commandments and hurls back his answer: "Honour thy father and mother."[2]

Now, at this point Barth could have taken at least two paths: He could have said: "Yes, honor.

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1. Credo. p.179,f.

2. Credo, E.T. p.181.

Here honor should mean 'to hold in respect', 'to listen attentively', even if one should then disagree. One can respect and honor those he does not agree with. There is freedom in the Church to disagree, as long as one genuinely searches for truth."

Yet Barth does not continue in this way at all. Barth first states: "...The whole question of tradition falls under the Fifth Commandment: Honor thy father and mother."[1] He then states, somewhat puzzlingly,: "There is no question of bondage and constraint. It is merely that in the Church the same kind of obediences as, I hope, you pay to your father and mother, is demanded of you towards the Church's past, toward the "elders" of the Church. That is quite simply an ordinance.[2]

If one sets aside for a moment the question of how Barth tries to force his view point, or rather legislate it, one may ask: what is the import of this passage? It would seem to be that tradition, the elders of the Church, are simply to be "obeyed", that is, in all essentials, "obeyed". In addition, this is an "ordinance". Yet this is much more than "listened to with respect" or "held in esteem". For where one listens with respect, or holds in esteem, one can still disagree.

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1. ibid.

2. Op.cit., p.181. (Barth's emphasis).
German Edition: "Es geht um keine Bindung und Unfreiheit....Das ist ganz Schlicht eine Ordnung." German Edition, p.156.

Three Moves Involved.

Perhaps at this point we could step back from this passage, and look at what Barth has done. One sees three moves that Barth has made. First, Barth picks up one of the Ten Commandments, namely the Commandment to "honor your father and mother." This, in itself is a move. For he might have approached the problem in a different manner. He might have avoided drawing upon material of law, that is, material of a "legalistic" nature. Yet this was his first move, to appropriate the fifth commandment.

His second move was to alter "honor" to "obey". The commandment, in Barth's interpretation, calls for "obedience". As we have already mentioned, he might have taken another path in interpretation, and might have said "'honor', yes, this should best be understood as 'to respect', 'to hold in esteem'." Yet Barth chooses to make this move, from "honor" to "obey".[1]

The third move was to make this commandment binding, that is obligatory: "Obey...this is simply an ordinance." One may note that obedience can be freely given, given by choice and not in response to a demand. Most parents, perhaps, would not demand obedience, especially from young adults (and most young adults would not accept this demand even if it were made). What one wishes to point out is that obedience, in its primary, family, setting can be offered on the part of the offspring out of freedom

1. That is, from "ehren" to "gehorchen".

of choice. If for example after the youth has thought over what a parent wants him to do, and, for example, finds this abhorrent to his conscience, or values, he can choose not to obey. Perhaps, much more to the point, the parent may refuse to demand obedience. He may refuse to "lay down the law" in this respect. He may allow his offspring to have minds of their own, and make their own decision, in individual instances, whether to obey or not.

Yet Barth's third move is quite in contrast to this. He says "Obey...this is simply an ordinance."[1] As an ordinance is something that is legally binding, and from the context, Barth is talking in terms of those "in the Church", his meaning would be: This obedience is legally binding for those in the Church. Barth is "laying down the law" with regard to "obeying tradition".

Thus in contrast to the alternative we have spelled out, where obedience is not demanded, but is offered out of freedom, here, with Barth, obedience is demanded: it is seen as an ordinance, that is as legally binding upon those in the Church.

It is with this third step or 'move' that we see the nature of this obedience of which Barth speaks. It is spoken of as an obedience which is binding upon 'all in the Church'. It is to be seen as a law, an "ordinance".

Thus disagreement with (the main lines of)

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1. German Edition: "Ordnung" (regulation, order). German Edition, p.156.

tradition would mean breaking an ordinance. Disagreement with tradition is not allowed. This would be disobedience, that is disobedience in the realm of thought, or "noetic" disobedience.

It is with this third step in which one is in effect ordered to obey, that one sees that this is not the obedience which adults, even young adults might offer to their parents, but rather the obedience of childhood. For young adults are usually allowed to consider and think over what they are to obey. Should they, after considered thought decide they cannot obey, usually they are free to take this option not to obey. Obedience is not binding.

Yet Barth's view of obedience differs from this view just at this point: Obedience is binding, and that means, regardless of one's own thought processes and decisions. Thus this obedience resembles the obedience of childhood in which the parent, perhaps for the safety of the child, leaves no room for disagreement and makes obedience binding.

The crucial difference we see between these two types of obedience is that the first (that typically offered by young adults) allows for a process of thought, on which basis a person decides whether to obey or not to obey. Obedience is offered willingly and freely.

The obedience of which Barth speaks in contrast is binding, and does not allow disobedience, that is disagreement. Thus any process of thought on the basis

which a person would decide whether to 'obey' or not is rendered simply superfluous. There is no place for considered thought in Barth's view. What is called for, even demanded here is unquestioning obedience.

Thus we have here an authoritarian interpretation of a commandment,[1] which has been laid down or legislated in an authoritarian manner.[2] One finds this, we may note, at the heart of the relation to tradition.

The Cross-Category Move.

There is a 'move' of another type which Barth makes here. We say a move 'of another type', for this move is essentially different from the three moves we have just described. The move we wish to describe consists essentially of picking up a segment of tradition or scripture and, taking it out of its initial context, crossing to a different context with the same segment of tradition: that is, crossing categories, and doing so in a limiting manner, a manner which would limit or inhibit freedom.

Barth picks up a passage that has probably had

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1. The move from "honor" to "obey", that is to "obey" in the sense of unquestioning obedience.

2. The attempt to portray this unquestioning obedience as law, or an ordinance. Thus it is not to be seen as offered willingly and out of freedom, but seen, rather, as demanded, and as binding.

a certain 'authority' in the early years of his hearers, an 'authority' in addition to its 'authority' as Scripture. That is, an authority which it has gained through its use in childhood years of Christian households. Thus, even if the commandment has not been articulated in childhood years, (which it most likely has), it has been enforced, most likely, repetitively. In Continental households, the effective force of this command is generally acknowledged to be considerably stronger than in British, and especially American, counterparts. So Barth has picked up a 'commandment' that has both the 'authority of Scripture' and the overtones of childhood experience behind it.

His "move" is to cross from the realm of the family to the realm of the Church with this commandment. Here there exists a similar situation. That is, there is a similarity between the relation of parent and child on the one hand, and the relation of the oldest generations of Church thinkers and the younger generations, that is, between 'the Fathers', and "younger" thinkers. As one feels this similarity, Barth's move would, in our view, gain emotional leverage. His application would feel fitting, or "right".

Yet this only begs the question. Is what may be considered good and appropriate for childhood, even early childhood, that is, unquestioning obedience, is this automatically to be assumed as good in this other realm? One does not see how this follows.

We will run up against this type of "move", especially in its limiting or inhibiting force, again and again in Barth's thought.

Other Instances of Barth's Use of the Fifth Commandment vis-a-vis Tradition.

Is this simply an emotional outburst, an ill considered statement by Barth? It would seem not, for (1) he uses essentially the same formulation in the first Chapter of Credo, a chapter devoted to methodology. In addition (2) Barth chooses to use essentially the same formulation ten years later in the Opening Chapter of his Dogmatics in Outline.[1] The Fifth Commandment is invoked again in what would appear as Barth's attempt to legislate a relation to tradition, and one of the particular kind we have described.

Summary.

As we have seen, the relation to tradition involves, not respect or holding in esteem (in which case, disagreement even basic disagreement is possible) but obedience. This obedience (which may, of course, include respect and holding in esteem) is obligatory and is "an ordinance". Thus, as noetic obedience is binding and obligatory, disagreement is precluded. As there is no freedom in which to arrive at one's own decision, there is consequently no place for considered

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1. E.T. p.13.

judgement, that is any process of thought by which one arrives at a judgement as to whether to "obey or not to obey". Thus what Barth talks of here is unquestioning obedience, that is, unquestioning assent to tradition.[1] As such it is akin to the obedience of childhood, in contrast to the obedience of a young adult, where considered judgement typically has a place.

Criticism One.

What is involved here is a childish concept of "honoring". That is, it is "honoring" from a child's point of view. He has not yet developed 'a mind of his own' with which to think things over and arrive at considered judgements about what is presented to him. He is taught to obey "without question". As he grows, he learns that he can disagree with his parents, and yet still respect them. He can still hold them in esteem and respect their views, even if he is forced to disagree at particular points.

Perhaps a parent who does not allow for disagreement as the child grows into a youth and a youth into a young adult is really inviting revolt and repudiation, and a consequent alienation. So also, perhaps,

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1. There is only one qualification offered by Barth, one which does not alter what we have outlined in its essentials: as long as tradition is not in conflict with Scripture. "I accept what interprets this witness (Scripture) to me. I reject what contradicts it." Credo, p.183. Here one wishes to point out, the subjectivity of the theologian is involved. One need not enumerate the diverse and contradictory beliefs found to "interpret Scripture" to the hearer, nor those beliefs thought not to be in contradiction with it.

a Tradition, which does not allow for disagreement, is inviting repudiation by its offspring. This is a theme we shall explore briefly near the conclusion of our thesis.[1]

Criticism Two.

If Barth is speaking of entering into a binding relation to tradition in which one simply obeys (the main lines of) tradition, we have one question: in response to what demand does one do this sort of thing, (that is, enter into this type of relation). Who demands this and where? As a Protestant, one is hard pressed to find a source for this alleged obligation. Barth in fact avoids raising this type of question, the primary and basic question in this matter. That Barth avoids this primary question is of significance. For here, at the beginning, his case would appear to be weakest, that is, without apparent foundation.

In the sections which follow concerning the relation to Tradition in Barth's theology, we shall place the statements we have just treated next to other statements about Tradition. For example when Barth comes to treat another Early Church creed, the Nicaean Creed in his Church Dogmatics, he will state at the outset that its formulations "...must be restored to an unconditional validity...!"[2] In short

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1. See below, pp.517ff; pp.530f.

2. C.D.I/1, p.484.

we shall be treating an aspect of Barth's operational procedure which he has not openly admitted to, and reflected upon in his own account of his theological method in the Prolegomena (Volume I) of his Church Dogmatics.

Section D.

THE CREEDS OF THE EARLY CHURCH IN BARTH'S THEOLOGY.

When we speak of Barth's relation to Tradition, specifically to the Creeds of the Early Church, we might specify at this point which creeds we mean. Yet first we might note one thing. Our concern lies primarily with how Barth regards and treats the beliefs enclosed within these creeds. Since Barth will often treat these beliefs without explicit reference to the creeds our concern lies with how the beliefs of these creeds are treated. As to Barth's treatment of the text of these creeds, this exegetical task, in which he deals formally with certain portions of creeds, occupies limited space in his theologizing. To limit ourselves to studying Barth's formal treatment of the text of these creeds would be to curtail our study, and perhaps miss some of the most significant aspects of Barth's manner of relating to tradition. In short, our concern is primarily with the manner in which Barth treats the beliefs enclosed within (and/or considered to be implied by) these creeds, regardless of whether Barth is treating the text of a creed.

By the creeds of the Early Church we mean specifically the "Apostles' Creed", the Nicaean Creed, both in its original form adopted in AD 325, and in its form as adopted at Constantinople in AD 381. In the background lies the Chalcedonian Creed of AD 450,

and even further in the background, the Athanasian Creed.

Although Barth apparently finds the "Apostles' Creed" the most useful framework in which to carry on his theologizing - he uses this creed as a framework for his dogmatics in both Credo and Dogmatics in Outline, as well as choosing to treat it yet again in connection with Calvin's Catechism in The Faith of the Church (1943) - it would appear that the Nicaean-Constantinoplian Creed has even more importance for his theologizing. One could readily see why this would be so. It is the Nicaean-Constantinoplian creed which articulates a complexity of beliefs concerning Christology and the Trinity, both of which occupy highly important and prominent places in Barth's theologizing. The "Apostles' Creed" is much less developed in this respect.

One can look at the special prominence of the Nicaean Creed in Barth's theology from another angle: its importance to Barth in asserting a wide range of "orthodox" beliefs over against Nineteenth Century Liberalism. Thus, at the place where Barth first takes up the text of this creed and treats it at length (in the portion of his Doctrine of the Trinity treating "God the Son"),[1] he speaks firstly of its primal importance for his task: for "into this creed were

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1. C.D.I/1, pp.484-512.

taken up the decisive determinations on the theology of the Trinity made by the Council of Nicaea in 385" and reaffirmed by the Council of Constantinople in 381. Barth continues:

> "We call it the document of the most importance here for the dogma of the divinity of Christ,
>
> 1. because, of the three early Church symbols formally received by the Reformation, its determinations in particular are in this respect at once the most trenchant and the most succint;
>
> 2. because...it gives us conclusively the result of early Church discussion on the divinity of Christ;...
>
> 4. because it asserts unambiguously, what liberal Protestantism refuses to listen to, and what, for that very reason, must be restored to an unconditional validity.... [1]

Although one should not diminish the importance of the first two points in this passage, it is to the fourth point that we shall turn our attention. Here there would appear to be a deep determination lying behind Barth's words: a determination to 'ram through' these credal beliefs over against 'liberal Protestantism'. Since the latter has "refused to listen to" the assertions of this creed they "must...for that very reason... be restored to an unconditional validity."[2]

Thus it would appear that when the subject of liberal Protestantism arises, it is at this point that

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1. C.D.I/1, p.484. (emphasis added).

2. Emphasis added.

Barth's relation to these creeds (and this one in particular) comes into sharpest relief. One might paraphrase Barth here: over against liberal Protestantism, it is imperative that the assertions of this creed be restored to an unconditional validity.

Further, one finds implicit in this passage two aspects of Barth's relation to creeds which we are exploring in this section of our thesis: (1) an imperative: these things must be believed; and (2) an imperative which would claim that these creeds must have an unconditional validity.[1] What we have found here is that Barth wishes to assert these two things just where 'liberal Protestantism' is concerned. This suggests that tradition, namely credal tradition, shall be wielded as a weapon over against liberal Protestantism.

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We have been suggesting here that the Nicaean-Constantinoplian creed has the highest importance among the Early Church creeds for Barth's theology. Yet even if the "Apostles' Creed" lacks the detailed formulations so important to Barth's theology, one should not conclude that it has a less exalted place as regards its "authority" to articulate the truths of revelation. Both would appear to have equal authority in Barth's framework of theology. As to the Chalcedonian and Athanasian Creeds, these lie in

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1. We shall examine this "unconditional validity" below, pp.354ff; pp.363ff.

the background. Much less attention is given to them. The spotlight returns again and again to the beliefs and formulations of these first two creeds.

In this connection we might note another passage where the "unconditional" importance of these creeds are asserted. In the first chapter of Credo, a work of dogmatics which uses the "Apostles' Creed" as its basis, Barth says that while Dogmatics is the task by which the church makes critical examination of her Proclamation past and present, this relationship is reversible. That is, Proclamation (and by this Barth means what "the Church" has proclaimed, not only in preaching, but in its creeds, dogmas and theologizing) may have to "call dogmatics to order", instead of being "called to order" by Dogmatics. Thus, with obvious allusion to liberal Protestantism, Barth states: Certainly... Dogmatics can deteriorate and run wild. It can actually be that, instead of calling to order, Dogmatics has to be called to order and corrected by the Church's proclamation that has kept to better ways."[1] What is this proclamation which has "kept to better ways."? It is clear, by the way in which Barth continues that it is "the Creed" or "the Confession". "Just as along the whole line of Church service, the function of the Confession is necessary, so also this function of the Confession is necessary: the scientific

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1. Credo, p.6f. (emphasis added).

examination of the Church's proclamation with regard to its genuineness."[1]

We might note immediately that here the Creed has precisely the same function as "the Word of God" as Barth describes it in his Prolegomena. That is, it is the criterion by which the Church examines the genuineness of her Proclamation (her theological utterances and preaching, past and present). This suggests (1) that Barth has not given a full account of what shall be the criterion for the critical task of Dogmatics in his Church Dogmatics. In that place he has only named "the Word of God" and specifically, "Scripture as the Word of God" as fulfilling this function. This also suggests (2) that since 'the Creed' fulfills the same function as "the Word of God", Barth may actually operate upon the assumption that 'the Creed', like Scripture, is a human form of "the Word of God". We shall investigate this issue near the end of this part of our thesis devoted to Barth's relation to Tradition, namely the supposition that in this theology, the credal tradition of the Early Church is regarded as a fourth form of "the Word of God" (along with the Word Revealed, the Word Written, [Scripture], and the Word Preached).[2]

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1. Credo, p.7.

2. See below, pp.363ff.

Section E.

BARTH'S TREATMENT OF TWO BELIEFS: "THE VIRGIN BIRTH" AND "THE SECOND COMING."

Introduction.

At this point we shall briefly study the manner in which Barth treats two beliefs which are regarded as of considerable importance in his theological framework. Since on the one hand, these two beliefs, the belief in a "Virgin Birth", and the belief in a literal "Second Coming" at the end of time, have posed considerable problems for both Nineteenth Century, and Twentieth Century man, in a significant number of cases, both within 'the Church' and outside it, and, on the other hand, these beliefs are regarded as of considerable importance in Barth's theological enterprise, it is important for us to look at how Barth approaches these beliefs. Does he acknowledge the problems encountered in these beliefs; is the question of truth concerning these beliefs raised and dealt with, that is, does the question of truth have any real significance for this theology? These are the questions we shall be asking.

We may note that we encounter these beliefs primarily as credal beliefs in Barth's theology. That is more often than not, these beliefs are treated in the context of the creed, that is in conjunction with other credal beliefs. For example, in Dogmatics in Outline and in Credo, these beliefs make up two of the beliefs of the creed, that is, the "Apostles' Creed",

which Barth uses *in toto* as a framework for his dogmatics in these works. Thus they are treated as *credal* beliefs, even though they may have firm roots in Scripture.

THE "VIRGIN BIRTH" IN CREDO, DOGMATICS IN OUTLINE AND THE CHURCH DOGMATICS.

The "Virgin Birth" in Dogmatics in Outline.

We shall turn first to Barth's treatment of this belief in his Dogmatics in Outline, and then proceed to Credo and the Church Dogmatics. When Barth approaches this part of the creed in Dogmatics in Outline, he admits that this belief is one that is problematic not only for those outside "the Church", but for vast numbers within "the Church" as well. Barth acknowledges this in the way in which he opens his chapter on this part of the creed, concerning the Virgin Birth: "We have now come to one of the places, and perhaps indeed to the place, at which at all times, and even largely within the Christian community offence has been taken."[1] He then admits that he is aware of the "uneasy feeling" as to where he is going next (in the creed), and that his audience might be "brought up short by what is coming now."[2] One might expect that the writer would articulate some of the problems involved with this belief. That is, he

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1. Dogmatics in Outline, p.95. (first paragraph of the Chapter proper).

2. Ibid.

might, at minimum, point out some of the reasons for this "uneasy feeling" he speaks of, or explain why, in his view, people are "brought up short" when approaching this belief. In short, one might expect a writer, at this point, to consider the question of truth concerning this belief.

Indeed, the ambiguous manner in which Barth continues after this opening might lead one to expect consideration of the question of truth concerning this belief. For he says "...we want to approach this section of the creed just as peacefully and objectively as in the preceding sections .... Here too our concern must simply be with the truth...."[1]

Yet what does he mean? For this is of methodological significance. Does he mean: the question of truth shall be our concern too, that is, historical and ontological problems with this belief? The answer quite clearly is: "no". Barth has no intention of raising questions of truth concerning this belief, as is made clear by the way he proceeds from this point onwards.[2] What, then, does he mean by saying: "Here our concern must simply be with the truth."? Apparently he means that his concern shall be with this belief. It shall be presupposed as true from the outset, that is, a priori. His concern

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1. Ibid., p.95.

2. Ibid., pp.95ff.

shall be with "The truth of the conception of Jesus Christ by the Holy Spirit and of His birth by the Virgin Mary..." (The opening sentence of the prefatory paragraph of this chapter).

As Barth proceeds, the question of truth is quickly replaced by a question of a very different kind: "Must we believe this?" The answer, which follows immediately is simply: "yes".[1] This "yes, [we must believe this]" is left standing, without any attempt to support it, or any assurance that he will attempt to give some rationale for this "ought" subsequently. We may note two things, then. Firstly, the question of truth is never raised as Barth proceeds. It has been completely avoided. And secondly, the remainder of the chapter centres around another question: How should this belief be understood? That is: What should be the meaning of this belief. Thus Barth begins his third paragraph with: "If we wish to understand the meaning of 'conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary'...." From this point onwards, this is the only significant question: How should this belief be understood?

The consequence of this procedure is that the belief is asserted dogmatically in the face of

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1. Ibid.

Barth's admission of the serious problems encountered in the church in believing this belief. In addition, it is not asserted as the personal belief of the writer and lecturer, concerning which others are free to arrive at their own conclusion, but rather as *something that must be believed.* Thus, the belief is not only asserted dogmatically but asserted in a legalistic manner.[1]

One further question could be asked. How important or significant for Barth is the belief in the Virgin Birth? Can one, for example, consider the belief in the Incarnation (or "the mystery of the Incarnation", in Barth's words) and hold this *apart from* a "virgin birth"?

Barth observes that tradition has never insisted that God had to take this path *of necessity* (that is, that God had *of necessity* to become incarnate through a "virgin birth". The deity could have taken other paths to accomplish the same task. "But", Barth interjects, immediately, "that cannot mean that... we are free to affirm it or not affirm the virgin birth ".[2] Here again, as in the opening of the

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1. While one may grant that the *tone* of the passage is not dogmatic at this point (Ibid., p.95), yet the "message" of the passage, especially when seen in its context, *is*. This should be obvious from the other points we have raised, in connection with this passage ("Must we believe this?...yes". (Ibid.,p.95)).

2. *Ibid.*, p.100.

chapter, the belief comes to the fore as something that must be believed. There is no freedom in which one could choose not to affirm it.

In the final paragraph, which concerns specifically the "virgin birth" in distinction from the Incarnation, Barth says: "One thing may be definitely said", namely, that where people have shied away from "this miracle, a theology has been at work which has ceased to understand...the mystery [that is, the Incarnation]...and has essayed to conjure away the mystery of the unity of God and man in Jesus Christ, [and thus] the mystery of God's free grace". In contrast to this, "where this mystery [of the Incarnation] has been understood,...the miracle [of the Virgin Birth] came to be...recognized. It became... an inward necessity at this point."[1] Barth ends his chapter with these words.

Thus Barth sees this belief as a necessary correlate of the Incarnation. Not to hold it, would threaten the whole of the Incarnation, and with it the whole of grace. So, in Barth's scheme of things, it is not only a necessary belief, but a belief of the highest priority. This evaluation would be in line with Zahrnt's view: "For [Barth] the virgin birth is a fundamental tenet of Christianity."[2]

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1. Ibid.

2. Zahrnt, p.112.

The "Virgin Birth" in Credo and the Church Dogmatics.

When one turns to Credo and to the Church Dogmatics one finds Barth's approach to this belief, essentially the same as we have described it in Dogmatics in Outline. There is one minor difference, however, when one comes to the Church Dogmatics. We say "minor" for if it were not for Barth's method, things might be different. We refer to Barth's procedure of beginning with the "actuality" of revelation, and then, but only then, going on to ask about the "possibility" which 'lies behind' this alleged actuality. This is the methodological path Barth takes with the belief in the "virgin birth" also. For it is, for Barth, as it stands in both Scripture and Creed, one of the "actualities" of revelation. Thus Barth begins by presupposing the truth of this belief. It is regarded true and asserted as true before historical questions, for example, questions of possibility are raised. As a consequence of this procedure, the question of truth is regarded as settled at the outset, that is, by beginning with the alleged actuality of this event.

If Barth shall go on, after this initial move, to ask about the "possibility" which lies behind this (alleged) actuality, one might ask: What significance do such questions have, in light of this initial move. That is, once someone has decided that something is 'actual', how significant is it to ask, subsequently,

"Is it possible?"

What one would argue here is that, given Barth's initial move, where the decision about this belief's truth has been made, prior to consideration of any problems, (and made thus in a dogmatic manner), any subsequent considerations of historical problems, etc., will have the nature of a superfluous academic exercise. That is, since the belief has been presupposed as true a-priori, that is, before questions of truth are raised, any subsequent examination of questions of truth has a superfluous nature. If, in contrast, Barth had asserted the belief tentatively, in his initial step, with the readiness to revise his assertion following historical questioning, then such subsequent historical questioning would, in our view, have real meaning and significance. Yet this tentativeness (despite appearances to the contrary at times) is not characteristic of Barth's procedure. In its place one finds the certainty of dogmatic assertion. Thus, even taking into account Barth's articulation of historical difficulties with this belief, we still find this belief treated essentially in the same manner as in Dogmatics in Outline, where we found that:

1. The question of truth has no significant place;
2. The belief is one which must be believed in the Church, and;

3. The only real question concerns the proper content of the belief and its possible relationship with other beliefs;

4. The belief itself is regarded as both necessary and fundamentally important.

THE "SECOND COMING" IN CREDO, DOGMATICS IN OUTLINE AND THE CHURCH DOGMATICS.

The 'Second Coming' in Credo.

Belief in the Eschaton or 'the Second Coming of Christ', in the form it stands in the creed has, like the "virgin birth", proved to be a problematic belief, within the 'ecclesia' as well as without, in both Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. Yet here in Credo,[1] Barth does not acknowledge the presence of problems, as he has with the Virgin Birth. In fact nowhere in this account is the question of truth about this belief given even passing notice.

One finds the doctrine treated in a 'literal' manner, that is, that the risen Christ, who has ascended, will return at some future time. He will return from where he is "inaccessible" to ear and eye in the present, and will return in a manner which is accessible to ear and eye. Barth makes a clear distinction, in his treatment, between the present, and the future in which this 'second coming' will happen. "This present...means contemporaneousness, the having of Jesus Christ as contemporary." Yet he is "in concealment" sed et ad dexteram Dei" in our present. At this future time, "He will return

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1. Chapter 12, pp.117-126.

from the concealment into which he there entered." Barth quotes, in an unproblematic manner: "He comes again in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory" (Matthew 24:30), and perhaps not wishing to miss out on the imagery of 'judgement in-breaking from above' follows this, by quoting another passage from Matthew: "As the lightning cometh out of the east and shineth even unto the west, so shall the presence of the Son of Man." (Matthew 24:27).[1] No problems are noted in connection with these passages, nor their visual aspects.

He then continues to interpret this 'second coming' as the inbreaking of judgement in which Christ will come as judge of 'the quick and the dead'. There is no 'realized eschatology' here. The historicity of this belief is asserted in an unproblematic and dogmatic manner.

The 'Second Coming' in Dogmatics in Outline.

In Dogmatics in Outline one finds no significant differences. In "this future coming...He will issue out of the hiddenness in which he still remains for us today..."[2] (Here though, Barth does acknowledge problems with New Testament visual imagry).

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1. Both passages in Credo, p.121.
2. Dogmatics in Outline, p.133.

The Importance of this Belief in Barth's Theological Scheme: the Church Dogmatics.

This is not a minor or insignificant belief in Barth's theology. On the contrary, it is a major belief, comparable with the Incarnation. Barth's plan or 'blueprint' for his Church Dogmatics revolves around major three doctrines. That is, it is laid out in the form of three Doctrines (following the Prolegomena and the Doctrine of God): the Doctrine of Creation, (which comprises Volume III), the Doctrine of Reconciliation, (which comprises Volume IV), and lastly the Doctrine of Redemption, which was to comprise Volume V, but which was left undone. Just as the Doctrine of Creation concerns the 'act of Creation' at the beginning of time (along with allied concerns), and the Doctrine of Reconciliation has as its centre the Incarnation, so the Doctrine of Redemption was to have this event at the end of history as its centre. Here the revelation of God was to be made manifest to all men, that is, revealed to the body's eye, and no longer only to the 'eye of faith'.[1] Thus, in Barth's scheme of dogmas, this one is, if not 'first among equals', perhaps 'second among equals'.

Yet for a doctrine of such central significance in his own dogmatic scheme, we still find that he has

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1. Dogmatics in Outline, pp.134-135.

not even taken notice of the difficulties vast multitudes in the churches, in the Twentieth Century, have with this belief 'taken literally' as Barth asserts it.

Section F.

CREDAL BELIEFS AS "TRUTHS OF REVELATION" UPON WHICH BARTH BUILDS HIS THEOLOGY.

In Barth's operational procedure in his dogmatics, he typically begins with the "actualities of revelation". These "actualities of revelation" are regarded simply as "givens", as simply "there". It is upon these "givens" that he subsequently builds his theology. Thus, for example, one of his subsequent theological "moves" is from "actuality" to "possibility". That is, if such and such is an "actuality", Barth shall raise the question: What is the "possibility" which lies behind this actuality; i.e. what possibility is actualized here? One finds the normal procedure, of investigating the "possibility" (of something being the case) in order to proceed to the question of its "actuality", reversed in Barth's procedure. The line of thinking here, essentially, is: if something is actual, it must also be possible; we must find what possibility has here been actualized, so better to understand the actuality. Thus, the quest is for further understanding of the content of revelation.

What is of importance here is Barth's manner of beginning: He begins by presupposing the truth of these "actualities" or "realities" of revelation. As we have remarked, they are treated as "givens", as simply "there". The question as to their truth does not arise, in any significant sense, either prior

to the statement as to their truth, nor subsequently.

Our question at this point in our thesis is: What is the source of these "actualities" or "realities of revelation", which Barth begins with and subsequently builds upon? More specifically, is credal tradition a source of these "actualities"?

What we find is that a surprising number of these "actualities of revelation" have their source in credal Tradition, that is, in the creeds of the Early Church, and in the dogmas of the Early Church which developed in close connection with these creeds.

Thus very early in Barth's Church Dogmatics, in his Doctrine of the Trinity[1] one finds that credal beliefs (and their articulation in the dogmas of the Early Church) have a place of central importance. Thus, for example, we find credal beliefs, especially those of the Nicaean-Constantinoplian creed, underpinning Barth's Doctrine of the Trinity. This Doctrine and its Christology occupies a highly significant place in Barth's Dogmatics, as its early placement in his Dogmatics suggests.[1] Here we find a whole nexus of credal beliefs (many of which have been taken up and given more explicit articulation in Early Church dogma). Barth in fact devotes almost thirty pages to an exposition of the second article of the Nicaean creed in

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1. C.D.I/1, pp.339ff.

his treatment of "God the Son",[1] and nearly thirty pages to the formulations of the same creed concerning the Holy Spirit in his treatment of "God the Holy Spirit."[2]

Let us look at one of the beliefs which Barth regards as an "actuality", yet which has its source in credal tradition, or rather in Early Church dogma's articulation of credal tradition: the eternality of the Son. And let us look at it with this question in mind: Does Barth treat credal beliefs as "actualities of revelation" even when such beliefs are not to be found in Scripture? That Tradition has a relationship to Scripture, one is not denying (even if this relationship should at times be quite tenuous). Yet our question is this: Shall Barth treat beliefs of Tradition as "actualities of revelation" even where he himself admits that such beliefs are not to be found in Scripture?

Let us look then at Barth's treatment of "the eternality of the Son" (that is, existence before, and after the incarnation). Barth admits that this belief "is not to be found in the Biblical texts",[3] Its source is named as the dogma of the Early Church. Yet Barth goes on immediately to declare the belief

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1. See C.D.I/1, pp.484ff.

2. Ibid., pp.536ff.

3. C.D.I/1, p.475.

as a truth.[1] Subsequently he builds upon this belief.

In summary, we may note that (1) the belief is not to be found in Scripture; (2) Barth acknowledges this; (3) Its source is named as dogma (the dogma of the Early Church); (4) It is at the outset simply declared to be true that is declared to be an "actuality"; (5) Essentially no problems about the truth of this "dogma"-"actuality" are raised either prior to this, or subsequently; (6) The question, How shall this belief be (rightly) understood? is essentially the only real question. One may also note that this dogma is in close association with credal tradition.[2]

Thus here Barth begins his process of thought by presupposing the truth of this belief, regarding it as an 'actuality' given in revelation. Yet its source is not in Scripture, but rather in Tradition.

As one goes through the Church Dogmatics one finds many other alleged "actualities" which form the "point of beginning" for Barth's theologizing. A significantly large number of these alleged "actualities" are in fact appropriated or borrowed from Tradition. That is, they are often statements appropriated from the credal tradition of the Early Church, and from

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1. Ibid.

2. As Barth points out in his exposition, C.D.I/1, pp.474ff.

dogmas closely associated with these creeds. This also applies even if these tenets of belief at points had roots in Scripture, or were "interpretations" of Scripture. The form in which they are appropriated is the form they had in Tradition.

Examples of Dogmas and Credal Beliefs Assumed and Treated as Actualities.

Here there are too many to list. Yet we may point out a few. As we have already mentioned, a whole nexus of beliefs concerning the Trinity are treated as "actualities" in Volume I of the Church Dogmatics. We have just pointed out one: the eternality of the Son. The "Virgin Birth" and the "Conception by the Holy Spirit", considered already,[1] have a central place in Barth's treatment of the Trinity.

As one might expect, the beliefs of the Nicaean Creed have a central place in Barth's dogmatization upon the Trinity. One of Barth's statements as to why it has this place is suggestive for our concerns: "...because it [the Nicaean Creed] asserts unambiguously, what liberal Protestantism refuses to listen to, and what for that very reason must be restored to an unconditional validity in evangelical dogmatics."[2]

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1. See above,

2. C.D.I/1, p.484.

Thus there are a host of dogmas which are simply asserted as having "unconditional validity" in this dogmatics. Dogmas concerning the second person, for example, include (in Volume I/1) "Begotten of the Father" (p.487), "Begotten, not created" (p.492), "the Only-begotten" (p.486) "Homoousia" (pp403, etc.). The dogmas concerning the persons are developed in a way which attempts to avoid the 'Modalism' opposed in the creeds, that is, as modes of existence, rather than modes of activity. The presupposition at the root of Barth's procedure is that the tenets of these creeds are (1) correct; (2) true and (3) unambiguous.

Other Sources for Barth's "Actualities of Revelation".

One would not deny that some of Barth's "actualities of revelation" come directly from Scripture. Others would appear to come from the development of dogma, and creeds after the period of the Early Church. Still others would appear to be of Barth's own making, at times derived inferentially from other beliefs.[1]

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1. For example "the hiddenness of God" in C.D.II/1 would appear to be an "actuality of revelation" in that it is a "statement of faith"(p.183) which can only be made on the basis of revelation. This hiddenness "is one of God's properties"(p.184). Thus here "the hiddenness of God" is treated as a tenet of belief which "we confess" in faith (p.184). Yet its source is not to be found in any literary document. In the form that Barth articulates it, it would appear to be a specifically Barthian 'article of faith', given in revelation, and so, an "actuality" of revelation. This 'article of belief' one may note forms the basis of a sizeable portion of Barth's exposition of his "Doctrine of God" (C.D.II/1, pp.179-203).

As our purpose is to investigate the place of the credal tradition of the Early Church in Barth's thought, we shall return to our main theme at this point.

Tradition vis-a-vis Scripture.

One is not saying that interpretation of Scripture does not have a place in Barth's Dogmatics, even a highly visible place. It is evident that it does. Rather, what we wish to point out is that a sizeable number of the "actualities of revelation" which form the basis of Barth's thought have their source, by and large, in tradition, that is in the credal tradition and the dogmas of the Early Church.

If there is much interpretation of Scripture in Barth's exposition of these "actualities" (often novel exposition), and in their development (very often novel development), this is a separate consideration. One should still not overlook the fact that the source of these alleged "actualities" is in tradition. In saying this one is not denying that credal tradition, at certain points, has roots in Scripture, and at points is an interpretation of Scripture, even a "selective" interpretation of Scripture, picking up some elements here, ignoring other elements there. Yet at many points, as Barth admits, these beliefs are not to be found in Scripture.[1] They are peculiar to tradition.

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1. We have cited one, concerning which Barth admits this, "the eternality of the Son". C.D.I/1, p.475.

Non-the-less, even at these points, where the beliefs are not to be found in Scripture, we find Barth no less adamant in asserting them, that is, in simply "declaring" them to be true, and proceeding to build upon them.[1]

Through Tradition to Scripture.

It is at this point that we might look at how Barth sees the dogmatician relating to Scripture through tradition, and how there is a "sola" regarding creeds in Barth's theological programme. Thus we learn, in the "Methodology Chapter" of Credo (Chapter I) that theology is "Creed-bound".[2] And this means that theology approaches Scripture through the Creeds. In fact, it is only through the creeds that one may approach Scripture. One cannot go around the creeds to Scripture itself. For any "appeal on the part of Dogmatics to the very Bible itself is forbidden by the fact that [Dogmatics] is itself confession-bound...and therefore brings to the confessions...that respect which children owe by God's command to the words of their human fathers."[3] This statement should highlight the significant place creeds

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1. An example follows Barth's "declaration" of "the eternality of the Son", C.D.I/1, p.475ff.

2. Credo, p.8.

3. Credo, pp.7-8.

have, vis-a-vis Scripture, in Barth's theological programme. Barth's theologizing seen in the light of this passage, takes on a different appearance from the usual, for in typical views of Barth's theologizing, Scripture is usually seen as the only determining text. "Barth the theological exegete" is the usual picture.

Section G.

CREDAL TENETS AS "TRUTHS OF REVELATION": ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE FROM BARTH'S STATEMENTS IN CREDO AND ANSELM.

As added support for our contention that tenets from credal tradition form a significant number of the "actualities" or "realities" or "truths of revelation" which are treated as "givens" in Barth's theology, let us go to the "methodological chapter", Chapter One of Credo (1936). Here Creed and Dogmatics are seen as standing in close connection.

The work of dogmatics consists in that it "unfolds and displays those truths in which the truth of God concretely meets us. It articulates again the articles of faith...to make them plain in their interconnections and context."[1] Now our question is whether the alleged "actualities", the "actualities" revealed in revelation actually have a credal form in Barth's thought, that is, have the form of credal beliefs. In the above passage there is a fairly clear connection between "those truths in which the truth of God meets us", and "the articles of faith" which dogmatics articulates in a way as to "make them plain in their interconnections and context." That is, Barth is apparently equating "those truths in which the truth of God meets us" with "the articles of faith" in the Creed.

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1. Credo, p.3.

This equation is confirmed in the paragraph just previous to the one we have cited, where he speaks of the Creed itself. Our question, again, is whether the articles of faith or the tenets of the creed are to be identified with the "truths" of revelation which form the basis of Barth's Dogmatics. Here in the paragraph which precedes the one we have just cited, Barth speaks of "the truth, which is identical with God Himself, and which the believer has heard and received in the form of definite truths, in the form of articles of faith."[1] Now in this passage, "has heard and received..." implies Barth's concept of revelation. This is confirmed in the way that Barth continues: "...the disclosure of this truth is a free gift that...comes to meet the believing man. It is God's revelation."[2] Thus the "definite truths" in this passage can be understood as the equivalent of "those truths in which the truth of God concretely meets us" in the next paragraph (i.e., in the first passage we quoted and are examining). Thus by "those truths in which the truth of God meets us" Barth means the same as the "definite truths" in the second passage we cited. In this passage they are equated with "articles of faith" that is, the tenets of the Creed: "the truth...which the believer has heard and

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1. Credo, p.2. (emphasis added).

2. Credo, p.2.

received in the form of definite truths, in the form of articles of faith."[1]

In summary, that which "is first said to [Dogmatics] in the revelation of God's reality"[2] is "heard and received in the form of definite truths."[3] Here we have the "truths" of revelation, or the "actualities" of revelation of which we have been speaking. Now here in the "methodological chapter" of Credo, Barth has clearly equated these "definite truths" of revelation with the articles of faith in the Creed, that is, with credal tenets. Thus what appeared to be an equation in the first passage ("those truths in which the truth of God concretely meets us" (equals)... "the articles of faith") is now quite definitely an equation.

In addition, the dogmatic process of thought is described in terms of these "articles of faith". That is, taking these articles of faith as its "raw material", that is, as "givens", dogmatics seeks "to unfold and display" these beliefs "...to make plain their interconnections and context."[4]

Now one might ask, is this simply a spurious methodological account? One finds very little talk of this in the Prolegomena of the Church Dogmatics.

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1. Credo, p.2. (emphasis added).
2. Credo, p. 3
3. Credo. p.3.
4. Ibid.

In reply to this question, one would point out that here we have almost a complete reduplication of the method Barth has found with such favor, in his study of Anselm. For here too, it was a matter of taking elements from 'the Credo', that is, taking 'articles of faith' and examining them in a way as to show forth their "inner consistency". This was at the heart of the dogmatic method in Barth's Anselm.[1]

Now we can return to the Prolegomena of the Church Dogmatics and understand the passage in Barth's summing up of his work where, as we have previously noted, he speaks of:

> "tenets, in the understanding and elucidation of which the dogmatic unfolding and presentation of the content of the Word of God must be carried out."[2]

We have previously noted two things about this passage in particular, and Barth's Prolegomena in general (C.D.I/1 and I/2): (1) Barth does not identify the source of these tenets (to which he refers in this passage) which form the basis of his theologizing; and (2) Barth has also said little or nothing of the place and significance of credal tenets during the course of his account of his methodology in the Prolegomena. Thus, in trying to understand the importance and significance of credal tenets, or the tenets of credal

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1. See above, pp.236ff.

2. C.D.I/2, p.876.

tradition, we have had to leave Barth's Prolegomena to the Church Dogmatics behind, and have gone to Barth's statements in Credo, with additional reference to his study on Anselm.

In seeing the central importance and significance of credal tenets for Barth's actual method, we have also seen that the "actualities" or "realities" or "truths" of revelation" in their form, as human words, are actually, in a significantly large number of instances, tenets of credal tradition. As these "actualities" in the form of tenets of belief are used in the form of basic presuppositions in Barth's thought, and are subsequently built upon, they are an aspect of method which is of paramount importance for Barth's theology.[1]

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1. Again, we might repeat, that we are not holding that all of the "actualities" or "truths of revelation" Barth builds upon come from the creeds, but rather, that a significantly large number of them do.

INTERIM SUMMARY OF POINTS AND CONCLUSION ONE: UNTHINKING SUBMISSION TO TRADITION.

In this interim summary, we shall now try to bring together our research into the relation to tradition in Barth's actual method in his Dogmatics, and in so doing also review aspects of his methodological work on Anselm relevant to this research. First we shall review briefly the type of relation to tradition in Barth's Anselm, especially in reference to the "actualities" in Barth's Dogmatics. We shall then list our points concerning Barth's relation to tradition, and consequently review our research point by point, drawing what conclusions seem appropriate.

In this aspect of Barth's working method with which we have been working with here in Chapter II (i.e. Tradition), we find a strong parallel with the method which he "found" in Anselm, and looked upon with so much favor. What we refer to specifically, is that in Barth's interpretation of Anselm, the latter "began with", that is, used as his "point of departure", elements of thought, or A B C D's, taken from "the Credo" of the Church. On closer examination of Barth's interpretation, we found that these A B C D's, these presuppositions allegedly used by Anselm as the basis of his thought, were in Barth's interpretation, in fact "tenets of

belief" taken from tradition, that is the credal tradition and dogmas of the Early Church.[1] None of these A B C D's in fact came directly from Scripture. Scripture was only relevant as "something not to be in contradiction with" as one proceeded.[2]

When one turns to Barth's Dogmatics, one finds a parallel to these A B C D's in the alleged "actualities" or "truths of revelation". The parallel one finds with Barth's Anselm is that in the Church Dogmatics these alleged "actualities" have essentially the same place and essentially the same nature as in Barth's methodological study on Anselm.

They have the same nature: While we are not claiming that all of the (alleged) "truths of revelation" have their source in credal tradition, yet we have found that a significantly large number of them do have their source in the credal tradition and dogmas of the Early Church. Even when many of these beliefs have some "rootage" or basis in Scripture, it is in the form given to these beliefs by tradition that Barth uses them. They have the same place in his thought: As we have pointed out, these "actualities" form the "beginning point" of Barth's thought. They are that from which Barth proceeds, that upon

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1. See above, pp.261ff; especially pp.265ff.
2. See above, pp.261ff.

which he builds. It should not be totally unexpected then if Barth's attitude toward these alleged "actualities" is much the same as his attitude toward the A B C D's in his Anselm study. (In the following we shall be referring specifically to those "actualities" which have their source in the creeds and dogma of the Early Church).

We lay out the following as a summary of the points concerning the relation to tradition in Barth's Dogmatics, here seen in connection with his views as they occur in his book on Anselm.

1. The tenets of the credal tradition of the Early Church are assented to in an unquestioning manner.

1a. The question as to their truth is not raised subsequently. The question as to historical truth occupies no significant place.

1b. The creeds of the Early Church are assented to as a whole, that is, in toto. The whole extent of credal tradition of the Early Church is assented to in this manner.

2. They are not only assented to, but asserted, and asserted in a dogmatic manner. These credal beliefs thus have the character of dogmatic assertions in this theology.

3. They are taken and used as presuppositions upon which Barth builds his thought (not alone upon these assertions, but significantly and centrally upon these assertions.

4. The beliefs of these Early Church creeds are asserted in toto as necessary beliefs for both Church and Theology, and thus are seen as unconditionally binding upon both Church and Theology.

5. Conclusion: As a consequence of these factors, (1) - (4), we find that unthinking submission to credal tradition is an integral aspect of Barth's working method. It is an aspect to be found at the very basis of his theology, at the very point that he "begins" his theological process, that is at his methodological "point of departure." As such, this aspect: unthinking submission to tradition, is of central importance for understanding Karl Barth's theological method.

Now we shall consider each point separately, summarizing our research.

1. If we find in Barth's Anselm that the whole extent of "the Credo" is to be assented to, and

assented to in an unquestioning manner, that is, in a manner in which the question of truth about either the whole of "the Credo" or its particulars shall not be raised antecedent to assent, or subsequently, we have found essentially the same actual method followed in Barth's dogmatics.

To review: In Barth's Anselm we have found the method he describes to consist of taking tenets from 'the Credo' or credal and dogmatic tradition of the Early Church and using these without raising the question as to their truth either prior to their use or subsequently. They are assumed in an unquestioning manner and used in an unquestioning manner. The process of thought in which several A B C D's are used vis-a-vis an X, does not raise the question of truth of this X in itself, but seeks, essentially, only to show the inner-consistency between the A B C D's and the X, that is, it seeks to understand the X vis-a-vis the A B C D's.

In addition Barth speaks of an assent to 'the Credo' as a whole, as a necessary prerequisite for theology. It is not an assent to certain beliefs in particular, but an assent to the totality of 'the Credo'. Thus, Barth says that "A science of faith which denied or even questioned the Faith - the Credo of the Church - would ipso facto cease to be either

'faithful' or 'scientific'."[1] Barth also says that "Any theologizing upon the acceptance of the Credo in faith can be nothing more than a description of that acceptance, that is, of the Credo accepted. It cannot be...a basis of our acceptance of the Credo ."[2] This quite clearly indicates that theologizing does not raise questions of truth concerning individual beliefs, or give reasons for its acceptance of certain beliefs vis-a-vis the question of truth.

We might point out again that in examining Anselm's thought vis-a-vis Barth's quite unusual interpretation of Anselm we found Barth's interpretation concerning these matters untenable and essentially wrong. That is, even if Anselm may have accepted most or all of the beliefs in "the Credo", (and even this is open to question) there is substantial evidence that he did wish to raise the question of truth concerning these beliefs subsequently, and raise it vis-a-vis presuppositions, not all of which were taken 'from the Credo', as Barth assumes.[3]

Thus, this view of Barth's can be attributed to Anselm, in our view, and in the view of most interpreters of Anselm, only by misinterpreting Anselm at

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.27. (emphasis added and parentheses around "the Credo of the Church" were removed for emphasis).

2. A.F.Q.I., p.28.

3. See above, pp.236ff; especially pp.238-242.

several key points (points we have studied in Part II). What we have here then is most probably Barth's own view of theological method.

To review our research into Barth's own theological procedure with reference to point (1): we have found unquestioning assent to the beliefs of the creeds of the Early Church. We have found an absense of any significant questioning both prior to this assent, and subsequent to this assent.[1] We have found that this applies to essentially the total extent of the two main creeds in question, the "Apostles' Creed" and the Nicaean-Constantinoplian Creed. (That is, one finds, for example, questioning as to the proper exposition of these beliefs, but not questioning concerning the truth of the belief itself).

2. and 3.: We shall consider points (2) and (3) together: (2) The beliefs of the Early Church creeds are not only assented to unquestioningly, but asserted dogmatically; (3) they are taken and used as presuppositions upon which Barth builds his thought.

Thus we have typically found credal beliefs simply declared as "truths". There are typically no problems articulated and dealt with prior to the assertion of their truth, nor subsequent to the assertion of their truth. That is, they are not only

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1. What we mean by "significant questioning" is questioning that could actually have a bearing on whether or not to accept the belief; or upon the certainty with which the belief is held.

assented to in an unquestioning manner, but also asserted, and thus, dogmatically asserted.

Thus in our study of Barth's treatment of "the Virgin Birth" we have found that, while Barth states at the outset that "our concern must simply be with the truth",[1] what he means is not that he will be concerned with the question as to whether this belief is true, but rather that his concern will be with this belief considered as true. Thus we have found that no questions concerning the truth of this belief are dealt with prior to its assertion as a truth, nor subsequently (Dogmatics in Outline, pp.95ff). Barth simply begins by asserting the belief to be true. Subsequently he builds his theological construction upon this presupposed truth (relating this belief to other beliefs, likewise declared as truths, and asking essentially one question: What does this belief mean, when seen in the context of other beliefs?).

We have found essentially the same methodological procedure in regard to the belief in "the Second Coming." In fact the same methodological procedure is applied to essentially the complete extent of the beliefs of the Apostles' Creed (C.f. Credo and Dogmatics in Outline). To summarize: the beliefs are dogmatically asserted, and subsequently used in the form of

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1. Dogmatics in Outline, p.95.

presuppositions, upon which Barth builds his theology.

4. Are these creeds then, for Barth, binding upon Church and Theology? In Credo Barth sees obedience to the central texts of Church tradition as a binding obligation: The Commandment, Honor your Father and Mother is seen as a commandment which applies to the decisions of the "elders" of the church. "Honor" is changed to "obey" in Barth's exposition. And this obedience to (the main lines of) tradition is seen as "an ordinance" ("eine Ordnung").[1] In short, obedience is seen as binding and necessary.

We have found that in Barth's treatment of the "Apostles' Creed," even just at the point where one might expect a Twentieth Century theologian to relax this type of binding obligation toward the creed, namely over the belief in the Virgin Birth, even here, this belief "must" be believed.[2] The belief in a "Second Coming" at the end of History is treated in essentially the same manner: as necessary and binding.

As to the other major Early Church creed of high importance to Barth's theology, the Nicaean Creed, Barth states that its formulations (after their neglect in Nineteenth Century Liberalism) "must

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1. Credo, E.T., p.181; German text, p.156; see above, pp.293ff; especially p.301f.

2. Dogmatics in Outline, p.95.

be restored to an unconditional validity" ("unbedingt geltend gemacht werden muss").[1]

Even if Barth shall not tow such a "hard line" when talking of Confessions in general, in the Prolegomena to his Church Dogmatics,[2] yet when it comes down to specific creeds, that is, the Early Church creeds in particular, specifically, the Nicaean Creed and the "Apostles' Creed", Barth actually does take this hard line: These creeds, in their total extent, are binding upon the Church and its Theology.

5. Conclusion: Unthinking submission to credal Tradition. As the beliefs of these Early Church creeds are assented to without the question as to the truth of their beliefs being dealt with prior to their assent, nor subsequently in any significant manner (point 1), and as these beliefs have the nature of dogmatic assertions in his theological framework (point 2), that is, dogmatic assertions which form presuppositions upon which he builds his theology (point 3), and as the beliefs of these creeds must be believed in the Church and in its Theology (point 4), this leads us to the conclusion that the relation to Tradition, specifically credal Tradition, in this theology is characterized

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1. C.D.I/1, p.484; K.D.I/1, p.445.

2. C.f. C.D.I/2, pp.647ff.

by unthinking submission. One must believe these things without thinking, that is, without questioning their truth. Any thinking done is done on the presupposition of their truth.

If one should object to our assessment and say "yes, but", much of what is asserted in creeds (1) either has some rootage in scripture or (2) comes directly from scripture, and therefore by going to scripture Barth escapes an unthinking submission to Tradition, we would say "no", he does not, in our view, escape unthinking submission. For scripture only becomes revelation, becomes "the Word of God," in an Event ("Ereigniss") in man's personal present. In a chapter which follows we shall look into the nature of man's relation to "the Word of God" in this theology.[1] There we shall find that when Scripture becomes "the Word of God" in this alleged Event, (1) it is only in such an Event that Scripture becomes "the Word of God," and only thus does it have the nature of authoritative revelation. (2) Yet this alleged Event is an experience of man. Specifically it is an event in which man experiences a divine validation of certain human words of scripture. Now, as this is an experience which is alleged to have a divine cause, one might wish to have some

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1. See below, pp.405-414.

detachment in which to arrive at a critical judgement, (1) about this alleged experience, and (2) about what is allegedly validated in such an experience. Yet both of these things are methodologically inadmissible in Barth's theological framework. One may not stand back from this experience and try to use his own independent critical judgement concerning (1) whether such an event has occurred and (2) concerning what has allegedly been validated in such an event. To do so would introduce "foreign" criteria into dogmatics, criteria which are not identical with "the Word of God". As a consequence, there can only be unthinking submission to what is experienced as "the Word of God". Klass Runia, in his work, Karl Barth's Doctrine of Holy Scripture[1] concurs: "When this divine act of revelation occurs i.e. this Event , God Almighty speaks to us, and His authority is factual in spite of the defective medium i.e. the humanity and fallibility of scripture . The final authority of His speaking is there, and we can only submit."[2] It is unthinking submission, for man is denied any criteria independent of this "Word of God" with which to arrive at considered judgements about such an alleged experience.[3]

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1. Eerdmans, Grand Rapids, 1962.

2. Ibid., p.175.

3. We shall go into this subject in greater depth below, pp.405-414.

Our point is this: unthinking submission to (credal) tradition is accompanied by unthinking submission to what is experienced as revelation through Scripture. Thus, if one should say that Barth goes (from the creed) to Scripture with the question of truth, this in our view, is not accurate. It would be more accurate to say that Barth goes to his experience of "the Word of God," which may or may not, depending on God's action, occur. He must, according to methodological principles submit unthinkingly to what allegedly becomes revelation in this experience (i.e. this Event in which the fallible words of Scripture allegedly become infallible revelation).[1] Thus unthinking submission to Tradition is accompanied by unthinking submission to man's experience of "the Word of God" as God allegedly "speaks" to him in an Event, through the words of Scripture.

At the root of the problem here is this: the source and the criterion of Dogmatics coincide; they are identical. "The Word of God", as witnessed to by Scripture is both criterion (the sole criterion) for dogmatics and source (the sole source) for dogmatics. Thus there can be no criteria about this criterion-source. Nor can there be any criteria about (1) man's experience of the alleged Event in which Scripture becomes this criterion-source, or

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1. Runia, op.cit., pp.175ff.

(2) the noetic content of such an experience, i.e. the content of what is alleged to be "the Word of God" in this experience.

If we have seen that there is unthinking submission both in reference to credal tradition, and in reference to (what is alleged to be) "the Word of God", perhaps this is not simply a coincidence. In a section which follows, we shall ask whether credal tradition is in fact a fourth form of "the Word of God" in Barth's theological framework.[1] That is, does Barth operate upon the assumption that credal tradition is, like Scripture, a form of "the Word of God"? We shall find evidence that this is so. And further, that unlike Scripture, which must become "the Word of God" before it is infallible in its articulation of revelation, we shall find evidence that Barth assumes, that is, operates upon the assumption, that credal Tradition is "the Word of God", and is infallible in its articulation of revelation, even apart from any divine Event. If these things are so, that is, if Barth operates upon these assumptions, then it is easier to understand why there is unthinking submission to credal tradition in Barth's theological framework.

Finally, we have said that unthinking submission (to Tradition, and to what is alleged to be "the Word of God") is an integral aspect of Barth's method. We

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1. See below, pp.363-376.

have said this for the reason that it is involved at the very point where Barth 'begins' his theologizing, that is, at his methodological point of departure. This of course does not mean that it is involved only at the beginning of his theology, (the first volume of his Church Dogmatics,) but rather that it underlies his whole theological enterprise, as it proceeds, volume by volume. Thus it does not occur at some point distantly removed from his "point of departure", where it could perhaps be seen as superfluous or irrelevant to his enterprise as a whole. Rather it is involved at the very root of his theology, specifically at the very point at which Barth assimilates what will become "presuppositions" or "premises" upon which his theological edifice is constructed. Thus it cannot be seen as a superfluous aspect of his method, but rather as integral to that method.

We have now drawn out our first conclusion from the several points we have summarized concerning Barth's relation to Tradition: The relation to {credal} Tradition in Barth's theology is characterized by unthinking submission. In what follows, we shall go on to examine other aspects of Barth's relation to Tradition, and from these aspects, together with the ones summarized here, draw out a second conclusion.

Section H.

THE INFALLIBILITY OF CREEDAL TRADITION.

Now that we have summarized several points about the relation to Tradition in Barth's theology, we may go on to lay out a further point. The net result of what we have been describing in this section on "the relation to Tradition" is a process of thought which considers creeds, that is, the Creeds of the Early Church, as infallible. They are infallible articulations of revelation. How do we come to this view?

In the methodological chapter of Credo, Barth speaks of revelation as "the truth, which is identical with God Himself, and which the believer has heard and received in the form of definite truths, in the form of articles of faith. ...Even the disclosure of this truth is a free gift that positively comes to meet the believing man. It is God's own revelation."[1]

As we have previously pointed out, Barth goes on to describe the task of his dogmatic enterprise as one which "unfolds and displays those truths in which the truth of God concretely meets us. It articulates again the articles of faith...(in order to) make them plain in their interconnections and context...Dogmatics is the act of the Credo determined by the scientific

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1. Credo, p.2. (Second emphasis is added).

method appropriate to it - credo, ut intelligam."[1]

We have seen what this phrase "credo, ut intelligam" has meant for Barth, in his interpretation of Anselm. In essence, beliefs of 'the Credo', (or here, the creed) are assented to in an unquestioning manner, never to be questioned as to their truth again. Subsequently, in the process of thought, one belief is examined with reference to several other beliefs, not examined for its truth, but, essentially, for its content, and for the manner in which it can be related to other beliefs.

If, in Barth's Anselm, the content of 'the Credo' is assented to in an unquestioning manner, never again to be questioned as to its truth, we have found the same in our study of Barth's treatment of selected beliefs within his dogmatics. Our final conclusion was that this relation to tradition required unquestioning submission to tradition, specifically, the credal tradition of the Early Church.

We have also seen that the creed is, in Barth's view an articulation of the revelation of God, an articulation "in the form of definite truths, in the form of articles of faith." And further that these "definite truths" from the creed form a basal and central element in the dogmatic process. For the work of Dogmatics can be described as taking these

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1. Credo, p.3.

"definite truths" and "making them plain in their interconnections and context".

In summary, we have here creeds (1) which are an articulation of the revelation of the deity; and (2) which articulate truths which form material upon which Dogmatics builds. Additionally, we find (1) an unquestioning and unproblematic assent to the credal beliefs of the Early Church together with (2) a dogmatic assertion of the same. We also find (3) Barth's view that these creeds are binding upon all in the Church. For these reasons, and for the additional reason that, in practice, we cannot discover a place where Barth finds fault with these Early Church creeds, it would appear that in this process of thought the creeds of the Early Church are regarded as infallible, and as infallible articulation of revelation.

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The Cultural (Conditioned-ness of Creeds Rendered Insignificant.

One question naturally arises: How does Barth deal with the question of cultural conditioned-ness of Tradition, that is credal tradition. Does he simply ignore the question? The answer is "no." Yet he deals with the question in a manner which intends to render it irrelevant and insignificant. In the relatively brief section devoted to "Confessions" near the end of Barth's lengthy Prolegomena,[1] he admits and acknow-

1. C.D.I/2, p.620ff.

ledges the fact that the makers of creeds suffered limitation due to their cultural setting.[1] Barth goes on at length about this limitation, that is, about the fact that the creedmakers were conditioned to some extent by the cultural-political-social context in which they worked out creeds.

The key word in Barth's exposition here is "limitation" that is limitation in the sense of partial determination. For suddenly, in the midst of this exposition, Barth makes a transition and talks of another limitation upon the creedmakers: the limitation of the deity.[2] The creedmakers (allegedly) experienced limitation from this source as they sat in their cultural context. It is this limitation which counts for Barth. For this (alleged) limitation by the deity involved a determination of their thought. That is, the limitation of the deity took the form of a determination imposed upon their thought.

The effect of this transition from cultural determination to divine determination (that is proceeding to this additional factor) is to render any cultural determination insignificant and essentially irrelevant. The import thus appears to be: even if man was limited by his cultural context, the limitation imposed upon him by the deity insures that right

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1. C.D.I/2, p.633ff.

2. C.D.I/2, p.635ff.

doctrine resulted non-the-less. We can, as a consequence, ignore the question of cultural conditionedness.

One sees here a theme common in Barth's theologizing: "man's confusion" yet "God's providence". If one looks further, one finds that Barth's whole exposition concerning the limitation of the deity embodies a specifically Barthian theory, and one that rests upon a dogmatic assumption. That is, it rests on Barth's theory of theological knowledge, in which man experiences a determination of his thought. That is, as man encounters what is allegedly "Word" and is passive in the face of this, the theory is that his thought undergoes a control and determination, and this means a limitation, in which man is limited and determined by the deity in his revelation.

That the deity goes about determining people's thought in this manner is a Barthian theory of divine activity. It is also a theory which Barth characteristically refuses to substantiate. It thus takes the form of a dogmatic assertion.[1]

What we wish to note here is that it is specifically a Barthian theory which allows Barth to disregard any concrete questions of cultural limitation and determination upon the creedmakers and their creeds. The alleged limitation and determination of their

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1. We have gone into this aspect of Barth's thought in a chapter which follows. See below, pp.405ff; especially p.410f.

thought by the deity renders this question in effect insignificant and irrelevant. If any cultural factors have affected the work of the creedmakers, the action of the deity in imposing his determination upon their thought processes has (allegedly) assured "right doctrine". Barth still has "infallible" creeds, but only by reason of his dogmatically asserted theory of theological knowledge.

Let us return to our main theme, the "infallibility of credal tradition", and now look at a consequence of this view. If the credal tradition of the Early Church forms an infallible articulation of revelation in Barth's thought, and this infallible articulation has a central place in Barth's dogmatic process, this means, among other things, that extra-scriptural material is given the status of "infallible doctrine". For as Barth, is the first to acknowledge, the creeds of the Early Church embody beliefs which are not found in Scripture,

Thus for example, the eternality of the Son, a belief we have mentioned previously, is a belief which Barth himself says "is not to be found in the Biblical texts."[1] It is to be found in the creed adopted at the Council of Nicaea, and is definitely implicit in the form given this creed in Constantinople in 381 A.D.[2] Now if one were to say this belief is

1. C.D.I/1, p.475.

2. Early Christianity, Documents edited by Roland H. Bainton, Nostrand, New York, 1960, pp.165-166.

an interpretation of Scripture, as Barth does, it would seem equally true that it is an addition to Scripture. For even Barth will acknowledge that the belief "is not to be found in the Biblical texts."

What this means is that extra-scriptural material, this belief and many others like it embodied in the creeds of the Early Church have been given the status of infallible articulation of revelation. They are (1) assented to without question, (2) not questioned subsequently, (3) asserted dogmatically as normative, as what "must" be believed in the Church, and (4) built upon in his dogmatic process. While one is not saying that there are no exceptions to what we have laid out, which there may be, this would appear to be 'the rule'!

One may then point out one significant difference between credal tradition and Scripture in Barth's thought. Scripture may in fact make mistakes; Creeds do not. While Creeds, the creeds of the Early Church are infallible in this theology, Scripture is not infallible. Barth then can take the view that there was no Garden of Eden, but he cannot, or will not take the view that there was no Virgin Birth. Creeds are binding upon him in a way that Scripture is not.[1] One may note in this connection that

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1. Whether Barth says creeds are fallible or infallible is not the point of our inquiry. Our question has been to ask how are they actually regarded in use: Are they regarded in practice, that is, as his contd...

Barth's theory of Scripture as human words which become the Word of God in the present through an Event in which the Holy Spirit is active, allows him a certain freedom in regard to Scripture, a freedom which, one may note, is not allowed with regard to Early Church Creeds. This freedom, a freedom from being bound to a 'literal' interpretation of Scripture, and having also the freedom to ignore parts of Scripture most probably is due to Barth's theory of Scripture, as that which authoritatively becomes the Word of God for man in man's own present. For not all of Scripture can become the Word of God at any one time, but rather, this portion, and perhaps later, that portion. There is no guarantee that all portions of Scripture will become the Word of God. Thus there is freedom to ignore portions of Scripture. Yet in contrast the Church must stand by and uphold the complete extent of the beliefs embodied in the Early Church Creeds. One is not free to ignore (or radically reinterpret) "the Virgin Birth" or "the Second Coming."

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actual method operates, as infallible? Our answer has been : Yes. As we have already mentioned Barth speaks of the limitation and fallibility of the creedmakers, yet he goes on to speak of a factor which renders these affairs insignificant: the alleged limiting and determining activity of the deity. Thus what statements Barth may make about the (theoretical) fallibility of creeds, should be seen in this context.

We would conclude from the factors we have cited that even if Barth will not come out and say so, he does in fact hold the position and operates upon the assumption that the Creeds of the Early Church are infallible. In this, they differ from Scripture which is not infallible.

Section I.

TRADITION AS REVELATION: CREDAL TRADITION AS THE FOURTH FORM OF THE WORD OF GOD.

Now we might go one step further. If Early Church creeds are infallible, then are they an infallible articulation and formulation of revelation? If so do they not then effectively become a fourth form of the Word of God in Barth's theological programme, alongside the Word Revealed, the Word Written (Scripture) and the Word Preached? If these things are so, what is the effective authority of the credal tradition of the Early Church, over against the authority of Scripture? These are the questions we shall explore in this chapter.

For our investigation of these questions, let us go firstly to the "methodological chapter" of Credo (1935). Here Barth speaks of revelation, and speaks of it as

> ...the truth, which is identical with God Himself, and which the believer has heard and received in the form of definite truths, in the form of articles of faith...Even the disclosure of this truth is a free gift that positively comes to meet the believing man. It is God's own revelation.[1]

If one asks the question: what is another name for this revelation, which the believer "has heard, and received in the form of definite truths", and which

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1. Credo. p.2.

"comes to meet believing man", it would appear to be: "the Word of God". Yet we are acquainted up until now with only three forms of "the Word of God": The Word Revealed, the Word Written (Scripture) and the Word Preached. But, by both the context and the wording of this passage, it is fairly clear that Barth is not referring to Scripture or preaching here, as the form in which revelation is mediated to believing man. Rather, it is the creed to which he is referring. The subject at hand in the context surrounding this passage is the creed. Now one may ask: in what form has the believer received the revelation of God? He has received it "in the form of definite truths, in the form of articles of faith."[1] And where does one find these articles of faith? The answer is obvious: in the creed.

Thus the believer receives "revelation" "in the form of articles of faith". Here, then, it would appear that Barth has implicitly acknowledged that there is a fourth form of "the Word of God" in his theological scheme: the creed. Is there other evidence which might support this, namely the view that Barth's theology operates upon the assumption that "the creed", or more specifically the credal tradition of the Early Church is a fourth form of the Word of God. At this point we might refer back to where we examined the "givens", or "actualities" i.e. "actualities of revelation" upon which Barth bases his

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1.(From the passage we have just quoted) Credo, p.2.

theological construction. What we found was that a surprising majority of these alleged "actualities of revelation" were in fact credal beliefs or Early Church dogmas which articulated credal beliefs. Thus the form which revelation or the Word of God took at this primal and basal level in Barth's theologizing was that of credal beliefs (and Early Church dogmas formulated in close connection with credal beliefs): Trinity, eternality of the Son, etc.(See above, p325ff).

In short, if Barth wished to base his theology on (what was allegedly) "the Word of God" (and one sees no reason to doubt this repeatedly stated wish) we have found that the form revelation or "the Word of God" took was, in a significant number of cases, credal beliefs. We might also go to Barth's book on Anselm in this connection. In Barth's interpretation of Anselm, we find that Anselm's most central presupposition, that is, the chief among his A B C D's must be regarded as "the Word of God" in order for the "argument" to have force. As we have pointed out in Part II, Barth speaks explicitly of the 'key phrase' of Anselm's Proslogion as "A Word of God within the context of his revelation, to which also belongs the revelation of his existence".[1] The 'key phrase' is "that than which nothing greater can be conceived";("aliquid quo maius nihil cogitari potest"). Yet where does this

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.131. See above, pp.226ff.

phrase, which must be considered the Word of God, come from? It comes from 'the Credo'. But what is the content of this 'Credo', in Barth's mind? We can find no evidence that Scripture is involved in 'the Credo' (directly at least). The form which the content of 'the Credo' takes in Barth's Anselm is that of Early Church beliefs: creeds, and dogmas constructed in close connection with these creeds.[1] Here, then, is a theological method in which parts of tradition,(e.g. the key phrase, allegedly taken from 'the Credo') must be regarded as "the Word of God." One wishes to point out, in this connection, that Barth is most vague about how this phrase can be seen as having its source in 'the Credo'. That is Barth merely states this to be the case, and leaves his statement hanging, with no support. We have found some amount of evidence which, in fact, suggests that the source of this phrase is 'pagan' philosophy (i.e. non-ecclesiastical thought), and not any such 'Credo'.[2]

Thus in Barth's interpretation of Anselm we also have a view of a theological method which (1) uses the credal tradition of the Early Church as a basis ('the Credo') and (2) in which basic elements of thought upon which the theologian builds must necessarily be considered "the Word of God", while yet the source of

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1. See above, pp.223ff.

2. See above, pp.134ff.

these basic elements is the credal tradition of the Early Church.

Now we might return to Barth's dogmatics proper. What we are saying is that in Barth's actual procedure, in his dogmatics, the "actualities of revelation" upon which Barth bases his theologizing, are to be found in the form of beliefs of credal tradition; and that this occurs in a significant number of places. This suggests that the form of "the Word of God" upon which Barth wished to base his theology at these points, was not one of the first three forms of "the Word of God", which are explicated in Barth's Prolegomena, but a fourth form of "the Word of God," whose existence is not explicitly admitted by Barth: "the Word of God" as credal tradition.

Now we might go one step further. If credal tradition is an articulation and formulation of revelation, as we have just found, it is also infallible in its articulation and formulation of revelation. This was the conclusion of our explorations in the preceding chapter.[1] Yet, if creeds are an infallible articulation and formulation of the revelation of God, then it would appear that they are an infallible form of "the Word of God."

Are they treated as such in Barth's actual procedure? One notes that the alleged "actualities

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1. Cf. above. pp.354-362.

of revelation" in Barth's thought are treated as "givens". They are not to be questioned as to their truth prior to their use, nor subsequently. They are not to be examined with 'the tools of reason', nor supported by human means. Thus, for example, the line of reasoning is not from "possibility" to "actuality" but rather just the reverse, from "actuality" to "possibility". (That is, one presupposes the "actuality" and from this derives its "possibility").[1] In short one finds these beliefs taken from credal tradition treated as infallible. The only real question concerning these beliefs is the question as to their content, and correct exposition.

Yet if credal tradition is used in this manner, and there is additional evidence that Barth regards it as infallible, this suggests rather strongly that Barth operates upon the assumption that credal tradition is "the Word of God." That is, credal tradition does not have to become "the Word of God" in an Event in man's own present, as do Scripture and Preaching, but rather, that even apart from this Event, it is "the Word of God." If this is so, Barth's 'occasionalism' or 'actualism' is absent just at this point. The creed can be drawn upon in utter trust in its reliability as an articulation of the revelation of God.

One does in fact find what appears to be utter trust in the reliability of these creeds. Nowhere can we find Barth rejecting or even taking exception

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1. See above, p.325.

to the beliefs articulated in these Early Church creeds. (specifically, the Apostle's Creed, the Nicen**o**-Constantinoplian Creed, and, more or less in the background, the Chalcedonian Creed). One is hard pressed to find any questioning of the beliefs of these creeds over and above a purely 'academic' exercise. In place of real questioning of these beliefs, we find, essentially, an unquestioning submission, of which we have spoken above.[1] We also find these beliefs treated as "givens", as "actualities", unproblematically built upon in Barth's theologizing.

While one notes that Barth is of the opinion that these Early Church creeds do not contradict Scripture, and in fact are seen as authoritative interpretation of Scripture, yet if what we are suggesting is so, there is a significant difference between creeds and Scripture. Scripture in Barth's theory <u>becomes</u> "the Word of God." It becomes this at points, in the Event in man's present, in which the Holy Spirit acts within man, validating and confirming the human words of Scripture as "the Word of God." Yet <u>the total extent</u> of Scripture does not become the Word of God in this Event.[2] In contrast, it would appear that Barth operates upon the assumption that the creed, <u>in its total extent, is</u> the Word of God. If this is so this would explain Barth's flexibility in what he

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1. See above, pp.348ff.

2. See below, p.361.

accepts as true from Scripture, and in contrast his inflexibility about the question of truth vis-a-vis creeds.

The Consequences of Such a "Position."

Even if we set aside the question as to whether for Barth creeds are "the Word of God," without having to become thus through God's action, it would appear that we still have here an infallible articulation of revelation. That is, it would appear that Barth operates upon the assumption that the creeds of the Early Church are an infallible articulation of revelation.

If so this places credal tradition in contrast with Scripture, which is not infallible. That is, Scripture makes mistakes; creeds do not. As we have pointed out, for Barth, there was no Garden of Eden, yet there was a Virgin Birth.

Yet there is another consequence of this operational presupposition of Barth's regarding creeds. If creeds are an infallible articulation of revelation this means that extra-scriptural beliefs have been given infallible status. For if creeds are an interpretation of Scripture they also are, at points, an addition to it. As we have mentioned, Barth is the first to point out that not all the beliefs of Early Church tradition are to be found in Scripture. The belief in 'the eternality of the Son', for example,

is one which Barth admits "is not to be found in the Biblical texts."[1] "The Trinity" is in this category as well.[2]

We would conclude, then, that there is a fair amount of evidence that Tradition in these three places (the Apostles' Creed, the Nicen**o**-Constantinoplian Creed and, in the background, the Chalcedonian Creed) has been given infallible status. And further that the total extent of these three sources are effectively considered infallible articulation of revelation, thus raising extra-scriptural beliefs to the status of infallible articulation of revelation.

We would also conclude that there is a fair amount of evidence that credal tradition functions in Barth's scheme as a fourth form of "the Word of God." Unlike Scripture, which is a human and fallible articulation of revelation, and which at points becomes "the Word of God," it would appear that the credal tradition of the Early Church is an infallible articulation of revelation, and thus in toto, and not just at points is "the Word of God."

Seen from this vantage point it would be difficult to say that credal tradition had less authority than Scripture in its articulation of revelation. Whether it actually has more authority than Scripture in this theological framework, we would leave an open question for the moment.[3] In any case, the totality

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1. C.D.I/1, p.475.

2. Cf. C.D.I/1 p.382.

3. See below. pp.375f; also,pp.360f, and pp.516f.

of the content of these creeds is binding upon the church in this theological programme, whereas the totality of the content of Scripture is not. That is, one is not bound to believe all the things believed by the writers of Scripture, and thus all the beliefs in Scripture (e.g. the belief that there was a Garden of Eden), yet one is bound to believe the total extent of these creeds (including the belief in the "Virgin Birth", and a "Second Coming" at the end of history).

While Scripture is additionally a 'rule of faith' in the sense of a limit for theology: something not to be in contradiction with, yet so are these creeds. In fact, it is in these creeds that the orthodoxy Barth wishes to reassert receives basic articulation. Barth is as aware as anyone else that not all of this orthodoxy is present in Scripture.[1]

This suggests that the credal tradition of the Early Church has become a 'canon within the canon' for Barth. That is, among all the beliefs one might find

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1. Barth in 1935 remarks: "In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, time and time again, arose the possibility of rejecting the Nicene Creed, orthodoxy, scholasticism, the Fathers of the Church... and the confessions of faith - all with a flourish of a trumpet - with a consequent adherence to the Bible. I am thinking of G. Menken, J.T. Beck, Hoffman of Erlangen, Adolf Schlatter, all men of genius. It is a strange thing, but this procedure, which appears to be so consistent with scriptural principles has always resulted in a very "modern" theology....They had freed themselves of the dogma of the Church, but not of their own dogmas and their own ideas." Credo, pp.180-181. Quoted from Hamer, pp.193-194.

in Scripture, those which are taken up into these creeds receive 'canonical' status. Thus even if one might hold that, in the case of the Apostles' Creed, all the basic beliefs are to be found in Scripture, (even if this might be so), the fact of primary importance for Barth would appear to be this: that these beliefs, and not others from Scripture, were asserted by the Early Church. Here we find a 'canon' of beliefs in the context of Scriptural beliefs.

If one goes on to the Nicene Creed it becomes increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to maintain that all the beliefs here are actually to be found in Scripture. If many of these beliefs are interpretation of Scripture, they are also additions to Scripture. As Barth finds exalted significance in this creed in particular, i.e. the Nicene, especially in its Christological and Pneumatological beliefs, here extra-scriptural beliefs become part of Barth's 'canon of beliefs'. With reference to the beliefs of Scripture these credal beliefs form a 'canon within (and outwith) the canon'. One adds 'outwith the canon' (of Scriptural beliefs) for the reason we have just referred to: not all of the beliefs of these creeds can actually be found in Scripture.

If credal tradition was effectively considered an infallible articulation and formulation of revelation, and in fact functioned as a fourth form of "the Word of God" in this theological programme, and if

Barth operated upon both of these assumptions, it is not difficult to see why this should have happened so covertly in this theology, and why Barth might have avoided self awareness concerning these things. For to give any part of tradition infallible status, especially the status of infallible articulation of revelation, has typically been abhorrent to Protestantism. Any notion which might bring tradition up upon the same ground with Scripture, as, for example a rule of faith has usually been strongly opposed within Protestantism.

Any notion that tradition that might bring tradition up upon the same ground with Scripture is also in contradiction with Barth's own statements about the status of tradition. In one of his responses to questions concerning tradition following his lectures which make up his Credo (1935) he states:

> ...The Reformation Scripture-principle placed the Church permanently under the authority of the prophetic-apostolic Bible-Word; and it did that in the opinion that in this human distinction between the Church and Holy Scripture as teacher of the Church, there is expressed the abiding lasting difference between the Lord of the Church, and the Church as the assembly of believers. This barrier between Scripture and Church which points like a sign to the barrier between the Church and its Lord, has, in Roman Catholicism been overstepped. Tradition is not revelation.[1]

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1. Credo, p.180.

If we are correct, or nearly correct in our main point in this chapter, namely that Barth operates upon the assumption that the credal tradition of the Early Church is a fourth form of "the Word of God," and is regarded in fact as an infallible articulation of revelation, then it is regarded, in effect, as revelation. We find it somewhat ironic that Barth has put his views concerning tradition so clearly just at this point, i.e. Credo (1935), in a work where his operational assumptions would appear to be in utter contradiction with these stated views.

Further we find more than a little evidence that Barth's theology operates upon assumptions about credal tradition which give credal tradition, in many respects, roughly equal status with Scripture. As far as its authority, there is at least one respect in which credal tradition would seem to have an authority of a higher sort than Scripture. For there are extra-scriptural beliefs in creeds which must be believed (since the creed in toto is binding upon the Church), while there are beliefs in Scripture which are not binding upon the Church. It would appear that Barth's theory of "the Word of God" gives him a certain liberty in his approach to Scripture. That liberty is not present in his approach to these Creeds.

It would be at least historically understandable if Barth were forced into this covert position by

fighting against a liberalism which exercised its liberty in ignoring the beliefs embodied in these creeds. As to whether this was a good thing, even good for the very things he wished to preserve and reassert, this is a separate question, which we shall take up later.

CONCLUSION TWO:

CREDAL FUNDAMENTALISM IN BARTH'S THEOLOGICAL METHOD.

Now at the end of our study of the relation to tradition in Barth's theology, we shall bring together several aspects of our research, and examine the following thesis: that there is an implicit fundamentalism at the very basis of Barth's theology, a fundamentalism in reference to creeds rather than scripture, and thus what could be termed "credal fundamentalism". The term "fundamentalism" admittedly has unfavourable connotations; it is typically seen as a pejorative term. Yet it is also a descriptive term. That is, "fundamentalism" usually involves several factors fairly consistently. As to the term's pejorative connotations, one wishes to acknowledge their presence, yet one would also point out that in the last few years this term has become one which many would take upon themselves, perhaps with some pride, or at least without hesitation. Thus one sees more than a few people including church leaders, choosing to call themselves "Fundamentalists", and holding a "World Congress" under this banner. Thus it would appear that the term has a descriptive function, as well as both favourable and unfavourable connotations.

If there are unfavourable connotations involved with this term we wish to lay this factor out in the

open. Our purpose is not simply to 'fling' a term at Barthianism, but rather ask (1) to what extent does this term apply?;(2) are we using the term in a fair or an unfair manner?; and (3) in what ways might the fundamentalism in Barth's theology differ from other types of fundamentalism? We would, of course, admit that our intent is "critical" at this point, as well as descriptive. We shall look at these questions as we proceed. Yet our first task is to list the results of our investigations which lead us to use the term "fundamentalism", and specifically "credal fundamentalism" with reference to Barth's theology.

We have found (1) that creeds are infallible in Barth's framework;[1] (2) They are infallible articulation of revelation;[2] (2a) As infallible articulation of revelation, there is considerable evidence that they constitute a fourth form of "the Word of God" in Barth's operational framework;[3] (2b) They are infallible, or inerrant in their 'literal' meaning. That is, they are infallible in their originally intended meaning. No radical reinterpretation or demythologizing of these beliefs can be allowed. (3) They are binding upon both Church and Theology. Not just certain beliefs are seen as binding upon the Church and theology, but creeds

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1. See above, pp.354-362.

2. See above, pp.363-376.

3. See Ibid.

in toto.[1] (4) As such these creeds form a "canon within the canon", that is a canon of beliefs which must be believed. As such, therefore, they constitute a list of "fundamentals" or "fundamental beliefs" to which Church and Theology are bound.

In short, we have here: an infallible articulation of revelation, which is inerrant both historically and doctrinally, in its 'literal' meaning, that is, in its originally intended meaning. The beliefs enclosed within these creeds are "fundamental beliefs" and are binding in toto upon both Church and Theology. If fundamentalism, in its usual forms, typically involves (1) an inerrant text, and (2) a body of beliefs regarded as (a) fundamental, (b) necessary, and (c) infallible, then we have found these same elements in Barth's theological programme as well.[2]

Now we might go on to point out how the credal fundamentalism we find in Barth's theologizing differs from most other forms of fundamentalism. The most obvious difference is that, in Barth's case, the inerrant text is not Scripture but creeds, specifically the creeds of the Early Church. It is here that one finds the beliefs which are fundamental, necessary and infallible. We shall reserve comment on this aspect of Barth's theology until the conclusion of our thesis.

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1. See above, pp.347ff.

2. For #1 see #1 and #2 above, p.378 ; for #2a see #4 above, p.379 ; for #2b, see #3 and #4 above, p.378f ; for #2c, see #1 and #2 above, p.378.

Another significant difference between Barth's type of fundamentalism and many other types of fundamentalism is Barth's disavowal of any attempt to substantiate these beliefs from outside texts of authority (i.e. scripture). Thus, for example, in a form of fundamentalism which involves a belief in the inerrancy of scripture, arguments are often offered to support this belief. Archaeological evidence is sought, for example, in an attempt to support the accuracy of scripture, especially the Old Testament. Arguments may also be offered in support of other beliefs, arguments, for example, for the existence of God, etc. What we are referring to here are attempts to substantiate what has already been asserted dogmatically, and what would be held to be true, dogmatically, even if no (extra-scriptural) substantiation could be found. Yet when we turn to Barth's theologizing we find a definite contrast in this respect. Thus if we are correct in maintaining that there is a credal fundamentalism in Barth's theology, it is one which is not accompanied by argument in support of its claims. If beliefs are dogmatically asserted, here, in Barth's theology, this dogmatism is not modified by subsequent argumentation in support of the truth of its assertions.

There is yet another difference between the credal fundamentalism we find in Barth's theology and most forms of fundamentalism. While in most forms

of fundamentalism, a position is taken up quite explicitly concerning the "fundamental beliefs", for example, by issuing a declaration, listing these fundamental beliefs, and setting out the position in regard to them, Barth, in contrast does not (to our knowledge) even set forth his position concerning the methodological importance of credal tradition. In fact, as we have already noted,[1] what he says concerning the "authority" of Tradition, (which includes credal Tradition) is in contradiction with the actual position we find him taking up concerning the Early Church Creeds as he carries on his theological enterprise. Thus what we have been concerned with here is a "position" taken up by a theologian, yet not fully acknowledged, and even at times disavowed. In contrast, in most forms of fundamentalism, the fundamentalistic position will be made quite explicit, for example, by the publication of a declaration listing the specific beliefs deemed 'fundamental'.

If we are correct in holding that Barth's theologizing involves this type of fundamentalism, it is one which lies at the very basis of his thought. For as we have seen, a significant number of the "actualities of revelation" upon which this theology is built are taken from credal tradition and the dogmas which developed in close connection with credal

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1. See above, pp.374ff.

tradition. For this reason one would argue that what we have described as credal fundamentalism forms an integral part of Barth's process of thought. For it is involved at the initial step in this theologizing, that is, at the point where Barth begins with the "truths" or "actualities of revelation".

This then forms the second terminus of our study of the relation to tradition, namely that Barth's theology involves an implicit fundamentalism, one that might be called credal fundamentalism.[1]

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1. Our first terminus or goal in the study of the relation to tradition in Barth's theology was to show that this theology involved unquestioning submission to credal tradition.

Chapter III.

MAN, REVELATION AND THEOLOGY: ISSUES OF METHOD CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MAN, THEOLOGY AND THAT WHICH IS ALLEGED TO BE REVELATION IN BARTH'S THEOLOGY.

MAN, REVELATION AND THEOLOGY: ISSUES OF METHOD CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN MAN, THEOLOGY AND THAT WHICH IS ALLEGED TO BE REVELATION IN BARTH'S THEOLOGY.

A. Introduction.

In the four sections which make up Chapter 3 we shall devote consideration to four different aspects of Barth's theological programme. Although each of these sections takes up and examines a separate and distinct aspect of Barth's Theological programme, the selections are arranged in a way that one theme leads on to the next. Thus Barth's "No" to Anthropology leads to ask: Why did he say "No"? Was it something to do with the nature of man's proper relation to revelation or, "the Word of God", in this theological programme. After answering this question with a tentative "yes", we then go on in the next section to consider in more detail, "Man's Relation to 'the Word of God'" in this theology. This relation is of central importance for the following section, where we look at Barth's conception of Apologetics. Our findings in this section, "Dogmatics as Apologetics", are, subsequently, of central importance for our fourth section "Theology as 'Word'." Thus, while each of these four sections attempts to consider a separate aspect of Barth's method, each section has a relationship to the theme of both the preceding and the following sections.

We have grouped these aspects of method under the title "Man, Revelation and Theology", since we are concerned here with aspects of method in which man, his relationship to what is alleged to be revelation, and the relationship between revelation and theology are crucial.

Section B.
BARTH'S "NO" TO ANTHROPOLOGY.

In looking at the problem of Barth's relation to philosophy, and the humanities in general, and at a changing relationship and attitude over the crucial years of 1928-32, one is aware of a many sided problem, and the difficulty of doing the problem justice in the limited space we can devote to it. That there was a basic shift of attitude is clear. There is little argument among scholars that in the period 1927-32 there was a great visible shift in Barth's ideals about doing theology. One has to say "ideals" for what actually happened in his actual doing of theology would have to remain a separate consideration.

One of these methodological ideals, as one can sense from Barth's very unusual interpretation of Anselm, is that theology should shed any substantial dependence on, or participation in, schools of philosophical thought. More basically theology must "cleanse" itself of any philosophical presuppositions. Most centrally, it must shed itself of any anthropological presuppositions, and any anthropological basis whatsoever.[1]

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1. Robert Shoffner, in his book, Anselm Revisited, which has come to hand too late for us to use it in our research, is very much of the view that the abandonment, and dismissal of anthropology, (that 'is independent' anthropology, one which stands 'independently' of revelation) was at the heart of the methodological issues at hand in Barth's study of Anselm.
cf. Anselm Revisited, A Study of the Role of the Ontological Argument in the Writings of Karl Barth and Charles Hartshorne, Brill, Leiden, 1974, p40ff.

This shift of intention in ideals about doing theology and its significance for Barth comes out very strongly in the preface to his renewed attempt at doing Dogmatics, Die Kirkliche Dogmatik, Volume I, Part 1, published in 1932, that is about a year after his work on Anselm was published. The manner in which he expresses himself shows a depth of determination and indicates that in Barth's view something crucial and basic was at stake.

> ...To the best of my ability I have cut out in this second issue of the book everything that in the first issue [his Christliche Dogmatik of five years earlier] might give the slightest appearance of giving to theology a basis, support or even a mere justification in the way of existential philosophy... Because in the former undertaking I can only see a readoption of the line Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Hermann, and because in any thinkable continuation of this line I can only see the plain destruction of Protestant theology and the Protestant Church... I can therefore only say No here.1.

We may note the vehemence implicit in this statement "...I can only see the plain destruction of Protestant theology and the Protestant Church..." This is not a minor issue in Barth's mind. We may note also that it was not existential philosophy in particular which he was objecting to. For "the line of Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Hermann" was not involved with existential philosophy. Rather we see here the larger issue of the theological use of (non-ecclesiastical)

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1. C.D. I/1, p.ix,x.

philosophy, and philosophical anthropology, as central; that is, elements of thought, presuppositions and constructions which have an independence from theology, and thus, for Barth, stand independently from 'the Word'.

In the following we shall examine how philosophical anthropology fared in all of this, for we feel this to be not only central here, but a sound indicator of Barth's attitude toward non-ecclesiastical philosophy in general. We will try: (1) to indicate briefly the change of attitude to this field of study and its relevance for doing theology; (2) to look at the intellectual context in which this occurred, that is, the options that were actually open to Barth and other Germanic thinkers, and (3) to venture a supposition as to why Barth took the track he did.

After Barth's first attempt at Dogmatics, the Christliche Dogmatik of 1927, Friedrich Gogarten, in an article reviewing the work, lifted up for examination an implicit I-Thou anthropology which Barth had made use of in his theological exposition. Barth subsequently ceased work on his Dogmatics, and in the period that followed was to re-think the whole of his methodological basis for his Dogmatics. It was in this period that his study of Anselm became so important to him.

He discovered in his first attempt at dogmatics what became in his mind a fatal flaw. In Zahrnt's words, he found "to his horror" that man, the listener, or hearer of the word had been "bound up in the concept

of the Word."[1] That is, that there was an anthropological element, a participation in contemporary anthropological efforts in his Dogmatics. That Barth, in contrast with each of his major contemporary theologians, saw a threat here, and a threat which had to do not only with philosophical anthropology in particular, but philosophy in general, can be seen from a passage from the first half-volume of his restart in Dogmatics which appeared five years after his first attempt in 1927.

> ...I must regard the anthropology [which Gogarten fails to find in me] as harmful, because with it I do not see how we are to avoid the danger of handing over theology afresh to some sort of philosophy and so loøsing the real theological theme. [2]

The use of the words "harmful", "danger" and "loøsing the real theological theme" suggest that we have found a basic and deeply felt issue in Barth's mind. And we may note that anthropology is here at the centre of the issue of the relation of dogmatics to philosophy.

The ostensible reason, then, for Barth's avoidance, even abhorrence of anthropology is that it would swallow up theology with its own concerns, and the more basic themes of theology would be lost, that is, obliterated.

While the student of history can understand the concern, given Barth's own interpretation and under-

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1. Zahrnt, p.58ff.

2. C.D. I/1, p.145f.

standing of Nineteenth Century liberal thought, in which, according to Barth, theology was totally transformed into anthropology, yet one must note that Barth's reaction to this interpreted state of affairs is quite different from that of his major contemporaries.

ANTHROPOLOGICAL OPTIONS.

The second concern in these pages is to set out some of the intellectual context and the options actually open to Barth.[1] It was not that there was an absence of creativity in the anthropological sphere in the 1920's, nor a lack of alternatives to Nineteenth Century anthropologies. There was, for example, the work of Scheler, Husserl and Heidegger.[2] Nor was it that there were no schools or strands of anthropology which were hospitable to the Judeo-Christian heritage. Martin Buber's I and Thou had appeared in 1922. There was the work of Ferdinand Ebner and Eberhard Grisebach which proved suggestive for Gogarten and others. The neo-Kantians, Cohen and Rosenzweig, also participated in the search for new anthropological insights.[3] Barth was acquainted with both of the latter in the early 20's, and in fact attended Cohen's lectures as a student in Marburg.

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1. In our Introductory Chapter on the Philosophical Landscape of Germanic Europe we have layed the groundwork for what we describe here. See above, pp.31ff.
2. See above, pp.31ff.
3. cf. Martin Buber's "The History of the Dialogical Principle" in Between Man and Man, E.T., Macmillan, New York, 1965, p.209ff.

Bultmann had found insights in the earlier Heidegger; and even if Heidegger's work in itself was not essentially hospitable to the Judeo-Christian tradition, Bultmann found those insights suggestive and helpful.

One cannot simply label all the above "existentialist anthropology" and think that it was all somehow monolithic or homogeneous and denigrate the whole, as nihilistic or a product of current cynicism. Where there was a Sartre there was also a Buber. Where there was a Heidegger there was a Jaspers. One could make a distinction between "social" anthropology, e.g. Buber, Ebner, Grisebach, and, in contrast, what we might call "non-social" anthropology, e.g. Sartre, Heidegger. That is, the former in contrast to the latter placed a high value on interpersonal relation, and interdependent living in the world.

Within the anthropological sphere there was also the development of depth psychology. Again it would be a mistake to see this as monolithic or homogeneous, or lacking in creative diversity. Where there was a Freud there was a Jung and an Adler. It would also be a mistake to think that those who came after these three left all their assumptions unquestioned, or for that matter their major hypotheses. Perhaps there are birth pangs and teething trouble in any field. There are too many who would dismiss depth psychology by simply citing a few obvious mistakes of Freud, or a few

remarks felt to be obnoxious or degrading to being human.

Again, within this field, one could not say that there were no strands of thought which were hospitable to the Judeo-Christian tradition. One could cite Jung, as one of the forefathers of this field, as one who would be quite sympathetic to the Judeo-Christian tradition. Thus one sees a wide diversity of options open to the theologian in this era. One also sees each of the other major theologians formerly of the Zwischen den Zeiten group making use of contemporary anthropological efforts. Bultmann with Heidegger, Gogarten with Ebner and others, Tillich with existentialism generally, and Brunner with his own 'independent orders of creation.' We find none of these theologians recoiling in horror. One would be arguing here that there were anthropological options relevant for theology in this period. In Bultmann, Gogarten and others in the Zwischen den Zeiten group we see some of these options actually taken up and used.

One notes that Barth's attitude to contemporary anthropology is anything but positive. For example, in the whole of the Church Dogmatics, that is, in over 5000 pages, brimming with references to writers contemporary and long past, there are only three references to Freud. These occur after 1945 and in what could be called Barth's exposition of his Doctrine of Man. What is significant is that there are only three refer-

ences, each of which is negative to Freud, and are possibly basic misunderstandings of Freud's work.[1]

In contrast, there is a ten page section in the same volume devoted to the study of the views of Mary Baker Eddy, an American spiritualist and founder of "Christian Science".[2] (The Blumhardts, two South German spiritualists of the late Nineteenth Century who were so influential on the early Barth, reappear in this section of writing. The latter reappear, interestingly enough, throughout the Dogmatics.)

Barth's Doctrine of Creation, which is mostly an exposition of his Doctrine of Man was composed almost forty years after the publication of the major part of Freud's work (i.e. 1945-55 vs 1910-1920). Certainly there was enough time for Barth to consult secondary sources and give consideration to such a germane thinker of his own time and his own Germanic context.

What is of more specific interest here is that in the period 1930-1945 in which Barth rethought the foundations of his theologizing, produced his prologomena and published half of his Church Dogmatics, anthropology, i.e. anthropological considerations in any real sense of the word are conspicuously absent. That is, the subjectivity of the theologian, the theological thinker and reader receives no consideration in terms of the tools available for this in his own context.

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1. K.D., III/1, p.382, III/4, p.150,177.

2. K.D., III/4, pp.414-422.

One would wish to qualify this statement that there is no real consideration of the 'I' who considers the 'Thou', the object of theology, but qualify it only slightly. Certainly the subject of man arises at points in this period 1932-1942, but arises not so much for consideration as for condemnation. That is, man, especially in the first half of C.D.II/1 is seen as basically only a negative factor in theological knowledge. He can make basically only a negative contribution. He is a factor to be overcome by gratia. Yet in all this, man is rarely lifted up for consideration in himself. There is no developed anthropology, only fragments, and these, basically negative toward man, remain in an undeveloped state. We may note that this period includes the first two volumes of the four volumes of the Church Dogmatics. This is therefore no momentary absence of anthropology. This qualification does not alter our basic supposition, that Barth intended to avoid any use of, or participation in contemporary anthropological efforts. If anything it underlines the need for some framework on which these semi-anthropological fragments can be related to each other, or brought into some coherence. This is wholly lacking in Barth's work.

Why Did Barth Reject Anthropology?

The question could now be raised as to why anthropological questions and the problem of subjectivity are ignored, or more than that suppressed.

The stock Barthian answer was that theology was

in danger of being swallowed up by anthropology.[1] Reference was made to Nineteenth Century liberalism, where supposedly, this happened all across the board. The alarm was sounded. The ship of protestant theology was about to founder if anthropological questions were allowed an entry! This answer we may note was not at all accepted in theory or in practice by other major Germanic thinkers of this era, for they made use of anthropological concepts and anthropological frameworks rather continually, and affirmed their right and the need to do so.

If we search for a deeper reason we can only venture a supposition. It is suggested by a comment made by John Bowden in his small biographical book on Barth.

> He somehow avoided the fact that Christianity (and Judaism before it) did not start from a miraculous revelation from heaven, bypassing all human faculties, and an exalted book, but was worked out through human lives and histories and insights in a process which always has been and always will be imperfectly carried on. [2]

Only if one conveniently avoids the problem of human subjectivity can one blithely assume that his thoughts reproduce the thoughts of the deity and so therefore assume an identity between the two (despite all protests to the contrary).

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1. Cf. the passage cited above, p. p.388; Cf. also p.386.

2. John Bowden, Karl Barth, S.C.M. London, p.116.

If one temporarily avoids the problem of human subjectivity, perhaps one can hold this view for awhile. If one wants to keep on holding this "objectivist" view what better way than by denigrating anthropology as such, and, going further, attempting to banish it altogether from the theological thought world?

This banishment or attempted banishment occurred in the 1928-32 transitional period.[1] When Barth, to his "horror" found that he was considering the listener in and with what the listener was listening to, or in his terms, that man was bound up in the concept of the "word".[2]

But why could this have aroused such "horror"? One would want to experiment with the supposition that the attempt to know man's subjectivity concretely, that is, the attempt to have a concrete anthropology would face one with the difficulties and the ambiguity of knowing in the theological realm.

John Baillie's story of a man hunting with a friend is suggestive here. The two hunters startled a strange bird. The first said, "Oh, that's a woodcock." His companion said, "That's not my idea of a woodcock." "Perhaps not", was the retort, "but its God's idea of one."[3] The story, while perhaps a

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1. As we have noted above, Shoffner is of this view. See p.385, note #1.

2. Zahrnt, p.58,f.

3. The Sense of the Presence of God, Oxford,London, 1962, p.191.

crude example of the mentality we wish to lift out for examination is nonetheless an example of the type of omniscient objectivism we find in Barth. This negation of the distance between the human mind and the mind of the deity inherent as an assumption in Barthianism, could not be so easily, nor blithely made when one has to take into account man's subjectivity. If one can successfully ignore this problem, and as a bonus, push it off the field without arguing for its irrelevance one can more easily enter the Barthian frame of mind about the ease of theological knowledge.

Rather than say that liberal thought had poor anthropology, that is, poor insights, inadequate, faulty or misleading views, and emphasize the search for new or better insight into man Barth exerted his energies to try to run anthropological inquiry off the field. Anthropology <u>as such</u> was seen as a threat in Barth's theological enterprise, and viewed with grave suspicion (as we have seen above). Other of his contemporaries did not share this suspicion. Bultmann, Gogarten, Brunner and Tillich each in his own way held anthropological insights in high regard, even as indispensable to a viable, credible theology in the Twentieth Century.

Why then was Barth so opposed to it? Why the deep suspicion? Why the attack <u>on the discipline itself?</u> Why was the listener no longer listened to (in contrast to his first attempt at Dogmatics in 1927)?

One wonders, firstly, how anthropological insights e.g. insights into the nature of man's subjectivity, and into interpersonal relationship could be regarded as irrelevant when a writer writes his prolegomena to a large scale work in which man's subjectivity does indeed come into play. It was not lack of space for such considerations. The prolegomena takes up two part volumes. One wonders, secondly, why anthropological insights would be seen as a threat to the integrity of his theological enterprise, to the extent that he would repudiate a fellow writer for his emphasis on the importance of contemporary insights into man.[1] Gogarten, the writer in question, had drawn on the insights of an Austrian, Ferdinand Ebner, Das Wort und die geistigen Realitäten - Pneumatologische Fragmente published in 1921. The latter's anthropology certainly could not be termed hostile to the Judeo-Christian tradition.[2]

What one wonders is why anthropology was treated as (1) irrelevant and (2) even a threat, instead of possibly a genuine help, in doing theology, and as a field where the theologian could participate critically.

It is interesting to note in passing that the Zwischen den Zeiten group of theologians fragmented in this period. Bultmann and Tillich had left the

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1. cf. Zahrnt, p.58,59.

2. ibid.

group in the late 20's, Gogarten was repudiated (c.1930) and not long after, Brunner was strongly attacked (1934). Is it pure coincidence that the fragmentation of this group coincided with Barth's disavowal and repudiation of anthropological efforts? That is in a period when these others affirmed links with other disciplines, and "contemporary culture". In the case of Gogarten, it is more than coincidence. In the case of Tillich, one notes the latter's objection to an "antihumanistic attitude which I must regard as a denial of the Protestant principle" in Barthianism in the early 1930's."[1] In the case of Bultmann, one can see in retrospect a strong dissonance between the two on this issue reflected in Barth's article "Bultmann, an Attempt to Understand Him".[2] In the case of Brunner, one notes that the "Natural Theology" that Barth attacked with his pamphlet "Nein" in 1934 is quite tied up with Brunner's view of the "orders" or structures of human existence, that is, with anthropological considerations which have an independence from purely revelational theology.

There is friction therefore between Barth and each of these writers, and it would appear that this friction becomes most heated at this point: when it is a matter of man seeking an understanding of himself without recourse to 'revelation'.

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1. On the Boundary, Collins, London, 1967. (first published 1936), p.41.

2. In Kerygme and Myth, Vol.II, S.P.C.K., 1962. pp.83ff.

To return to our main concern, what we are suggesting in our supposition is that conscious use of anthropological concepts would be a threat to the level of certainty, or the type of certainty that a thinker such as Barth expects to have in the theological-noetic realm. And concurrently, the fear that anthropological insights in themselves would not lead to healthy doubt in the midst of faith but rather that they would lead instead to the annihilation of faith itself. That people have this fear does not mean that the fear is fully justified. Nor does it follow that the annihilation of faith necessarily follows from anthropological insight. That this may have happened with certain individuals or strands of thought in certain periods does not in itself prove a necessary connection, nor does it say that this has always happened.

Man's "Binding Relationship" to "the Word of God".

The view that we are putting forward, namely the great likelihood that Barth has attempted to banish anthropology in order to retain his extreme 'objectivist' view of theological knowledge, in which it is allegedly unproblematic for the human mind to duplicate divine thoughts and structures (the human noetic ratio, and the divine "ontological ratio") is suggested by those passages in the Church Dogmatics where Barth seeks to make obligatory a certain type of "binding" to "the Word", that is a type of binding to "the Word" in which there is no "distance" or "room" for man to use his

critical judgement concerning his experience of what is allegedly "Word". That is, there is no detachment allowed for here.

It is in perhaps the most strongly worded passage about the importance of being "bound" to "the Word" that we hear that any alternative to this type of binding eliminates the possibility of certainty in theological knowledge, and can only end in doubt, that is, disbelief.[1] That this type of binding is of methodological importance for Barth can be seen (1) from the vehemence of his expression and (2) from its place, at the outset of his lengthy section on "The Knowledge of God" in which the actuality and possibility of knowledge of God are considered within the framework of his theology proper.

It is a type of binding of man to "Word" in which no detachment is allowable. That is, there is no "distance" between man and "Word" where any anthropological questions could come into play, questions of perception and/or distortion of perception, seen in an anthropological perspective. It is an area where man is now allowed the use of his critical faculties.[2]

It is in the same passage where Barth insists on this tight "binding" to "the Word" as a necessity for theology that he states that any alternative to such "binding" eliminates the possibility of certainty in

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1. C.D.II/1, p.6, 7.

2. C.D.II/1, p.74.

theological knowledge and "leads inevitably to uncertainty... and therefore to doubt."[1] It seems clear that what Barth means is unless one is so bound, one will end up in disbelief.[2] The implication is that one will loose the whole of belief unless he is so bound. And not only the individual believer, but "the Church". Thus the whole of "the Church's" belief is seen at risk here.

It is precisely here, where the "you" (or Thou) of man is bound to "the Word" that Barth saw the problem with his first attempt at Dogmatics. He had allowed anthropology to have a say precisely here. He had included man in his concept of "the Word," and had allowed anthropology in precisely at this point.[3]

What one would note, then, is the manner in which anthropology is "elbowed out" in Barth's attempt to make "binding" upon man this being bound to "the Word," that is in such a way that nothing can intervene between man and "the Word." The Thou who hears can only bow to what he hears. He is not allowed to stand back from this experience of hearing and look at his experience, that is, with an understanding of himself, with anthropology. Thus he is disallowed the use of his critical faculties and judgement about this experience.

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1. C.D. II/1, p.7.

2. This would seem to be implied in these two moves, first to "uncertainty" and then to "doubt". Thus this last "doubt" does not mean uncertainty, but disbelief. These two follow "inevitably".

3. See above, p. 66-71.

It would appear then, in our view, that to allow the theologian a genuine and operative anthropology would mean that the theologian could not be bound in the manner that Barth describes in C.D.II/1. He would, in his hearing of "the Word", have to maintain some detachment, some distance in which to take into account how his own subjectivity is involved in his "hearing". He would have to use his critical judgement about this experience of hearing.

And this is what Barth seeks to disallow, that is any distance or detachment from what is experienced as "Word," for the consequences of this, in Barth's view, is uncertainty which necessarily leads to disbelief. Thus, if the theologian intends to articulate and present the Church's belief, such detachment and 'distance' is seen as not only a threat to the individual's belief, but as a threat <u>to the belief of the Church</u>. (If one were to take issue with this line of thinking of Barth's, it would be with this assumption that "uncertainty" about belief, that is, <u>intellectual uncertainty</u> leads necessarily to doubt, that is disbelief. Lack of being sure could just as well lead, after thoughtful re-examination to becoming more sure.)

In this supposition about the reason for Barth's 'No' to anthropology we are arguing that here is a significant reason, if not the central reason Barth has sought to drive anthropology off the field: it threatens the certainty of theology. Additionally such a

threat to certainty leads, in Barth's manner of reasoning, "inevitably to uncertainty in the Knowledge of God, and therefore to doubt."[1]

Conclusion.

It seems clear from the statements of Barth we have cited that he will not allow any place for anthropology in his theology, that is for any borrowings from, or any participation in the concerns of, philosophical anthropology or depth psychology.[2] He will isolate himself from all contemporary attempts in anthropology.

As to why this is so, we have ventured a supposition: to allow anthropological considerations a real place in Barth's thought would be a threat to the type of certainty Barth seeks in his theology.

As motivation is a complex issue, and may involve more than one factor, we are not arguing that this is the only factor in Barth's "No" to anthropology, but rather that it was probably a significant factor, if not the central factor.

Postscript to the "No" to Anthropology.

As a postscript we might note again the irony of the situation vis-a-vis Barth and anthropology that we mentioned at the close of our survey of the Germanic

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1. C.D.II/1, p.7.

2. It is a completely separate issue as to whether and how far Barth really did make use of philosophical anthropology, for example existential anthropology, and to what extent this element lies in the form of unexamined presuppositions in his thought.

Philosophical landscape.[1] Barth has tried to drive anthropology off the field in his Dogmatics, attacking Friedrich Gogarten in particular for taking up the I-Thou personalism of thinkers such as Ebner, Grisebach, Rosenzweig and Buber. Yet when Barth exposited his Doctrine of Man in Volume III of his Church Dogmatics, both he and the last mentioned, Martin Buber, agree that each other's views of relational reality nearly coincide. One could argue then about the source of Barth's concepts of relational reality, but this is beyond the scope of our thesis.

1. Above, pp.39ff, especially p.42.

Section C.

MAN'S RELATION TO "THE WORD OF GOD" IN BARTH'S THEOLOGICAL PROGRAMME.

In the following we would like to summarize what we have laid out concerning the relation to "Word" in the previous chapter and, in addition, fill out our account of this relation. It is a relation of central significance for Barth's Theology and thus for understanding his actual methodological procedure.

In the preceding chapter we have described the "binding" relationship to "Word" or "the Word of God" which Barth makes normative for his theology and which he sees as a necessary prerequisite for Theology.[1] In Volume II/1 of the Church Dogmatics, where this relation to "Word" concerns Barth most directly, we may note firstly that this consideration comes at the beginning of his account of "The Knowledge of God." That is, it comes at the beginning of his account of how it is that God is known (this forms the first section of his "Doctrine of God"). The relation to "Word" thus has a place in this exposition which suggests its significance and importance for the whole Doctrine of God which follows.

Perhaps a clarification is in order at this point. When Barth is speaking of this "binding" relationship at the beginning of Volume II/1,[2] he

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1. See above, pp.399ff.
2. C.D.II/1, pp.4ff.

speaks of "Word" or "Word of God" without any additional reference as to the form of "the Word" which he is speaking about. There is no mention specifically of Scripture here,[1] nor specifically of "the Word revealed", that is of the primary Events of revelation, Incarnation, etc., nor specifically of the Word preached. Thus we would conclude that he means to speak of "Word" as mediated, that is of "Word" as man encounters it in its three forms (the Word revealed, the Word written, or Scripture, and the Word preached[2]). In support of this 'reading' of Barth, one would point out that he talks of the "mediated" character of this knowledge.[3] Yet his point seems to be that it is mediated knowledge; it does not appear important to name again the 'source' through which it is mediated. Thus he is speaking of a binding to "Word" as mediated (through Event, Scripture and Preaching). He is not, for example, speaking of a binding to Scripture per se.

To summarize what we have tried to lay out in the preceding chapter[4] the relation to Word is one in which man is bound to this Word in such a manner that

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1. Ibid, pp4-14.
2. See Volume I/1, the chapters devoted to each.
3. C.D.II/1, p.9.
4. See above, pp.399ff.

leaves no "distance" between man and "Word", distance in which man could stand back and reflect upon what he experiences as "Word" or which is alleged to be "Word". There is only one thing he can do: obey. To loosen this relationship, or to "escape out of the constraint of the Word" would, in Barth's view, lead "inevitably to uncertainty" and "therefore to doubt", i.e. unbelief.[1]

This 'obedience' is not, in the main, obedience to a command or an imperative but an 'obedience' to an indicative. As its place in a chapter on "The Knowledge of God" suggests, it is noetic obedience which is entailed in this view. It is the "obedience of thought" which is central.

Yet in this type of binding relationship, there is no detachment in which one can stand back and reflect upon what allegedly approaches him as "Word". Barth's concept of "Event" is of importance at this point. That is, an Event of revelation in the here and now, in which man hears human words, (the human words of Scripture or Preaching) as "Word." Before "the Word" experienced in this manner, man can only be passive, that is, receptive, and obey. As we have remarked, he cannot stand back from this experience and reflect upon it.

Thus there is no "room" in this relationship for

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1. C.D.II/1, p.7.

anthropological questions, that is for the use of anthropology, as we have pointed out in the foregoing chapter. There is likewise no "room" for philosophical epistemology, for theories of knowledge to come into play, or in Barth's words, "a theory of knowledge... where consideration of the truth, worth and competence of the Word of God...can for a time be suspended. But this is the very thing which...must not happen".[1] As this passage suggests, there is no 'room' here for man's critical faculties to come into play in considering the experience of what allegedly approaches him as "Word". He cannot step back and ask: Is this true, is this good?

In Barth's 'summing up' of this first section he states explicitly that one cannot step out of this "binding" relation to "the Word of God", and from outside this relation use one's critical faculties regarding what allegedly happens there. For

> "'From outside' means from the point of view of a human position where truth, dignity and competence are so ascribed to human seeing, understanding and judging as to be judge over the reality and possibility of what happens here."[2]

Barth continues:

> But this is the very thing which is excluded by the inner understanding of what happens... as we are taught at least by our first step.[3]

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1. C.D.II/1, p.5.
2. C.D.II/1, p.31.
3. Ibid.

The "first step" was entering into this binding relationship to 'Word'. Thus to step outside this relation and use one's critical faculties is a possibility which is excluded in this programme of theology.

One notes how the use of one's critical faculties are characterized in this 'summing up'. To use one's critical faculties allegedly means "to be judge over". Thus Barth attempts to put man, that is, the man who would use his critical faculties, in the "guilty" position of passing judgement upon what is (allegedly) the activity of the deity. This characterization is convenient for Barth's purposes, for so characterized, it would appear that man is passing judgement upon the deity. This is not an untypical Barthian move. But this is a characterization, and allows no room for using one's critical faculties in the sense of "forming judgements about" such and such. This use of one's judgement does not necessarily imply a superior position. In any case, even if one were to "allow" this characterization of the use of one's critical faculties, they are used concerning what allegedly occurs in this event. That is they are used vis-a-vis a human experience.

Barth not only wishes to deny any dignity to human critical faculties, but, in his characterization, wishes to denigrate and impugn them as guilty of passing judgement upon the activity of the deity.[1] This is a

1. The characterization is continued in the same paragraph, C.D.II/1, p.31, and recurs at points throughout Volume II/1.

denigration of a central and integral part of man, that personal centre of his perception and willing and feeling out of which he lives.

Let us return to our theme: the nature of this binding relationship to Word. It is a relationship in which as we have mentioned, one experiences a determination of one's thought. In Barth's summary he states this view quite unambiguously: "We have had to understand the Knowledge of God bound to the Word of God as an event utterly undetermined by man but utterly determined by God as its object.[1]

Yet this is an alleged noetic determination, that is a determination of one's "knowledge", and thus a determination of one's thought. One wonders how Barth can know that his knowledge is utterly determined by God, if he cannot step back from this experience of determination and look upon it with his critical faculties. How can he know, for example that this event is "utterly undetermined" by man. This like many other statements in this context remains in the form of a dogmatic assertion.

It is interesting to note that with this dogmatic assertion (that this knowledge is "utterly undetermined" by man and its counterpart, that it is "utterly determined" by the deity), Barth has eliminated consideration of other factors, immanent in the human cultural-social

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1. C.D.II/1, p.31.

context which might "determine" one's thought, or even cause such experiences as 'a determination of one's thought'. Consideration of these factors is dogmatically eliminated by the import of these two dogmatic assertions. In a chapter which follows ("Undertow in Theology"), we shall try to lay out one possible cause for such an experience, which lies within man's own cultural context.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

In this relation to "Word", one is so bound that he is only to obey, noetically, what he experiences as "Word". In addition there is no "room" in this binding relationship for him to step back and use his critical faculties concerning (1) this experience or (2) the alleged noetic content of this experience. Not only cannot the question of worth be raised on this ground but the question of truth as well. Man cannot be fully present as man, that is with his critical faculties intact. He must in fact leave them behind or "outside", as Barth acknowledges, when he enters "inside", that is into this relationship. Essentially the only thinking man can do concerning what presents itself to him as "Word" is to think or rethink the noetic "content", and verbalize this in human concepts and words.

This then is a relationship in which one obeys without prior, or subsequent critical thought. As such, the relation to "Word" in Barth's theological

programme is one of unquestioning obedience. It is this for the reason that there is only room here for unthinking submission to what is experienced as "Word."

If one says, as Herbert Hartwell does, in support of Barth that this relation to "Word" involves no sacrifice of the intellect, and says this "not only because man's faith enquiring into its object is itself a rational activity but...the object of man's faith, the revelation...is a rational event";[1] this in our opinion, is simply verbal subterfuge. Even if one's mind is engaged in rethinking and "reflecting upon" the alleged content of the revelation in this event, and even if the revelation is "rational" or consistent with itself, it is still a relation to what is alleged to be "Word" in which one must cast aside one's critical faculties and cease from using one's judgement concerning (1) such an experience in itself and (2) the alleged noetic content of such an experience. It remains a relation to "Word" of unquestioning submission.

THE RELATION TO TRADITION AND THE RELATION TO WORD COINCIDE.

The relation to Word, as we have here attempted to describe it, is of central importance for understanding the broad extent of Barth's methodology.

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1. Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth, Duckworth, London, 1964, pp. 46-47.

For not only does man encounter "the Word of God" in Scripture and Preaching, but also in tradition and in dogmatics itself. As we have already mentioned, one encounters "the Word of God" in the creed, that is, specifically in the creeds of the early church. In his chapter of Credo, devoted to methodological issues, Barth clearly states that revelation is "the truth, which is identical with God Himself, and which the believer has heard and received in the form of definite truths, in the form of articles of faith...Even the disclosure of this truth is a free gift that positively comes to meet believing man. It is God's own revelation."[1] It is quite clear from the context that this revelation is "the Word of God". If tradition, and specifically the credal tradition of the early church is a form of "the Word of God," something which Barth will not openly acknowledge, but is an operative assumption of Barth nevertheless, as this passage rather clearly indicates, then one can understand how it is that the Barthian relation to credal tradition is one of unthinking submission. For what is involved here is what we have been talking about in the present chapter: unthinking submission to what is allegedly "the Word of God". Since the credal tradition of the early church is actually regarded as a form of "the Word of God" in Barth's theological programme, we may

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1. Credo, p.2.

now understand the unthinking submission to tradition in a new way: as unthinking submission to (what is allegedly) "the Word of God."

There is yet another form of the Word of God in Barth's theological programme. It is Dogmatics itself. We shall lay out our evidence for saying this in a following chapter ("Theology as 'Word'"). Here too we shall find that unthinking submission is present, or rather, "expected."[1]

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1. See below, pp.426ff.

Section D.

DOGMATICS AS APOLOGETICS : BARTH'S CONCEPTION OF "IMPLICIT APOLOGETICS".

For many readers, and even interpreters of Barth, apologetics is thought of as forbidden in this theology, as simply out of the question. Apologetics as such, in fact, would seem to go entirely against the grain of Barth's thought. Thus Robert Willis, in his lengthy and quite scholarly work, The Ethics of Karl Barth,[1] concludes that "Barth's position... deliberately rejects both the possibility and the necessity of apologetics".[2] This is not an unusual view of Barth's attitude toward apologetics.

Yet, if we were to accept this conclusion, and stop here, we would miss out not only on Barth's quite positive attitude toward a particular conception of apologetics, but we would also miss out on possibly some of the most significant and some of the most interesting insights into Barth's own conception of the character of Dogmatics, that is, the character of Dogmatics as "revelation", as "Word", or "the Word of God".

Firstly, let us turn to the question of apologetics. Is Willis correct in holding that Barth rejects both the possibility and the necessity of apologetics?

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1. Brill, Leiden, 1971.

2. Op.cit., p.447.

We would point out firstly that if Barth shall reject certain conceptions of apologetics, which he does, this does not mean that he does not offer another conception of apologetics as a substitute for the conceptions which he has rejected.

Thus in Volume I/1 of the Church Dogmatics, where he soundly rejects the broad range of options which have usually been grouped under the term apologetics,[1] (which for the sake of convenience we have termed "explicit apologetics") he does not come to a dead halt, but goes on to describe a conception of apologetics he considers important and worthy.

He has rejected all apologetics which would make its appeal in an explicit manner, argue in an explicit manner, which make use of presuppositions acceptable to both 'belief' and 'unbelief', and which essentially involve "argument" of any sort. Thus even Brunner's "eristics" receives a forbidding "no!". Brunner, in his "eristics" would attempt to "smash the axiom of reason". Barth goes on to state that apologetics of these kinds are "ineffective" because they are "irresponsible" and are not "up to date". As our purpose is to examine and explore the conception of apologetics which Barth favours and seeks to advance, we shall not pursue his grounds for dismissing explicit apologetics

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1. C.D.I/1, pp3lff.

at this point,[1] but rather refer the reader to a source where in our view a sound account of this rejection is given.[2]

We have already examined the view of apologetics which has emerged in Barth's study of Anselm,[3] and which we have regarded as a guide to Barth's own views for the reason that it is an extension of Barth's interpretation of Anselm. We have found it to be an extension of Barth's own creation, with little or no reference to Anselm's actual work. It is also an extension upon which he looks with favour.

Here in the Church Dogmatics we find views, first put forth in the book on Anselm, given a more definite elaboration. At this point we shall presuppose an understanding of "implicit apologetics" as we have described it in Part II.[4] Far from the rejection of the possibility and necessity of apologetics in toto, as Willis suggests, here in the Church Dogmatics, we find an alternative to the views of apologetics which Barth has rejected. As we have seen in Part II,[5] it is the alleged role assumed by the deity vis-a-vis the work of the theologian which is of crucial importance.

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1. See C.D.I/1, pp.31ff.
2. See Avery Dulles, A History of Apologetics, Hutchinson, London, 1971, pp.231ff.
3. See above, pp.191ff.
4. See above, Ibid.
5. Ibid.

Thus it comes as no surprise when in Volume I/1 of the Church Dogmatics Barth says that "there has never been any other effective apologetic...than the unintended one...which took place when God Himself sided with the witness of faith."[1] Here again, the activity of the deity is central. Yet in reference to what? What is this "witness of faith" to which Barth refers? It is the actual work of the theologian. It is important to be clear about this point. For "the witness of faith" might mean several things: Scripture, Creeds, Dogma, even the person who 'witnesses'. Yet in this passage Barth quite clearly means the work of the theologian. We say this for the following reason. Barth has just said, in the beginning of the paragraph in question, "No!" to Brunner's eristics.[2] He continues, saying that "Really responsible, up-to-date theological thought...will reveal itself to be such by being...the witness of faith against unbelief"[3]. It is in this same paragraph two sentences later, that Barth speaks of the deity siding with "the witness of faith". Thus we should understand by this phrase: theological thought, i.e. dogmatics. We can now paraphrase this passage: It is when God sides with the words of the theologian that the apologetic is effected.

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1. C.D.I/1, p.31.
2. Ibid.
3. C.D.I/1, p.31. (emphasis added).

There is an implication here, namely, that it is in an "Event" (Ereigniss) that this occurs, that is, an Event in the Barthian sense of an Event of revelation in the present, in which one hears human words as "word", as "the Word of God". Does one find evidence that "Event" is involved in this conception of apologetics? In the paragraph following the passage we have cited, Barth says that what "unbelief" expects of faith is "Event". And he continues: "It is not in our power to cause this event".[1] This rather clearly indicates an event allegedly caused by the deity, or Event in the sense we have just described it. That this element or aspect is central to Barth's view of apologetics is supported by the way Barth closes his whole discussion of apologetics and polemics (that is after his rejection of other views of apologetics): "Apologetics and polemics can only be an Event, they cannot be a programme".[2]

One might ask: does one find additional support for thinking that it was Barth's view that theology in particular, the theologians own work, is that which becomes revelatory in the "Event" which has been referred to here? Between these two references to "Event" we have just cited, we find Barth saying:

> So far as...theology is really and effectively apologetic and polemic, it is so because its distinctive work...is acknowledged, strengthened and blessed by God as a witness to faith.[3]

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1. C.D.I/1, p.32.
2. C.D.I/1, p.33.
3. C.D.I/1, p.32. (emphasis added).

We note that this view of apologetics is placed in direct contrast to one which "negotiates" with "unbelief" "on the basis of common presuppositions". Now to answer our question: is it really theology itself, in contrast with Scripture, which becomes revelatory in the "Event" referred to? This would appear to be confirmed, for in this passage, it is when " theology's distinctive work" is, we may say, validated[1] by the deity that it becomes really and effectively apologetic.

Thus we have two instances where it is the work of the theologian in particular which is "validated" by the deity in this conception of apologetics. The implications of this view of Barth will become more important as we proceed.

We find no evidence that Barth has changed his view of "implicit apologetics" as his Church Dogmatics proceeds. Thus he speaks of apologetics as "implicit, incidental and supplementary" in Volume II/1.[2] Here, as in Volume I/1, apologetics rests solely on "revelation".

The view that the theologian plays a part in apologetic activity, that is, only to the extent of showing the "inner consistency of Christian statements" as we have outlined already in Part II,[3] is to be found

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1. Barth uses the term "validated" in other similar contexts.

2. C.D.II/1, p.8.

3. See above, pp.193ff.

again in Volume IV/3 where "even in respect of the most obstinate unbeliever it can be accomplished that the inner-consistency, and to that extent, the meaning of the Gospel message is intelligible to him".[1]

While we are not, of course, saying that the apologetic aspect of Barth's dogmatics was as important to Barth as dogmatics qua dogmatics, nevertheless, there is a definite view of apologetics here. It is one in which dogmatics itself has an apologetic role to play. In short we find a concept of "Implicit Apologetics", in essentials the same as we have found in Barth's book on Anselm. We shall now conclude our study of Dogmatics as Apologetics by briefly comparing Barth conception with that of other theologians, and, drawing out an important contrast.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.

Our account of dogmatics as apologetics would be incomplete if we did not at least give mention of other conceptions of Apologetics worked out by theologians contemporary with Barth, in which dogmatics itself was intended to have, or did in fact have an apologetic function. Barth's conception of dogmatics as apologetics in fact is only one conception among many others in which Dogmatics, Systematic Theology or Biblical Theology can fulfil an apologetic function.

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1. C.D.IV/3, p.848.

Here we can only give mention of some of these other conceptions, as it is not the task of our thesis to give a full account of these conceptions.

One notes that almost all the major Germanic theologians of the first half of the twentieth century have chosen to place apologetics within the substance of their theologizing. That is, their theologizing is intended to function, at least at points, as apologetics. Apologetics is not seen as a separate discipline, distinct from Dogmatics, Systematic Theology or Biblical Theology.

One might wonder why Biblical Theology is included in this list. So we might begin with Rudolph Bultmann. Even though Bultmann often disclaimed apologetic intent, for example, in his demythologization programme, interpreters often beg to differ with him. Barth's comment upon this issue, may in fact, be of interest. In an article entitled "Rudolph Bultmann: An Attempt to Understand Him", Barth remarks that even if "Bultmann and his disciples are annoyed if we call him an apologist", he wishes, just as Schleiermacher wished, "to make Biblical exegesis, theology in general, and preaching in particular, relevant and interesting for its cultured despisers". Barth, apparently neutral in attitude at this point, rather than judgemental, goes on to say "Surely theologians have always been apologists in some sense; they

could hardly help it."[1] Avery Dulles in his concise, yet scholarly work, A History of Apologetics, is in full agreement with Barth's view. Other Germanic theologians which should be mentioned here are (1) Paul Tillich, with his conception of correlation, in which Systematic Theology co-relates with non-church civilization by responding to the questions it raises concerning Christian thought; (2) Emil Brunner, whose theology often intents to take the form of attack upon thought systems and/or ideologies which apparently oppose Christian thought. Because of this character of his thought, Brunner prefers the term "eristics" rather than "apologetics". Again the (eristic form of) apologetics lies within the dogmatic-theological substance; (3) Beyond Bultmann, Tillich, Brunner, there are a host of other thinkers both within and without Germanic Theology who have conceptions of apologetic intent, varying significantly with the views of those we have listed, yet many of these thinkers in their own way see Apologetics as a function of Dogmatics and Systematic Theology.[2,3].

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1. Quoted in Avery Dulles, A History of Apologetics, Hutchinson, London, 1971, p.234.

2. Here one might mention Friedrich Gogarten, and the Americans, H. Richard and Reinhold Niebuhr, among others. One might also look at the manner in which John M McIntyre finds apologetic significance in the dogmatic of Anselm's works, specifically his Cur Deus Homo. Anselm's method is seen as highly significant for the dogmatics of our own day. See St. Anselm and His Critics: A Reinterpretation of the Cur Deus Homo, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh, 1954. This work has proved suggestive at several points for our own probing of Barth views and his interpretation of Anselm.

3. For further material on Protestant Apologetics in

(contd...)

In reviewing the above alternatives to Barth's theory of dogmatics as apologetics, we see, in each of these alternatives, almost without exception, a definite contrast with Barth's conception. In each of these other conceptions, that which would fulfil an apologetic function is presented directly to the reader. That is, it is presented, in the main at least, in a manner in which his critical faculties can operate upon the material. For this important reason, what is involved in these non-Barthian conceptions is what one might term explicit apologetics; that which would effect the apologetic is "out in the open", and presented in a manner which invites critical examination.[1]

Here we find the most significant contrast with Barth's theory of apologetics. The apologetic here is not explicit. And it does not invite critical examination. In fact, as this theory of apologetics sits within Barth's theological programme, it not only avoids inviting critical examination, but forbids it. No human criteria can be used in examining the validity or worth of what alleges itself to be revelation or "the Word of God".[2] As we have covered this aspect of Barth's thought in the foregoing chapter

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the twentieth century, see for example Dulles, op.cit., pp.231ff.

1. While this may not be true in each case, it would appear to be true in most cases.

2. See above, pp.407ff.

devoted to consideration of man's relation to "the Word of God" made normative in Barth's theology,[1] we need not repeat again all what we found there. We might point out that the type of sacrifice of the intellect we found there, in the Barthian relation to Word, a relationship which involved unthinking submission to what was experienced as "Word", has now gained an additional significance with our findings in the present chapter. For here we found that it was theology itself, the theologian's own formulations and declarations, which were to become "the Word of God" in the (alleged) "Event" in which "God Himself (sides) with the witness of faith" confirming human words as the divine Word.

So not only must an unbeliever submit unquestioningly to the human words honored as authoritative in the churches, that is Scripture, but also he must submit unquestioningly to the human words of another and contemporary human being, the theologian, as his words allegedly become "the Word of God".[2] If all this poses difficulties for those somewhat within the churches (as in our view it does), how much more difficulty would it pose to someone totally outside the churches? In our opinion, more than a little!

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1. See above, pp.405-414.

2. We shall consider this aspect of Barth's programme below, pp.426-435.

Section E.

THEOLOGY AS "WORD" : DOGMATICS AS THE FIFTH FORM OF "THE WORD OF GOD."

As Barth's own views on Apologetics have helped us see, there is in fact a fifth form of "the Word of God" in Barth's operational framework in which he carries out his theology. Dogmatics itself forms this fifth form of "the Word of God", that is in the list of forms which include the Word Revealed, the Word Written (Scripture), the Word Preached, and as we have found above[1] the Word Confessed (in the Early Church Creeds).

One may note at the outset that if this is so, that is, if Barth actually operates upon the assumption that Dogmatics itself is a fifth form of "the Word of God", this might explain Barth's somewhat fideistic relation to his own productivity: it has become, for him, authoritatively "Word of God". Thus there is no need to add any justification at many points for the sometimes peculiar views he holds. If he is of the view that he has articulated "the Word of God" in his dogmatic programme, and regards his results as "the Word of God", then one could understand (1) why his theology is so declarative at significant points, that is declaring such and such to be the case, with little or no attempt to substantiate why he thinks

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1. See above, pp.363ff.

such and such to be the case; (2) one could also understand why his theology typically has the character of preaching.[1]

Further, since the relation to "Word" in this theological programme is one of unquestioning submission, this means that the theologian himself "submits" unquestioningly to the results of his own work. The consequence of such a procedure would appear to be a surprising absence of constructive self-criticism. One's own critical judgement need not be exercised even towards one's own work. Humanly speaking, this would seem to result in a surprising lack of responsibility for one's own thinking. From the theologian's viewpoint though, in such a scheme, the responsibility for his work "rests on the shoulders" of the deity.

Thus, in such a scheme, the theologian becomes a mouth piece for the deity. His own words are (allegedly) endowed with divine authority. If what we are saying is so, we are saying that Barth at points, operated upon the assumption that what he was saying as a theologian was a human form of "the Word of God". As we shall see, Barth refuses to acknowledge such an operational assumption, and in fact at many points declares himself to be opposed to such an assumption, (as we shall see in what follows). Nevertheless, there is evidence which points us in

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1. Gordon Clark among others points this out. See Clark, p.8.

the direction we have already suggested. We shall now go to the text of Barth's writings and lay out our evidences.

The passages in Volume I/1 of the Church Dogmatics concerning apologetics which we have already treated in the chapter concerned with "Dogmatics as Apologetics" give us evidence of this view. Here we found that it was "when God Himself sided with the witness of faith" that the only really effective apologetic took place.[1] We also saw, in the foregoing chapter, that by "witness of faith" Barth clearly meant the work of the theologian.[2] We saw also that Barth's theory of "Event", as a revelatory Event in the here and now, was involved in this conception. Yet these views almost exactly replicate Barth's theory of how the human words of Scripture become "the Word of God" in an Event in the here and now.[3]

We have found that these views on apologetics in C.D.I/1, which we have just described, very closely replicate Barth's views of apologetics which were exposited in his study of Anselm in this same period. Here also it was a matter of theology itself becoming "the Word of God".[4] We saw also which portion of

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1. C.D.I/1, p.31.
2. See above, pp.418.
3. See C.D.I/1, p.111ff.
4. See above, pp.195ff.

Anselm's "Ontological Argument" allegedly had to become "Word" in order for it to be an effective theological argument, namely, the key phrase, "that than which no greater can be thought." This phrase, in Barth's interpretation must be heard as a divine "Word" of prohibition: "thou shalt not conceive of a greater!"[1] As we have seen in our study of Barth's interpretation, we can find no real evidence that Anselm considered his argument in this light.[2] Thus we have two documents in which there is evidence for the view that dogmatics is in fact considered a fifth form of "the Word of God."

Now, we might ask, does one find evidences that Barth holds this view in particular instances, that is, that his own words, even his own peculiar theological viewpoints, are human words which are "the Word of God" and might become "Word of God" for others, for his readers?

In his "summing up" of his methodology at the end of the Prolegomena, Church Dogmatics, Volume I/2, Barth goes on at some length about man's relation to "the Word of God" itself, and speaks concerning "obedience to the Word". A "tight" and binding "bbedience to the Word" is declared mandatory as an

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1. (our paraphrase of Barth's rendering of the phrase) See above, pp.123ff.

2. See above. pp.123ff, and pp.117ff.

element of theological method.[1]

Barth says that he himself cannot make this a binding command upon his reader. He can only present "a challenge...a consilium, not an ultimately and absolutely binding command."[2] But Barth goes on to say: "If our decision does in fact acquire for others the force of a binding command," this is another matter. For "what this means is that it has pleased God to ratify our decision as the right one, and to use it to declare His will to others."[3]

Here we find Barth quite aware that what is at issue is his own methodological viewpoint, a viewpoint in fact concerning "Word" itself, or rather obedience to "Word". As we have described in our chapter devoted to "The Relation to Word" it is a specific type of obedience that Barth sees mandatory: a binding to "the Word of God" in which there is no critical distance from what alleges itself to be the Word of God. Consequently, we have here a specifically Barthian methodological viewpoint. And it is just this methodological viewpoint which, as it were, sits on the page in potentiality, the potentiality of being "ratified" by the deity, of being used "to declare

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1. We have examined this "tight" binding relation to "Word" above, pp.399ff, and pp.405ff.

2. C.D.I/2, p.859.

3. C.D.I/2, p.860. (emphasis added).

[God's] will to others", in short of becoming for others "the Word of God." One says this for the 'ingredients' are there: (1) God 'ratifying' human words, using human words 'to declare His will to others; and (2) this ratification shall happen in an Event in the specifically Barthian sense. For these words are, so to speak, "waiting"for something to happen. This is clearly implied by the phrases "If our decision does in fact acquire (~~is~~ the force of a binding command)" it is because of God's activity of 'ratifying' these words to the reader.

One would not expect Barth to give other reasons as to why his viewpoint could acquire binding force upon the reader, as he shuns modern anthropology. Yet he seems quite certain that his own methodological viewpoint could acquire binding force by divine action, the same divine action by which human words become "the Word of God": "ratification".

For our fourth evidence we shall turn to a very late text, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction (1963). As not only "Word" is involved in such an Event in which human words become "the Word of God", but the Holy Spirit, which works within man, 'validating' these human words, it is not unusual to find more evidence for the view that Barth thought of theology as a fourth form of the Word of God in a chapter on "the Spirit". In this very late work, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, Barth opens his chapter on

"The Spirit" with these words:[1]

> We cannot overlook the fact that we ventured some very extraordinary statements in the last three lectures....Taken by themselves, of course, they may have been...interrelated in and mutually confirming. Nevertheless, in their wholeness as in their particulars they were obviously statements that were not supported by what is usually considered sound evidence. They could not be derived from any points outside the sphere of reality and truth they represented.

Barth then asks the question:

> What is the power hidden within these assertions which establishes and illuminates them. In other words, how does theology come to take and hold the place described by them - a place which seems to the onlooker to be situated in mid-air? [2]

As this lecture is entitled "The Spirit", one can anticipate the answer to this question. The chapter is devoted to describing Barth's view of how theology, as a nexus of interrelated statements, unsupported as whole in any human way, receives its support from the Holy Spirit. Thus the Spirit "waits to vivify and illuminate [theology's] affirmations which, however right they may be, are dead without the Spirit."[3]

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1. As one who had the opportunity to be present when Barth presented this lecture in America in 1962, one was impressed not only by the freshness of his delivery but the liveliness of his exposition. Much of the characteristic rhetoric of the Church Dogmatics finds no place here.
2. Evangelical Theology: An Introduction. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1963, p.48. (emphasis added).
3. Ibid, p.57.

What one would wish to point out here is that it is specifically theology, theological construction, which receives its "support", in this hovering position, from the Holy Spirit. It seeks no support of human making but awaits this "support": the vivification and illumination given by the Spirit.

What one finds of interest here is that even if divine activity vis-a-vis theology is spoken of in more subdued terms than in the passages we have cited in the foregoing, it is the work of the theologian in distinction from the words of Scripture, and the words of preaching, which receive what amounts to divine validation.

Again we would point out that this dovetails neatly into Barth's framework concerning human words becoming "the Word of God", for in the alleged Event in which this happens, it is the Spirit which works within man, validating human words.

With the evidence we have laid out, there would appear to be fairly firm ground for holding the view that Barth operated upon the assumption that theology, and his theology in particular, was in fact a fifth form of the Word of God, that is alongside the Word Revealed, the Word Written, or Scripture, the Word Preached, and the Word Confessed (in the Early Church Creeds). We have found evidence for this in three separate documents, his study of Anselm 1931, his Prolegomena to the Church Dogmatics of 1932 and

his Evangelical Theology of 1962. In addition we have pointed out at least one instance in which the human words for which Barth clearly expected divine confirmation embodied a viewpoint which was clearly Barth's own.

A Contradiction Between Barth's Statements and His Operational Assumptions.

If we are correct about the issue at hand, there is then what amounts to a contradiction between what Barth says he is doing, and the actual assumptions upon which he proceeds. There are passages too numerous to enumerate in which Barth denies that theology can be more than human speech having only provisional nature. We might cite one of the passages in the Dogmatics in Outline (1945). In his introductory lecture describing "The Task" of Dogmatics, Barth goes on at length about the provisionality of Dogmatics, its nature as "an attempt" which is "preliminary and limited."[1] As the attempt at Dogmatics can only be a human attempt, so also, the words of Dogmatics can only be human words. One can have no "absolute dogmatics fallen from Heaven." One can have only "a human earthly dogmatics."[2] This passage is typical of Barth's insistence that the words of Dogmatics can only describe the Word of God; they cannot become "the

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1. Dogmatics in Outline, p.9.

2. Ibid., p.10.

Word of God."

We find then that what Barth says concerning the nature of Dogmatics, and the assumption upon which he operates in his actual theologizing, are in considerable contradiction with each other.

Chapter IV.

"UNDERTOW" IN THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF A BARTHIAN TECHNIQUE OF WRITING.

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"UNDERTOW" IN THEOLOGY: A STUDY OF A BARTHIAN TECHNIQUE OF WRITING.

One finds a recurring experience in reading Barth. We are of the opinion that it has something to do with the character of Barth's manner of writing. We shall try to draw this experience out into the open by comparing it to another, far more mundane experience. The experience we have in mind is that of swimming in the surf just off the sea shore. Quite often one can leave his comrades at one point on the beach, go in for a swim, yet after swimming for a time suddenly look up, and find that all has changed. One finds himself perhaps just as far from shore, but in a totally different place from where he expected. His friends are no longer "just over there" on the beach. They are missing. One experiences, very naturally, a sudden sense of bewilderment and disorientation. "How is it that I find myself here, when I thought I was over there, or where I left my friends? Can't I swim straight?" One finally finds his way back to his friends and, after telling his experience, is told that this very often happens when there is a current in the depths of the water which pulls him in a certain direction, yet with such subtle strength that he would barely be able to sense this. Thus, while the waves were rolling inward over him towards the shore, this subtle yet strong current was carrying him <u>down</u> the

shore. "Undertow is what it's called," said one of his friends. While he battled the obvious, the waves on the surface, it was what was deeper and less obvious, the undertow, that carried him in an unexpected direction.

Let us return to our experience of reading Barth. One often picks up a certain passage, and "wades through" it. After a perhaps lengthy period of reading, he sets the piece down. He wants to consider what Barth has said, and arrive at an opinion about it. Yet just at this point he may, we do not say necessarily, experience a sense of bewilderment, even a sense of intellectual disorientation. He may, though not necessarily, say to himself: What Barth says certainly feels right, it feels fitting. Yet I do not, and I cannot agree. Perhaps he subsequently uncovers the reasons he cannot agree, and these satisfy him as being sound. His experience then is one of internal dissonance, as if, using another image, in an earthquake, one part of him would go in one direction (his feelings), and another part of him would go in an opposite direction.(his decision making center, or thinking). There is friction between these two. Perhaps also there is a sense of bewilderment and disorientation: "How did I get here?" That is, why does this feel right? And why would I hold this position which Barth favours were it not for my

own thinking and good judgement?[1]

What we are suggesting is that there is often a strong "undertow" in Barth's theology. That is, Barth often picks up terms or concepts with strong emotional connections, in "doing battle" against some position or way of thinking. He may take the term or concept out of its original context and, for example, hurl it into anothercontext, a context that bears some, perhaps incidental, similarities with the original context.[2] Yet for the latter reason, we would hold that the term or concept hurled, would have the same or similar emotional connections. We shall pursue this idea further as we proceed.

Like icebergs moving through the sea, one-tenth seen, nine-tenths unseen, we would maintain that terms with strong emotional force make their way through Barth's text, with perhaps one-tenth of their 'import' or force obvious, and nine-tenths not at all so obvious.

If we leave behind the image of icebergs and return to our sea experience, we are venturing that certain terms and concepts with deep emotional connotations set up an "undertow" for the reader, that is,

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1. For the person who would agree with Barth, after "due process of thought", of course this kind of dissonance probably would not occur. But, we would maintain that the 'undertow' would be as influential and as forceful a factor for the one who agreed with Barth, as for the one who disagreed with Barth.

2. See below, p.440; p.444f.

a pull upon the feelings, which would pull him in a certain direction, perhaps quite strongly, even possibly until he finds himself in a new "position".

Thus we find what we could term a strong emotional appeal in Barth's writing at points, even at crucial points. It is more difficult to deal with than most emotional appeals, for it is often not obvious at first reading that it is an emotional appeal. That is, just as the swimmer battles the waves on the surface, yet is carried unwittingly by a deeper, less than obvious current, so the reader of Barth also, we venture, in battling with the obvious, "intellectual" concerns as he wades or swims through the Barthian text, can be carried on to a Barthian conclusion by this deeper, not so obvious, emotional pull upon his feelings. We do say "can" be carried, for naturally the background of the reader, and his present "position" as Protestant, Catholic, Conservative or Liberal will determine, to a great extent, how much emotional force certain terms and concepts will have. Yet we would venture that either for (1) the person whose religious and theological upbringing was some form of Christian "Orthodoxy"; or (2) whose present position is some form of Christian "Orthodoxy", the emotional force of Barth writing will be quite strong. We would hold this to be so because of (1) the importance and place of 'Tradition' in Barth's thought (2) the forceful manner in which 'Tradition', that is

"Orthodoxy" is used in waging his arguments. In what follows we shall explore several possible examples of "undertow".[1, 2.]

An Example of Undertow: The Characterization of Natural Theology.

One finds undertow at many points in Barth's writing. Most often one finds it when a viewpoint or stance is characterized in such a way as to make it appear abhorrent 'blasphemous', 'heretical', or wrongly prideful. Its the characterization which would seem to carry weight and effect an emotional pull, or rather 'push', away from the viewpoint or position at issue. Thus when Barth considers natural theology, he speaks of it as a 'sphere of activity', and

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1. We would note that we too have used a term with an undercurrent of emotional connotations. "Undertow" in its usual setting is a word sometimes uttered as a word of caution against serious danger. Danger of being carried out too far from shore to return. We shall still use the term, not go back and strike it out, yet acknowledge its emotional content so that for example a reader can then judge for himself whether this emotional undercurrent or undertow is appropriate or not. Although here the stakes are not high in our view, we would point out that a writer such as Barth rarely brings to the reader's conscious attention the emotional import of his words.

2. One is not saying that Barth is alone in using words and concepts this way, but rather that he had a remarkable ability so to use them.

characterizes it thus: "Whatever we think of natural theology's character...this sphere arises and exists in the fact that man depends on himself over against God."[1]

Now one can follow this, and it makes sense up to a point, even to one who does not share Barth's abhorrence of natural theology. But while one can see that Barth is somewhat accurate in pointing out that in natural theology "man depends on himself", in that it obviously involves man's use of his own skills, critical judgement, and other capacities, this "depending on oneself" is characterized, not only in this passage but in the larger context as well, as "depending on oneself over against God". That is, its as if "depending on oneself" is 'hostile' to accepting divine help, or necessarily excludes any element of depending on the deity. The one is depicted as automatically excluding the other. One may note in passing that there are many natural theologies in which religious experience forms an important part, and thus the natural theologian would seem, in part, to depend on the part the deity plays in his theology also.

More to the point is the manner in which Barth continues in this passage: "But this means that in

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1. C.D.II/1, p.168.

actual fact he makes himself equal to God."[1] One can see how it might be to Barth's advantage to characterize natural theology in this manner, for in this characterization it would seem that man is so blown up with pride that he not only repudiates God's grace,[2] but considers himself "equal to God."

The emotional undertow here, one would venture, is quite intense. For, at least for most Protestants and Catholics something successfully characterized in such a manner would be quite abhorrent.

What stands behind this characterization, especially this last sentence, man making himself equal to God? It would seem that it has to do with Barth's theory of religious thought, suggested probably by Feuerbach's views on religion, in which man isolates out what he considers the 'highest' in himself and forms his conception of the deity out of these attributes he finds in himself. That this is what Barth has in mind is suggested by his next sentence. "For the man who refuses His grace, God becomes the substance of the highest that he himself can see, choose, create and be. It is of this that he gives an account in natural theology."[3] (One may note in passing that somehow Barth's theology is completely exempt from

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1. Ibid.

2. The previous sentence implies this. This sentence following this confirms that Barth meant to imply this: "For the man who refuses His grace, God becomes..."

3. C.D.II/1, p.168.

these dynamics!) But then let us return to Barth's characterization. If man has attributed his 'highest' and 'best' to the deity, and the deity is seen primarily in terms of these attributes, then Barth's statement about man making himself equal to God would, at first reading at least, seem true in a distant almost poetic sense, there would appear to be some truth in Barth's words. That is, they would 'ring true' to the reader. They would feel true, even if on closer examination Barth's statement must be regarded as essentially wrong.

So if one considers Barth's words as having a poetic looseness, one can then understand how they might "ring true" for many readers. For, if Barth is speaking very loosely one can sense a connection between "making himself equal with God", and this process of attribution he points to. This might explain the effectiveness of his manner of writing.

Yet Barth does not intend to speak loosely, that is in an inexact, 'poetic' sense. He is intent to drive home his point as literally true: "But this means that in actual fact... he makes himself equal to God". Here Barth's accusation would seem to come undone. For even in the case of the 'natural theologian' who isolates out the 'highest and best' in man and attributes it to the deity, and even if the deity were thought of only in these terms, (1) the theologian would be aware that man has only a small or limited portion of each of these attributes in comparison

with the deity; and (2) he would be aware since he must distinguish between qualities which are and are not, 'highest and best', that man has qualities which are not 'the highest and best', and which he does not attribute to the deity. These attributes which he does not attribute to the deity remind him that he is indeed man. Thus, although this process of thought may indeed "elevate" man, as Feuerback suggests, he is not in any sense the "equal" of the deity, even in this frame of reference.

If Barth's characterization would appear at first successful, i.e. as a successful 'slam' at natural theology, could it not be (1) because of the 'poetic' import of his words; (2) how this 'poetic' import has some, albeit very loose, connection or relevance to what he is describing, and (3) once this connection is intuitively sensed, the passage, initially at least, 'rings true', or feels true.

The consequence is that unless the reader is on his guard, and pauses to analyse Barth's words, the 'slam' hits home. Natural Theology is then characterized as something 'abhorrent', even 'blasphemous', for Protestants and Catholics alike.

Another Example of Undertow.

Before proceeding we should refer to another passage in Barth, to which we have already given attention, which, in our view, involves undertow. In Barth's crossing categories with the 5th Commandment

and using it to indicate or reinforce a normative relation to tradition, one also sees undertow as a factor which could push one into simply accepting this rather unusual application of the 5th Commandment vis-a-vis "obeying" tradition. We have tried to explore the dynamics of this in the place we have discussed Barth's usage of this Commandment.[1]

"Guilt by Association."

We might point out what in our view is involved in most cases in which undertow would tend to be effected. Several terms might be applied; we shall use one. It usually involves, in our view, "guilt by association." That is, a type of thinking or a theological view, which Barth opposes is "guilty", wrong, and to be rejected by virtue of being successfully associated with a view or conception which, in its usual context, actually has been rejected or has been considered wrong or "heretical" e.g. in "orthodox thought." Or it is associated with a term or concept which is considered "wrong" or undesirable by a considerable number of people among those whom Barth wishes to address. Examples of such terms or concepts might be: "docetic", "pelagian", "synergistic", etc.

What is significant in this connection is that in such "guilt by association", the actual "association"

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1. See below, p.293ff See also our laying out of the cross category move, p. 299ff.

with the "undesirable" term or concept occurs in a way that avoids involving the 'considered judgement' of the reader. That is, it is an implied association. Thus it is not accessible to thought, unless the reader (1) stops to analyse the attempted association, (2) is able to identify the term of abuse implied, and then (3) is able to examine for himself, apart from the text, the validity of this association.

Now we may go on to examine what is in our view an example of undertow, effected by the implication of a 'term of abuse' or an "undesirable" term or concept, and its associations.

Undertow effected by implication, by a concept implied.

Before we go on to explore this example, let us lay out our view of the manner in which undertow might be effected by implication. That is, even if the term or concept which would tend to effect undertow is not explicitly used, or 'slung at' what Barth wishes to oppose or drive off the field, is it possible for undertow to be effected by the implication of such a concept? That is, if the implication is present that such and such an ("undesirable") concept is involved in something Barth opposes, and, of course, this "undesirable" concept is actually considered undesirable in its primary or normal context in the eyes of a significant number of readers, then cannot this implied connection tend to effect undertow?

Perhaps we could give an example of what we mean

from the realm of politics. In the late 1960's, when the American Vice President, Spiro Agnew, was spewing forth quite a bit of rhetoric about students and University "intellectuals," he referred to them as "an effete corps of elite snobs". Now, as more than one news commentator pointed out, looking back on the use of this phrase, even though "effete" meant "tired" or "worn out", it had actually implied something quite different to much of the public. When interviewed concerning what this phrase meant, a large number of people replied: "effeminate". Now if this term actually implied, or "communicated" (i.e. "came across as") "effeminate" to a significant number of people, as appears to be the case,(and if it be accepted that this implied term is a term of abuse, concerning the masculinity and 'potency' of students and University 'intellectuals'), then it was an implied term, and its "undesirable" connotations, which effected, or would tend to effect, undertow. Thus, while the actual term of abuse was not spoken, it had been successfully implied.in the minds of many people.

Naturally, when investigating actual instances of this phenomenon in Barth's theology, we shall have to ask if others have found such an "undesirable" concept implicit in Barth's exposition, so as to cross-check that it is not simply our own subjectivity which is involved. We shall investigate a possible example of undertow involving the implication of a

concept in what follows.

"Synergism" in "the Knowledge of God": An example of Undertow Probably Effected by a Concept Implicit in Barth's Exposition.

If one finds that the "pull" or undertow that we have spoken of is sometimes effected by an underground notion of thought, that is a notion or concept implicit in what is presented, or normally and usually connected with what is presented on the surface, we can now speak of what we see as a significant example of this.

Here, to repeat, the concept which effects the "pull" is not named. It is not made explicit; yet it is implied, and therefore present in an unexplicit manner.

Of course our own subjectivity is involved in such an assessment (that is, with the question: Is this implicit, as a notion of thought lying just beneath the surface of the text?). Thus we will look at how 3 major interpreters of Barth react to the material in question.

We will first try to describe what one finds on the surface, that is, explicit, which is in close connection to this subterranean notion. What one finds, put in brief form, is that in Barth's exposition of (his theory of) "the Knowledge of God", which forms the first half of C.D.II/1, there is here a theory in which knowledge of the deity is to come about in a

manner which involves no positive contribution on man's part.

Thus, whenever Barth runs up against a theory of knowledge of the deity (1) which stands independently of 'revelation', for example, natural theology; or (2) which involves even an element of independence wholly belonging to man, for example, man's use of his own critical judgement concerning what alleges itself to be revelation, one finds a strong negative reaction, in fact very strong negative reaction, along with an attempt to explain away any such independence, out of which man could make his own contribution to knowledge of the deity. To paraphrase Barth's reaction: it is bad, very bad, for man to think this way.

Yet what is this that is very bad, wrong, or mistaken? It would seem to be this: for man to think that he could contribute, out of his own resources, in a positive and significant way to his own knowing of God. Thus there is no creativity on man's part, no initiative, no 'enterprise' which is to be undertaken which is not totally dependent on what is "given" to man in revelation.

This 'ban' on any element of man's 'independent' creativity and enterprise means, among other things, that he can have no independent judgement concerning what is allegedly "Word" or revelation. That is, the use of his own critical judgement as an exercise of his own independence is to be condemned and disallowed

in this theological framework.

Thus this attempted 'ban' on man's independent creativity, independent judgement is made to apply just as strongly to any 'theology of revelation' as to any 'natural theology'.

What is condemned here (in C.D.II/1 first half) is any "cooperation with grace" on the part of man, that is cooperation in the sense of any independent contribution man can make to his knowledge of God.

If one asks: what is the subterranean notion implicit here? It would very much seem to be synergism. That is, in the way Barth frames and presents what he opposes, he has linked up what he opposes with those same elements many protestants have normally opposed, namely, synergism: synergism as a human enterprise in which man is seen as contributing out of his own 'resources' to his salvation. This may take the form of "cooperation with grace". For most forms of Protestant orthodoxy and in fact most forms of Protestant thought, synergism is an abhorrent form of thought. It is something to be avoided at all costs.

Thus Barth has linked what he opposes in the realm of noetic concerns, the realm of knowledge, with a notion, synergism, which has its normal place in the salvific or soteriological realm.

Now we might raise the question: is this only our own subjectivity at work here, that is in seeing "synergism"as the notion that he's barely hidden "just

beneath the surface" and thus the notion which would thus tend to effect an emotional pull, or "undertow" at this point? In this connection we would look at the two major 'Reformed' interpreters of Barth as they treat this section. It is significant that both Berkouwer and Hartwell see 'synergism' as the concept (or notion) which Barth is opposing here, in his theory of the Knowledge of God. They are quite definite in saying this.[1]

It is interesting to note in this connection that the Roman Catholic interpreter, Hans Urs von Balthasar, does not react in this manner to this exposition of Barth. Yet this is as one might expect: as a Roman Catholic thinker synergism would not 'raise his hackles'. It would most likely not be an objectionable concept. Yet the manner in which both Hartwell and Berkouwer explicitly name as "synergism" that which Barth is opposing, in his theory of knowledge, that is, repeatedly, and in a quite definite manner, suggests quite strongly that it is not just our own subjectivity at work.

What is involved here is a crossing of categories, that is a picking up of material which has 'authority' or weight in one area of concern (soteriology) and crossing with this notion, or material into

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1. Berkouwer on p.194; (and on p.196: Barth opposes "every form of religious autonomy and synergism"). Hartwell on p.52 (in reference to the section of II/1 on Natural Theology), also p.172. See also p.186.

another area of concern ('epistemology' if one uses the term very broadly).

There is a similarity, but not an identity, between what synergism describes in its normal soteriological, context, and what it would describe in its new, 'epistemological', context: that is, a cooperation with grace towards an end. The emotional pull, or "undertow", would be effected when a writer describes certain processes of knowing in the same terms in which synergism was condemned initially. (Of course, one is aware that the force of the emotional pull or undertow depends to a large extent on the 'authority' or weight the opposition to synergism has).[1]

What we see here, essentially, is "guilt by association". These processes of thought involving man's contribution to the knowing of the deity are condemned by association with a concept usually abhorrent within Protestantism, synergism: man's contributing to his salvation by his own efforts.

Conclusion: "Undertow in Barth's Theology".

What we see when language is used in such a manner as we have tried to describe here is an example of the anonymous aphorism: "Language can be a substitute for thinking." Language is used in such a way that the writer would 'win' his point without appeal to man's thinking and decision making process. The

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1. Certainly other factors may be involved as well, which perhaps one with competence in 'depth psychology' could explore. See for example, Erik Erikson on "Guilt and Initiative" in his study of Luther. Cf. pp.257ff, and pp.263ff in Young Man Luther, Norton, New York, 1962.

thinking process of the reader is involved only in an incidental and supplementary way.

We would venture that when the reader comes to read Barth he is more likely to be affected by what we have called undertow, than in other texts. Because of the way Barth addresses his reader, somewhat in the manner of a preacher-prophet, who calls for personal decision,[1] one would be of the opinion that this text would tend to involve the whole person far more than most theological texts. Thus the reader is more likely to be 'present' with his feelings as well as his thinking processes. He is therefore probably more vulnerable to "undertow" here than in reading most texts.

What we see then is a hidden factor in reading Barth. Undertow or rather the factors which would effect it, are not 'out in the open' where the reader can deal with them, lift them up for examination, and arrive at a decision about them. The undertow 'pulls' him where he feels, and pulls him in a manner which can only be articulated with difficulty. As we have seen, it is often cloaked in writing that sounds 'objective', and 'factual'. The characterization of natural theology (above) does not sound emotional. The 'facts' are reported almost in the manner of a news report. Thus there is often little hint on the surface of what lies 'beneath.

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1. Clark draws this out. See Clark, p.8.

What one senses here is a writer of unusual sensitivity to the nuances and emotional force of words and concepts of the language he wields,[1] an almost intuitive sense of what approach will yield the most emotional 'leverage' in a given situation.

What one also senses is often a startling lack of self-awareness about this very factor in his being. One gets hints of this lack of self-awareness at several points. Thus we find Barth speaking in a quite rhetorical manner, for example, and yet denying he is doing so in the same breath. He writes, in his Gifford Lectures,: "The Scottish Confession presupposes that Jesus Christ is our life, and we also... will likewise have to presuppose this - and do so in no rhetorical sense but in all seriousness and in reality." Now he could have said "and we do this in no superficial sense", but he chooses the words 'rhetorical sense'. As G. Clark who cites this passage observes: "Now, Christ may be the Prince of our life, the cause of our life, and his glory may be the end of our life, but it is rhetoric and not literal statement to say that Jesus Christ is our life."[2] Barth seems to lack self-awareness about the emotional import of his usage, as well as the similar concern of literary mode.

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1. Often translators have to amend their translation with footnotes as to how this phrase alludes to this or that situation on idea. Or else he speaks of his need to do so in a preface to the translation. Cf. Revolutionary Theology and Protestant Thought.

2. Clark, p.9.

While one would not decry the use of poetic imagery, and the use of evocative phrases in religious thought or theology, one would argue that these can be both fairly and unfairly used against one's opposition. We would find Barth's usage unfair for the reason that it is hidden, that is, unacknowledged and inaccessible to the reader. It remains inaccessible to his thinking process; and he can make no decision about it unless it is lifted up into the open by himself or an interpreter. In summary we find this element in Barth to be an attempt to 'win' his point without engaging the thinking process of his reader. We see it therefore as an unfair 'means' to his 'end'.

Postscript:

A POSSIBLE SOURCE (OR CAUSE) FOR THE EXPERIENCE OF THE DETERMINATION OF ONE'S THOUGHT.

Is it possible that there may be something more involved in "undertow", something which might explain, in some instances at least, what Barth has described as "a determination of ones' thought" by 'the Word'.?[1] That is, if one were to be absolutely passive in the face of the emotional force of undertow, is it not possible that one would experience a determination of his thought?; That is, experience a determination of his thought along certain lines, in a manner that all "synergistic" modes of theological knowledge, for

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1. See our discussion of this above, pp.410f.

example, would not only be felt to be wrong, but, if one allowed this undertow to dominate his attitude, remaining passive before this emotional force, one would experience a determination upon himself to consider these "synergistic" modes of theological thought as "wrong"? The consequence would be that only the allegedly "non-synergistic" modes of thought could be considered as "right", "correct".

Here then we see at least the possibility that, given the passive posture normative for man in Barthian thought, one might experience a determination of his thought. Yet he would experience this by reason of forces entirely immanent in man's historical-cultural setting, that is as a result of forces and dynamics having nothing to do with revelation, "Word" and "Event".

If this is possible, as we are arguing it is, then we have found at least one, among possibly many, ways in which man may "experience a determination of his thought", that is, from factors having nothing to do with 'revelation' or 'Event'. Unfortunately, in such a theological programme as Barth's, a person has no means of reflecting upon such experiences as would present themselves as 'a determination of his thought'. What we have wished to point out here is that, given a posture of pure passivity which is normative in Barth's thought, there are most likely many types of forces which would determine one's thought, and from

which one would receive an experience of a determination of one's thought. Simply to assume that one is being determined by 'the Word' or revelation strikes one as more than a little naive.

Chapter V.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF KARL BARTH'S THEOLOGICAL METHOD: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES.

Section A.

UPHEAVAL IN GERMANIC EUROPE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BARTH'S RELATION TO TRADITION.

At this point in our thesis we might stand back from the central themes of our thesis and look at the political-social-economic setting in which the theological method we have been describing has developed. Our purpose is to set certain factors from both the setting and Barth's theological method side by side, and ask the question as to whether there is a possible connection between them. Our aim is not to "reduce" this theology to historical causality in the sense of a total reduction. Rather, we wish to explore the possibility that aspects of a person's thought can be more fully understood if one understands the context or setting in which they came about. If a person's thought is to some extent, or in some respects, affected, or conditioned by his setting this is not intended to imply a total determination.[1]

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1. One is aware that as he himself is emphasizing economic factors in what follows in this chapter, he is most likely conditioned to some extent, or at least sensitized, by the economic difficulties of the present in Britain and the Western World generally. The distinction between "completely determined" and "partially conditioned" is important to us also!

Procedural Notes.

We shall then (1) look at certain central aspects of the setting in which Barth's thought developed; (2) ask the question as to whether Barth was sensitive to these factors (or aspects); and (3) look at a central aspect of Barth's method in light of these historical factors vis-a-vis a possible connection.

In our introduction, we have briefly sketched three events which in our view are important in understanding the political-economic-social setting in which this theology developed: The Great War, The Inflation of 1919-1923, and the Depression of 1929-1933. At that point we took up one of these events[1] and in a preliminary way went into some detail, (1) concerning the event itself and (2) concerning Barth's reaction. We did so (1) in order to examine how such an event could affect people and (2) to examine one of these events, in the context of the other two listed, in order that we might refer to it at points throughout Part II and the early parts of Part III. In the present chapter, we shall group all three events together yet shall concentrate our attention on the two economic catastrophes 1919-1923 and 1929-1933. Thus for the first of these events, the Inflation of 1919-1923 we shall refer back to our examination of this event in Part I. For the second event, the Depression of 1929-1933 we shall have to go into more detail in the present chapter. If some of the material

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1. The Inflation of 1919-1923. See above, pp.17ff.

in Part I is explicated again here, one does this in order to bring these issues into another context from the one in Part I, that is, in order to explore a specific concern which we were not able to articulate yet in that Background Section, yet now having given our views concerning Barth's theological method, we are now able to do so. We shall list our sources for what follows in a footnote at this point.[1]

The Unsettling Setting.

The Great War of 1914-1919 is typically seen as the one event which, in the first part of the Twentieth Century, shook Europe and shook it to the depths. One is not disputing this. One does not wish to diminish the significance of this event if one goes on to set alongside it other events which also shook Germanic Europe. That the Great War left much of Europe in ashes, that the human suffering cannot be calculated, and the loss of human life, which can be calculated, was very great, one does not wish to dispute or diminish. It is certainly the most obvious factor which deeply shook Europe and Germanic Europe in particular. Yet the events which shook Germanic Europe did not stop there.

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1. Hajo Holborn, A History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London 1969 (A recent and highly respected work, comprehensive in intent); R.A.C. Parker, Europe 1919-45, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London,1969 (A respected work by an Oxford Historian); Walter Laqueur, Weimar: A Cultural History, 1918-33, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London,1974. Others as cited.

If there had been an untroubled recovery from the War, the situation might have been far different. But Europe, and in particular, Germanic Europe, was not to have an untroubled recovery from this event in which it had essentially been defeated and very nearly destroyed.

If economic difficulties, even economic catastrophe, seem less tangible and less dramatic than war, perhaps because physical violence and destruction are not usually present, one should not conclude too hastily that the effects of economic crisis, even catastrophe upon the broad masses of human beings were significantly easier to bear. One says effects of economic crisis and catastrophe upon people; that is, in this case one is speaking of survivors of an unprecedented war.

One might find an analogy on a smaller scale. If we think of a person who has been involved in a nearly fatal automobile crash, and look in on this person several weeks later as he is recovering, only to have someone inform him that he is redundant, and his savings have been wiped out by the costs of the accident, the impact of this news, one would venture, would be considerably deeper than for one who has all the time been on his feet.

Germanic Europe was not yet on her feet, in the early 1920's, or rather after having been brought to her knees by this war, was slowly getting to her feet

when the first economic crisis set in. As we have described in Part I in a section on "The Inflation of 1919-1923",[1] this crisis escalated quickly into what most commentators have seen as a catastrophe; the effects were deep and lasting. The historian Hajo Holborn has commented:

> The inflation of 1919-1923 was a nightmarish experience to most Germans, and the panic caused by it was likely to recur whenever the economy entered critical days.[2]

Yet this was not the last, but only the first economic earthquake. If "the panic caused by it was likely to recur whenever the economy entered critical days", her critical days were not over. As Germany was struggling to her feet after this first economic catastrophe, a second was to envelop her not more than six years later. It was dissimilar from the first, and to this extent may have proved a puzzling experience, for deflation rather than inflation was involved. Here we shall go into some detail for we have only noted this event in passing in Part I.

Thus, in 1929, before the Wall Street Stock Market Crash, unemployment had already risen to crisis proportions with 2 million workers unemployed. It

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1. cf above. pp.17ff.

2. Holborn. A History of Modern Germany: 1840-1945, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London, 1969, p.600.

had risen steadily in the previous two years, 1927-1929.[1] If the Wall Street Crash was to precipitate a Depression in this situation, economic Historians point out that this happened in large part because Germany, and German industry in particular, was heavily dependent on sizeable loans from New York. These were withdrawn after the crash.[2]

After the crash, both the agricultural and the industrial life of Germany were to deteriorate quickly, until those unemployed numbered 5 million workers in the Summer of 1930 and remain near 6 million workers well into 1933, that is for a period of over three years. Unemployment among the basic labor force had risen, not to 6% or 8%, crisis proportions in our own time, but rather to 45% - 55%. Germany was again in the midst of economic catastrophe.

One might note that the Swiss writer Barth, formerly quite active in Religious Socialism and probably deeply sympathetic with these workers, was at this point engaged in his crucial methodological study of Anselm, that is, from the Summer of 1930 untile the Summer of 1931. He was in this period Professor of Theology in Bonn, that is, in Northern Germany.

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1. Holborn, op.cit., pp.639-640.

2. R.A.C. Parker, Europe 1919-45, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1969, p.214.

If one stands back for a moment what does he see? Germanic Europe has experienced a second 'economic earthquake', one similar in magnitude to the first. Like the first it has cut right across the whole social structure of the land.

The "unsetting" effect of both of these economic catastrophes which we are attempting to lay out, was in all probability heightened by the apparent inability of Germany's political leaders to deal with these crises. That is, from the viewpoint of the vast numbers of peoples who experienced these events, and their effect upon the material basis on which life depended, the experience of extreme uncertainty was most probably not compensated by confidence in the ability of the leaders to cope with these crises. Thus inflation raged for <u>four years</u> before any decisive and effective measure was taken, that is, any measure which reversed this trend. The second crisis was <u>also</u> to rage, essentially unreversed, <u>for four years</u> until the German nation found a "resolution" of sorts in "National Socialism" and its economic programme.[1]

Thus the effect of these crises must be seen both against the backdrop of a devestating and unprecedented war, and in light of a form of government, a democratic republic, which was essentially new to

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1. cf below.

the German people, whose leaders were apparently unable to cope with these crises for long periods of time. The "unsettling" effect of the crises themselves was most probably heightened by this apparent lack of effective leadership.

If "Angst" had become an especially important word in German life in these times one can understand here at least some reasons why. For on top of a war which had threatened the physical existence of many with destruction, these economic catastrophes threatened their physical existence in another manner. It had brought into jeopardy the means by which, and the basis upon which they have fed and housed themselves. That is, among the many other factors involved in an economic crisis, the very basis of their physical existence has been thrown into question. The primitive needs, without which even cave man could not survive, have been threatened.

Thus, for vast numbers of people and that included "intellectuals" as well as workers and employees in middle and upper classes, the economic firmament was experienced as unstable, undependable and unsettling. These events had an unstabalizing effect.

The View of 'Generalist' Historians.

At this point we might stand back from the situation we have been describing and turn to

'generalist' Historians concerned with this period of Germanic history and ask the question whether in their estimation these economic crises had the deep and persuasive effect upon life in Germany which we are suggesting. If for example in the opinion of 'generalist' Historians these economic catastrophes significantly shaped the political life of Germany, vis-a-vis the "successful" takeover of Nazism, we have a sounder basis upon which to see these economic catastrophes as deeply significant in the lives of the German people. (That is, in answering our question as to the depth of the effect of these economic events, upon the lives of the people of Germany, the effect of these events upon the political life of Germany should give us some indication of their impact).

Firstly we might lay out an issue which we have only mentioned in passing: namely that the mass of people who peopled the landscape of Germany cannot simply be seen as a homogeneous mass. Certainly there were "blue collar" workers industrial and agricultural; white collar workers of government and business; officials of private industry and state; leaders of industry and state, and so forth. Yet there were also those involved in the arts, the humanities and the sciences, those creative, explorative and articulate. In talking of the broad masses we have also been talking of a Heidegger, a Buber, a Schoenberg, a Planck. And we have also been talking

of Barth for whom Germany was "home" in this period, 1921-1934. In short, in talking of the broad masses who peopled Germany, we have also been talking of those who are often loosely termed "intellectuals". They also shared Germany's plight in this era.

Let us then ask how the Historians viewed the plight of these varied masses of German people in this era. We have already cited the Historian Holborn's statement about the Inflation crisis of 1919-1923, namely that

> The inflation of 1919-1923 was a nightmarish experience to most Germans, and the panic caused by it was likely to recur whenever the economy entered critical days. [1]

In Holborn's view the effect of the Inflation crisis for most Germans was both deep and lasting: the panic caused by it was likely to recur whenever the economy entered critical days. As we have noted, the German economy did in fact re-enter perilous days, not more than 6-7 years later.

Let us now turn to another Historian concerned with this period, R.A.C. Parker, and look with him upon these economic crises. Very briefly, it is Parker's view that these economic crises form a factor of considerable importance in understanding the sudden swing toward one extreme of the political spectrum in

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1. Holborn, op.cit., p.400.

the brief period, 1930-1933, that is, the "triumph" of Nazism.[1]

Parker points out that as late as the election of 1928, the extreme left, namely the Communist Party had far more popular support than the Nazi Party. Thus, in the election of 1928, the Nazi's did very poorly compared with the Communists:

N.S.D.A.P. (Nazi Party): 0.810 million votes.

K.D.P. (Communist Party): 3.200 million votes.[2]

The Social Democrats, the solid supporters of republican government, retained their primary place with 9.1 million. One notes, in fact, that the Nazi Party was at its lowest ebb at this point, in 1928, that is, before the economic crisis deepened into catastrophic Depression. For, by way of contrast, four years earlier, in 1924, the Nazi's had commanded a sizeable vote of almost 2 million votes, vis-a-vis the Communist vote of 3.6 million. From this low ebb of popular support in 1928, the Nazi vote was to undergo a swift and dramatic change. Thus two years later, in 1930, that is, immediately after the New York Stock Market Crash, the Nazi vote had suddenly risen from 0.810 million to 6.383 million. There was a swing to both political extremes at this point, for the Communist

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1. See Europe 1919-45, p.212.

2. All voting figures quoted from R.A.C. Parker, Europe 1919-45, p.222.

vote also rose, from 3.2 million to 4.5 million. The 'center' parties were losing ground; and with them the democratic structure of the Weimar Republic was slowly sinking.

It was two years later, in the decisive election of July 1932, that it was finally evident which political extreme would triumph in this political upheaval. In July of 1932 the Nazi vote had risen dramatically from 6 million votes to 13 million votes. In doing so, it had outpolled its nearest rival (and supporter of the Democratic Republic), the Social Democrats, by almost 6 million votes. It had actually captured over 1/3 of the total vote, and in so doing had secured the largest number of seats in the Reichstag. It was now in a position to take power.[1]

One might note the swing to both the "right" and the "left" extremes of the political spectrum in these four years. For example the Communist Party had risen in popular vote from 3.2 million in 1928 to 4.5 million in 1930, and still higher to 6.0 million in December of 1932, thus coming in third among the multitude of parties. In the opinion of most historians, disenchantment with Republican Government, with the Weimar Republic, in its Democratic form, had snowballed.

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1. Because of the political pluralism, with votes yet being divided up between numerous parties, the Nazis, while they did not have an absolute majority, had enough power in hand to force their way from this point.

Now we might stand back from this brief sketch of Germany's drift into totalitarianism to look at how our theme of economic upheaval and crisis fits into this picture.

In the view of most historians the economic upheavals and crises 1919-1933 were a significant factor in the drift of the German people toward totalitarianism. R.A.C. Parker states this view most strongly.

> The great question of these years 1919-1939 is: how did Hitler secure control of Germany? Germany was the only advanced country, advanced that is, in its standard of living and its level of education, that fell into the hands of an irrational dictatorship. The most plausible explanation lies in the economic fluctuations of the period between 1918 and 1933 and their social and political consequences. It is clear that opposition to democracy rose and fell in harmony with movements in prosperity.[1]

Parker goes on to explore this theme, stating that:

> These violent fluctuations and the hardships they brought would have tested the power of survival of any old-established and revered form of government. The democratic Weimar republic was new and was not revered.[2]

Parker sees a complex set of forces at work in this setting, yet sees these economic upheavals and disasters which we have been describing as the factors which

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1. R.A.C. Parker, Europe 1919-45, p.212

2. Parker, p.215.

most deeply affected the German people.

We have taken this side-track into the political-social sphere in order to ask the question as to whether these economic crises were events which were deeply significant for the great masses of German people. With the help of Historians Holborn and Parker, we can now say more definitely: yes. If these economic crises had such a pervasive influence on the course of Germany's political life, this can be seen as an indication of how deeply these events shook the vast masses of German epeople.

As we have pointed out, these vast masses of people included not only 'blue collar' and 'white collar' workers, officials of industry and government, and so forth, but also involved those in the humanities, the arts, and the sciences, creative thinkers of this period. Seen from another aspect, these vast masses included church-goers, clergy and theologians, that is, those who were to find Barthianism so welcome in this period.

We come lastly to Barth himself. Is there reason to believe that he, as most others, found these events unsettling, deeply affecting?

The Question of the Effect of these Economic Crises upon Barth.

At this point we may refer back to Part I where we explored Barth's letters for his reaction to

the Inflation of 1919-1923.[1] Here we found that Barth's reaction was one of amazement and shock. There is on the one hand wonderment over how day to day life actually continues in the face of these events. In May of 1923 he writes: "...Everything moves on in its course. That is the remarkable thing. One stands amazed and shocked. One feels that he is completely in the dark...."[2] On the other hand, there is not only wonderment over how life in general goes on in the face of these events, but how people and specifically Barth himself goes on, in the face of these events. We find this latter both in his letter of May 1923, and in his letter of December 1923. In May: "...One feels that he is completely in the dark, and yet lives on nevertheless in his corner, itself relatively transparent, and humanly speaking he draws his life out of this corner."[3]

The inflation is to rage on for another seven months. In December of 1923 Barth first writes generally: "On the whole, man is not to be destroyed, even though in individual instances he takes a severe beating." He then goes on to speak specifically of himself: "One notices above all in oneself how indestructibly one goes on living in the midst of all

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1. Cf. above. pp.25ff.
2. R.T.M. p.141.
3. R.T.M. p.141.

the apocalyptic events."[1] (Barth's emphasis). This last sentence is somewhat cryptic, yet the general sense would seem to be wonderment, amazement over the fact that one "goes on" living in the midst of these "apocalyptic events,"[2] while countless others are simply "ground under the wheels."[3]

Both of these comments, first in the letter of May 1923, and then in the letter of December 1923, appear to be highly personal, that is, as reflecting how Barth himself as a human being is reacting to these events.

From Barth's comments, one would venture that he, like many others, found these events deeply unsettling. If he refers to his own amazement and shock over these events,[4] perhaps he has articulated his own reaction well enough. One need not add more.

When the second economic crisis occurs we find Barth in Bonn, entering upon his study of Anselm, and reformulating his method. We have no reason to think that Barth should have been less sensitive to this second economic crisis than to the first. It seems unlikely that a man of 37 years (in 1923) should

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1. R.T.M., p.158.

2. Given the poetic looseness one finds in Barth's letters generally, there is no reason to take "apocalyptic events" in a literal sense.

3. Barth's remark in the May letter, that "it is quite impossible for anything else to happen than that countless people should silently be ground under the wheels." R.T.M., p.141.

4. R.T.M., p.141.

change substantially, in this respect, by the age of 44.[1]

Economic Instability and Theological Stabilization.

The question could be raised: Why does one go on at length about economic factors in a thesis concerned with religious thought? Essentially because both concern people. Here our concern has been with people who could not find stability, even relative stability, in an important area of their life. Yet among these people were a writer and many willing readers who, in this very situation, were actually to find stability and settledness in another way. One wishes at this point to place these two things side by side, the economic-political situation and the theological elements, the relation to Tradition, in the hope that one could better understand why this theologian, in the context of his hearers, in this period might opt for a type of relation to tradition which we have been outlining in our thesis, that is, a relation to tradition in which all essentials are regarded as "settled" and not open to question.

Barth's Turn to Anselm, and His Relation to Tradition.

Could it be that a creative thinker, the theologian Barth, formerly an active 'Religious Socialist'[2] sensitive to this crisis not only as to

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1. (Barth's letters during this period are not yet published).
2. Part I, pp.51f.

how it was "unsettling" for himself, but also for the vast mass of workers on whose behalf he had labored ten years before, and surrounded on every side by crisis, economic and political crisis, might find solace in turning to the work of another creative thinker, St. Anselm of Canterbury, in which he was to find an absence of crisis, and in which he was to find firm foundations in the midst of this situation of rapid change and upheaval, that is, firm foundations outside the economic and political arena? In addition, could it be that Barth found these firm foundations in what he (in our view, mistakenly) saw as Anselm's relation to tradition, a relation to tradition that we find him making his own after c.1930? This is a supposition of course, namely that Barth found solace in this time of 'testing' in turning to Anselm, and further, in making his own the relation to tradition he "found" in Anselm. Yet there is evidence which points in this direction. Eight years later, in 1939, he speaks of the satisfaction this study of Anselm has given him: "Among all my books, I regard this as the one written with the greatest satisfaction."[1] Of course one grants that this study of Anselm may have been highly satisfying for other reasons also, in addition to the one we are suggesting. Yet is it

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1. How I Changed My Mind, Knox, Richmond 1966, p.43.

possible that Barth has found here in Anselm a peace and tranquility that transcended the crises that surrounded him and his fellows on every side?

Even at this very point, in the summer of 1930, as Barth embarked upon the composition of his book on Anselm, the political firmament of Germany was slowly disintegrating within the context of the catastrophic Depression which has come upon it. The Müller Government has resigned in March (of 1930), unable to push its harsh economic measures through the Reichstag. Only four months later the Brünning Government tries to force its economic measures by Emergency Residential Decree, after their defeat in the Reichstag, only to have this Decree legally quashed by the Reichstag. The Brunning Government falls, the second Government to fall in five months. Elections are called as political violence, murders and street riots increase. The Government has collapsed in the face of devestating Depression.

Barth, undoubtedly sensitive to this situation, retires to his study and ponders Anselm. What does he find? He speaks of "the absense of crisis in Anselm's theologizing" and how this characterizes the whole of Anselms work.[1] The context in which Barth speaks of this "absense of crisis" is perhaps of pertinent significance. For it tells us <u>why</u> in Barth's

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1. <u>A.F.Q.I.</u>, p.26.

mind crisis is absent from this theology. It is because "Anselm always has the solution of his problems already behind him ... through faith in the impartial good sense of the decisions of ecclesiastical authority".[1] It is Anselm's (allegedly) unquestioning assent to 'the Credo', the decisions of ecclesiastical authority, which comes to the fore here. Thus it would appear that in Barth's mind "the characteristic absence of crisis in Anselm's theologizing" is directly connected with, and can be understood only in terms of Anselm's (alleged) relation to Tradition (that is, 'the Credo', as embodying the decisions of ecclesiastical authority).[2]

In this relation to Tradition, all basic questions (regarding, for example, the truth of elements of Tradition) are regarded as settled at the outset. The elements of 'the Credo' are never to be called into question subsequently. A page later Barth states that "A science of faith, which denied or even questioned the Faith - the Credo of the Church - would ipso facto cease to be either 'faithful' or 'scientific'."[3]

It is here that Barth finds the reason for the absence of crisis in Anselm's theology: there is (allegedly) only unquestioning assent to 'the Credo',

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1. A.F.Q.I., pp.25, 26.

2. This connection becomes clear in the context of Barth's writing. Cf A.F.Q.I., pp.25, 26.

3. A.F.Q.I., p.27. (emphasis added)

or Tradition in Anselm's theology. All the essentials are regarded as settled, intact and not open to question. The task of theology, in this regard, is only to reflect upon the elements of 'the Credo', drawing out their interconnections and in so doing seeking for deeper understanding of the Faith, "the Credo that has already been spoken and affirmed."[1]

It is interesting to note that it is precisely at this point that we have found Barth most at variance with other interpreters of Anselm, and also unsupportable, namely, as regards what amounts to a fundamentalistic relation to 'the Credo' or Tradition.[2]

Here in the midst of an unsettling situation, one which, as we have seen, must have been unsettling to Barth as well as multitudes of others, we find that Barth has found stability and settledness. He has found it in Anselm's (alleged) relation to Tradition, and he has subsequently made this relation to Tradition his own.[3]

Our supposition is that this move into such a relation to tradition can most likely be understood more adequately when it is viewed against the backdrop

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1. A.F.Q.I., p.27.

2. See above, Part II, pp.236ff.

3. As we have been attempting to show in Part III it is this element of Barth's interpretation of Anselm, unquestioning assent to 'the Credo' or Tradition which Barth has taken over and made a central and basic element of his own theological method.

of the chaos, confusion, upheaval and change which has destabilized the whole life-world of the people who inhabited Germany.

Conclusion.

In supporting our contention that economic and political factors ought to be taken into consideration in understanding this basal element of Barth's theology we have pointed out that Barth, like most other people in Germanic Europe, was sensitive to these events, and in the case of the Inflation of 1919-1923 we know that it made a deep impression upon him.[1]

We have also seen that surrounded on every side by crisis, political and economic, in 1930-1931 Barth was to find a "characteristic absense of crisis" in Anselm's theology, and that he himself was to name the reason for this absense of crisis: the type of relation to tradition he found in Anselm's thought.

We have tried to show in Part III that this relation to tradition which Barth allegedly finds in Anselm forms a key to the process of thought in Barth's Dogmatics: it is a basal element of his working method in his Dogmatics.

What we have tried to do in this present chapter is to go back to the context, that is, the polit-

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1. As we have pointed out, letters from 1924 onwards are not yet published, or are in the process just now of being published. Thus we have dealt with Barth's reaction to the first crisis, rather than the second.

ical and economic setting, to see whether there are factors there which could help us better understand the type of relation to tradition Barth has taken up. Our contention is that by understanding factors which deeply shook the life-world of people in this place and period, one can better understand why they should seek factors, even if in another sphere (theological as opposed to political), which would give stability and some amount of "settledness" in a deeply "unsettling" situation. There is, in fact, a "settledness" and stability to be found in Barth's type of relation to Tradition. There is no questioning of these "essentials" of the faith; there is only unquestioning assent. Essentially the only question is the question of content.

One has chosen to avoid a "tight" argument in regard to the theme of this chapter and chosen instead to place these two things, the political and economic setting and the relation to tradition side by side, selecting factors from each which seem relevant, and placing these together with what evidence we have been able to find, for example from Barth's Anselm and his autobiographical article of 1939. Our aim has been (1) to argue for the contention that the extremely unsettled economic and political situation should be taken into account in trying to understand why Barth took up the type of relation to tradition we are

describing in Part III,[1] and further (2) to argue for the great likelihood that these factors did in fact influence the development of Barth's thought, at this very basic methodological level, the type of relation to Tradition he took up and put into effect.

Post Conclusion.

If we have found factors which were unsettling, even deeply unsettling for the Germanic people in our brief study of the economic upheavals against the backdrop of the Great War, we shall in a following chapter[2] find additional factors, unsettling in nature, which will "build into" the factors we have laid out. That is, when taken together with the economic factors, the

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1. Of course in looking at other factors which might have shaped the development of Barth's method one could also look at the rise of Nazism, and at the possibility that Barth's thought took shape over against this threat to the integrity of Protestant, and Catholic thought in Germany. Yet one should note that Hitler took power in 1933 only after a large swing toward National Socialism in the elections of 1930 and 1932. Yet Barth's crystalization of this type of relation to tradition shows forth in his Anselm which was written between the Summer of 1930 and the Summer of 1931, that is, before the surge toward Nazism had taken shape. This does not rule out the possibility that Barth's reaction to National Socialism shaped the course of his methodological development after c.1930. Yet this is a separate question.

2. below. pp.483ff.

unsettling effect is heightened, making the need for finding solid, "settled" factors a need of great significance.

The additional unsettling factor which we shall explore in a following chapter is the "unsettlement" accomplished in the realm of theology, that is, accomplished by the 'Dialectical Theologians', Barth chief among them. We refer to the revolt against 19th century liberalism in which the latter was, to a great extent, overthrown. Very briefly, what we shall say in this later chapter is that these "unsettlers" had so rent apart 19th century liberalism and so left it broken into pieces, in this first period 1915-1925, that surrounded with their destructive results, with essentially no constructive effort accomplished, they themselves might have found their own "unsettlement" of the theological realm unsettling. Thus, for example, near the end of this first period Barth was to turn to Heppe's Dogmatics and highly prize its orderly exposition (in contrast to the 'disorderly exposition' of a Luther). Here was order and settledness in the midst of the "unsettlement" Barth had both experienced and accomplished. This theme of finding settledness and stability we shall pursue further in this later chapter.[1]

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1. below., the section which follows.

Section B.

BARTH, STRAVINSKY, REVOLT AND NEO-CLASSICISM: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PARALLELS AND CONTRASTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO INFLUENTIAL FIGURES, IN CONNECTION WITH THE THEMES OF OUR THESIS.

We have been trying to explore and draw out several themes in our thesis, themes which interlock at points and are interrelated. Now it is time to select two of these themes and try to elucidate them. We are choosing to do so by finding a parallel in another discipline, as organic and changing in its development as the discipline of theology.

While many lecturers in Historical Studies state that in the course of their work, references must be made outside the narrow confines of the specified area, to other historical movements, processes etc., we note that this intention often lacks fulfilment. We do not propose to follow such a precedent. In the midst of our study, we choose to put this concept to work.

Our intention then is to elucidate and draw out two of our themes as we discover both a parallel, and within this parallel, a contrast with the process by which Barth became Barth. Central to both the parallel and the contrast is the relation to tradition which we have been exploring in our thesis.

Though one here crosses a boundary into another

discipline, that of the creation of music, and the historical discipline concerned with this, one is not unaware of the difficulties of being "out of his own depth." If we shall stumble at times in understanding what has gone on in this other discipline, this is a risk we recognize and choose to take. We shall indicate our sources for the history of music at this point in a footnote.[1]

We find a parallel with the development of Barth's theology in the development of Western Music in the first half of the Twentieth Century. Let us turn to these composers and look firstly at their setting.[2] These composers inherited a world in which music and literature were closely bound up. In the Nineteenth Century, Romantic writers often saw music as the highest expression of their ideals. For their part, composers often saw themselves as articulating the highest ideals of the ideational realm, concretizing these ideals fluidly into music. Both

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1. Joseph Machlis, Introduction to Contemporary Music, Norton, New York, 1962 (a standard work), Donald Jay Grout, A History of western Music, Norton, New York, 1910 (a major and respected work in this field); Alfred Einstein, Music in the Romantic Era; A History of Musical Thought in the 19th Century, Norton, New York, 1947. Other sources as cited.

2. Our main source here is Alfred Einstein's respected work, Music in the Romantic Era: A History of Musical Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Norton, New York, 1947. See pp. 20ff.

composer and writer peopled roughly the same thought-world, though with major and minor scuffles between them (e.g. Wagner and Nietzsche against Brahms). Yet there were uniting bonds: E.T.A. Hoffmann, for example, whose very early Romantic novels were a stimulus both to the literary and the musical sides of this commonly shared ground. This common ground between art, literature and philosophy is something rarely seen in our own century. Thus, for example, the off and on ideational friendship between Wagner, the composer of Operatic Music Dramas, and Nietzsche, writer and philosopher, does not somehow seem out of place in the Nineteenth Century, where, if there were this kind of friendship (i.e. ideational kinship) between, for example, a Sartre and a Schoenberg, in our own time, this would seem much more remarkable.

There was, apparently a fragmentation between the humanities and the arts near the end of the Nineteenth Century. We shall find this fragmentation of the arts and the humanities reflected in the development of both figures with whom we shall be concerned: Igor Stravinsky and Karl Barth.

We shall try to lift out parallels and contrasts in the development of these two men in order to illustrate and elucidate Barth's own development in two major dimensions: (1) Barth's relationship to Nineteenth Century Protestantism, and (2) Barth's relationship to Tradition. We shall also investi-

gate a third dimension after treating these two: Barth's relationship to the humanities, philosophy and anthropology in particular.

If one should say that such a comparison between a major theologian and a major composer is futile, since composers compose music, and do not reflect upon their work i.e., are not also thinkers, this simply is not true. While, admittedly, some composers of the early Twentieth Century remained literarily silent, the central figures were usually quite articulate concerning the issues they faced.[1]

A Basic Pattern in the Development of Barth and Stravinsky.

The basic pattern one sees in the development of both Barth and Stravinsky is (1) a revolt against, and repudiation of, their immediate predecessors; this was followed by (2) the establishment of a relationship with a more distant past.

Let us look firstly at Stravinsky's development with these two aspects in mind. In the eyes of an historian of Western Music, the three ballets of Stravinsky c.1910-15 ("The Firebird", "Petrouschka", and "The Rite of Spring") do not represent a minor disagree-

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1. Cf. for example Schoenberg's lengthy writings on composition. Stravinsky himself has been quite prolific literarily about issues concerning the nature and purpose of music, in disagreement with alleged Nineteenth Century viewpoints.

ment with the immediate past, nor indeed a major disagreement. Conscious revolt and repudiation would be more fitting expressions. Stravinsky was apparently well aware of his "differences" with "established" musical practice, and later acknowledged his fears concerning the reaction of the "established" musical figures of Ravel, Debussy etc., to the premières of his ballets in Paris at this time.[1]

It was music that intended to have nothing to do with the music of the immediate past, and thought of itself as purified of Romantic sentiment, finesse and elegance. Historians, though, will usually point out how dependent Stravinsky and others were on the immediate past for the "tools" with which they smashed this past. For example new methods in orchestration, (the way a composer could wield an orchestra), developed by Stravinsky's teacher, Rimsky-Korsakoff, Richard Strauss and others, were taken over

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1. He found that his fears were somewhat unjustified. Taken seriously ill with a possibly fatal infection, he remarks that Diagelev, who produced the ballets refused to visit him, possibly for fear of catching this (possibly lethal) infection. Yet both Ravel and Debussy came. Puccini also came - to pay a visit to this young Russian who was in effect overthrowing their own mode of musical practice. (The musical public of Paris had been less than tolerant towards Stravinsky's Ballets. A raucous riot had taken place at the première of "The Rite of Spring"). Cf. Stravinsky's autobiographical note, intended as an addendum to his autobiography, issued with a special recording of his Petrouschka (1911) in 1962. See C.B.S. No. M.S.6332.

and used in order to give vent to the musical forces within him.[1]

A Turning to a More Distant Past.

After this disruptive period in the musical realm which involved revolt and repudiation, there was a turning to a more distant past; a turning for resources needed for construction. Here (beginning at about 1920) we find the beginning of a period of quite self conscious Neo-classicism: a conscious attempt to work within self-imposed limitations, limitations which were regarded as having their source in this more distant Classical past.[2] As to what

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1. Barth also used aspects from the immediate past in order to smash this past. It could be argued that his use of certain elements taken over from Kierkegaard, Overbeck and Dostoevsky enabled him to fracture Nineteenth Century Liberalism.

2. Stravinsky was only one of a number of composers who turned in a Neo-classical direction (Hindemith, Poulenc, Honneger etc.). The term "Neo-classical" is a broad one, indicating the use of musical forms taken from Classical, Baroque and even pre-Baroque periods (that is from c.1600-1790). Yet perhaps just as importantly, it was capturing the spirit of composing which they found in this period. According to the Neo-classical composers, music in this period had little or nothing to do with the expression of feeling, whether personal or communal. Music was to express "musical ideas" (motifs and patterns formed by the arrangement of notes) not emotion or visual image. Naturally the historical accuracy of this view of the Neo-classicists concerning music of the Classical and Baroque periods is open to question. If one doubts that this Neo-classical turn was important or prominent in Stravinsky, it was not less than prominent in his own mind. When, later, after this Neo-classical period, a critic chided him for imitating Mozart, Stravinsky replied: "Imitate Mozart? I stole him!" (From concert notes, BBC Radio Three, 30th November 1974. Reported there as a reliable quote).

this Neo-classical turn meant, in concrete terms, we shall explore this as we go on to compare the manner in which Stravinsky appropriates from the Classical past with the manner in which Barth appropriates from his Classical past, that is from Early Church Tradition. But let us first look at Barth's development up to 1932, and its similarities with the development of Stravinsky.

The Parallel with Barth's Development.

Here we find a parallel with the development of Barth, which we have described in Part I of our thesis. In Barth too we find conscious revolt, even repudiation of the immediate past, with the publication of the several editions of his Römerbrief. We have also found that after this period of revolt and repudiation (c.1915-1923) there was a turning to a more distant past, specifically to the orthodoxy of Early Church creeds and dogmas. We find this clearly as he begins to lecture on Dogmatics in 1924, and progresses toward his methodological study of Anselm in 1931, where 'the Credo' or the articles of belief of the Early Church have a very prominent place.

Relation to Tradition: the Contrast.

If we find Barth appropriating the whole of the main lines of 'the Credo' of the Early Church, that is the whole of Early Church tradition, in a relationship which is 'binding', obligatory and

unquestioning, we find a much looser and perhaps more facilitating relation to "Classical" tradition in Stravinsky and the Neo-classicists.[1]

The 'Credo' of the Classical period of music contained many aspects: Classical harmonic practice Classical rythmic practice, Classical forms, that is, rather rigidly prescribed formats for the lay-out of the music. The Classical 'Credo' also contained a conception of what music was meant to be. One should say "conceptions" for naturally there was a diversity of viewpoint, yet a diversity which usually converged at important points.

Yet it was in the interpretation of this Classical conception of music that Stravinsky and the Neo-classicists drew most heavily upon the 'Classical'. Thus, in this (interpreted) conception, music was not the vehicle of feeling, as it was for the Romantics;[2] nor was music a means toward expression of literary or 'programmatic' ends. The highest musical expression was seen as occurring in music which had no extra-musical associations (e.g. Bach's Brandenburg Concertos, Mozart's Symphonies).

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1. In the following, "Classical Tradition" and "Classical period" might be misleading terms. Stravinsky and his fellow Neo-classicists meant by this term, essentially The Baroque and Classical periods of music. That is, roughly, from 1600-1790. At times they also included the Renaissance Period under this heading.

2. Here their interpretation is usually seen as most open to question.

Yet on the other hand, if Stravinsky and the Neo-classicists drew heavily on what they saw as the 'Classical' conception of music, they felt little obligation to use other aspects of 'the Credo' of the 'Classical' composers. For, needless to say, they chose to reject, in the main, the accepted harmonic practice of the 'Classical' composers. This applied equally as well to rhythmic practice, or 'respect' for bar lines. With form (the layout of composition) they felt free to use what they found worthy, and freely adapt what they did not.

Thus the Classical 'Credo' was a source which was drawn upon selectively. It was not viewed as something "binding, imperative and authoritative."[1] It was not assented to in an unquestioning manner. In summary, there is a looseness in this relation to the past, to tradition, a freedom to select what is found to be of value, to set aside what is not.

Relation to the Nineteenth Century.

Another contrast within this parallel between Barth and Stravinsky concerns relation to the recent past, the 19th century which was repudiated in the initial period. In contrast to Barth who never essentially revised his opinion vis-a-vis Nineteenth Century Liberalism, (that is, it remained repudiated

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1. Barth's words concerning the creeds, C.D.I/2, p.648.

more or less in toto as he took his 'Neo-classical' turn), Stravinsky came to reassess aspects of 19th century practice. Perhaps as an expression of newly found fondness for the repudiated 'fathers' he composed a full ballet in which he took up the music of Tchaikovsky and "re-composed" it, preserving both themes and elements of the harmonic structure of Tchaikovsky's music, yet altering a bit here, a bit there until it had a distinctive Stravinskian character.[1] Here the anger and the repudiation had been transcended. A selective and critical appreciation of the recent past had emerged. We find no such critical appreciation emerging in Barth after c.1920. Nineteenth Century Liberalism remained for him, up to the end of his life something essentially to be abhorred. It remained a serious "wrong turn" in the development of Protestant Theology, which he along with others had to "set right". In contrast, Barth's former comrade, Bultmann, found much worthy in Nineteenth Century Liberalism, while yet not all of Nineteenth Century Liberalism could be seen as worthy. Bultmann was not alone among Barth's former comrades in finding worthy elements in this recent past; Tillich and Gogarten also found elements of value. Rather it would appear that Barth was essentially alone, among the major figures of Protestant theology in his almost total abhorrence of this recent past.

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1. "Le Baiser de la Fee" ("The Fairy's Kiss"), 1928.

A Possible Reason for the "Neo-classical" Turn in Barth and Stravinsky.

Why could a Neo-classical turn seem attractive and even needed, for both of these figures? After a period of fracturing the recent past, a period of upheaval, and loss of stability (in each respective field), one could well understand if there were a wish for stabilizing elements, for deep "ballast"; the wish, for example, for a distant past, where everything seemed "settled". In typical Protestant (and Catholic) views, and from Barth's viewpoint, most major questions of dogma received their basic shape by the end of the 'Classical' period of Christian Theology (the period of the Early Church creeds and dogmas). Orthodox belief had received rather definite formulation, at least in its essentials. There was a "settledness" here, where basic questions of belief had actually been settled. Likewise, for Stravinsky, and his fellow Neo-classicists, the mature Baroque and the mature Classical periods of the history of Music had a "settled" quality. Here there were settled, well established forms and procedures. Thus in both fields there was a stabilizing quality which could be gained by a "Neo-classical" turn. What each of them had done in their respective fields had been quite "unsettling", not only for their contemporaries, but perhaps also for the "unsettlers".

The Quest for the "Autonomy" of the Discipline: Another parallel between Barth and Stravinsky.

In this Neo-classical turn which each made in his own way one sees another parallel, and within this parallel, a contrast. Each was concerned in his own way with the integrity and "autonomy" of his discipline. This was against the backdrop of the Nineteenth Century, in which each saw his own discipline as threatened by being subsumed under, or appended to other disciplines.

In the view of the Neo-classical composers, music was in danger of loosing its essential integrity, and had actually lost its essential integrity at points in the Nineteenth Century by being subsumed to "extra-musical" material or ideas.

This had happened to the most remarkable degree, in their view, in the productivity of Richard Wagner. Here music had been taken up into a "higher" art form and had become completely subservient to the aims and goals of this "higher" art form. The art form in question was the Music Drama. The central aim of the Music Drama was the embodiment and expression of specific Dramatic Content, for example, Germanic Myth, the idea of the Super-man, etc. The Drama was the centre. The Music was only a means to an end, that is, a means of expressing the Drama.

It was not only in Wagner that the Neo-classicists saw this happening. It was, in their view,

happening all across the board, albeit in other ways. Music was subservient to extra-musical material in the Tone Poems of a Liszt just as much as in the "tone painting" of a Debussy and a Ravel. In the former, music was subservient to extra-musical material, for here music was only a means of giving expression to the "story" or literary idea of the Tone Poem. In the latter, in Debussy and Ravel, music was seen as subservient to the "picture" it was to "paint". Thus in Debussy's La Mer, for example, music was to evoke the sea. Again an extra-musical element had become central. In all of these examples, music was seen as a means, toward extra-musical expression, not as an end in itself. It was seen as a means to other ends. It was thus in danger of losing its essential integrity, in danger of losing its ability to stand on its own, apart from drama, story or image.

Thus we have a parallel of sorts with the way in which Barth, and others, viewed the theological situation viz-a-vis the 19th century, in which theology too was seen to have its "autonomy" at stake, that is, threatened with being swallowed up into "anthropology" and "philosophy".

What is of interest in this parallel is the contrast, that is the contrast between the type of "autonomy" pursued by Barth and that pursued by Stravinsky.

In Stravinsky's development, this aim was

pursued in a stronghanded and definite manner yet in a manner which did not involve cutting off relations with adjacent fields. Thus one finds a co-operation, and a series of joint efforts specifically with those 'disciplines' which threatened the independence of music as a separate art. So one finds collaboration with dance: the ballets of the early period were followed by balletsin the Neo-classical period (for example, Pulcinella, a ballet based on a 're-composition' of music of the 'Classical' composer G. Pergolesi).

Yet in all this, music "related" to these other disciplines in a way that if the other discipline was 'subtracted' from any particular collaboration, the music left over as a remainder would stand on its own qua music. Thus even today, when the choreography and even the story behind the ballets are set aside, the music is typically seen by critics as capable of standing on its own, apart from any extra-musical allusions.

Here is a 'model' of autonomy which is in definite contrast to Barth's pursuit of autonomy. For in Barth's pursuit of, let us for the moment call it "autonomy", as we have noted throughout the thesis, there was a negation of any collaboration with other disciplines, and in fact what amounted to a severance of relations (with anthropology, philosophy in general, historical criticism etc). In our view, this bears

more resemblance to an "isolation" than to "autonomy". Of course one might call it autonomy vis-a-vis other disciplines, and if one should wish to use the word in this manner, the observation could be made that this is the "autonomy of isolation" not the "autonomy of relation". This is the autonomy of the monk who leaves his monastery and wanders out into the desert, thus breaking off relations not only with the world but with his fellow religionists. As a consequence it is an autonomy untested by any relationship risked.

Conclusion.

In this chapter we have seen a parallel between Barth and Stravinsky in the manner in which they have related to the distant past, or tradition. More importantly there appears to be a very similar pattern of revolt and repudiation of the recent past followed by a turning to a more distant past. Here we have seen a parallel. Yet within this parallel, a contrast: namely in the manner in which each has related to this distant past, or tradition: Stravinsky, selectively; Barth, unselectively, in that he appropriates and dogmatically asserts essentially the whole of the Early Church orthodoxy. There is a looser relation to tradition in Stravinsky, one which is not binding, one which allows him to select according to what he can honor, and find useful.

We have also seen a parallel in the attempt of each to re-establish his discipline as a discipline

'in its own right' that is in a way that preserves its independence vis-a-vis other disciplines. Yet within this parallel we have also seen a contrast: namely in the character or type of independence sought. Stravinsky sees and brings about a co-operation and collaboration with the very disciplines which, in his view, threatened to subsume music to higher aims and goals. The co-operation and collaboration between music and the other disciplines was to occur in such a way as to preserve the independence of the discipline of music (In many interpreters views this aim was realized; the music of Pulcinella, and the earlier ballets, The Rite of Spring, etc. have remained long after the literature and dance have been forgotten).

The independence or "autonomy" from other disciplines which Barth has sought has had a very different character. Rather than co-operate or 'collaborate' with other disciplines out of its own independence, theology, in Barth's hands, has been more like a monk who has left the world and even his monastery behind, and has wandered out into the desert,[1] into a "notoriously oppressive solitude."[2] This so called

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1. We have used a metaphor which T.H.L. Parker, an interpreter quite favorable to Barth, has used in describing Barth's "path". See the last paragraph of Parker's biography, in connection with his introductory chapter, in Karl Barth, Eerdmans, 1970.

2. Barth's own words concerning 'The Solitude of the Theologian' in Evangelical Theology: An Introduction, p.110.

"autonomy" pursued by Barth is perhaps more accurately seen as a type of isolationism, in which co-operation with other disciplines is a priori eliminated as a possibility.

If there is a close similarity in the parallels we have pointed out in the development of both Barth and Stravinsky (despite the strong contrasts we have found within these parallels) we are not arguing that, in their revolt-repudiation and their consequent neo-classicism, they were actually part of the same cultural forces connected with the breakdown of "the 19th century syntheses". This is a question beyond our scope and competence. Yet the similarity does suggest something less than this, that is, it does strongly suggest that there were inner dynamics "immanent" in the development of each, which in all probability shaped the development each underwent. We have suggested that the Neo-classical turn might very well have been taken when the un-settling character of the revolt and repudiation might in the end have been quite "unsettling" even to the "unsettlers". Firm 'ballast" or stability had to be sought for the "constructive" part of their task. Our aim here has been to examine the manner in which each related to one of the chief sources of this firm ballast, that is, the manner in which they related to tradition in this 'Neo-classical' turn. It is at this point that we have found the strongest contrast between these

two figures. In drawing out this contrast our aim has been to illustrate and elucidate the most central theme of our thesis: the relation to tradition.

CONCLUSION
TO
THE THESIS.

Section A.

SEVEN REASONS FOR NOT TAKING BARTH'S THEOLOGICAL PROGRAMME SERIOUSLY AS A REAL OPTION FOR THEOLOGY.

In the following, we shall summarize several aspects of our research into Barth's theological method. Drawing upon this material we shall then state seven reasons for our opinion that this theological programme should not be taken seriously as a real option for theology.

We shall, firstly, summarize certain aspects of our research concerning man's relation to Tradition in this theology; secondly, certain aspects concerning man's relation to (what is alleged to be) "the Word of God". We shall then go on to state our reasons, point by point. (After stating our first point we shall have to lay out and summarize additional material).

Unthinking Submission to Tradition.

In Part III of our thesis, we have found unthinking submission to the credal Tradition of the Early Church to be a primary and basic aspect of Barth's method. Why does one say "a primary and basic aspect"? Since beliefs taken from these creeds form a significant portion of the presuppositions of this theology, upon which Barth subsequently builds his work, the unquestioning assent to these beliefs constitutes an aspect of this method which is logically

prior to the use of these beliefs in his theologizing. For this reason, we see this aspect of Barth's procedure, i.e. an unthinking submission to credal beliefs as a primary and basic aspect of his actual procedure. We have not held that all Barth's basic presuppositions come from credal tradition, but rather, we are looking at those which do; these form a significant number of the whole.

Thus one finds unthinking submission not only to beliefs which come directly from Scripture, but also to beliefs which even Barth will acknowledge, are not to be found in Scripture. If these credal beliefs are held to be an "interpretation" of Scripture, they are, as formulations of belief, also additions to Scripture. They are the human opinions of the Early Church about Scripture. Thus even where one might hold that certain credal beliefs have only some "rootage" in Scripture (e.g. that they are only to some extent "implicit" in Scripture) yet even here, the formulations of belief are those human formulations of the Early Church. It is to these beliefs as well that one must submit, without question, in this theological procedure. One must submit, for the beliefs of these creeds are regarded as necessary and fundamental for both Church and Theology.

Unthinking Submission in Man's Relation to What is Allegedly "The Word of God".

We have also found an unthinking submission to what is alleged to be "the Word of God" in this theology. That is, when, in an Event ("Ereigniss") in man's present, Scripture becomes "the Word of God", through the alleged action of the deity, in which the Holy Spirit acts within man, validating or "witnessing to" the words of Scripture, here also we have found an unthinking submission.

In our study of man's relationship to "the Word of God" in Barth's theology, we have found that it was methodologically inadmissible for one to step back from the experience of this Event and use his critical acumen (1) concerning whether or not such an Event has occurred in his own "present"; and (2) concerning the content of what was allegedly "the Word of God" in this event. That is, it is methodologically inadmissible to try to stand back from the experience of this alleged Event and use human criteria in evaluating this experience.[1] As a consequence, one must not only (1) submit unquestioningly to the content of what is allegedly "Word of God" in this experience, but (2) he must also do this concerning an experience he cannot evaluate with human criteria. This experience was one in which one experienced a determination

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1. See above, pp.405ff, especially pp.408ff.

of one's thought, that is a divinely imposed determination to think in such and such a manner.[1] As one example of this, we found that for Barth, Anselm's "key phrase", "that than which nothing greater can be thought" becomes, and is to be regarded as, "the Word of God". And the meaning or import of these words is that of a divine prohibition: "Man shall not think (or conceive) of a greater." One may note that Barth is forced to interpret "non posse" as "is not permitted" rather than "is not able". (We have found this interpretation textually untenable. See above, p.228f).

How does Barth know that this is "the Word of God"? Can he step back from his experience of an Event in which this phrase has become, for him, "the Word of God", and reflect critically upon this experience, using human criteria. Since it is methodologically inadmissible to "step back" and use his critical faculties concerning such an experienced Event, the answer would have to be "no". Thus if we are correct in our "reading" of Anselm's phrase, i.e. that the phrase has to do only with a limitation immanent in human conceiving, and nothing to do with any prohibition about what man may think, then one would see the possibility that Barth's misinterpretation of this phrase is due to a lack of

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1. See above, pp.410f.

critical examination concerning the experience of such an alleged Event. We cite this as only an example of the problems involved in Barth's type of relation to "the Word of God".

Summary.

We have found that in this theology both man's relationship to credal tradition and his relationship to what is experienced as "the Word of God" involve unthinking submission, that is, methodologically necessary unquestioning obedience to the noetic content of both credal Tradition and what is experienced as "the Word of God". In the case of the latter, (the Word of God), we have also found an uncritical approach to the experience of the alleged Event of revelation.

POINT ONE. This then forms our first point: there is an unthinking submission to what is alleged to be revelation (in the case of "the Word of God") as well as what is implicitly regarded as an authoritative articulation of revelation (in the case of Early Church creeds).

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Yet our first point leads us on to another observation. We shall here summarize in more detail what we have described at certain points of Part III of our thesis. Concerning both the man's relationship to "the Word of God", and man's relationship to

Early Church creeds, we have found that in each case man is bound so tightly to the "content" of each that there is no "distance" between man and these "objects", that is, "distance" in which man could stand back and use his critical faculties concerning these "objects". That is there is no "space" or room for critical questioning to arise concerning e.g. the truths of the assertions of the Early Church creeds, or the truth of what is alleged to be "the Word of God" in an experienced event. There is not even any room for the question as to whether one has experienced such an Event. That is, there is no place for the critical questioning of the human experience of such an alleged Event.

What we have found in place of critical questioning is unquestioning obedience. In the case of man's relation to "the Word of God" this obedience is an explicit part of Barth's declared methodology. We shall now review this in more detail. At the close of Barth's Prolegomena (C.D.I/2) in a section intended, in part, to "sum up" his methodology, Barth states that "We are not investigating [the norm of dogmatics] but its method, and therefore the obedience which dogmatics must render to the work and action of God is taking place in His Word."[1] This obedience is described as a "necessary obedience."[2]

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1. C.D.I/2, p.857.

2. Ibid.

That is, it is an obedience which is a methodological necessity in this theological programme. (Barth also states that "this obedience is to be described and understood as strict and complete...").[1]

That this methodologically necessary obedience to the experienced "Word of God" precludes critical questioning is also evidenced in Barth's writings. One cannot "escape out of the constraint of the Word" for this would lead "inevitably to uncertainty" and "therefore to doubt", that is, unbelief.[2] At this point we may note again what we have just previously pointed out,[3] namely that critical questioning is precluded not only concerning (1) the content of such an experienced event, i.e. the content of this alleged "Word of God" but also (2) concerning the occurrence of such an alleged Event (and thus of man's experience of such an Event). Concerning (1) critical questioning of the content of such an experience, Barth states that there no room for theories of knowledge to come into play, (e.g. a philosophical epistemology), "a theory of knowledge...where consideration of the truth, worth and competence of the Word of God...can for a time be suspended....This is the very thing which must not happen."[4] Concerning

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1. Ibid.
2. This whole passage (the three quotations) occurs in C.D.II/1, p.7.
3. See above, pp.503ff.
4. C.D.II/1, p.5.

(2) critical questioning concerning the alleged Event, and concerning one's experience of this alleged Event, Barth explicitly states that one cannot "step outside" this relationship in which one is "bound" to "the Word of God."

> 'From outside' means from the point of view of a human position where truth, dignity, and competence are so ascribed to human seeing, understanding and judging as to be the judge over what happens here. But this is the very thing which is excluded by the inner understanding of what happens... as we are taught...by our first step.[1]

This "first step" is a methodological step, into a binding relationship to the "Word of God", out of the "constraint" of which one must never escape, lest one fall into "doubt" that is, disbelief.

Now although one cannot expect Barth to be explicit about his operational assumptions concerning creeds, as he has been here concerning "the Word of God" (those that we have laid out remain unacknowledged in his Prolegomena, and are (often) contradicted by his statements), non-the-less we have found that the manner in which Barth approaches Early Church creeds almost exactly reduplicates the manner in which he approaches "the Word of God" (as we have just described). That is, it is as if Barth were approaching "the Word of God" itself when he approaches these creeds. (This

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1. C.D.II/1, p.31. See above, pp.407ff.

would not be difficult to understand if, as we have argued, these creeds are an authoritative, even infallible form of "the Word of God"[1]). That is, his methodological procedure is essentially the same, even if one must search harder to find explicit statements which confirm this procedure. Here too one is bound to the "content", bound in such a way which precludes "distance" between man and the creed, "distance" in which questioning of the truth of elements of the creed could have any meaningful significance. Here also obedience to the creed is an operational (methodological) necessity. One is not to escape out of the constraint of the creed.[2] Dogmatics is "Creed-bound...and therefore brings to the Creeds...that respect which children owe, by God's command to the word of their human fathers."[3] We have looked at the nature of this "respect" owed by God's command, which Barth describes in more detail in the same work (Credo),[4] and we have found that Dogmatics is Creed-bound in that it must not only "honor" the Creed (as one is commanded to honor one's father and mother in the fifth Commandment), but

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1. See above, pp.363ff.

2. There shall be no "end runs", around the creed, directly to Scripture (that is in a way that avoids or obviates credal beliefs). See Credo p7,f.

3. Credo p.8.

4. See above, pp.293ff.

"obey" the Creed. "This is simply an ordinance." ("Ordnung").[1] Thus one must obey, without questioning. Here too we have found evidence that unquestioning obedience to creeds to be a necessary aspect of Barth's operational programme. We have found evidence of this not only in the statements of Barth which we have examined in Chapter II of Part III,[2] but we have found evidence of this in Barth's actual operational procedure (i.e. in our examination of his approach to specific credal beliefs).[3] Here as in man's relation to "the Word of God" in this theology, man is so bound to the content, in this case, to the content of the creed, that there is no "distance" between man and creed, in which critical questioning could take place.

As our research concerning credal Tradition was, to some extent, suggested by a comment of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, we might acknowledge our debt to his words by including them at this point, for they view these issues from a slightly different critical perspective.

> Barth and the Confessing Church have encouraged us to entrench ourselves behind 'the faith of the Church' and evade the honest question, What is our real and personal belief?... To say 'Its the Church's faith, not mine can be a clericalist subterfuge, and outsiders always consider it as such....We cannot like the Catholics identify ourselves with the Church....[4]

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1. Credo, p.181.
2. Above, pp.315; 319; 347f, 509.
3. Above, pp.311ff.
4. Letters and Papers from Prison (first edition),p.180.

Since we are quoting Bonhoeffer to acknowledge our indebtedness, rather than as support for our case we need not comment, except to say that Bonhoeffer touched upon **what**, for us, has been "the tip of an iceberg", the lower regions of which we have been exploring in our thesis. If Barth does not identify himself with 'the faith of the Church' he comes so close as to leave no significant distance in which to critically question the basal elements of **this** 'faith'. We may now state **'point two'.**

POINT TWO. We have now drawn together and summarized enough elements from our research to state our second point: There is a lack of critical detachment, both from "the Word of God" as "heard" in an experienced Event, and from the beliefs of the Early Church creeds in this theological programme. That is, there is a lack of critical detachment from those elements of thought which will form the presuppositions upon which Barth builds his theology.

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POINT THREE. From the same research we shall draw out our third point: At the most basic level of this theology, that is, at Barth's methodological "point of departure", i.e. at the point where Barth assimilates these presuppositions upon which he shall build his theology, there is essentially no place for the exercise of human critical judgement concerning

both the truth and the worth of the presuppositions upon which he builds his theology. Such a place is denied to human critical judgement by reason of methodological procedure, specifically, unquestioning obedience to the content of (what is alleged to be, or experienced as) "the Word of God", and unquestioning obedience to the content of Early Church creeds.

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POINT FOUR. Our fourth point is drawn from the same research, together with the previous points: Man in his wholeness cannot be present and active in such a theological enterprise. He must, as a procedure of method, lay aside those critical faculties by which he could arrive at considered judgements concerning (1) the truth and worth of the basic theological presuppositions, and (2) the truth and worth of his religious experiences, specifically the experience of "the Word of God". He must lay aside his critical faculties before entering upon such a theological programme. This is required by the method of this theology at its methodological point of departure, that is at its very root. The consequence of this is a significant denial of man's humanity. He must lay aside a central and essential part of his humanity, when entering upon such a theological enterprise as is to be found here.

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POINT FIVE. Our fifth point we shall first state, and consequently establish: There appears to be a pure heteronomy at the very basis of this theology, a heteronomy essentially unmodified by any element of autonomy. That is a religious heteronomy in man's relation to his experience of "the Word of God" and to the content of this alleged Word of God. One finds this same heteronomy in man's relation to Early Church creeds in this theology. It consists in an unthinking submission, or unquestioning obedience to the content of the experienced "Word of God" and the content of the Early Church creeds. This unquestioning obedience as we have just noted is a methodological necessity in this theological programme, specifically at the "point of departure" of this theology. Thus we say, this theology is founded upon a heteronomous relation to the sources which it uses as its own basis. We would add one comment: such a heteronomy is unnecessary, and is thus an unnecessary devaluation and denigration of man's humanity.

Let us examine this point in light of the evidences we have already laid out, and in connection with a passage from the conclusion of Barth's Prolegomena, Church Dogmatics, Vol.I/2.

At the conclusion of his Prolegomena, Barth acknowledges that a heteronomy is inherent in his theological method, and says this specifically in connection with "the obedience which dogmatics must

render to the work and action of God taking place in His Word."[1] Yet he goes on to say that this heteronomy is modified by a compensating autonomy. The autonomy consists in this: man's free decision to obey the Word of God. Thus this obedience is "the fully free decision belonging to the human subject of dogmatics."[2] Because this autonomy is involved in dogmatics, the heteronomy, which Barth has already acknowledged, is allegedly transformed into theonomy. This is possible, for "autonomy cannot be understood, any more than heteronomy, as in antithesis to theonomy."[3]

With this last statement we shall not take issue. Yet we do take issue with Barth's supposition that the heteronomy he has described, and which we have described in our thesis in a more expanded form, is in any way significantly modified by the autonomy he has referred to. We say this for the following reasons: (1) The obedience to "the Word of God" he refers to is explicitly acknowledged to be a necessity in his method. He refers in this very context to "the necessary obedience...of dogmatics to the Word of God ".[4] This obedience "is also

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1. C.D.I/2, p.857.
2. Ibid, p.858
3. C.D.I/2, p.857.
4. Ibid.

to be understood and described as strict and complete..."[1]

(2) Since this obedience is a necessary aspect of Barth's theological programme, even if man may have this freedom, to choose to obey or to disobey "the Word of God", he must lay aside this freedom if he is to enter upon this theological programme. He must in fact choose to repudiate this freedom before entering upon such a theological enterprise, for the simple reason that obedience is a necessary and basic aspect of this theology, specifically unquestioning obedience.

As a consequence, once a man has entered upon such a theological enterprise and assented to its "ground rules", we cannot see how the heteronomy Barth acknowledges (and which we have explored in more detail) is in any significant way modified by any autonomy. We say this specifically with reference to the methodological "point of departure" of this theology. Here, specifically, we see a heteronomy in man's relation to (what is alleged to be) "the Word of God" and to credal Tradition. It is thus a heteronomy at the very basis of Barth's theology.

As such heteronomy is unnecessary in most contemporary Protestant theologies, we can only see this basal aspect of Barth's theology as an unnecessary devaluation and denigration of the fullness of man's humanity. Here he must remain in religious

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1. Ibid.

childhood, similar to early biological childhood, in that here the child has not yet realized (brought into actuality) his potential to form judgements and make decisions about truth and value. Thus we would see this heteronomy at the root of Barth's theology as a childish denigration of the fullness of man's humanity.

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To these five points we may now add two more. They are different in nature from the first five, and thus we point out a shift here.

POINT SIX. Because of the manner in which credal tradition is apparently regarded in this theology it is doubtful whether this theological method, and consequently the theology built with its use, could be considered acceptable, generally, within Protestantism. We refer to what we see as an operational assumption in Barth's theology: namely that the credal Tradition of the Early Church is an infallible articulation of revelation, and as such is an infallible form of "the Word of God." Such an assumption would apparently place one part of the Church's Tradition on equal footing with Scripture (Scripture in fact in Barth's operational programme is a fallible form of the Word of God, where Early Church creeds are apparently infallible). Thus, if Barth does in fact operate upon this assumption, and

if his theological programme involves this assumption, it is difficult to see how this theology could be generally acceptable within Protestantism. One says this for the reason that Protestant Theology has rather consistently rejected any notion that any part of Church Tradition should have an authority equal or superior to that of Scripture. In Barth's theology it would appear that the credal Tradition of the Early Church does have an authority at least equal to that of Scripture.[1]

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POINT SEVEN. Barth's Theology, which tries with ardour to preserve tradition, may, in our view, by that very ardour, in fact, be a danger to Tradition. That is, if this theological programme were to be taken seriously as a real option for theology, and further as the only real option for theology, (which it claims its method to be),[2] it tends to present Twentieth Century man with a black and white choice: submit, or repudiate. That is, submit, without question, to essentially, the whole of Early Church credal Tradition, or repudiate the same whole. There is apparently no middle ground. The whole extent of these creeds are presented as necessary and binding for Church and Theology.

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1. See above, pp.360f, and pp.375f.

2. See for example the preface to the second edition of Barth's study of Anselm (written in 1958), A.F.Q.I., p.11.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer's comment on the nature of Barth's approach is of significance here: "Friss, Vogel, oder stirb!"[1] There is perhaps no equivalent in English which can do justice to the poetic aptness of this phrase (a quotation from Goethe): "Eat bird, or die!" It is usually translated as "take it or leave it."[2] Yet perhaps the German alludes to something deeper than this usual English Translation would indicate. "Friss Vogel, oder stirb", "Eat bird, or die." That is, "eat, consume, swallow whole, do this or go empty away...even unto death." A bird has no teeth, it cannot chew before swallowing. It must either swallow something whole, or spit it out. Yet this bird is confronted with this dilemma: "Eat!, or die." Is not this somewhat similar to the dilemma which Barth's theology would pose, if taken seriously as a real option, or more particularly, the only option for theology? Here also, it would appear, one is confronted with a dilemma: Consume the whole, without "chewing it over", or leave off, go away... even unto death. That is, we have found no place for "chewing something over," prior to, or subsequent to, the assent to the central Christian beliefs in this theology. We can find no significant "place" in this

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1. Letters of 5th May 1944. Cf. Letters and Papers from Prison, The Enlarged Edition, S.C.M., London, 1971, p.286.

2. In the "Enlarged Edition" of 1971 it is translated as "like it or lump it." Cf. op.cit., p.286.

theology for the exercise of human judgement concerning the truth and worth of these central Christian beliefs either prior or subsequent to their acceptnace. The main task of the mind in this theology is apparently to re-think 'the Credo', 'the faith of the Church' in order to see its interconnections, and correctly understand its content.[1]

As Twentieth Century man has most often resisted submitting without question to religious dogma (and rightly in our view), one would hold that the dilemma which Barth's theological programme poses to modern man is in fact a threat to the very tradition he sought to preserve. For it means that if most people in our century were aware of the extent of that to which they would have to submit, without questioning (that is, the broad extent of the beliefs of the Early Church creeds), they would, if this were the only theological option before them, more than likely repudiate the whole of Christian belief, rather than submit in this manner.[2] Yet because Barth's theological programme does in fact, in our view, pose such a dilemma, one would hold that this theological programme should not be regarded as a sound option for theology in our time.

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1. See for example, Credo, pp.2ff.

2. One would not argue with the fact that there are considerable numbers of people in our century who would and do submit unthinkingly to various forms of dogma. Whether this is a good or healthy phenomenon is a separate question.

Section B.

BARTH'S DOGMATICS AND PREACHING : WAS BARTH'S THEOLOGY NECESSARY FOR PREACHING, SPECIFICALLY BARTH'S OWN PREACHING? A CONCLUDING CRITIQUE.

In that we have argued that Barth's theological programme should not be considered seriously as a real option for theology, and have thus argued for its rejection, for the reasons we have given, perhaps in arguing for its rejection one risks "throwing out the babe with the bath water." In what follows, we shall (1) make a distinction between the two, "babe" and "bath water." In doing so, we shall (2) turn to Barth's sermons, where what we shall call "the babe" receives, in our view, the best articulation. At this point having turned to Barth's sermons, we shall raise a question about Barth's theologizing: Was Barth's Dogmatics necessary for preaching, and specifically for Barth's own preaching? We raise this question as a question of more than a little importance. For Barth has claimed in many places that his Dogmatics exists in order to serve "Church Proclamation." Preaching, in Barth's view, is the central and most crucial form of "Church Proclamation."[1] Yet the question we shall ask is whether Barth's Dogmatics was actually relevant and necessary for

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1. See Church Dogmatics I/1, pp.51ff and pp.98ff for example.

preaching, specifically for Barth's own preaching. If the answer is essentially "no", then serious questions must arise as to the relevance of this theology, namely its relevance to its most central declared aim: to serve Church Proclamation. Thus here we shall offer yet another critique of Barth's Dogmatics.

Let us turn then to our distinction between "babe" and "bath water". By the "bath water" we refer to the frame of reference in which Barth has done his theologizing. In Part Three of our thesis we have attempted to describe several central aspects of this frame of reference: a relation to Tradition of unthinking submission; a relation to what is experience as "the Word of God", also characterized by unthinking submission, etc.

The "babe" that we refer to figuratively in this metaphor is also the one we refer to literally: the one who came, the one who reached out, across to man, the one who approached man not from above or below, but (we are choosing our imagery consciously) approached man from within man's own setting. We find the best articulation of what we refer to here, not in Barth's Dogmatics, but in his later sermons. Let us turn to those sermons in order to draw out what we mean. There are two collections of published sermons, comprising nearly thirty sermons which Barth preached between 1954 and 1964. Some, but not all

of these, were preached in the prison chapel of the Basel Prison.[1] Since there are a considerable number of sermons, preached over a considerable period of time (10 years), and since not all of them were preached in a prison setting (at least three were either in a local church or in a University Chapel service),[2] we have a fairly reliable indication of the preaching of Barth's most mature period. (We have chosen to turn to these thirty sermons from Barth's late period rather than to the two published collections from his early period, for the latter, for the most part, pre-date the publication of the first volume of Barth's Church Dogmatics in 1932 and thus could not, even theoretically, reflect Barth's theologizing after 1932.[3])

Barth's Preaching and Barth's Dogmatics: Contrasts.

Let us then turn to these later sermons of Barth, in order to explicate further what we mean by "the babe". In doing so we shall draw out contrasts with what we find in the Church Dogmatics.

Here in Barth's later sermons, Christ has become Brother. He is among men. He speaks with

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1. Deliverance to the Captives, Harper and Row, New York, 1961; and Call for God, Harper and Row, New York, 1965.

2. See for example, Deliverance to the Captives, pp.60ff, pp.93ff, pp.101ff, and most probably pp.136ff.

3. For these early sermons, see Karl Barth and Eduard Thurneysen, God's Search for Man (1935), and Come Holy Spirit (1934), both published by T. and T. Clark, Edinburgh.

authority yet in a way which does not threaten man's integrity, his personal centre. He does not speak in a manner which would overwhelm man, or in a "Loud Voice". He does not speak as an alien, a visitor from "outer space" (although his transcendence is preserved). He speaks with sensitivity to the problems and traumas that man actually encounters.

In contrast, even in the second half of the Church Dogmatics, (C.D.III and IV) the Christos appears essentially as an alien in man's situation. One would point,, for example, to Barth's imagry in entitling a section of his Dogmatics "The Way of the Son in the Far Country": He comes, even here, essentially as an alien. He is not also, whatever else he may be, really one of us. And he is only "on a visit". The import and significance of this imagry, and more like it, is not diminished by the repetition of any dogmatic formulae about "fully God and fully man".

Let us now turn to the first half of the Church Dogmatics, that is, to that part of the Dogmatics which has been our concern in our thesis, Volumes I and II. It is here that we find the greatest contrast, one would almost say, discontinuity, with what we have just pointed to in the Prison Sermons. Was Christ Brother here? Was the approach of the deity to man so characterized here (in Volumes I and II of the Church Dogmatics)? We do not think so.

One should not be mislead by much emphasis on "Incarnation" and "Christology". Incarnation, yes. But it is a "descending upon" man from above. It is a "breaking in" upon him. This appears as a condescending move on the part of a deity. It is not seen as a reaching out to man, a reaching across, i.e. an approach without threat, (as, in contrast, it is in the later sermons).[1]

One notes also, (although this is a lesser matter), that, as Barth talks of Christ as Brother, in his Prison Sermons, Barth himself talks as a wayward brother to fellow wayward brother; and is explicit and open about how he views this situation. As we have noted at several points Barth's approach to his listener (or reader), in his Church Dogmatics, we can only note a great contrast here, in the manner in which Barth approaches those human beings he finds in prison and chapel pew. He speaks firmly and with authority,...but not as Authority. He approaches his listeners as one among their midst, not condescendingly, "from on high." He says "we" and he means "we".

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1. As a child one has very similar experiences, experiences of intrusion "from above", i.e. his parents. Some of these experiences are happy; others are not. Some parents encourage and foster adulthood. Others, perhaps unknowingly, do not. One would venture that arbitrary intrusions "from above", i.e. intrusions which one could not "make sense out of", and use his powers of judgement about, however limited, these sorts of intrusions, whether we are talking of biological childhood or religious childhood, would only perpetuate childhood.

In the passage we have chosen, below, Barth meditates upon the two criminals crucified with Jesus, and draws out his conclusion that this was the first Christian community. He ends his sermon in this manner:

> And now, dear friends, we are not asked in the least if we want to be such people, thank God. We are such people, all of us - you in this house called a prison, with all the burden that brought you here, and with your particular experiences in this place - those others of us outside who have different experiences and yet, are, believe me, in the same predicament....[1]

Barth reiterates the promise of forgiveness he has already explicated. Those in the prison are invited to share in Communion, and the sermon closes. Whether one agrees with Barth here is not to the point. Rather, that when Barth says "all", he means "all". He speaks, embracing his own, and their, situation.

Barth's Dogmatics and Barth's Preaching: Was This Theology Necessary for This Preaching.

Now we come to perhaps the most significant characteristic of these sermons of Barth. Perhaps we could draw it out by asking the following question: If one had come to these sermons first, with no acquaintance with any of Barth's other works, could one have expected to find what up to now we have explored in

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1. Deliverance to the Captives, Harper and Row, p.83.

the Church Dogmatics, that is, the credalistic character and cast of the Dogmatics, and more specifically, the particular kind of "tight" and binding relationship to creeds which we have described in Chapter Two of Part Three?

What we wish to lift up for examination here is another characteristic of these sermons: they are not "doctrinal" in character. Barth did not choose to preach "doctrinal sermons" when he had the chance. More than this, there is almost a total scarcity of references to doctrines. There is no attempt to simplify or "popularize" those dogmas which Barth spent four decades recasting into a Barthian shape. He does not take for example the material presented in the lectures of Dogmatics in Outline and try to preach a simplified version of them.

The character of these sermons is quite in contrast to these options. They have the essential character of carefully wrought improvisations upon the theme of a short passage of Scripture. One sees a freshness of approach, and an expressiveness which this improvisatory nature allows. If this is so, there is an interesting similarity with the sermons of Luther, and those of Zinzendorf two centuries later; a freedom of exposition, an 'earthiness' or contact with common mundane human reality, and an absence of

dogma as such.[1]

One is not saying that at points there are not dogmas beneath the surface of this preaching. But they are, on the whole, well out of sight. If there are dogmas at points beneath the surface one is also not saying, and this is something else, that there are not specifically Barthian touches at points in these sermons. But again they are rather unobtrusive, and, with a few exceptions, not central to the basic import of his message.

Let us look at the import of these points. Was not the whole stimulus, or perhaps more accurately the most central aim of the Church Dogmatics to serve "Church Proclamation"; and further is not preaching, for Barth, the central and most crucial expression of "Church Proclamation"? Volume I of Barth's Church Dogmatics clearly affirms these points.[2]

We have then come to our central question: Is the whole Barthian Dogmatic enterprise necessary to such preaching? We will have to say 'no', for the following reasons: If it is necessary that some sort

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1. Cf. "The Hermeneutics of Count Nicholaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf", Arthur James Freeman, Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Princeton Theological Seminary, 1962, pp.217-236. Cf. also The Martin Luther Christmas Book, Translated and arranged by Roland A. Bainton, Muhlenberg, Philadelphia, 1968, p.9-15. and the sermons which follow.

2. Cf. C.D.I/1, pp.1ff, pp.51ff, and pp.98ff.

of theologizing lie behind such preaching (1) need it be or have been of a specifically Barthian character, as we have tried to out-line and explicate in our thesis, i.e. in its relation to tradition, and its relation to the experience of "the Word of God"; and (2) need it even be a theologizing which tries to bring into the present the whole extent of the beliefs of the Early Church Creeds and dogmas? Since (1) dogmas as such play such a limited role in Barth's preaching, and even if some exist beneath the surface at points; and (2) since the general character of his preaching is more that of disciplined improvisation on passages of Scripture, we will have to say "no" to both of the above questions. The human words in which the evangel/ion is expressed can have a rather loose relationship to "established doctrine", i.e. the dogmas and creeds of the Early Church. It is Barth who has shown perhaps the best example of how this can be so, in his sermons.

We would thus conclude that Barth's specific type of theological programme, both in its method and in its content, was not necessary for this preaching. Thus we cannot see that Barth's Dogmatics has any necessary relevance to its most central stated aim: to serve Church Proclamation, i.e. preaching. Rather than be of help to such preaching as Barth practices, his Dogmatics may in fact be a threat to such preaching. For as we have pointed out in our

seventh point, Barth's theology confronts man, and that includes the man who mounts the pulpit, with a dilemma: submit, or repudiate! Submit without question to the whole of "orthodoxy" or the beliefs of the Early Church creeds, or repudiate the whole of the same. This is the dilemma Barth's theology poses for the one who would preach as well as for people in general.

It is a false dilemma, as Barth's preaching of "the babe" has shown us. For in this preaching we see no necessary submission to the whole of credal Tradition; we do not see that the dogmatic assertion of the totality of credal Tradition is at all necessary for such preaching. A selective and critical assimilation of Tradition, and a selective and critical assimilation of what is alleged to be "the Word of God" would apparently serve just as well as a basis for such preaching. The dilemma, therefore, which Barth's Dogmatics poses for the preacher is a false dilemma.

Yet it is a dilemma which carries with it a threat, that is, a threat to the very heart of the Christian message. For the number of preachers who can and would willingly submit, without question, to the whole of credal Tradition is limited. Thus the significant number of preachers who cannot and will not submit to Tradition in this manner would be forced, by Barth's theological programme to reject the central

Christian beliefs, lock stock and barrel. The "babe" (in both its metaphorical and its literal sense) would then be thrown out with the bathwater. The central Christian message would be lost.

In contradiction to Barth, we are holding that man must have real freedom in relation to his, man's, past. Not a freedom which he must set aside, and repudiate before entering upon a dogmatic programme such as Barth's. And additionally, that such freedom is not of necessity a threat to "the babe", as we have described. In contrast the denial of such freedom in relation to the past may, in fact, pose a much greater threat to this "babe", to the central core of the Christian message. This then is our eighth and final reason for holding that Barth's theological programme should not be taken seriously as a real option for theology.

Here in Barth's theology faith, in our view, has sought and found certainty. Yet it has done so at the cost of honesty. It has not honestly faced the question of truth regarding those assertions upon which this theology is founded. In contrast it has submitted unquestioningly to these assertions, and has sought to make these assertions binding upon man regardless of questions of truth. For the eight reasons we have delineated, we have therefore argued that this theological programme should not be taken seriously as a real option for theology.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY.

In the Bibliography which follows our purpose has been, firstly, to give full notation of works cited in our thesis, and indicate the sources, primary and secondary, we have drawn upon, and secondly, to point the reader to the chief primary and secondary sources, relevant for our subject matter. Any attempt to be comprehensive both with reference to primary and secondary sources has proved simply impractical by reason of the weight of numbers. For example, the Kirschbaum-Busch bibliography of Barth's published works contains 553 entries. While one notes that the number of separately published "open letters," sermons, and magazine articles form the bulk of this material, simply to make a similar listing would only be to present the reader with another problem, that of selection. Thus we shall present our own bibliography as we have described above, yet in doing so refer the reader to the Kirschbaum-Busch work.[1]

The Bibliography has been divided into the following sections: I. Bibliographies. II. Works by Barth. III. Works concerning Barth. IV. Anselm and his Medieval Setting. V. The Political-Economic-Social and Cultural-Ideational Context of Barth's Development.

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